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Abstract
Despite the trend in recent medieval historiography which has accepted the
presence of paid warriors as no longer an aberration, the role o f the mercenary within
and outside twelfth-century society has still escaped in-depth analysis. Such an
approach, however, has the dual merit o f building an understanding of the mercenary
phenomenon itself and of highlighting the often overlooked social and cultural relations,
structures, and breakdowns that produce men willing to fight for profit. The period
1187-1218 provides one o f the earliest, richest backgrounds against which to examine
the mercenary. The accelerating return o f a money economy, hardening of feudal
structures, developing of a chivalric ethos, and opening (and closing) vistas of urban life
all played a role in who constituted a mercenary or who fought in an acceptable manner
for pay. Moreover, conditions at the start and finish of this long twelfth century had
changed dramatically, creating markedly different groups of marginalized combatants.
After a narrative of the century’s paid military activity, the analysis examines the
conditions that dictated whether a salaried warrior somehow qualified to
contemporaries as contemptible. A survey o f the Latin vocabulary shows not only a
wide variety of combatants, but also a lack o f consistent disparagement in the terms
themselves (save for routiers and Braban^ons). A look at the business side o f warfare
further reveals an array of men engaged in profitable violence: from magnates seeking
viii
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new realms to low-born infantrymen earning the wages of skilled laborers. With money
so prevalent in military affairs, the real question o f mercenary status lies in the nature o f
an individual’s identification with a group. In the 1100s such identification could prove
simultaneously regional, familial, national, and religious. The real crime of many low
born mercenaries was in shedding these associations. In the end, this outsider status
was confirmed in contemporary eyes by the many hired soldiers kept by the Cathar
heretics o f the early 1200s. The condemnation o f paid warriors derived ultimately from
their position as intruders and not solely from a rejection o f profit-making within
wartime.

IX
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I
Introduction
In his recent History o f Warfare John Keegan challenged historians, before they
simply dove into the narrative o f battle and politics, to ponder the question of why men
will kill one another.1 It is a daunting task and one largely untouched, Keegan admitted,
precisely because so much more must come into play. It requires the historian to
become part psychologist and part sociologist, to go within “the secret places of the
human heart, places where self dissolves rational purpose,”2 and to go outside into the
wider questions of societal relations. It is a complex business, then, just to examine the
normal soldier, let alone the exceptional cases like mercenaries. No honest analysis of
mercenaries can avoid these questions, and in this manner, mercenaries provide a unique
lens through which to view the people and culture of the 1100s.
Warfare is fundamentally a social question. Only complex societies have the
means to organize their resources and tools to accomplish particular violent goals.

‘Keegan, A History o f Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 79:
“Perhaps military historians would be better historians if they did take time to reflect on
what it is that disposes men to kill each other.”
2Ibid., 3.
1
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Those groups characterized by unceasing cycles of raid and counter-raid, debilitating
episodes of spontaneous violence that show little o f strategic or tactical forethought—
these groups have yet to pass beyond the “military horizon.” Anthropologists of war
have classified their violence as primitive warfare. For many years the only voice on this
subject, H.H. Turney-High made the link clear between social organization and the way
wars have been fought.3 Among the hallmarks of civilizations that had come above the
military horizon, he especially noted those that practiced a specialization of tasks both
on the battlefield and back in the heartlands o f production. A second important trait
derives from this first condition, namely, the ability of a civilization to field forces that
can practice and hold formations.4 Given the state of scholarship on medieval warfare
when Tumey-High wrote, he can be forgiven for erroneously concluding that Europe
had slid back below the military horizon after the fall o f Rome and that it stayed below
well past the twelfth century. The fact is, however, that western Christendom in the
1100s did see a growing specialization among the armies and recognized the value of
disciplined formations.
The philosopher Michael Gelven has taken this paradigm even further: “War
must be distinguished from other forms of conflict in that it is fought because o f the
communal sense o f being-with-others and not merely fought by groups.”5 Reduced to

3Harry Holbert Tumey-High, Primitive Warfare (Columbia: University o f South
Carolina Press, 1949), 23, 26.
*Ibid., 53, 67.
5Michael Gelven, War and Existence (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1994), 48.
2
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its most basic elements, Gelven’s definition sees war as an existential conflict between
the we and the they. This “we-they principle” explains why people are willing to war,
even those who profess to hate it. A bitter pill to swallow, perhaps, but Gelven’s point
is hard to avoid: “we do not fight primarily to achieve justice or to right a wrong but to
achieve meaning.”6 This position derives from the understanding that being with others
is one o f the fundamental ways in which we exist. Everyday, we deal with the “presence
and meaningfiilness” of other people. Everyday, we decide anew whether they are a
part o f our own meaningfulness or constitute an existential other. If they fall into the
latter category, the next immediate question centers on whether and how they threaten
our being.7 Between many such groups not only does some tension exist, but it is
actually a beneficial strain since it serves to sharpen the sense of identity among the
many individual members of each group. Only when this tension grows beyond a
tolerable level and cannot be otherwise ameliorated do the conditions exist that allow
either group to engage in organized violence *
Even though mercenaries are one o f the few martial aspects to escape Gelven’s
scrutiny, he may have nonetheless provided a key to understanding them. Where is the

61bid., 13, 62.
1lbid., 133-5. On this point, see also Stanislaw Andreski, M ilitary Organization
and Society, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1968), 9: “When thinking
about sources o f pugnacity we must always remember that very seldom do men fight for
the sake of fighting; usually they fight for something: be it food or women or
precedence. . . .”
*Again, see Andreski in conjunction with Gelven, p. 13: “No culture is possible
without normative codes, and these cannot be upheld unless deviations from them are
condemned.”
3
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fundamental group identification o f the mercenary? This is the most pressing question,
reflected in the constant refrain that mercenaries only fight for pay. In this charge lies an
instinctive recognition that the ultimate identity o f the hired soldier is likely in flux. Thus
other questions crowd in after this first one. In the twelfth century could mercenaries
“belong” to the cause o f their employer? Were they still members o f whatever ranks of
society had originally harbored them? Might we see them as traitors not just to a group,
be it a nationality, social group, or Christianity, but also to themselves? Then again, to
what extent might the roving bands o f the century’s latter half form a new group? The
“we-they principle” provides a means to look at the motivations of anyone willing to
risk their existence in such a violent market. The opportunities for social mobility are
obvious enough,9 but the question o f identity will provide still other explanations. The
hired soldiers o f the 1100s demonstrated more than an aptitude for rapine, destruction
and faithlessness. They operated at times with a valor recognized by their secular and
ecclesiastical contemporaries; throughout the century they fought with methods both at
harmony and in opposition to those of the martial elite; at times they gave way to
looting while at others they showed remarkable restraint and discipline.10 A look, then,

9Bronislaw Geremek, “The Marginal Man” in The Medieval World, ed. Jacques
Le Goff, and trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (London: Collins and Brown, 1990). 358:
“Marginality in the late Middle Ages was greatly accelerated by wars, which created
possibilities o f existence outside the normal life experience of peasants and artisans, first
in regularly commanded companies and then in autonomous bands.” Geremek also
noted the paradox that war also produces a certain social stability in that marginalized
groups, at least for a time, have a place again within society, admittedly as cannon
fodder.
10J.F. Verbruggen, The Art o f Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle
Ages, 2nd edition, trans. Col. Sumner Willard and Mrs. R.W. Southern (Woodbridge:
4
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is in order at the mercenaries o f the twelfth century, both those who merit the label and
those who have mistakenly had to wear it.
The first and last problem that confronts any study of mercenaries is that of
defining the subject itself The proposed definitions vary greatly, being often distracted
by a particular attribute of the hired warrior. On one point alone do all agree: that the
mercenary fights in return for monetary wages. If this one aspect provides the sole
commonality across national, disciplinary, and temporal divides, then surely something
else is at work to cause a continued effort to complete the definition. There is, but the
very evolution of the term has clouded its underlying meaning. Thus it becomes
worthwhile first to examine contemporary understandings of the concept before asking
the twelfth century to provide answers to a question of the twentieth century.
Even if he did not invent the term, Niccolo Machiavelli nonetheless provided the
context in which it has been understood for hundreds of years. Still smarting from the
abrupt end of his political career, Machiavelli spent the early part of 1513 looking for
the reason behind the dimming o f his own and Italy’s future. By the end of that year,
and certainly by the spring o f the next, the majority of The Prince was complete, and
Machiavelli had found his answer." His thorough denunciation of the condottieri and
the mercenary bands that they led has informed not just impressions of the Renaissance,

Boydell and Brewer, 1997), dealt with some of these issues in passing, but never headon. Matthew Strickland, War and Chivalry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), in fact did deal admirably with these topics, but his purpose was to highlight
mercenary activity to the opposite effect: to illuminate the position o f the knighthood..
"Frederico Chabod, M achiavelli and the Renaissance, trans. David Moore
(London: Bowes & Bowes, 1958), 33-4, especially n.2.
5
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but also what is meant by the term mercenary. The picture he painted has weathered
well; the treacherous, cowardly, ungodly and ever-ambitious soldier for hire is still the
first image conjured by the label. In peacetime or war, he is a dangerous commodity to
have purchased, a tool with a high propensity to break and thereby damage the
employer. The lesson was universal, according to Machiavelli. The downfall o f the
Roman Empire began with its turn to hired foreigners; recent history showed the
example of the great Companies that had literally held portions of the peninsula hostage;
Venice’s reliance on mercenaries not only explained the brevity of her ascendancy, it
testified how great a republic she was for nearly overcoming such a crippling obstacle.12
However skewed Machiavelli’s interpretation may be of the mercenary’s role in
historical developments, his critique of the hired warrior was devastating.
He continued the attack in his Art o f War, which he actually published before
The Prince and which was the first o f his works translated into English. Less strident, it
rounded out the indictment of the rented soldier no less effectively in the context of a
learned discussion between Cosimo Rucellai and Fabrizio Colonna. As Cosimo
questions Fabrizio incisively on military affairs, the latter responds in the most
commonsensical fashion that logically there is simply no good to be found in the
mercenary. Again the theme appeared that mercenaries seek the prolongation o f wars
so as to continue earning a living.13

12Niccolo Machiavelli. Machiavelli: The C hief Works and O thers, ed. and trans.
Allan Gilbert (Durham: Duke University Press, 1965), vol. I, 46-54.
nIbid., II: 563, 573-4. “Because he will never be reckoned a good man who
carries on an occupation in which, if he is to endeavor at all times to get income from it,
6
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These, then, are the attributes of the “whores o f war,” the signs by which they
can be identified even when they deny their status as such: a willingness to kill for no
better reason than money, a propensity for treachery when there are multiple bidders for
their services, an active effort to avoid actual combat even while prolonging the state of
armed confrontation, and a consuming effort to acquire all the material wealth they can
by whatever means which the flux of war allows. For Machiavelli, these traits could be
present in any warrior at any time and was the most compelling reason he saw for the
creation o f native militias. The characteristics still come to mind because the word is
often used to question the legitimacy of any military effort. Americans receive in their
earliest history classes the lesson that the British importation o f Hessians proves who
had the just cause during the American Revolution.14 The creation of national armies in
the wake of the French Revolution further made the role o f the mercenary suspect, a
contamination o f those causes for which it was legitimate to kill 15 The Kaiser added to
the opening rounds o f World War I his comment that the British Expeditionary Force

he must be rapacious, fraudulent, violent, and must have many qualities which of
necessity make him not good. . . .” 574.
14Anthony Mockler, The New Mercenaries (New York: Paragon House
Publishers, 1987), 5-6: “Over 200 years have passed since the War of Independence and
American folk-memories and folk-prejudices against the status of the mercenary soldier
might be thought to have disappeared. But it seems that on the contrary they have not
been forgotten.” Mockler found, to his own surprise, that Americans still tend to
eschew mercenary service (in comparison to French or British numbers), even after the
end of the Vietnam War produced a large number o f potential recruits, and despite
subculture efforts to glamorize the life. “The prejudice in America against mercenary
soldiering is, like all prejudices rooted in history, overwhelmingly strong.”
l5Ibid., 7: “. . . for the mercenary soldier the cry o f patriotism is the knell of
doom.”
7
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was an “army o f mercenaries”, a charge which the poet A.E. Housman felt compelled to
answer.16
Houseman’s poem is but one o f many apologies for mercenaries. Like most, he
immediately admits the role o f money and then buries it under issues of far more weight.
In this case, the salvation o f the democratic world. It goes almost without saying that
approaches to the presence o f mercenaries depends entirely on perspective; the brigand
of one side is the hero of another. Thus the insider opinion is all the more telling. The
search for euphemisms shows even the contemporary mercenary’s recognition of the
need to better the image. One modern-day mercenary noted in a 1964 interview that
“we don’t much care for the word ‘mercenaries’ ourselves.” Instead, he was busy
organizing church services for the “volunteers.”17 This identification with a particular
cause is the strongest defense o f many labeled mercenaries and, as I shall argue, one that
legitimately removes many soldiers from the pack of rented warriors. Less effective to
the outsider observer but used quite often nonetheless is the mantle o f the adventurer.

16“These, in the days when heaven was falling.
The hour when earth’s foundatins fled,
Followed their mercenary calling
And took their wages and are dead.
Their shoulders held the sky suspended;
They stood, and earth’s foundations stay;
What God abandoned, these defended,
And saved the sum o f things for pay .”
A.E. Housman, “Epitaph on an Army o f Mercenaries,” in Collected Poems (New York:
Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1965): 144.
17Mockler, vii.
8
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This particular guise dresses up the mercenary as a misunderstood spirit, one whose
fulfillment lies outside the comfortable zones o f civilized society. This apology has
adopted the ambiguous label o f “soldier of fortune" as its especial favorite, once again
admitting the role o f money but supposedly emphasizing the dominant role o f facing-off
with chance itself18 The argument beguiles, but it does not convince. In fact, in
Mockler's view, it only confirms the disturbing essence of the mercenary: “a devotion to
war for its own sake.”19 The conclusion thus continues to reappear that, whether in the
romance of Beau Geste or the glossy pages of Soldier o f Fortune magazine, the
mercenary as a concept cannot escape its tarnished image.
What is not needed, then, in either popular publications or scholarly works is a
defense or whitewash of the term. It has been too strongly pejorative for too long to
admit any facile change. Moreover, the phenomenon of “mercenarism" has attended
human conflict even before the classical Greeks found it so profitable. David found
himself fighting for the Philistines in the years before becoming Israel’s second king and
the Bible’s greatest military leader. So, rather than removing the word from its popular
understanding and trying to hem it in with academic restrictions, historians need to leave
the word its vitality and utility. The advantages of this approach actually increase the
further away one gets in either direction from Machiavelli. Particularly in this century,
the few scholars to train a critical eye on historical cases of mercenaries and near

I8Jay Mallin and Robert K. Brown, Merc: American Soldiers o f Fortune (New
York: Macmillan Publishing, 1979), 2. “All mercenaries are soldiers o f fortune, but not
all soldiers of fortune are mercenaries.”
19Mockler, 17.
9
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mercenaries have tried to bend the word to fit their own categories. The situation
worsens when the focus of such studies antedates the examples o f mercenary behavior
that haunted Machiavelli. The hired soldiery of the Hundred Years War and the
Companies that came out of that conflict’s debris provided the examples for
Machiavelli’s paradigm. In the preceding centuries, however, parallel examples are
harder to find, and those who did fight for pay quite often do not merit being called
mercenaries.
The twelfth century is especially pivotal on this point for two intersecting
reasons. The first centers on the fact that a society that produced and found a place for
salaried fighters changed both whom it produced as surplus warriors and how it utilized
them. The second is historiographical. Historians have changed greatly their own
approach to the twelfth century, but they have not fully dealt with the place of
mercenaries in the new picture being developed of society in the 1100s. Generally,
mercenaries no longer appear as aberrations in a dominant feudal scheme, but a new
problem has arisen. With a much more flexible lattice of military and social connections
now informing perceptions o f the twelfth century, the question of how to use the term
mercenary, and to whom to apply it, has become more acute.
Still casting a long shadow from the late 1800s, Sir Charles Oman provides a
fascinating example of how the mercenaries in the Middle Ages have defied easy
understanding. His History o f the Art o f War in the Middle Ages first appeared in 1885
just a year after it won the Lothian Prize at Oxford for an undergraduate essay. In its
first incarnation, Oman’s study had this to say of mercenaries between the Norman
10
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Conquest and the onset o f the Hundred Years War: “A stranger to all the nobler
incentives to valor, an enemy to his God and his neighbor, the most deservedly hated
man in Europe, he was yet the instrument which icings, even those of the better sort,
were obliged to seek out and cherish.”20 Oman expanded this essay with more use of
primary evidence into a two-volume study which appeared first in 1898 and then in its
final form in 1923 Covering the period from 378-1278, the first volume toned down
both the denunciation of mercenaries and the former emphasis on their supposedly antifeudal role. With feudal hosts typically “untrained, undisciplined, disorderly, and
sometimes disloyal,” monarchs naturally turned to the readily available mercenaries of
the 1100s. They, at least, were “professional soldiers, who served with fidelity as long
as they were regularly paid.” At the same time, their very value as troops who did not
abandon the campaign at the end of a forty-day term of service still brought them under
Oman’s criticism; they remained the suspect kind of warriors who want war to continue
indefinitely.21 In addition, Oman only saw them as distinct from the feudal levies; he
saw their use as occurring only in cases where it would be impractical to summon the
feudal host. The idea of the two groups operating together is absent from his study.

“ Charles W Oman, The Art o f War in the Middle Ages, rev. and ed. John
Beeler (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953), 65.
21Sir Charles Oman, A History o f the Art o f War in the Middle Ages, vol. I
(Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1991), 368-9 Further problems than just interpretation
show up in these pages. Oman has Henry II’s Brabangons actually fighting in England
against Robert of Leicester’s Flemings, something which might have happened but is
difficult to prove. On 370, he goes on to describe the mercenaries o f Henry II and his
sons as cavalry forces, a position hardly supported by the sources and effectively
demolished by Boussard (see below).
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The year before Oman’s final edition, Hans Delbriick published the third volume
o f History o f the Art o f War within the Framework o f Political H istory22 This
particular volume focused on the medieval period and has long enjoyed a prominent
place in the footnotes of scholars. Partly because of its sheer size, Delbriick’s study
gave more attention to mercenaries before 1200 than any previous general survey.
Despite Oman’s influence, especially on English developments, Delbriick abandoned a
critical stance of any sort on mercenaries and just reported their presence as he found
them in the chronicles. At the same time, he shied away from any attempt to define
them. Their preponderance led him to see them as vital parts o f medieval society’s
military organization, but neither could he shake the idea that they were an aberration
amid a feudal world. England especially defied simple categorization, and eventually led
to the conclusion that “the mixture o f mercenaries and knights in the English military
organization soon completely overshadowed the feudal concept.” It became in time a
“mercenary system,” a description unfortunately open to confusion in the absence of
definitions. In another perplexing passage, he stated that “the nucleus of the
warriorhood, the knightly class, was socially based on and supported by the granting of
land, while the active army was recruited and maintained with money.”23 In any number
o f passages, Delbriick noted the intermingling and cooperation o f quite different

“ Hans Delbriick, M edieval Warfare, vol III of History o f the Art o f War, trans.
Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). Originally
published as Geschichte der Kriegsknnst im Rahmen der Politischen Geschichte in
1924.
231bid., 172, 313, 169
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elements among medieval military hosts, but he still was not wholly reconciled to a
cohabitation of feudalism and mercenary employment. Part of this stemmed from the
inclination to view the twelfth century in light of developments to come. The most
pertinent example, and one that crops up repeatedly after Delbriick, is the label of
“mercenary captain” that William o f Ypres must often carry. Delbriick explicitly stated
what often implicitly lies in this designation by calling William a precursor of the later
condottieri. He says the same o f Mercadier, Richard the Lionheart’s most prominent
mercenary,24 but there are considerable differences between the different milieus that
produced and harbored these men. The latter example is far more related to condottieri
than the former.
The general trend of continental research has been to see in medieval mercenary
forces the kernels of modem, standing armies. Delbriick wrapped up his third volume
with the opinion that standing armies were necessary antidotes to marauding bands of
routiers25 The most thorough study in the nineteenth century of mercenaries had
already anticipated this conclusion and actually went beyond it. In two articles from
1841 and 1842, H. Geraud claimed that the mercenaries of the twelfth and early
thirteenth centuries were a vital step away from ad hoc military levies to the professional
corps that mark modem nation-states. He took up the narrative of their exploits and
misdeeds almost right at mid-century, seeing their quick irruption in western Europe as
partly due to the remnants o f the Second Crusade straggling back from Outremer, partly

uIbid., 316.
25Ibid., 508.
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to the intestinal conflicts of Christendom, especially in Beam and across Lorraine,
Brabant and Flanders. Geraud noted the destructive aptitudes of these men, avides de
pillage, but without condemnatory rhetoric. Moreover, their depredations against the
church deserved a certain understanding since ecclesiastics had declared a “war of
extermination” against them. Working primarily from Geoffrey de Vigeois and a bit
from Roger of Howden, Geraud traced in his first article the violence that wracked
primarily the Angevin dominions during Henry II’s reign. As Henry II’s sons continued
to lose when they crossed their father, the pool of potential employers shrank until by
the mid-1180s, the vagabond mercenary bands themselves began to wither away under
the dual pressure of unemployment and armed suppression. Those who proved
successful, however, were those who passed under the command o f successful captains
like Mercadier for Richard Lionheart or Cadoc for Philip Augustus. This transformation
would take place in the last years of Henry U’s reign, but especially during the conflicts
of Richard and John with Philip of France.26 The bulk o f Geraud’s second article
centered on the career o f Mercadier, but also noted other prominent captains o f hired
soldiery such as the Algals brothers, Cadoc, Louvart and Fawkes de Breaute (Falcaise in
the French). Cadoc disappeared from the records after participating in the 1213 raids
and counter-attacks around Dam. With his apparent demise, Geraud claimed the French
monarchs dropped the use of mercenaries. Those who continued to employ mercenaries
were, unsurprisingly, the English monarchs and Simon de Montfort in the Midi, where

26The very period of struggle that Oman would dismiss over forty years later as
“weary and uninteresting.” 370.
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they made possible his plans to go beyond the scope of the crusade. Eventually, many
o f these in the south would be demobilized after 1229, but Geraud concluded with a
caution that this was not the end o f the routiers. already these adventurers had
transformed into soldiers (with all that word’s connotations of discipline and regular
practice, as opposed to warriors, for instance). Their value and effectiveness would
play, even centuries later, into Charles VII’s creation of a permanent army.27
Geraud’s two articles left few stones unturned in the field o f Plantagenet/
Capetian struggles, with the exception of the early English Exchequer records, the Pipe
Rolls. He also passed over, except in brief asides, the use of mercenaries, especially
Brabanpons, by Frederick Barbarossa in Italy. A century passed before Jacques
Boussard and Herbert Grundmann filled these lacunae. Grundmann’s contribution still
provides the basic road map through the primary sources for all continental appearances
of mercenaries, including finally the use o f such troops by Barbarossa and those o f his
magnates who went to Italy with him. He has been faulted by some for not including
mercenary activity in England (either in Stephen’s or John’s reigns), but this is hardly a
just criticism since he clearly was limiting himself to occurrences o f routiers and

27H. Geraud, “Les Routiers au Douzieme Siecle,” in Bihliotheque de t'Ecole des
Charles 3 (1841-2): 125-147; and “Mercadier.Les Routiers au Treizieme Siecle” in
Bibliotheque de I'Ecole des Charles 3 (1841-2): 417-443. M.P. Henrard, “Les
Mercenaires dits Brabansons, au Moyen Age,” in Annales de I'Academie dArcheologie
de Belgique XXII, 2nd series (1866): 416-35, followed up on some o f Geraud’s tentative
conclusions, but unfortunately weakened his credibility by the absence o f some critical
information. The most glaring omission was the death of Mercadier, already covered in
Geraud’s articles, but of whom Henrard could only note a disappearance after Richard
the Lionheart’s death. Nor did it help to end on a note o f nationalist pride: “Vaillance
inutile, mais qui prouvait qu’apres douze siecles le courage des Beiges, exaltes par
Cesar, n’avait pas degenere.”
15
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Brabangons, from which groups England was typically free except the most critical
moments of Henry U’s and John’s reigns28
The role of the English monarchs as the century’s major employers o f surplus
soldiers finally came under a balanced, critical eye in 1947. Jacques Boussard used the
evidence of the Pipe Rolls to sort out a number of tangles left by the chroniclers and at
least one historian.29 He overturned Oman’s assertion that the twelfth century
mercenaries traveled and fought on horseback as much as they did on foot. Not only is
there not enough evidence among the chroniclers to verify Oman’s thesis, but Boussard
found instances among the Pipe Rolls where infantry-style equipment (bucklers and
pikes) was being purchased for the salaried troops. He noted the early role o f scutage
among the Anglo-Norman kings to finance the fielding of an army. These early
instances of mercenary activity were to be overshadowed by the wars o f Stephen’s reign
between the king and his rival, the Empress Matilda. Unfortunately, Boussard followed
Geraud’s footsteps and skimmed across this period in his haste to get to the wars of
Henry II, an understandable haste since Stephen’s reign left no Pipe Roll evidence. This
led him like many others only to note Henry II’s expulsion o f Stephen’s mercenaries and
their captain William of Ypres. Further into Henry’s reign, however, Boussard was able
to use the Pipe Rolls to good effect, calculating the probable largest contingent of hired

“ Herbert Grundmann. “Rotten und Brabanzonen. Soldner-Heere im 12.
Jahrhundert,” in Deutsches-Archiv fu r Geschichte des M ittelalters V (1941-42): 419492.
“ J. Boussard, “Les mercenaires au XI Ie siecle: Henri U Plantagenet et les
origines de 1’armee de metier” in Bibliotheque de I'Ecole des Chartes CVI (1947): 189224.
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soldiers available to Henry II or his sons. That number, based on equipment purchased
and ships used to transport the troops, was 6,000, well down from the fanciful 20,000
of the Gesta Henrici Primi or the 10,500 that Geoffrey de Vigeois claimed were killed
at Berry30
Boussard’s article also demonstrated the deepening understanding that historians
were acquiring of how medieval society approached warfare. Under the influence of the
military orthodoxy o f their day, which sought a decisive battle, Oman and others found
the medieval world defective in both tactics and especially strategy. They found the
seemingly endless cycle o f raids, counter-raids, and the occasional meeting of two
armies (which more often resulted in a truce than a battle) altogether frustrating.
Boussard avoided this trap and instead noted that the power and reputation that Henry
II's mercenaries provided him often enabled him to attain his goals without risking what
he already had on the field of battle.31 Additionally, the vast bulk of twelfth century
warfare lay in the drudgery o f besieging a castle, more often by starving the garrison
into submission than by violent assault. For this task, soldiers on a salary were infinitely

“ Boussard’s estimate is all the more interesting for being so close to revised
estimates of how many knights could be produced by England’s feudal levy. See John
Beeler, “The Composition o f Anglo-Norman Armies” in Speculum XL (July 1965), 403,
n. 22, for a discussion on estimates ranging from 5,000 to 7,000 knights.
ilIbid., 194. The premier statement of the medieval reluctance to risk a pitched
battle would appear nine years later: R..C. Smail, Crusading Warfare (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1956). Smail’s thesis remains vital to understanding
medieval strategy, but as it was particularly built upon the circumstance of the crusader
states, historians should import it into western Christendom with some care. Smail
himself kept to a more “Omanesque” view of medieval strategy in his “Art of War” in
Medieval England, ed. A.L. Poole (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958): 128-167.
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preferable to enfeoffed vassals with fickle loyalties and a fine sense of when their feudal
obligations were fulfilled.32 All in all, Boussard’s approach is quite balanced. His
subjects are soldats de profession et brigands a I 'occasion, not enemies of God and
society, nor are they anachronistic conceptions of what constitutes the good soldier.
In English and American historiography another change was underway. The
long-standing presupposition that the use of money was antithetical to feudalism started
to come under attack. In 1954 J O. Prestwich presented a paper that showed the close
link between the military needs of the Anglo-Norman kings and the financial and
administrative precocity o f their government.33 From William the Conqueror’s initial
investment in an invading army up through the early part of Stephen’s reign, the
financial resources o f the Anglo-Norman kings formed the basis of their military
success. The need to maintain that success in turn led to the creation of machinery to
regulate and maximize the royal income. This symbiosis linked many different
components of society at home with others abroad: “the expenditure on the wages of
troops, the construction and repair of castles, the pensions to allies, the bribes which
eased the course o f campaigns and diplomacy, and the upkeep of the bureaucracy
itself.”34 William Rufus continued the military spending o f his father to such an extent

32Boussard, 194,221.
33J.O Prestwich, “War and Finance in the Anglo-Norman State” in Transactions
o f the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., vol. IV (London: Butler and Tanner, 1954): 1943 Since reprinted in Anglo-Norman Warfare, ed. Matthew Strickland (Rochester:
Boydell and Brewer, 1992).
u Ibid., 76
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that Louis VII’s biographer, Suger, called him mercator. And although Henry I may
have not been quite the “merchant” his brother was, he nonetheless kept his own
retinues of hired warriors. Even the setbacks of Stephen’s reign provide an oblique
proof of the financial underpinning o f the Anglo-Norman military institution. Prestwich
saw Stephen’s first four strong years as those in which he put his uncle’s treasury to too
much use. Its exhaustion led to the arrest of Roger o f Salisbury and his faction, a quick
financial shot in the arm, but a long-term debilitating blow as it weakened Stephen’s
later ability to gather revenues. On the question of mercenaries, Prestwich clearly saw
them present in all four reigns after 1066, and while he did not stoop to denigrating
them, he continued to see them as separate from “feudal” levies35
One particular institution brought money and feudalism closer together than
many historians have been comfortable with. The money-fief, orfief-rente, was the
subject of Bryce Lyon’s 1957 study which came down firmly on that side of the fence
which claimed it was a feudal arrangement first, a monetary agreement second. Lyon
dispensed from the start with any perception of hard currency as antagonistic to feudal
forms. Anything might qualify to be utilized as a fief.36 The primary characteristic of the
money-fief was not the income, but the conditions imposed of homage and fealty,

3SSee especially his comments on the penance o f 1070 which imposed varying
penalties on the army of conquest, based on the nature of the ties that linked the fighters
to Duke William, 65.
36Bryce D. Lyon. From F ief to Indenture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1957), 25: “If there had never been a money economy the fief-rente in kind would no
doubt have developed just as did other varieties of fiefs not of land. Circumstances such
as a lack of land or a matter o f convenience would have eventually compelled the feudal
lord to enfeoff all sorts of objects and incomes in order to acquire the vassals needed.”
19

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

military service (typically by knights), and other standard feudal obligations. Working
onward from this position, Lyon distinguished between feudal and non-feudal payments.
The money-fief, of course, was feudal; pensions, rents, and annuities were likely
candidates for non-feudal, particularly if these grants lacked any o f the customary feudal
obligations. Mercenary wages were unequivocally non-feudal. They did not have that
extra bond that marked the money-fief, that marked more than a cash nexus between
two parties. Money-fiefs, after all, were heritable, could be assumed in wardship, and
had an investiture ceremony similar to that for granting traditional fiefs of land.37 The
most telling evidence lay in the fact that in the hey-day of their use, money-fiefs did not
grant an amount even equal to the standard rates of pay in the field. Hardly any
conclusion was left but that “its chief function was to set up a feudal obligation on the
part of the vassal .”38 The money-fief brought those so enfeoffed into the feudal web,
created the necessary leverage to compel the vassal to join a campaign. Once there, his
wages (or lack thereof) were a separate matter.39 The twelfth century’s most famous
money-fief, that one o f 300 marks of silver from the English king to the count of

37Against these attributes it is hard to accept the backlash o f arguments against
Lyon’s study. John Beeler, Warfare in England: 1066-1189 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1966), 305, 307, described money-fiefs as “pseudo-feudal devices;” and argued
that “despite the feudal formulae, it is difficult to regard the money-fief as anything
other than a retainer.” C. Warren Hollister, The M ilitary Organization o f Norman
England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 189-90, wrote that “the feudal terminology
of the fiefs-rentes and the vassalic overtones...cannot disguise the crucial fact that
service was being rendered for money rather than for land.”
38Lyon, 237.
i9fbid„ 243.
20

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Flanders for the service o f 1,000 knights, brings up a question, however, that Lyon did
not address. While the count of Flanders may not deserve to be called a mercenary for
accepting this grant from the English king, what of his subjects whose bodies he
hazarded thus940
In all this time only one monograph has appeared to deal specifically with the
topic of twelfth century mercenaries. John Schlight’s Monarchs and Mercenaries
appeared in 1968 A slight volume and enjoyably written, it suffered in its publication
from the absence of much o f its critical apparatus. Schlight covered the employment of
mercenaries by the Anglo-Norman kings on through Henry II’s reign. Some mention
went to Richard’s early military apprenticeship and the presence of mercenaries that
early in his career, but Richard’s later reliance on hired troops, and especially John’s
need for them, were scarcely noted. Nonetheless, Schlight scored some important
points. He recognized the negative judgement implicit in many historians’ treatment of
the subject.41 He also underscored the medieval tendency to speak of undesirable
elements like mercenaries in corporate, stereotypical passages often liberally borrowed
from previous writers. Not least, throughout the book he continued to push for a
reduction of the importance and primacy of the feudal levy, particularly with regard to

^See chapter VII below.
41John Schlight, Monarchs and Mercenaries (Bridgeport: Conference on British
Studies, 1968), 10: “Since the mercenary stands in the historian’s mind for money,
disloyalty, heresy, and anti-social behavior-characteristics antithetical t the tidy package
of feudalism-he has become the skeleton in the family closet and is mentioned usually
with contempt by his and our own contemporaries.” Schlight, however, does not place
himself in context here, and one has to assume that his definition is likewise negative.
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alternative means of raising troops.42 These conclusions are no less remarkably
insightful despite being in the company of a number of overly facile presuppositions.
Where Lyon left open the possibility that retainers might have a feudal tie to their
employer-lord, Schlight shut the door. Although he admitted the mixture of feudal and
monetary links in the households of the English monarchs and their magnates, Schlight
asserted that the monetary element predominated. Thus, he placed himself in that camp
which sees anything other than a landed fief as impure feudalism and therefore suspect.
This led him to categorize some of the knights o f the feudal levy as mercenaries—at
least during those periods when they were fighting for the king beyond their required
time of service. More troubling, he casually dismissed the question o f national origins
as playing a role in defining potential mercenaries.43 Yet only a few pages later, he
notes that “geographic” designations such as Brabangons, Aragonese, and Basques were
common appellations o f mercenary bands. Schlight does attempt to answer the question
left by Lyon on the status of combatants procured through the money-fief. He writes
that they are mercenary in status, but he is unclear whether he is referring to the holder
of the money-fief, the soldiers that the holder provides, or both.44

42On this point, he was in good company. R..C. Smail, “Art of War” 117 . “It is
doubtful whether the military needs of the English kings could ever have been met from
feudal sources alone.” And John Beeler above, n. 18.
43Schlight, 14: “A mercenary was a soldier who fought primarily for money
rather than for land. Since there were no nations in the twelfth century it is rhetorical to
ask whether or not he was a foreigner. He could be English or non-English without
distinction.”
**Ihid., 19.
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Since its publication in 1976, John Keegan's Face o f Battle has influenced how a
number of medieval military historians have approached their topic.45 One o f the best
histories of medieval warfare, however, had already approached the topic a la Keegan
not long after World War II. J.F. Verbruggen’s De Krijgskunst in West-Europa in de
Middeleetiwen unfortunately had to wait over two decades before being translated into
English.46 A phenomenal study, it did not abandon the traditional analysis o f battles, but
put them in a much larger perspective o f what it meant to be a combatant in these
affairs. Working from vernacular sources as much as from the typical monastic
chronicles, Verbruggen asked what it meant to be a warrior in the Middle Ages, what it
meant to experience the life-threatening risk of battle, and what kind of conditions away
from the battlefield produced the peculiarities o f organized medieval conflict. With this
approach, his analysis of battles did not just examine what happened when cavalry met
infantry, but also what it meant when a social elite found itself effectively confronted on
the field o f honor by its inferiors. It was not at Courtrai in 1302 or Bannockburn in
1314 that an Age o f Cavalry came to end; its very existence became questionable in
light of infantry successes in the two previous centuries.47 Finding effective use of

45Stephen Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings (Rochester; Boydell
and Brewer, 1994), 5, for such an acknowledgment. Also Randall Rogers, Latin Siege
Warfare in the Twelfth Century (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1992), 5
^Even then, scholars were frustrated by the publisher’s obvious decision in the
1977 edition to leave out much of the critical apparatus of the original. This fortunately
has just been rectified in a second edition. See n. 10 above.
47Verbruggen effectively killed the concept of an infantry revival at the start of
the fourteenth century, but the myth is taking its time dying. See Kelly DeVries’s
introductory remarks in Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century
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cavalry and infantry, Verbruggen concluded in sharp contrast to Oman that the Middle
Ages did know strategy and tactics. Alongside all this armchair analysis, Verbruggen
also made fruitful inquiries into the effect o f fear on the conduct of battle, especially that
species o f terror which the lower strata o f society had to conquer in order to withstand
the crash o f the stereotypical knightly charge. The conditions of urban life came under a
brief scrutiny to highlight the conditioning of the medieval infantryman in preparation
for the trauma o f battle. Not least, Verbruggen’s treatment of mercenaries, large
portions o f which were culled from the first English edition, built upon the work of
Grundmann. Besides enlarging the narrative coverage, Verbruggen also did much to
place them in the larger context of medieval society. He touched on questions of origin,
motivation, organization, and conduct by mercenaries, especially the footloose bands of
the latter twelfth century. His is one o f the few studies to put the mercenaries of
Stephen’s reign in context of the later rise o f mercenary companies. Remarkably
detailed for a survey, Verbruggen left only the fields of Henry I’s and John’s reigns
untilled.48
The former would finally receive detailed treatment from Maijorie Chibnall
when she looked at the presence o f mercenaries in the military household of Henry I.
More than that, her study also demonstrated not just how muddled the lines were

(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1996), where Devries portrays Oman as still holding the
orthodox position in medieval military historiography.
^Verbruggen also left untouched the issue of defining mercenaries. It is perhaps
an unfair criticism to make of a survey o f such scope, particularly when Verbruggen
does not descend into the trenchwork o f trying to split mercenaries apart from quasifeudal retainers, engineers in the siege train, or other permutations.
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becoming between “feudal” and “mercenary” components, but how this blurring was
becoming more acceptable as an interpretative stance.49 She accepted as a common
place the crucial role of currency in twelfth century governance. Relying upon St.
Anselm’s own paradigm, Chibnall noted the three most common bases of service in the
Anglo-Norman realm: those who must do so out o f duty because they already hold land
are thereby a part of the established order, some for a salary, and others to regain lost or
forfeited possessions. In this confusion of motives, Chibnall attempted neither to define
the mercenary label nor to categorize any one person as such. Implicitly, she meant
nothing negative by the term. She went on to examine some of the members o f the
fam ilia regis whose names appear enough to allow some conclusions about their status
and motivations. The overarching trait of the military household’s members was their
heterogeneity. Some came from the petty nobility of England and Normandy and, from
the lack of property grants and such from them, may have been younger sons (jwvenes)
trying to establish themselves. Given Henry I’s success outside the marital bond, more
than one of his illegitimate sons not surprisingly showed up in the fam ilia. The lower
ranks of society also took advantage of the opportunities inherent in serving the king at

49Maijorie Chibnall, “Mercenaries and the Familia Regis Under Henry I,” in
History XLII (February 1977): 15-23. Reprinted in Anglo-Norman Warfare, ed.
Matthew Strickland (Rochester: Boydell and Brewer, 1992): 84-92. All further
references will be to the Anglo-Norman Warfare volume. Chibnall also noted both the
important role of the bacheliers or juvenes as a ready pool of available warriors for the
fam ilia regis and Georges Duby’s study of this group: “Au XHe siecle: les ‘jeunes’
dans la societe aristocratique dans la France du nord-ouest,” in Armales. Economie,
societe, civilisation V (Sept./Oct. 1964); trans. Cynthia Postan as “Youth in
Aristocratic Society” in The Chivalrous Society (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1977): 112-122.
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such close quarters. Nicknames indicate the presence of some of these individuals; the
troublesome apellations miles or serviens do likewise. The familia regis did not
discriminate. From heavily armed cavalry to less well-equipped soldiers to archers, the
dominant criterion was a demonstrable loyalty to Henry 150 Save for the presence of
pay, one has to wonder whether any among Chibnall’s named examples actually qualify
as mercenaries. Only broad designations seem to wear the label with little trouble: the
Bretons whom Henry knew from his youth or the foot-archers and auxiliaries with
which he augmented his armies before Tinchebrai in 1106 or during the Vexin
campaigns of 1116-18.
J O. Prestwich had not abandoned these issues in his own research and thus
echoed many of Chibnall’s conclusions four years later in his own article on the military
household. Again, the allegiance o f familia members appeared as a dominant
characteristic.51 Prestwich was particularly concerned to find in the twelfth century the
germ of Edward I’s military corps d'elite. He found it, particularly in the possibilities
suggested by the Treaty of Dover, the already-mentioned money-fief that Henry I

“ Chibnall, “Mercenaries and the fam ilia regis”, 91: “But whether feudal vassals,
quasi-vassals or stipendiaries, the fully-equipped knights of the household troops, in
common with the more lightly-armed archers and vavassors, took pride in loyal service
to their lord.”
5lJ.O. Prestwich, “The Military Household of the Norman Kings,” in English
Historical Review 96 (January 1981): 1-35. Reprinted in Anglo-Norman Warfare, ed.
Matthew Strickland (Rochester. Boydell and Brewer, 1992). References will be to the
reprint. On the character of the fam ilia regis: ANW, 118: “The Norman fam ilia regis
was remarkably heterogenous in its composition, both socially and geographically, and
remarkably homogenous in its loyalty. It included both great magnates and mercenaries
serving on short-term contracts, and its members were drawn from Brittany, Flanders
and France as well as from Normandy.”
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granted the count o f Flanders. What struck Prestwich most was the ability of the
familia to absorb with apparent ease an extra five hundred to one thousand extra
knights. This flexibility became less surprising, however, as Prestwich added to
Chibnall's twelve definite household members a much larger sampling of fighters.
Where Chibnall confined herself only to those linked explicitly to the familia regis,
Prestwich was willing to include for study any whose close military association with the
king made them probable household members. By then examining the careers of men
like Rualon o f Avranches and Brien fitzCount, Prestwich found the military household
to be entangled in far more than military affairs. These warriors often doubled as
administrators, exchequer officials, and sheriffs. Their abilities lay not only on the
battlefield but also in managing the resources of the king. All this intertwining
complicates, of course, the question o f who in the household may be most accurately
described as a mercenary. Why, for instance, should Prestwich describe such virtual
unknowns as Walter fitz Ansger and Odo Borleng as “professional soldiers with a
strong sense of duty,” but William o f Ypres as “the Flemish mercenary captain”052
The problem lies in how the term continues to be used. Stephen Brown recently
summed up the state o f perceptions on mercenaries in the twelfth century:
The professional warrior in receipt o f a monetary return for his service is now
taken to have been a crucial component o f the forces of the Anglo-Norman and
Angevin monarchs. Despite this the mercenary can scarcely be said to have
achieved respectability in the eyes of the historian.53

52/bid„ 126-7.
“ Stephen D. Brown, “Military Service and Monetary Reward in the Eleventh
and Twelfth Centuries,” in History 74 (1989), 20.
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Historians have continued to see in the twelfth century’s unease over money issues or in
clerical howling over lay depredations o f ecclesiastical houses proof o f the mercenary’s
extra-feudal position. “In truth, any unease felt upon this subject is of our own creation,
rooted in the fact that in current usage the adjective ‘mercenary’ is employed above all
to condemn,” wrote Brown.54 His solution called for historians to strip the word o f its
negative connotations, to isolate the label laboratory-style from its sordid connections.
Stephen Morillo had already adopted this approach in the research which would become
Warfare Under the Anglo-Norman Kings. He likewise noted that “the problem o f
confused terminology extends to the present literature” where not only have Latin and
vernacular tongues proved resistant to consistent, specific definition, but “but modem
English military terms have been used imprecisely or inappropriately. ”ss Morillo tackled
the mercenary conundrum by opting for an explicitly functional definition, one that
could be worn and shed multiple times even in a single campaign with no reference to
the negative baggage o f later centuries.56 Although reminiscent of Schlight’s definition,
Morillo's avoided the pitfall o f insisting on an absolute division between “feudal” and
“mercenary” elements. He clearly confined the increasingly troublesome term “feudal”

^Ibid., 2 1 .

“ Stephen Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, p. 9.
56Ihid., 11: “Finally, it should be noted that the word ‘mercenary’ carries none of
the negative connotations it has gained from later centuries. It is essentially the
equivalent o f ‘professional’, that is one who is paid for his work, and is thus contrasted
with words denoting different bases of service, such as ‘feudal’ or ‘territorial’. And like
‘infantry’ or ‘cavalry’ it is a definition of operational mode, not strict classification: an
enfeoffed soldier, if paid for his service, is a mercenary, not a feudal soldier.”
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to a description only of things related to the fief (typically, but not always a grant of
land). But this distinction did not really separate the mercenary out from feudal society.
Nor should it, since “friendship and money were the twin pillars o f the Anglo-Norman
military system and the army it produced.”57
Perhaps in time, the approach of Brown and Morillo may divest the mercenary
label of its derogatory mantle. The care with which both have had to qualify the term,
however, indicates a long road before such a division becomes accepted. More
importantly, there is a danger of making the word less useful by trying so to clean it up.
Brown noted this potential in the case of the count of Dreux, citing the risk o f making
“mercenary” lose any “analytical meaning” if it is applied to everybody who has served
for a monetary reward.58 The worst scenario might be the intellectual whiplash that
occurred when so talented a military historian as John Keegan, simply in order to stay
true to a theoretical construct, described the modem volunteer army as mercenary.59
Instead o f struggling to redefine the term, it would be more fruitful for historians to
accept its pejorative nature and then use it with more precision themselves. Part o f this

57Ibid., 13. Morillo also stressed the overlap between feudal and mercenary
warrior pools, 50, but his best example is Henry I’s deathbed scene when nearly the last
command of the king was to see that his soldiers received their due wages. “No other
incident better sums up the peculiar combination of personal and professional ties at the
heart of the Anglo-Norman military system,” 92.
58Brown, 25
59Keegan, A History o f Warfare, 227-8. While this particularly broad use o f the
term is unacceptable, the question may remain open with regard to current recruiting
policies o f the National Guard system in the United States. The prevailing attitude most
likely is that one under which people join the Guard not to defend their country but to
finance a personal goal.
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effort would involve identifying what elements formed the negative bases of the
category.
Two traits were as evident in the twelfth century as they were in Machiavelli's
day. Wages remain the sine qua non of the mercenary in any epoch. Even though the
1100s may not have had a term directly translatable as mercenary, those combatants
who most regularly qualify as mercenaries were typically described as miles
stipendiarius or miles solidarius. In both cases, the monetary element was a distinctive
factor. Its presence, however, as Brown noted, is not concrete proof of mercenary
status. The second trait and truest indicator, for any period as well as the twelfth
century, is whether the hired soldier feels an identification with the employer beyond
the salary .60 That so many of the studies noted above have remarked on the loyalty of
the supposed mercenaries of the 1100s should cast some suspicion on whether they
ought to be so described. On the other hand, the twelfth century knew the sort of
faithlessness that Machiavelli would later rail against. Bertran de Bom made the
standard comparison o f mercenaries to whores when he spoke of the treacherous
Basques.61 It is these warriors, marked more by a selfish taste for enrichment than any

“ Brown, 23: “Money was a resource which facilitated service; proof of its
provision does not answer the question of why the service was sought or forthcoming.”
And on the issue of who qualifies as a mercenary, p. 29 . “In each case the key question
to be posed is whether the individual providing military service saw his fate, not just the
provision of his next meal, as bound up with the lord he followed.” Also, Mockler, 167: “However, it is not so much by principles or definition as by practice and definition
that mercenaries are judged and recognized.” Herein lies the applicability of Gelven’s
“we-they principle” to the mercenary question.
61Admittedly a problematic passage. Brown accepts the Occitan word basclos as
“Basques,” a common translation. Bertrand’s latest editors, however, have opted for
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abiding identification with something greater, who can be correctly described as
mercenaries in the twelfth as well as the sixteenth and twentieth centuries.
Mockler has suggested that the real mark of the mercenary is “a devotion to war
for its own sake.”62 If the chroniclers in the period 1095-1216 were to be taken at face
value, this would seem incontestable. The capacity of salaried troops for ravaging both
countryside and town, and all the churches in between, left the clerical historians
horrified. Their lethality during raids toward the unarmed o f society and in the midst of
battle against all they faced likewise seemed to show an abnormal thirst for blood. To
see mercenaries, especially those of the twelfth century, in this light only would miss
both something about the real nature of mercenaries and as importantly, about the
society that produced, expelled, and then employed them.
These issues are the focus of this study, which covers the years 1087-1218.
Chapters two, three, and four present the story of the hired warriors in this long twelfth
century. Chapter two deals with the earlier period when military institutions were less
formal, less compartmentalized, and society reflected this situation. This situation began

"freebooters." The stanza in question runs thus:
No m platz compaigna de basclos
m de las putanas venous;
sacs d ’esterlis e de moutos
m 'es laitz, qand son vengut de fraus;

I don’t like the company of
freebooters or of common whores;
a sack of sterling pennies and coins
is ugly to me when they have come
by fraud;

Bertrand de Bom, The Poems o f Bertrand de B om , eds. William D. Paden, Tilde
Sankovitch and Patricia H. Stablein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986): no.
43,11. 25-28.
“ Mockler, 17.
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to change across the century, however, a development which the next two chapters
portray. At the end o f chapter four, a more complex society and certainly more
sophisticated military picture emerges. Through all this narrative, though, runs the
strong monetary presence once thought antithetical to feudal society. The latter
chapters are an analysis of the society that produced so many warriors, of the military
culture which predominated, and o f the culture which lay hidden underneath that one.
Chapter five, through its study o f the contemporary vocabulary, reiterates the myth of a
knightly preponderance. In conjunction with chapter six, it also points out the doubleedged role of military wages in the twelfth century: typically acceptable, but
occasionally the grounds o f severe condemnation. Chapter seven is concerned with the
relations of salaried combatants with their own governments and societies, as well
foreign polities, other social strata, and ethnic/linguistic affiliations. The last chapter
deals with the ultimate focus o f identity in the Middle Ages, the Church. For
mercenaries, their employers, and their opponents, the place of hired warriors within or
without Christendom was the clearest expression of the we-they principle. By painting
the mercenaries as heretics, the Church was presenting its clearest statement that these
warriors were “bad" because they were interlopers, or worse, traitors. Their profitmotivated violence was a symptom of their real crime.
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II
A Sport for Kings
The limits of any historical inquiry typically tend to the arbitrary, and the present
emphasis on the twelfth century is hardly an exception. On the other hand, a study of
mercenaries has certain natural boundaries set by the very presence o f employers. For
once, then, the artificial device of dissecting historical developments according to the
reigns of kings actually recommends itself, and that of William Rufus has several traits
which make it the best starting point. Obviously, the use o f mercenaries predated him.1
In terms of the social position of mercenaries, William Rufus’s reign witnessed the
chrysalis moment in crusading ideology, a transmutation with ramifications far away
from the Holy Land as the Church’s thinkers began to redefine the role and purpose of
fighters. Even as the Crusades hastened the rise of that group which would constitute
the knighthood, a second, secular ethos for that group was developing, o f which

‘On earlier instances of hired soldiery: Verbruggen, 128; Prestwich, “War and
Finance” in ANW, 64-5, particularly his comments on the penance o f 1070; Bernard
Bachrach, Fulk Nerra: The Neo-Romcm Consul (Berkeley: University o f California
Press,), 41, 105; David C. Douglas, William the Conqueror (Berkeley . University of
California Press, 1964), 191-2.
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William Rufus was one of the earliest proponents.2 In both instances, crusade and
chivalry, knights (milites), who had heretofore been distinguishable from other warriors
only with difficulty, had to hand another lever with which to elevate their place in an
increasingly hierarchical society.3 As they rose, both literally upon their equine mounts
and in feudal society, they left less fortunate warriors in a seemingly anomalous position,
unenfeoffed and without the benefit at least of having some ecclesiastical resignation to
the violence of their profession.
This seeming anomaly is another reason for looking at the royal employers of
northwestern Europe. The traditional cradle of feudalism has undergone quite a
conceptual change so that many of the former bastions o f ad hoc decentralization are
now seen as precocious forerunners of efficiently run, centralized and bureacratized
states.4 The Anglo-Norman realm typically heads the list of such polities, with Anjou,

2Frank Barlow, William Rufus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983),
118: “William was renowned for his knightly word . . . He undoubtedly played a part in
developing the knightly code o f behaviour which became known as chivalry .”
3Sally Harvey, “The Knight and the Knight’s Fee in England,” in Past and
Present 49 (November 1970): 3-43, on the relatively poor status o f most of England’s
knights according to the Domesday Book survey. Although primarily opposed to
Harvey’s argument, R. Allen Brown correctly pointed out that “to be bom a knight was
to be potentially a lord or lordling, and the indispensable pre-condition of a worth-while
career at arms and of social preferment.” “The Status o f the Norman Knight,” in War
and Government in the M iddle Ages, John Gillingham and J.C. Holt, eds. (Totowa:
Barnes and Noble, 1984), 26. Also, see Strickland, War and Chivalry, 21.
4The first telling attack on the feudal model came from Elizabeth A.R. Brown,
“The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe,” in
American Historical Review 79 (1974): 1063-88. Brown’s article struck many
responsive chords with its parade of exceptions and contradictions to the orthodoxy o f
feudalism, but seemed to do little more than encourage historians to be more careful as
to what they let the word “feudal” refer. A much more thorough attempt to replace the
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Norman Italy, and the Capetian heartlands scrambling not far behind. The societies
organized for war were no so much those with a network of enfeoffed vassals just
waiting for the summons to war as they were those with both vast financial resources
and the means to direct them to violent ends.5 In the end, though, the focus here is not
on the kings who directed such resources, but on the resources themselves, the men
willing for one reason or another to kill, to risk being killed, to risk the censure of
society and church, to abandon one life for the opportunities o f another. In this role,
they constituted the “sport” o f this chapter; they were pieces in the contests of kings and
great magnates. On occasion, however, some of these men played the game themselves;
from Catalonia to England there are numerous examples of territorial, economic and
authoritative enrichment by so-called mercenaries.
They left little record of themselves, and this is typically true during Rufus’s
reign. Our best glimpses o f these adventurers comes during the first half o f the twelfth
century; before and after the reigns o f Henry I and Stephen, they tend to be covered by
a blanket o f corporate condemnation by the chroniclers. William o f Malmesbury
indicates that reports of the king’s generosity drew soldiers to England not just from the
Latin West, but also from the East. M ilites, whether knights or simpler soldiers, came

model of feudalism is that by Susan Reynolds, Fiefs and Vrassals (Oxford. Oxford
University Press, 1994).
5See Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, 17: “The institutional
strength o f the government was in large part responsible for its wealth, and the influence
of money on the military system is clear. Mercenaries appear in most episodes of AngloNorman warfare, and military institutions to which money was originally foreign, such
as the knight’s fee, were influence by it at an early date: scutage was collected regularly
under Henry I and probably under his father and brother before him . . . ”
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to him from nearly every province as far away as the Alps. Once in England, not only
did these freebooters found the pickings too ripe to forego, but William Rufus showed
little ability or inclination to rein them in.6
In the particular case of William II, the actual depredations of his mercenaries
attracted less opprobrium than the extremities to which the king was forced in order to
pay them. It was a theme that William of Malmesbury found hard to abandon. The new
king admittedly faced opposition on several fronts, almost all o f which ultimately
involved his older brother Robert’s claim to the throne. As a natural countermeasure,
Rufus collected a large troop o f soldiers quickly without quibbling over wages and by
promising even better rewards to follow. This need would grow into a trait, and from
there into a vice, so that the king soon let merchants set their own prices and soldiers
their own pay. The unsurprising upshot was the royal treasury was quickly exhausted,
and Rufus had to begin turning the financial screws on his kingdom. Nor did the
situation abate after William bought off his brother’s claims to the English crown; he in
turn began maneuvering to wrest Normandy from Robert. As far as Malmesbury was
concerned, this acquisitiveness cost Rufus his soul, as much for chasing temporal
renown as for letting his people’s substance be plundered in order to finance his wars on
the continent.7 Eadmer’s analysis o f the same events led to the same conclusion since
William’s financial straits lay at the root of much of his troubles with archbishop

6William o f Malmesbury, Gesta Regum, W. Stubbs, ed. 2 vols. (London: Rolls
Series, 1887-9), II: 368-9.
1GR, II: 368-9, 379.
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Anselm. Their first sharp conflict began when the king’s efforts against Duke Robert
became so costly that William “was even reduced to some traits which it seemed
unfitting that the King’s majesty should suffer.”8 Both to offset this situation and to
improve the Church’s relationship with William, Anselm offered the king five hundred
pounds of silver, an amount that at first thrilled the king but which he refused upon the
advice o f his counselors in the unfortunate hope that the hint of displeasure would cause
Anselm to increase the amount o f the gift. It would be the first of several clashes
between king and archbishop over money and military affairs.
Even before Anselm’s elevation to Canterbury, the competition between
William Rufus and Robert Curthose was heating up with Henry playing to both brothers
for whatever advantages he could secure. William opened his campaign for Normandy
in 1090 by bribing the garrison of Saint-Valery into admitting him there. From there he
gained the adjacent port and the town o f Aumale and then moved further into the upper
Norman countryside, acquiring castles in the same manner. The Anglo-Saxon
Chronicler and Gesia Regum both note the tactic as William’s standard practice, and
one to the advantage of the Norman magnates. The king’s money enabled them to put
their castles on a war footing and bring them up to full garrison strength with troops

8Eadmer, Historia Novorum in Anglia. Martin Rule, ed. (London: Rolls Series,
1884), 43: Ea tempestate rex, Normcmniam fratri suo Roberto toto conamine auferre
laborans, multam et immensam undecunque collectam pecuniam in hoc expendebat,
adeo ut nonnulias etiam difficultales pateretur, quas regiam pati excellentiam indecens
videbatur. The translation here is that o f Geoffrey Bosanquet: History o f Recent Events
in England {Philadelphia: Dufour, 1965), 44.
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paid by the king.9 Walter o f Saint-Valery and his cousin Stephen o f Aumale were
merely the first to abandon Duke Robert in favor of William’s treasury; besides Aumale
Stephen also fortified his castle on the river Bresle “at the king’s expense” and filled it
with members of William’sfam ilia. Gerard de Goumay appeared next with the
deliverance o f his castles of Goumay, La Ferte-en-Bray, and Gaillefontaine. Once in the
English king’s service, he began recruiting his neighbors. Eventually Robert, count of
Eu, Walter Giflfard, and Ralph of Mortemer (who might have already become Stephen
of Aumale’s brother-in-law by this time), along with “almost all the lords between the
Seine and the sea joined the English and received large sums of money from the king’s
resources to provide arms and men (armis et satellitibus) for the defence of their
homes.”10
By the summer o f 1090, then, Duke Robert faced a serious crisis: William
Rufus had seduced most of Upper Normandy to his side, and at the other side of the
duchy, Henry was taking advantage o f the situation to increase the autonomy of his
small enclave. He had used his bequest from the Conqueror to acquire control of much
of the Cotentin, including Avranches, Coutances, Cherbourg, Gavray and other castles.
Besides the support of earl Hugh of Chester and Richard of Reviers, Henry was
collecting further forces “by persuasion or payment.” 11 In the height of the summer,

9ASC\ s.a. 1090. Florence, 191. GR, II: 363: Itaque castrum sancti Walerici, et
portum vicimrn, et oppidiim quodAlbamarla vocatur, sollertia st/a adquisivit, pecunia
custodes corrumpens. Barlow, 273-4.
10OV, iv. 182
uIbid., 220: et collectis undique viribusprece precioque cotidie crescebat.
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Duke Robert had to deal with division among his own supporters as Roger o f Beaumont
and his son Robert of Meulan besieged the castle o f Brionne which the castellan had
refused to surrender to them.12 The financially strapped duke had granted Roger’s
request for the castle’s return to that family for a considerable sum o f money. A bloody
assault followed after which the duke had to reward all the participants, including the
resistant castellan, with further grants. To the south, the men o f Maine were already in
rebellion against Norman control and could not be brought to heel while the duke faced
so many other brush fires. On Curthose’s part, he did what he could to secure the
support o f vassals, allies, and any mercenaries he could find. To counter the defections
of Walter Giffard, Ralph o f Mortemer, and Stephen of Aumale, Robert gave one of his
illegitimate daughters in marriage to Heiias o f Saint-Saens, the possessor o f a
stronghold directly opposed to the lands of Rufus’s trio o f new adherents. Orderic
reports that Heiias gave his new father-in-law, and later his brother-in-law, quite
courageous and dutiful service for many years, undergoing many dangers and eventually
the misfortune o f disinheritance.13 With so many o f his other vassals proving unreliable,
Robert Curthose finally took the step of calling on his nominal overlord, Philip I, the

12An interesting business in which William Rufus may have had a hand: Orderic
reports, but not with any great chronological precision, that Robert o f Meulan came
back to Normandy from England, and muneribus et promissis Guillelmi regis turgidus,
haughtily demanded Ivry from the duke. Curthose refused, and when Robert of Meulan
defied him, then imprisoned the latter and also took custody o f Brionne, which he
entrusted to Robert o f Meules, son o f Baldwin. Chibnall agrees with Yver, 204, n. 1, in
dating this interchange to 1090. Because o f a charter witnessed in 1089 by Robert of
Meulan for the duke, however, Barlow, 271, n. 35, has questioned the precision of the
1090 dating.
13OV, iv. 182, 204-11.
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king o f France. He responded by entering Normandy with considerable forces and
joined Robert in besieging one o f William’s newly acquired strongholds, perhaps
Aumale. William again responded with his best weapon: the English treasury.
Reporting on Philip’s decision to withdraw from Normandy, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
temporized, noting the inducement of William’s gifts to Philip but also speaking o f the
affection in which Philip held William. William o f Malmesbury gave the French king no
such credit. He depicted Philip as being tom from the banqueting table and hardly fit to
engage in any martial activity despite the bluster of his entry into the duchy. Indeed, “as
he was making great professions, the money o f the king of England met him by the way,
with which his resolution being borne down, he unbuckled his armour and went back to
his gormandizing.”14
Affairs only appeared to worsen for Robert after the French king’s departure;
William’s influence next made itself felt within the capital o f Rouen itself where one of
the leading citizens, a Conan, son of Gilbert Pilatus, began organizing a revolt against
the duke. Orderic reports that Conan “made a pact with the king to hand over the city,
and arrogantly maintained against the duke a huge permanent household of men-at-arms
and dependants (militum et satelliturn familiam). ”15 The plan apparently called for an
uprising in early November to be supported by an insertion of William’s forces. Robert

‘“Florence, 191. ASC, s.a. 1090. GR, LI: 363: Et ille quidem iners, et
cotidianam crapidam ructans, a d bellum singidtiens inghrvie veniebat: sed occurrenmt
magna pollicenti nummi regis Angliae; qitibus infractus, cingulum solvit et convivium
repetiit. On the possibility that Aumale was the actual target left unnamed by the ASC,
see Barlow, 276, n. 55.
,sOV, iv: 220.
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apparently received word o f the impending treachery and began bringing allies to the
scene, most surprising of whom were his brother Henry and Robert of Belleme. Barlow
has surmised that these two came to Robert’s aid for a combination of reasons: Henry’s
greater animosity (at that particular moment) for William as opposed to Robert, a desire
to keep the more forgiving Robert in place as duke, and a general aristocratic closing of
ranks against any bourgeois uprising.16 Whatever their reasons, these two brought a
considerable weight o f forces, military expertise, and ruthlessness into the duke’s camp.
By 3 November, a body of William’s forces under Reginald of Warenne, the younger
son o f the first earl o f Surrey, had moved up to the city and fighting broke out. A ducal
relief force arrived from the south to even up the forces involved and then the two
princes led a sortie out of the citadel. Duke Robert soon abandoned the actual fighting
and moved across the Seine to await the outcome. Henry, on the other hand, threw
himself vigorously into the fracas and joined Robert of Belleme in reducing the city’s
population and resistance. William’s troops just outside the city were unable to give
much support and Conan o f Rouen soon found himself a prisoner of the duke’s
supporters. Before Robert’s leniency could come into play, however, Henry personally
punished Conan’s treason by hurling the townsman from the top o f Rouen’s citadel.
Never one to miss an opportunity for enrichment, Robert o f Belleme, along with
William of Breteuil, “carried off the citizens o f Rouen captive like foreign raiders
(exteros predones) and imprisoned them harshly in dreadful dungeons. . . and, stripping

l6Barlow, 274.
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them o f all their possessions, ill-treated them as if they had been foreign enemies ”n
With this success, Belleme returned home and renewed hostilities by Christmas o f 1090
with his neighbors of the Giroie clan, Hugh of Grandmesnil and Richard of Courcy.
Once he invited the duke to join him in the siege o f Courcy, it was only natural for the
besieged to turn to William Rufus for help.18
With Robert Curthose thus engaged, William saw a ripe opportunity to renew
his campaign in Normandy, this time in person. By late January he had reached Dover
and was preparing a great fleet to take him and least a sizable portion of his treasury to
the continent. What forces he may have collected in England, and the nature o f their
military connection to him, remains hidden. But he would not lack for troops. In fact,
upon his arrival in the duchy in the first week o f February, the Normans brought their
own gifts to him as the opening gambits to establish mutually profitable relations. The
stream o f new adherents grew as word of Rufus’s presence at Eu spread. Bretons,
Flemings, and Frenchmen likewise, knowing his reputation for prodigality, came to
enlist under his banner and enjoy the ready supply of English money. Upon the
campaign’s close, many of these would return home, according to Orderic, and boast
there that their own princes could not match William Rufus’s generosity.19 Meanwhile,

17OV, iv: 222, 226. GR, II: 469. The ASC, s.a. 1090, concluded this part o f
William’s campaign with the comment that England was “utterly ruined by unjust
taxation.”
I8OV, iv: 231. Barlow, 276.
19OV, iv: 236: Tunc magnificentiam eius alacriter experti sunt domumque
petentes cunctis eum princibus suis divitiis et liberalitate preposuenmt.
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Robert Curthose broke off from the siege o f Courcy and moved to counter William’s
latest incursion while Robert o f Belleme withdrew to the south. The rest of the events
of February are unclear, but by the month’s end, the two brothers had negotiated a
treaty that gave Robert some short-term advantages, William some in the longer term,
settled any future succession concerns, and fully excluded Henry from the settlement.20
Among the conditions of the treaty of Rouen, William pledged in return for the
territories he gained in Normandy to help Robert return Maine to ducal control. Before
turning to that particular goal, however, the king and duke decided to secure their
eastern flank by reducing the base of their youngest brother. Orderic leaves us unclear
whether Henry raised a rebellion in the Cotentin first, thus incurring his brothers’ armed
attention, or if his preparations there were in anticipation of their invasion. William o f
Malmesbury indicates that Henry began raiding from his position in eastern Normandy
precisely because he had been cut out of the arrangements that purported to dispose o f
William the Conqueror’s former realm. Regardless, the young count fortified his cities,
particularly Coutances and Avranches, and found Bretons and Normans willing to fight
under his banner. Doubtless these were warriors o f the lower ranks, not necessarily the
kind just a half-step away from ruffian status, but nonetheless soldiers who stood to lose
little but gain much if they supported Henry and he won out. Such was not the situation
for Henry’s greater allies; Hugh of Avranches, who was also earl of Chester, saw little
incentive in holding out against the English king. Along with others barons and
castellans o f Henry’s party, Hugh submitted to William and Robert, letting them have

20Ibid., 250. For full details of the Treaty o f Rouen, see ASC, s.a. 1091.
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control o f his castles. In these straits, Henry fell back upon Mont Saint-Michel, where
he was besieged by his brothers for over two weeks in March or early April. Once
water ran out in the fortress, he asked for a safe-conduct to abandon the mount with his
allies (sociis). William and Robert agreed readily to the proposal and let Henry leave
with all his baggage. After surrendering his castles to the king and duke, Henry traveled
into Brittany, “where he thanked the Bretons for the support which they and they alone
had given him.”21 Orderic has the clearest narrative concerning Henry’s confused
itinerary over the next few years. William o f Malmesbury has the count going to
England with his two brothers almost immediately after his surrender when they went to
counter the latest Scottish irruption into England, but if he did so, he stayed quietly in
the background. The idea that he circled Normandy via Brittany and France to settle in
as an impoverished exile in the Vexin seems more probable; from this position he was
effectively beyond his brothers’ grasp, but close enough to benefit from any opening
that they might leave him.22 Conceivably, such an opportunity came late in 1092 when
the citizens o f Domffont rebelled against their immediate lord Robert o f Belleme and
invited Henry to come in as their new lord. He took possession o f the city and began to
rebuild his position. Besides warring on his former comrade-in-arms Robert of Belleme,
Henry also led actions specifically against his brothers. The geography of his position

21OV, iv; 250. Chibnall has noted the extensive estates that Bretons later
received from Henry, most probably for their efforts in these early days on behalf of the
future king. Among those so honored were Alan fitz Flaald and Richard de Reviers.
GK, 364.
n OV, iv; 250-2. Barlow, 285-6, 288.
44

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was such, however, that these depredations naturally cost Robert Curthose far more
than they did William Rufus. Orderic summed up Henry’s situation at the end of 1092,
writing that “he was not treated as a brother by his brothers, but rather as a stranger, so
that he was forced to seek the support o f strangers (exterorum), namely the French and
Bretons. . . .’,23
Even before Henry made himself again a thorn in his brothers’ sides, the accord
between William and Robert had begun to deteriorate. After campaigning with William
against the Scots throughout the latter part of 1091, Robert began to suspect to what
extent William meant to honor his part of the treaty. Two days before Christmas he
parted from the royal entourage and made for Normandy.24 William spent the next two
years settling the internal and external affairs o f Scotland. In 1093 also came his famous
illness that resulted in a host of promised reforms and the elevation of Anselm to the
archbishopric o f Canterbury. At his Christmas court that year, messengers arrived from
Robert announcing the duke’s intention to abide no longer by the terms of the treaty of
Rouen since the king apparently had no intention himself o f doing so. Robert would,
however, grant his brother until mid-Lent to come to Normandy and show some
evidence that he meant to fulfill his obligations under the agreement.25 Most likely, the
proof that Robert wanted involved help in the subjection o f Maine, a project which by
this time would probably also include yet another combined effort against Henry.

^OV, iv: 256, 292. Barlow, 288.
2*ASC, s. a. 1091.
25ASC, s.a. 1093/4.
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Possibly also on Robert’s mind would have been some o f William’s diplomatic
initiatives earlier that same year. Eadmer reports that William came personally to
persuade Anselm to accept the archbishopric after a meeting with the count of Flanders
at Dover.26 With his focus typically on the Anselm, Eadmer does not mention what
transpired at Dover, but William o f Malmesbury revealed the nature o f the agreements
reached when they were hammered out again at the start o f Henry’s reign. A monetary
relationship had existed between the Norman dukes and Flemish counts since before the
Conquest of England, but had lapsed in 1071 when William the Conqueror supported
the losing side of the civil war that saw Robert the Frisian acquire the comital title of
Flanders. Although not yet count o f Flanders in 1093, Robert II was already managing
much of its affairs as his father’s health declined. Most likely it was he, not his father,
who met with William Rufus and suggested a renewal of the money-fief o f three
hundred marks of silver in return for military aid and counsel. Malmesbury suggests
that Robert II easily secured the renewal because of the kinship o f the two men and
William’s penchant for spending freely.27 No text survives of the 1093 agreement, but
its successor in 1101 has, and some general conclusions can be derived from it and the
1110 Anglo-Flemish treaty o f Dover.28 The treaty of 1101 stipulated that the count of

26Eadmer, 39.
21GR, II: 478-9, on the annual gift of 300m. from William the Conqueror to
count Baldwin and Robert II’s efforts to secure its renewal from Henry I. See also
Lyon, From F ief to Indenture, 32-5; C. Warren Hollister, The M ilitary Organization o f
Norman England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 186-89.
“ Pierre Chaplais, ed„ Diplomatic Documents Preserved in the Public Record
Office, vol. I (London: Stationery Office, 1964), nos. 1 and 2, pp. 1-8. Fernand
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Flanders, in return for annual installments o f five hundred pounds o f silver, had to
provide upon summons from the English king 1,000 knights ready to fight in either
England or Normandy. If the summons were to Maine, the count was responsible for
only five hundred knights. In 1110, both parties agreed to reduced amounts: Henry paid
four hundred marks for the service o f five hundred knights in England or Normandy, but
only 250 in Maine. If the knights had to travel by sea to the selected theater, the burden
of transport lay with the English king. While in his service in England, the knights were
expected to render fealty to the king, swearing that they would hold and defend the
realm against all men.29 From the time that the knights left Flanders, it became the
English king’s responsibility to supply them and to replace their material losses, even as
he did for his own military household.30 The articles that have caught the most attention
are those that envisage the complicated but all too possible situation wherein the
Flemish count, who held part of his territories from the king o f France, receives the
summons of the English king in order to fight against the French king. In this instance,
the count was still to honor his obligation to the treaty, but less himself and the ten

Vercauteren, A ctsdes Comtes de Flcmdre, 1071-1128 (Bruxelles: 1938), no. 41, pp.
109-16. On the confusion surrounding the dating of the 1101 treaty, see Fran^ois-Louis
Ganshof, “Note sur le premier traite anglo-flamand de Douvres” in Revue dit Nord 40
(1958), 245-57.
^Chaplais, Diplomatic Documents, no. 1: Et postquam predicti milites in
Anglia erunt, fiduciasfacient regi Henrico vel legatis ejus...juvabunt eum perfidem ad
tenendum et defendum regnum Anglie contra omnes homines.
301bid. : Et si comes Rotbertus vel sui homines in auxilium regis venerint,
quamdiu in Anglia fuerint erunt ad victim regis et rex reddet eis perdita eorum facta
in Anglia sicut mos est reddere fam ilie sue.
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knights that he owed to the French king. This small band would serve with the king of
France while the other Flemish knights would serve with the Anglo-Normans.
Vercauteren supposed these treaties to have been secret ones, thus accounting
for the lack o f copies among Flemish records,31 but this hardly seems a necessary
conclusion. Word of the meeting between William Rufus and Robert U of Flanders
would have doubtless seeped out, even as it did to Eadmer. And for those who needed
hints as to the conference’s content, the movement of English silver to Flemish ports
and reciprocal movement of as many as 1,000 Flemish knights, each with three horses,
towards Gravelines and Wissant should have been sufficient indicators. The option was
left open both for the count of Flanders to bring more than the minimum number of
knights required and for the English king to recruit extra soldiers within Flemish
territories. It would be in keeping with William’s practices to purchase this kind of
military support and then, by its very presence, bring an opponent to the bargaining
table.32 The count’s concern that he not have to violate the fealty sworn to the French
king has obscured the real target of the treaty: Robert Curthose.33 As the campaigns of

31Vercauteren, 111.
“ Compare Richard FitzNigel’s later admonition to Henry II: In utriusque vero
temporibus stremtis aclibus gloria principnm est; set excellit in hiis ubi pro
temporalibus impensis, felici mercimonio mansura succedent. “The glory of princes
consists in noble actions in war and peace alike, but it excels in those in which is made a
happy bargain, the price being temporal and the reward everlasting.” Dialogus de
Scaccario, Charles Johnson, F. Carter, and D. Greenway, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1983), 2.
33Franpois-Louis Ganshof, “Note sur le premier traite anglo-flamand de
Douvres,” 249: “A diverses reprises, le cas d’un conflit arme entre le roi d’Angleterre et
le roi de France, Philippe I", est vise, mais toujours a titre d’eventualite secondaire: ce
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1094 would bear out, William Rufus had planned well. Philip o f France did rejoin the
duke of Normandy in the field, but William still profited from an influx o f Flemish
soldiery.34
William’s other initiative of 1093 built upon the concessions he had gained in the
Treaty of Rouen. That settlement had granted William the county of Eu35, where he had
based himself in 1091 and whose lord’s strong loyalty he had enjoyed since his
coronation. Sometime in 1091, presumably after the treaty had been concluded, Robert
count of Eu died and was succeeded by his son William. This William had supported
Duke Robert during the 1088 attempt to remove William Rufus from the English
throne, and apparently, upon his accession to the county, renewed his allegiance to duke
Robert. Barlow has pointed out that the duke’s acceptance of this pledge could have
constituted a casus belli for Rufus,36 but that the spendthrift turned yet again to his
treasury. Not for nothing did Florence o f Worcester call the king “the great seducer
{seductor maximus).”37 According to Florence, William of Eu abandoned his “natural

n’est pas contre lui que l’alliance est conclue...L’ennemi vise, mais non cite, est Robert
Courteheuse, ffere du roi, due de Normandie.”
“ Barlow, 331. Hollister, M ilitary Organization, 188, n.3. J.H. Round, ed.,
Calendar o f Documents Preserved in France, 918-1206 (London. Public Record
Office, 1899), no. 1325.
35ASC, s.a. 1091.
“ Barlow, 324.
37Florence, 197, and Barlow, 324. In the particular case o f William Rufus, the
usual association of mercenary activity with prostitution is heightened by the king’s
homosexuality.
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lord” duke Robert for money and the promise o f greater territories to be awarded later.
For Rufus, the transaction may not have been so expensive as Barlow assumed: the king
never had to deliver on the promise of future territory to the count of Eu, who was
accused of participating in the plots of 1095. A trial by judicial combat followed, and
upon his defeat, Count Robert was blinded and castrated, penalties which he did not
long survive.38
Following Curthose’s Christmas warning, William Rufus gave orders for the
collection o f a feudal aid to pay for a cross-Channel expedition. His need for funds at
this time was the impetus behind his first clash with Anselm, alluded to above. Affairs in
England thus kept him from trying to depart until Candlemas (2 February) o f 1094. He
arrived at Hastings then but had to wait until 19 March before favorable winds enabled
him to cross to Normandy/9 Not surprisingly, he made for Eu. There followed an
interview with Duke Robert in which neither party found satisfaction. William returned
to Eu and opened up the treasury once again. He took fighters into his pay “from all
quarters” and detached a number of Norman nobles from their allegiance to Robert with
the usual mixture o f gold, silver, lands, and promises o f better things to come. With
each defection William followed his previous practice and filled the newly acquired

XASC, s.a. 1096. OV, iv. 285. Chibnall’s conclusion, based upon Guibert of
Nogent’s memoirs, that William of Eu had died by the summer o f 1096 seems quite
acceptable. See Guibert of Nogent, S elf and Society in Medieval France, John Benton,
ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 135-6.
39Barlow, 327, 331. ASC, s.a. 1094.
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castles with his own garrisons.'40 As William bought the support o f much o f Upper
Normandy and called on Robert II o f Flanders to honor their agreement, Robert
Curthose also sought outside help. He called on the French king again, who this time
pushed for a peaceful arbitration o f the brothers’ differences. Perhaps under his
influence, William and Robert held another meeting with their advisors. This time, the
warrantors of the treaty of Rouen judged that William was in violation o f its terms, a
verdict William immediately ignored. He responded instead with the capture o f Buresen-Bray, a castle o f Robert’s long-suffering son-in-law, Heiias o f Saint-Saens. A small
victory, it paled beside William’s inability to draw, or take, the rest of the duchy away
from Curthose.41
Robert’s diplomacy paid the greater dividends in 1094. In company with Philip
of France, Robert responded to the capture o f Bures by investing Argentan and there
capturing a reported seven hundred of William’s knights under Roger o f Poitou, a
brother to Robert o f Belleme. Besides the immediate benefit to the ducal cause,
William’s ransom o f all his knights doubtless provided Philip and Curthose with sorely
needed revenue.42 Barlow has Philip retiring from Normandy after this success, but the

F lorence, 197.
41Barlow, 332. ASC, s.a. 1094.
42See Suger, 10, for William’s readiness to pay ransoms as opposed to the fate
of French knights whose king could not afford to ransom them: Verum Anglie captos ad
redempcionem celerem militaris stipendii acceleravit anxietas, Francorum vero longa
diulum i carceris maceravit prolixitas, nex ullo modo evinculari poluerunt, donee,
suscepta ejusdem regis Anglia militia, homino obligati, regrtum et regem impugnare et
turbare jurejurando firmaverunt.
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Anglo-Saxon Chronicle places it later in the campaign. Meanwhile, Robert o f Belleme,
an accomplished and innovative besieger, came into the duke’s camp in return for
Curthose’s earlier help in his feuds with the Giroie family.43 He immediately made his
presence felt alongside the duke in a hard-contested siege at “Houlme”, an uncertain site
but perhaps Briouze, where William of Peverel held out with eight hundred men on
behalf of the English king until it became apparent that Rufus would be sending no
relieving forces. Robert’s allies and own troops then began converging on Eu to
besiege William Rufus there, and one can easily imagine at this juncture the king’s
strident demand to Ranulf Flambard back in England to muster 20,000 troops at the
coast for immediate departure to Normandy. The immediate threat dissolved, however,
when “intrigue compelled the king of France to retire” at Longueville from the
campaign, thereby stalling the offensive.44
Amid the vicissitudes o f 1094, there occurred one o f the more notable
developments in that symbiosis of financial and military administration that often was

43OV, iv: 232-6, 286-96, for Robert of Belleme’s campaigns and the sometimes
related hostilities between Ascelin Goel and William o f Breteuil. Among the many raids
that marked these conflicts are several instances of “borrowed” forces: in February 1091
Ascelin acquired the services of King Philip’s household troops (familiam Philippi regis
sibi ascivit). Less than a year later, William of Breteuil reopened the conflict and this
time, he got the use o f Philip’s knights. He gave the Frenck king 700 livres for their
use. Torigny, GND, 228, confirms Philip’s second farming out o f the household troops,
this time with William promising to cover all the expenses. In July 1092 count Henry
loaned his fa m ilia to Robert Giroie for a quite lucrative raid against Belleme territory.
These last forces are subsequently described as Giroie’s auxiliaries (auxiliarios suos).
“ Barlow, 333, especially on the surmise that Le Houlme was in the city of
Briouze. Florence, 198. ASC, s.a. 1094. The temptation is quite strong to see in the
charge of “intrigue” the symptom of William Rufus’s treasury at work again on the will
of the French king.
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English medieval government.45 When Rufus asked for 20,000 troops, Ranulf Flambard
sent the summons throughout the kingdom. This demand went far beyond the servitia
debita o f knights settled on established fiefs; it was more on the order of a general
summons. Florence o f Worcester recorded the mustering of infantry at Hastings
without noting that the men present fell short o f Rufus’s request.46 The scope o f the
summons had caused the levy to be figured upon the hide system that demarcated the
countryside; in this instance, one man from every five hides. They arrived at the coast
only to be met by Flambard and, doubtless to their surprised relief, told they could
return home after giving over the ten shillings which each grouping of five hides had
provided for their maintenance.47 The men went home, and Flambard shipped the
monetary windfall across the Channel to William.4* Whether the whole passage of
events was contrived thus to deliver a great deal of currency quickly, or was an

45Prestwich, “War and Finance” in A MW, 76: “The whole history of the
development of Anglo-Norman administration is intelligible only in terms of the scale
and the pressing needs of war finance: the expenditure on the wages of troops, the
construction and repair of castles, the pensions to allies, the bribes which eased the
course of campaigns and diplomacy, and the upkeep o f the bureaucracy itself.”
^ h e logistical nightmare of assembling, supplying, and transporting 20,000
troops in the late eleventh century naturally works against any idea that that many
troops were actually on hand. But in view o f how chroniclers tended to throw around
large figures, the real point here is that Flambard did muster an amazingly large number
o f soldiers, enough to seem close to Rufus’s fantastic demand.
47There are still questions over the figure of 10s. since Domesday Book, v, 56c
(Berkshire), indicates that each man was to receive 20s. pay and maintenance for a twomonth stint. Morillo, Warfare, 67, argues that soldiers left home with their maintenance
funds (ad victum), but only received their pay (slipendium) upon returning home.
48Florence, 198. ASC, s.a. 1094.
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opportunistic masterstroke by Flambard remains unknowable. Either way, men had paid
money so as not to have to render military service; if not actually called scutage,
Flambard’s collection o f funds was still essentially just that.49 Either way, it was
conceivably not the first commutation of military service for money, and the charter
evidence of later reigns has shown it to have been a favorite tool o f the English kings for
raising military revenues and sparing their own subjects the uncomfortable and
occasionally lethal circumstances of war.50
In spite of Flambard’s extraordinary revenue-raising, 1094 held few bright spots
for Rufus, and 1095 appeared for a time to hold more reversals for him. Sometime in
1094 the king decided to counter Robert o f Belleme’s effectiveness by coming to an
accommodation with count Henry at Domffont. Accordingly, he summoned Henry and
his longtime ally Hugh earl of Chester to him at Eu. For some reason, however, these
two went instead to England and passed November and December there. William
joined them after Christmas. They stayed together until the spring campaigning season
opened, at which time Henry went back to Normandy armed with new wealth from
Rufus to fight Robert. Although vague, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle gave Henry credit

49Hollister, Military Organization, 191, has followed Richard FitzNigel,
Dialogus de Scaccario, 52, in defining scutage as a commutation based on knights’
fees, and therefore non-existent in “prefeudal” societies (and by inference, inapplicable
to this mustering, since its basis was the old hidal system and not that of enfeoffed
knights). In light of Susan Reynold’s emphasis on the ruler/subject paradigm over the
lord/vassal one, Fiefs and Vassals, 33, this distinction appears more misleading than
useful.
“ See FitzNigel, 52: Mavult enim princeps stipendarios quam domesticos
bellicis opponere casibus.
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for inflicting “severe losses” on his eldest brother.51 In England, though, William faced
a succession o f distracting crises: first he moved against the Welsh, but then had to
hasten northward to pre-empt a baronial plot being headed by Robert o f Mowbray, the
earl of Northumberland. At the same time his cold treatment of Archbishop Anselm
grew suddenly hot when the latter pushed him over the issue o f recognizing Urban II as
the legitimate pope. Reluctantly and after much blustering and invective, Rufus
recognized Urban over his rival and reconciled himself to Anselm’s continued presence
in the see at Canterbury. William then turned against his secular foes with the
thoroughness that marked his campaigns in England. Although the chronicles do not
make specific mention of William’s military household in these actions, it is hard to
imagine the king suppressing internal opposition without such a disciplined and loyal
corps backing him up. He campaigned throughout the year, both in the north and
briefly again in Wales, before fortune let earl Robert fall into his hands. By threatening
to blind his hostage, Rufus forced the remaining northern rebels to capitulate. By year’s
end, then, he had substantially improved his position within the kingdom: at his
Christmas court, William Rufus dispensed justice (and penalties) with less regard to
possible negative ramifications; he also kept the lucrative bishopric o f Durham in royal
custody, perhaps to begin financing another expedition against his brother.52
Even as William had been mopping up the wreckage o f the baronial conspiracy,
an event had taken place on the continent with almost immediate consequences for

5lASC, s.a. 1095.
52Barlow, 338-59.
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William as well as longer-term ramifications for those soldiers who enjoyed the financial
patronage of the fam ilia regis. At the end of November, Pope Urban II preached the
sermon at Clermont that launched the First Crusade.53 In February William reaped an
unforeseen benefit from the militant piety that caused many of northwestern Europe’s
magnates to take the cross. Apparently by February, perhaps at the provincial synod
held by the archbishop of Rouen that month, Robert Curthose decided to join the armies
heading east. Orderic portrays Robert as drained by the incessant conflicts with his
brothers as well as the burden o f riding herd on his own fractious, always ready for
mayhem barons. His taking o f the cross was, in Orderic’s eyes, a staving off of his
inevitable loss o f authority.54 While this interpretation does not fit well with Robert’s
apparent momentum in 1094, his departure from the duchy nonetheless bespeaks a
disregard for practical political considerations that does fit in with Orderic’s usual
charges against the duke. The duke could not, however, avoid the economic
considerations o f the upcoming expedition, and so he turned to one o f whose riches he
had had plenty of proof. For 10,000 marks of silver, Robert mortgaged the duchy to
William for the duration of his absence, with the understanding that William would
relinquish Normandy upon Robert’s repayment of the debt. William squeezed his
kingdom as never before. Florence o f Worcester reported the cooperation o f the
English magnates, and yet, the great ecclesiastical houses had to break up their gold and
silver ornaments, and many knights and peasants were impoverished by the exactions.

53For accounts o f Urban’s sermon, GR, 395ff; OV, v, 14-8.
“ OV, v, 26.
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In September, William crossed to Normandy where the riches of England doubtless
eased the “reconciliation” of the two brothers.55 To cement his control o f the duchy,
William also rewarded Henry with the counties of Coutances and Bayeux, although he
held onto the towns o f Bayeux and Caen for himself.56 William stayed in Normandy
until the following Easter before returning to England to deal yet again with the Welsh,
the Scots, and archbishop Anselm.
The First Crusade not only brought about William Rufus’s final acquisition of
Normandy, it and the subsequent crusades would play major roles in the transformation
and rise o f knights in western Europe. The complex interplay between crusading and
chivalry, between the Peace and Truce of God and ecclesiastical legitimization of the
warrior’s function, is beyond this study, but the broad outlines deserve mention,
particularly since these developments impinged more and more on warriors, salaried or
not, through the twelfth century.57 Urban’s call to arms served to elevate thepraedones

“ Florence, 202-3. OV, v, 26. ASC, s.a. 1096. Eadmer, Historia Novorum, 75.
Torigni, in GND, 210-12.
^Torigni, GND, 210-12. Barlow, 364. There can be no doubt that Rufus’s
lordship o f Normandy was in his eyes to be complete. Barlow has noted the telling
incident wherein Robert Curthose deferred the complaints of Heiias o f La Fleche to
William Rufus. Just as indicative is Orderic’s prose which begins to sound like that of
the ASC when it comes to William’s efficient taxation, a complaint he had not before
lodged against the king, OV, v, 208.
57For introductory syntheses o f this topic: Georges Duby, "The Origins of
Knighthood," in The Chivalrous Society, Cynthia Postan, trans. ( Los Angeles:
University o f California Press, 1977): 158-170. Maurice Keen, Chivalry (New Haven.
Yale University Press, 1984), 4-5, 44-63. Jean Flori, L 'essor de la chevalerie: Xle-XIIe
siecles (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1986), 198-219.
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and raptores o f Christendom into the milites C hristi58 They were to be shepherds,
protectors of Christ’s flock, according to Fulcher o f Chartres’s account of Urban’s
speech. From the same sermon, William of Malmesbury emphasized the glory to be had
if Europe’s warriors left off from their crimes, left their fellow Christians in peace, and
spent their violent impulses rather on peoples who deserved to suffer them.59 Before the
century was half over, St. Bernard would put a spiritual seal of approval specifically on
the Templars, but in a larger sense also on all who fought for God’s purposes in
properly initiated and conducted campaigns. As the miles, the mounted warrior, moved
further into a distinct category that by century’s end would be distinguishable as
knighthood, he left many other combatants in an ambiguous position. This position
grew even more unenviable across the 1100s as the nobility increasingly co-opted the
knightly designation and thereby lent the label a secular boost also. In contemporary
social models, a place existed for the orator, the bellator or pugnator, and the
laborator.60 As m iles grew synonymous with bellator and pugnator, terms belonging
formerly to established nobility, those who lacked all the proper knightly gear and
initiation, as well as low-born soldiers such as archers and crossbowmen (and knights on

58Elisabeth Magnou-Nortier, “The Enemies o f the Peace: Reflections on a
Vocabulary, 500-1100,” in The Peace o f God, Thomas Head and Richard Landes, eds.
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992): 58-79.
59GR, II: 396: Ponentes ergo ferias sceleribus, ut saltern in his regionibus liceat
Christianis pacifice vivere, vadite; illam fortitudinem, prtidentiam illam, quam in civili
conflictu habere consuestis, justiori ejfundentcs praelio. he, praedicabiles per orbem
milites! ite, et prosternite ignavas gentes!
“ Georges Duby, The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined, trans. Arthur
Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 73-80, 297-301.
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the wrong turn o f fortune’s wheel), found themselves ever-more isolated even while
their presence on campaign was still vitally necessary. While absent in the histories of
William Rufus's reign, evidence of such attitudes, such marginalization, did begin to
show up afterward.
Whatever the Church’s wishes on the redirection of the aristocracy’s violence,
the departure o f the crusading armies did little to decrease the incidence o f raids and
counter-raids in northwestern Europe by magnates great and petty, intent on increasing
or recovering their territories. His troubles with Anselm kept Rufus in England until
November o f 1097, but, with the archbishop having chosen to go into exile, the king
was free late in the year to return to Normandy. While awaiting favorable weather at
Southampton, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicler reported that William’s household wreaked
havoc on the neighboring countryside, far beyond the depredations acceptable within
friendly territory.61 Once in Normandy, William made his goal clear: he wanted all of
the VexiiL, that doorway to the duchy that lay between Rouen and Paris along the Seine.
According to Orderic, Rufus demanded that Philip relinquish the strongholds o f
Pontoise, Chaumont, and Mantes to him, all o f which were within the French Vexin.
When the French refused his demands, war broke out immediately. As usual William
had already prepared the ground with a generous outpouring of English money,
probably now supplemented with the full revenues o f Normandy. Orderic portrayed
with vivid understanding the daunting decision that faced many of the Vexin lords who
typically held grants from both kings. In weighing the odds, William’s preponderance of

61ASC, s.a. 1097. Barlow, 376.
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renowned champions and seemingly bottomless coffers tipped the scales in his favor.
Robert of Meulan62 and Guy of La Roche-Guyon opened their castles to William’s
garrisons, along with others whom Orderic did not name. With Guy’s defection,
however, Orderic’s empathetic treatment surprisingly began to wear off; he treated
Guy’s new allegiance as the result of greed (Anglorum argenti cupidus), and the lesser
lords received a harsher indictment: “faithless to their own people they submitted to
foreigners out o f avarice.”63
Complex motives drew men into either camp and to the region itself. William’s
predilection for that embryonic martial ethos that would become chivalry was wellknown. Orderic wrote o f the captains and proven champions whom the king liked to
have about, as well as the public relations benefit that such numbers of superior knights
conveyed. By the time of the 1097-98 campaigns, the prowess and loyalty of men like
county Henry and Hugh o f Chester, William o f Evreux, and Walter GifFard were proven
commodities.64 With all four of these men, Rufus could also count on the weight of
their Norman and English possessions to enhance their performances. The case of

62Barlow, 379, describes Robert in this instance as a mercenary ally o f Rufus, an
interpretation which seems to go further than Orderic’s language permits. It also
diminishes the importance of the Beaumont’s family’s earlier cooperation with duke
Robert and the very dilemma of the Vexin lords, that of having strong interests in both
of the warring camps.
“ OV, v: 214: Sic alii nonnullifecerunt. qui suis infidi exteris avide
obtemperavenmt. For the foregoing details, see 212-14.
“ Henry had, o f course, vacillated between his brothers up until 1094, never
receiving straightforward treatment from either o f them until them. His arrangement
with William that year marked an improvement in fraternal politics as William did not
give Henry any cause to renege on their agreements.
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Robert of Belleme, who appears quite rapidly among William Rufus’s entourage as
commander (princeps) o f the king’s knights, is not so hard to decipher either. With the
reins now in Rufus’s instead o f Curthose’s hands, Robert of Belleme simply continued
his cooperation with the de facto if not de jure duke. Additionally, Henry’s alliance
with Rufus had put the young brother's star in the ascendant in western Normandy, a
situation Robert could best counter by putting his considerable military talent at
William’s disposal. Besides these notables, William also had the knights of his military
household at work in critical arenas such as Chaumont, where the Norman Gilbert de
Laigle came to Orderic’s attention by getting caputred. On the French side of the
conflict, there were naturally those who fought for patriotic reasons: “They did not
wish the high honour of the French to be tarnished, and fought the enemy to the death
for the defence o f their country and the glory o f their people.”65 In conjunction with
such fervor was another incentive for the poorer French: the rich ransoms that William
Rufus was known to pay for his captured knights, a fact noted by both Orderic and
Suger. Finally, the old standby of plunder still held its appeal for both sides. Little
wonder then that these campaigns “attracted distinguished champions and courageous
young knights from all parts o f France, and by resisting their foes time and time again
won valuable rewards for themselves.”66 The chroniclers’ language also make it clear

65OV, v: 216: Illi nimirum insignem Francorum laudem deperire noluerunt,
seseque pro defensione patriae et gloria gentis suae ad mortem usque inimicis
obiecerunt.
66Ibid.: Unde passim e tota Gallia electos athletas et audaces drones sibi
asciverunt, et multotiens hostibus obstantes sibi utiliter stipendia lucrati sunt. I find
the translation of stipendia as rewards rather than wages a bit questionable. On these
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that the contestants for the Vexin were not from the lower spectrum o f society. Besides
the presence of “champions” and “young knights”, the companies of unnamed warriors
also had sufficient panoply o f war for Orderic to describe them as armored and mailed
(legionibus armatorum and ferratis cohortibus). During William’s September ravaging
of Pointoise, that fortress’s defenders accounted for the slaughter of over seven hundred
knightly steeds. Left with their lives, William’s formerly proud knights (turgidi equites)
had to recross the Epte as foot-soldiers.67
Shortly after opening his campaign for the Vexin, William accepted the advice of
Robert o f Belleme that a quick dash in winter into Maine would yield unexpected
successes there. The bold maneuver did not proceed quickly enough, however, to
prevent word of its coming, and Heiias of La Fleche called out the local levies to harass
and delay the invading Norman forces. Incensed by the setback, William deputized
Robert to draw upon his household warriors to garrison vital castles. He also gave the
lord of Belleme ample funds to strengthen his castles and to augment the wages of the
stipendiary force garrisoning them.68 As William increased the pressure on Maine,

campaigns see also Suger, 8-10, and notes 5 and 46 above.
61Ibid., 216-8. Chibnall’s translation here requires some care. We do not know
for certain that the defenders at Pontoise were “knights”. Orderic, who described them
as /'Ilustres, shows throughout this passage a marked admiration for all the French (high
and low) who dared withstand Rufus’s forces. These particular defenders also showed
a remarkable proficiency with missile weapons, an ability which at this period may have
been part of a knight’s training as an all-around warrior.
68Ibid., 234: . . . et bellicosis larga stipendiariis donativa largirentur. Another
instance that admits several interpretations in the translation, but does not demand the
“mercenary soldiers” for which Chibnall opted.
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Heiias struck north in a successful raid against the absent Robert. On the way back to
his base at Ballon, however, Heiias and seven companions saw a hidden body o f troops
which they charged. It turned out to be Belleme who, having waited in ambush,
captured Maine’s adopted count and sent him on to William at Rouen. With the county
essentially leaderless, William saw his golden moment to recover the county once held
by his father. The Norman barons agreed and advised him to call out the duchy’s levies.
William sent out the summons, but he also let it be known that his neighbors and friends
could join his subjects for the expedition. He did not have to repeat the offer:
“Frenchmen and Burgundians, Flemings and Bretons, and other neighboring peoples
flocked to the open-handed prince, and multiplied the number o f his squadrons.”69
Even with his preponderant numbers, William found Le Mans too hard a nut to
crack, and it was only due to Robert o f Belleme’s enterprise that Fulk o f Anjou could be
brought to negotiations. At the end o f their conference, Fulk let most o f Maine slip
back under Norman rule even as it had been so under the Conqueror. William followed
up this diplomatic coup with a triumphal entry into Le Mans which was remarkably free
of any adverse omens or unlicenced violence by William’s escort o f one thousand
“eminent knights” {preclaros milites).70 England’s king was at the peak of his military
glory even though he had fought few successful engagements.
Besides his ceremonial entry into Le Mans, a number o f other incidents related
to the conquest o f Maine also contributed much to William’s martial reputation as

“Ibid., 240.
10Ibid., 244-6.
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stories o f him circulated. On the way to Le Mans, the king stopped at Ballon where
Robert o f Belleme still held the Angevin prisoners captive, a doubtless unpleasant
experience unless the lord o f Belleme refrained from the cruelties that Orderic usually
charged him with in regard to captives. Crying out to William from within the tower,
the Angevins asked the king to free them. He paroled them for the day amid criticism
that such generous treatment would let some escape. “Far be it from me,” responded
Rufus, “to believe that a true knight would break his sworn word. If he did so he would
be despised for ever as an outlaw.”71 This sort of chivalrous gesture was no small part
of that reputation that attracted soldiers to William’s household. Besides his generosity,
William also had a defiant flair that caught the imagination o f contemporaries. After
recovering Le Mans, William then released Helias from imprisonment at Bayeux. The
chastened ex-count then applied to William to join the king’s fam ilia until he should
prove through loyal service his worthiness to hold the county again, presumably as
William’s man. Although Rufus meant at first to grant Helias’s request, questionable
counsel from Robert of Meulan induced him to refuse. Denied this avenue of recovery,
Helias defied the king to his face and promised another war if he should gain his
freedom from Rufus. William, in a combination of anger and regal nonchalance, let
Helias go free to try to do his worst against the king. William o f Malmesbury captured
the king’s blunt style as he dismissed Helias: “Do you think I care what you would do?
Go away! Get out! Sod offl You can do whatever you like.72 These were the kinds of

7lIbid., 244.
72Barlow, 391. GR, II: 373-4. OV, v: 246-8.
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stories that soldiers loved, but which the clerics deplored as symptomatic o f the king’s
flaws. William could indulge in such behavior because his agents, especially Flambard,
were pillaging England’s riches, from the peasants and merchants on up to the sacred
vessels of churches. This unjust collection o f revenue went overseas, complained
Orderic. and “enriched foreigners for empty show.”73
The show had a point, however. It was part of a reputation built on romantic
impulse and calculated effect, a glamour that drew men to Rufus as surely as the wages
he paid. By 1099 William Rufus had engaged in only a few battles, and none with the
import o f Hastings for his father or Tinchebrai for his brothers. Yet the perception of
him as an effective and successful general would persist through the century even
though he had made little more headway in the Vexin than had his father or would the
kings that followed him.74 His last troubles in Maine particularly illustrate this point.
William had returned to England and was hunting in the New Forest when a messenger
reached him from Robert of Belleme. It turned out that Helias had made good on his
threat and, with a new army and fresh support from the some of the Le Mans populace,
was even then trying to storm the Norman garrison holding onto the citadel. In a near
legendary stunt, William is supposed to have abandoned the hunt immediately and
spurred for the coast. When cautioned to delay and collect an army, he responded, “Do
you think I shan’t have men? If I know my lads they’ll fly to me even through raging

73OV, v: 250.
74Barlow, 395-7, including reference to John o f Salisbury’s praise o f William.
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seas.”75 More heroics followed as William forced a captain to take him across a stormy
Channel, landed nearly alone at Touques, and dashed on to Bonneville. From there his
messengers left to summon an army which quickly gathered. Although the speed of
assembly seems to bespeak a force comprised of local Normans, Orderic reveals later on
that “races of many regions” made up the army with which Rufus quickly brought
Maine back under control.76 Doubtless some of these non-Norman elements were
already in the duchy as members of the military household, and more were present
simply because word o f the conflict had drawn them; in the latter instance, however,
William’s reputation as an employer and leader must be reckoned among the factors that
attracted foreign soldiers even before he surprised friend and foe alike with his crossChannel dash.
That reputation would die intact with William when he died in the New Forest
the next year, the victim o f a hunting accident. As far as the churchmen were
concerned, the hand o f God had fallen on the shameless pillager of church and country,
the profligate and blasphemous foe of Anselm. But if the ecclesiastics could barely
regret the death o f an impenitent sinner, “mercenary soldiers, lechers, and common
harlots lost their wages through the death o f the lascivious king, and lamented his
wretched end not through respect but out of vile greed that fed on his vices.”77

15GR, 11:373. The translation here is from Barlow, 403.
76OV, v: 256-60: multarum tribubusprovinciarum.
77OV, v: 292: Stipendiarii vero milites et nebulones ac vulgaria scorta questus
stios in occasti moechi principis perdidenmt, eiusque miserabilem obitum non tarn pro
pietate quean pro detestabili flagitiorum cupiditate planxerunt. . . .
66

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The death o f such a generous employer, however, did not close off the
opportunity for advancement that service with the English kings usually held out. Henry
was part o f the hunting party when Rufus found himself on the wrong end o f Walter
Tirel’s arrow. He dashed to London with Robert o f Meulan and was there crowned by
the bishop o f the city since Anselm was still in exile and Thomas of York could not
arrive quickly enough. Henry’s military education had come both at the hand of and in
the company of, his brothers; he had seen troops hired and had himself been a recruiter
of such.78 It was not likely he would put down such a useful tool, especially with
Robert Curthose expected almost daily to return from the East and reclaim the duchy, if
not the kingdom. Moreover, with the accession o f Louis VI the Fat, the Capetian
dynasty was about to enter a far more energetic phase, thereby enlarging the scope of
military opportunity for the professional soldier. From a historian’s point o f view, the
turn o f the century also marks, not so much an increase in the use o f paid troops, as a
change in their visibility as individual names begin to escape the anonymity of
geographic or national appellations.
Henry acquired the crown of England in August of 1100; Robert, having
acquired fresh military renown in the Crusade, returned to popular acclaim in Normandy
the next month. Almost immediately the perennial problem of divided loyalties sprang

78See GR, 11:478, and above, for Henry’s reliance on Breton troops that he hired
early in his career. Also Prestwich, “War and Finance” in ANW, 68: “But the
mercenaries were not thrown into unemployment on Rufus’s death. . .”; and Chibnall,
“Mercenaries and the fam ilia regis” in ANW, 84: “. . . and it was in the king’s mounted
household troops, the fam ilia regis, that mercenaries were most effectively employed.”
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up to complicate the lives of the Anglo-Norman magnates.79 While such a situation
certainly drew opportunistic warriors, the real impetus lay with the king, duke, and
greatest barons, who had the wherewithal to guarantee in gold and silver the loyalty of
at least some of their troops. Events in Maine quickly demonstrated how the ordinary
combatant expected to build upon those twin pillars, friendship and money,80 that
supported both military and social systems.
Helias o f La Fleche entered Le Mans again at the head of his supporters after
hearing of Rufus’s death. Although triumphant throughout the city, he found Aymer of
Moira and Walter fitzAnsger well-supplied in the citadel and inclined to hold it against
him indefinitely. The two sides settled down to a long and surprisingly amiable siege.
Orderic describes the two forces as playing practical jokes upon each other. Helias
even entered the citadel for visits whenever he wore a white tunic provided by the
defenders. Well before their supplies were threatened, Aymer and Walter spoke with
Helias of their real dilemma: they were holding the tower, and meant to keep on
defending it, but they did not know for whom. They proposed a truce until messengers
to Duke Robert or King Henry should provide them either relief or new orders. The
first messenger went to Robert, who declined to offer either help or advice, distracted as
he was by his homecoming and a possible invasion of England. The messenger went on
to Henry, who likewise had nothing to spare for the besieged garrison except his thanks

79See J.C. Holt, "Politics and Property in Early Medieval England," in Past and
Present 57 (November 1972): 3-52 passim, but particularly 15..
"“Morillo, Warfare, 13.
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for faithful service. With their fidelity proven, the defenders felt all options were
henceforth open to them. Walter and Aymer welcomed Helias for another visit and
offered him the tower—if he had enough money in his coffers. They intended to sell
him more than just the citadel, however; they were themselves in the market for a new
lord after William Rufus’s death. Such strenuous efforts as they had made ought to be
made for a lord and in turn rewarded by a lord. Helias had little reason to disagree and,
after accepting the tower’s surrender, took the men into his service. Presumably he
posted them for a time out of the city because Orderic describes how the count had to
shepherd them from the city populace whose homes they had burned down a year
before.81
Settlements like Walter’s and Aymer’s were not so easy to come by in
Normandy itself or England, where, in the struggle that all knew was coming between
Robert and Henry, many had a foot in both camps. Although Robert enjoyed a fair bit
of baronial support, he raised an army of more knights, plus archers and crossbowmen,
that embarked with him from Treport and eventually landed at Portsmouth.82 As he
marched inland to Winchester, he gained further strength through several defections.
Henry, on the other hand, came to Winchester with “all the English” and Robert of
Meulan, Roger Bigod, Robert FitzHaimo, and Richard of Reviers alone of the greater

81OV, v: 302-6. On Aymer and Walter’s offer to Helias: Si copiam nummorum
in aercirio ttto habes nobiscum felix mercimonium facere potes. Walter would be back
in Henry’s presence by September 1101 when he witnessed a charter of the king’s.
Given Henry’s close relations with Helias o f Maine in these years, it is hard to determine
if Walter had switched camps, or if such a switch would even be necessary.
82Florence, 208.
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nobility.83 Along the way, Henry followed the counsel o f Robert o f Meulan and began
dispensing “promises and gifts” (promissis et muneribus) to secure the loyalty of those
he felt were most likely to waver. Robert of Meulan’s advice to promise anything it
took to win was practical but debilitating in the long run, but the count had an answer
for that. There was no doubt in his mind that during such a crisis, anyone who actually
demanded payment for service that ought to be given freely, could be condemned later
as faithless and exiled. With widespread support among the native levies, then, and
freshly reinforced loyalty from his remaining barons, Henry confronted Robert. The
impending battle did not take place, however, as a number o f barons hurried between
the two armies to arrange a compromise. In the end Robert recognized Henry as king
of England in return for an annual subsidy of three thousand marks o f silver. The
brothers pledged themselves to releasing unjustly held lands o f the other and to re
installing with lands those lords who had forfeited by participating in the invasion. In
this last clause, Robert was especially negotiating on behalf o f Eustace of Boulogne,
who wanted to recover the estates his father had been given by William the
Conqueror.84
The famous peace o f Henry’s reign was not to descend on England yet, for
Robert o f Belleme had inherited the estates of his father and brother that were centered
on Shropshire. Robert maintained his reputation for cruel rapacity in the new territories

83And of course the prayerful support o f the English episcopate while he
continued dangling the possibility o f a rapprochement with Anselm.
MOV, v. 314-20. ASC, s.a. 1100. Florence, 208.
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until Henry finally summoned him in 1102 to answer in court for his violations.
Knowing the verdict and probable punishment, Robert moved into open revolt,
strengthening all his castles and calling for allies, first among fellow Normans and his
neighbors, but eventually among the Welsh also. Although the Welsh princes Cadwgan
and Iorweth probably needed little inducement to join any endeavor that might weaken
English royal power, Robert sweetened his offer with “lordships and lands, horses and
arms, and all kinds o f largesse.”85 The chronology grows confused as Henry gathered
again the English levies and his household forces and began piecemeal to reduce
Robert’s base in England.86 Orderic’s interpretation seems best, however, in that Henry
went first to Arundel, surrounded it with counter-forts, and then left it blockaded for
three months by his fam ilia and its officers. With this nearby threat neutralized, as well
as Robert’s closest base to Normandy unable to import fresh fighters, Henry moved
toward the Welsh marches and the heart of the revolt.
Henry settled down to a three-week siege of Bridgnorth. There, he faced a stiff
defense by the local garrison under the command of Roger, son of Corbet, Robert of
Neuville, and Ulger the huntsman, plus eighty stipendiary knights (stipendiaries milites)
left behind by Belleme. At one point in the siege, Henry’s greater vassals tried to
arrange a compromise between Robert and the king for fear that Robert’s eventual and
total defeat would leave Henry free to impress his will that much more on the remaining
barons. Their attempts to persuade the king in this direction were disrupted, however,

85Florence, 210.
“ Compare OV, vi: 20-30; GR, II: 472; Florence, 210; ASC\ s.a. 1102.
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by the English levies who apparently felt the need for justice even at risk to their own
lives. In Orderic’s account, these country knights shouted out their willingness to storm
the fortress immediately in order to bring the treacherous Belleme to justice.87 Thus
heartened, Henry began instead to increase the pressure on the rebels. He removed
Robert’s Welsh allies, or at least the most powerful, Iorweth, by “disarming them with
gifts and promises.” Then he swore to Robert’s three commanders in the hearing of
many that he would hang everyone he could capture in the fortress unless it was
surrendered to him within three days. A former vassal o f Belleme’s but now serving as
an officer in Henry's fam ilia, William Pantulph, assured Bridgnorth’s castellans that not
only would Henry make good on the threat, but that in return for submission the king
would increase their estates.
The irony o f the surrender has caused it to be often noted by historians.88 The
“feudal” (read: honorable) garrison and civic leaders caved in to Henry while keeping
the negotiations secret from the stipendiaries. When the time came to open the gates,
the erstwhile defenders had to contain forcefully the stipendiaries in another quarter of
the city to allow Henry’s entry. Their dedicated service, however, earned the paid

87Chibnall, OV, vi: 26, n. 2, has noted the trouble attendant on the phrase
pagensis milites She is right to discount the interpretations that would make these men
either mercenaries or members o f the fyrd. Besides the previous indications that
Henry’s household troops were still at Arundel, the strong desire for some sort of
justice to be exacted indicates a more than military association between king and troops.
88Among many: Chibnall, “Mercenaries and the fam ilia regis," in ANW, 91; JO .
Prestwich, “War and Finance,” in ANW, 68; Morillo, 178; Michael Prestwich, Armies
and Warfare in the Middle Ages: the English Experience (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1996), 152.
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knights the magnanimous gesture from Henry of leaving the castle with their arms and
horses.89 As they passed through the royal forces, they cried out that they had not been
part of the surrender lest this incident mar the reputation of stipendiaries.90 The
situation, however, was not so ironic as it was typical. The non-stipendiary defenders
were most likely locals (hence their designation as oppidani) who had every interest not
just in their own lives but in also preserving the stronghold and its appurtenances. The
knights serving for pay had little interest in local structures and far more in attracting the
notice of patrons. Naturally they would be the least inclined to capitulate.
With Belleme's eventual suppression and expulsion from England, the kingdom
itself would enjoy the absence, save along the Welsh borders, o f peace until after
Henry’s death in 1135. Normandy was another case entirely. The problem, according
to Orderic, was not just the duke’s sloth and ineffective authority; Hemy’s pacification
of England drove evildoers like Robert of Belleme back to a province already bursting
with bellicose malcontents.91 It was a morass which the king could hardly avoid.
Besides the lands he still held personally, like Domfront and the Cotentin, he had vassals
like Robert of Meulan whose lands and people suffered in the troubles of the duchy.

^See the comments of S.D. Brown, 37, on the distinction o f owning one’s own
weapons.
"OV, vi: 24-28.
9lIbid., 30; His itaque fugatis de Anglia, vehemens acerbitas nequitiae crevit in
Nenslria, el per iriennium inm m era perpeiravil facinora. There were also situations
like that of Roger o f Lacy, banished from England since 1095 when he had participated
in the last plot against William Rufus, and who was serving as magister militum for
Duke Robert in 1102, p. 32.
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Henry certainly noticed when his brother, deciding that Robert o f Belleme could not be
vanquished, concluded a peace treaty with him. Orderic, ever attuned to anything that
might bring down Robert of Belleme, is the only chronicler to mention an 1104 visit by
Henry to Normandy, at which time Henry accused the duke of breaking the treaties
between them by granting Belleme any accommodation. Unable to answer Henry’s
charges, Robert essentially bought his younger brother off by granting him the
allegiance o f William of Evreux 92 Henry allowed himself to be mollified by gaining
such a staunch subject and returned to England.
Trouble with some of Curthose's magnates drew him back the next year. The
castellan at Bayeux, Gunter o f Aunay, Reginald of Warenne, and several others of the
duke's retainers had captured Robert FitzHaimo and other members of Henry’sfam ilia
regis to hold for ransom. When he heard o f it, Henry fitted out a fleet and came to deal
with the worsening situation. Upon his arrival, many of the Normans rushed to treat
with him. The bishop of Seez, Serlo, reached him first and preached to the king and his
household troops of how badly the duchy was faring, and the church within it. Serlo’s
sermon not only persuaded the king and his fam ilia to cut their long hair and abandon
questionable fashions, but reputedly convinced Henry of the obligation upon him to
preserve the church in Normandy, even if it meant dispossessing his brother. Following
the Easter celebration, Henry sent messengers to Philip, apparently to inform the French
king o f his intentions, and to Geoffrey MarteL, the future count o f Anjou, whom he
summoned to his aid. In the meantime, Henry had to deal with the influx o f Normans

92Ibid., 58.
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ready to give him their help. Elaborating on Duke Robert's shortcomings more than did
Florence, Eadmer makes the flood of Norman defections to Henry seem a natural event.
They came running after the king's gold and silver, delivering up their castles, cities, and
towns to the English king. Henry of Huntingdon confirms that in 1105 King Henry
acquired Caen through monetary means, but Bayeux required an assault and the help of
Geoffrey Martel and Helias o f Maine.93 The castellan there, Gunter o f Aunay, released
the captive Robert FitzHaimo to abate Henry's anger, but refused to surrender the town.
Rather than buy his way in, the king and his allies stormed the place and burned it down.
Eadmer's final comment on the 1105 campaign focused on Henry's return to England in
order to collect more money for the unfinished takeover of Normandy .94
Henry returned to Normandy in the late summer o f 1106 to continue the contest
with Curthose. Henry began to pressure the last strong allies o f his brother, Robert of
Belleme and William, count o f Mortain. The king established a siege-castle, or
blockading fort, near Tinchebrai, a castle belonging to the count o f Mortain. There, he
installed a force of knights and infantry under Thomas of St. John to hem in William's
garrison in Tinchebrai. Hearing of this, William of Mortain responded in person,
bringing in supplies for his forces and wasting the countryside so that Henry's foragers
could find nothing. Henry in his turn reacted by assembling even larger contingents and

93lbid., 60-68. ASC, s.a. 1105. Florence, 213. Eadmer Historia Novorum, 165.
Henry o f Huntingdon, 452: Conquisivit igitur Cadomum pecurtia. Baiocum armis, et
auxilio consulis Andegavensis.
^OV, vi: 78. Eadmer, Historia Novorum, 171-2. O f course, part of this was
Eadmer just warming up to complain again about paying taxes.
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came to besiege Tinchebrai personally. Besides hisfam ilia, the king had quite a number
of Norman nobles, plus Helias o f Maine and a Breton contingent. Curthose acted next
and assembled (adunavit) his army with which to force Henry to abandon the siege.
Henry wrote disparagingly of Robert's forces, claiming they were only such as he could
buy or beg (prece et pretio adunare potuit). Efforts by several magnates to reconcile
duke and king failed, and the rare event o f a pitched battle actually took place. The
actual progress of the battle has been covered quite well95, and only two characteristics
need be pointed out here. Henry had many o f his household knights dismount to fight
on foot in the center, a tactic that stiffened their resolve and, by example, that of the rest
o f his forces.96 The troops which might deserve to be called mercenaries, the Bretons
and Manceaux,97 he kept mounted and out o f the first phase of the battle. After the
main forces had come together and were tightly concentrated on one another, Helias led
this mounted group in a charge that caused unusually severe casualties among
Curthose's infantry. Orderic claims 225 fell in the first onslaught.98 More importantly.

9SOV, vi: 84-90. The letter o f the Priest of Fecamp in EHR 25 (1910), 296.
Eadmer, Historia Novon/m, 184. See also Morillo, 169-170.
^See Morillo, 182, on the discipline and adaptability which marked the troops of
the fam ilia and how its experience improved Anglo-Norman armies as a whole.
97We do not know by what ties Henry brought Helias or the Bretons to the
battle. In later discussions with Robert of Belleme, (OV, vi: 94) Helias declined to join
any effort against Henry because he was “bound by a treaty to King Henry” (.Henrico
regi confoederatus sum).
98Torigni, on the other hand, GND, ii, 222, reports a total o f 60 casualties
among Curthose's troops and none among Henry's. In his letter to Anselm just after the
battle, King Henry boasted o f 400 captured knights and 10,000 foot-soldiers.
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Belleme saw the upheaval and decided a quick retreat was his best option. He left the
duke and the count o f Mortain behind to be captured and imprisoned by King Henry for
the rest o f their lives.99 The battle had lasted only an hour.
While Henry had been in England, one of the First Crusade's great heroes,
Bohemond, had come into Gaul recruiting volunteers for his upcoming expedition
against the Byzantine Empire. Henry denied him entry into England for fear that he
would lose his best knights to Bohemond's charisma and promises o f eastern riches.
King Philip, on the other hand, granted Bohemond just such an opportunity during the
very ceremony that made Bohemond his son-in-law. Many younger sons and
possessors o f small estates responded enthusiastically to Bohemond's appeal and joined
themselves to his cause. Among them was at least one future member (and an unusually
visible one) of Henry's household corps, Ralph the Red of Pont-Echanfray. Ralph had
attained the formal status of knight just before 1100 and next appeared in Orderic's
pages when he supported Eustace of Breteuil's succession. He went on the ill-starred
expedition against Durazzo, and after Bohemond's campaign dissolved, went on to visit
Constantinople (where his wife died) and Jerusalem. He reappeared in 1118 already
back at Pont-Echanfray, now apparently lord of the estate, but an active member of
Henry's military household. During campaigns in Evreux, he proved an effective
obstacle to Amaury o f Montfort's attempted offensives. He was among the leaders that
Henry installed in the siege-castle built at Evreux. At another time in the Vexin, he gave

"Robert enjoyed an unfortunately long life, dying in 1134 only a year before his
brother.
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up his mount to Henry's son Richard and allowed himself to be captured instead.
Ransomed within fifteen days, he had gained the close attention of the king, who
promised him great honors soon. As his only extra reward by that point appears to have
been a money-fief from the new lord o f Breteuil, he naturally still stayed close to the
king. Thus he was part of the 1120 return to England of Henry's forces, but drowned in
the disaster of the White Ship. Ralph's untimely death has left several questions
unanswerable. Why was he so active in the familia? His marriage typically would
remove him from the ranks of young bachelors striving to create a reputation for
themselves; perhaps his wife's death while he was still rather young effectively returned
him to that status. How and when did he become lord o f Pont-Echanfray, and was he
actually in search o f further honors and estates?100
Aggravating as such questions without answers are, at least they can be asked of
Ralph the Red. As Chibnall has pointed out, other members o f the fam ilia often hailed
from much more obscure backgrounds. Those with nicknames like Bertrand Rumex or
Odo Borleng she supposed to have come from modest families but with “just enough
resources to provide themselves with the training and equipment o f a knight.”101 If they
indeed had the training of knights, then such men came also at least from families with
the right sort o f connections to provide such an apprenticeship. For some like Rualon
of Avranches, a modest start in a foreign locale were the very circumstances that service

100Chibnall, "Mercenaries and the fam ilia regis" in ANW, 85. OV, vi: 40, 70,
220-2, 230, 246, 250.
101Chibnall, in ANW, 87.
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in a fam ilia could overcome. One of the Bretons that Henry knew from his youth,
Rualon, acquired the manor of Stanton Harcourt by grant and later the barony o f
Folkestone through marriage with the heiress, Matilda o f Monville.102 Among other
Bretons to gain renown and material rewards through the king's household were the
Aubigny brothers, Nigel and William. To serve in the fam ilia regis, or any military
household, was to seek advancement or recovery. On this last count Henry masterfully
managed both his personnel and the confiscated territories that he held.103 Among many
examples, the most prominent were Henry's illegitimate son Robert and his nephew
Stephen o f Blois. Both profited immensely from Henry's generosity with the forfeited
Mortain and Montgomery lands, plus marriages arranged by the king to valuable
heiresses.
Service in the fam ilia did not guarantee the king's attention upon a knight.
Although numbers are lacking, the large size o f the military household is evidenced by
its ability to absorb the thousand knights which the count of Flanders contributed under
the Treaty o f Dover. In addition, the campaigns o f William Rufus and Henry
demonstrate that the majority of the fam ilia regis spent far more time in the desultory
work of garrison duty than in the reputation-deciding broil of combat. And although the
chroniclers are less specific about such duty during Stephen’s reign, the irruption o f

102OV, vi: 246, n.3.
103Maijorie Chibnall, Anglo-Norman England, 1066-1166 (Oxford. Basil
Blackwell, 1986), 76: “By judicious control o f marriages or the transfer of forfeited
lands to collaterals, Henry was often able to establish his loyal vassals in great honours
without undermining the patrimonial claims cherished by all his vassals "
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adulterine castles during the Anarchy doubtless drew in soldiers in need of employment
o f any sort. The tedium could go on indefinitely for a permanent garrison, and near
likewise for those in siege-castles. A part of Henry's fam ilia spent three months in a
counter-fort outside Arundel before that castle's defenders decided that the fall of
Bridgnorth left little hope for Robert of Belleme's rebellion. Things could get warm
however, as the household troops stationed against Tinchebrai learned in 1106, and
Ralph the Red's contingent at Evreux engaged Amaury of Montfort's forces hotly on
several occasions. As Prestwich showed, the royal forces that fought at Bourgtheroulde
were most likely drawn from fam ilia garrisons at surrounding castles.104
This focus on the control o f castles led to increased friction between Louis VI
and Henry I. Before Louis’s accession in 1108, Henry compelled Payne o f Gisors to
give him control o f the castle originally built by Rufus. Strategically sited on the river
Epte right at the borders o f the Norman and French Vexin, Louis and Henry would
begin a conflict over the castle's ownership that lasted over a century. Louis the Fat's
problems only grew over the next three years: in 1110 or 1111 Robert of Meulan,
Henry’s faithful friend and counselor but also a vassal of the French king, avenged past
raids on his county by seizing and pillaging Paris;105 shortly thereafter, Louis’s most
independent-minded vassal, Theobald of Blois, rebelled and allied himself with his uncle.

104Prestwich, “Military Household” in ANW, 103.
105See C. Warren Hollister, “War and Diplomacy in the Anglo-Norman World:
The Reign o f Henry I,” reprinted in Monarchs, Magnates and Institutions in the AngloNorman World (London. The Hambledon Press, 1986), 283, for possible dates of
Robert’s raid. Also, Suger, 112, n.l.
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King Henry.106 Like so many o f the conflicts already described in Normandy, those of
the 1110s would draw numerous combatants from beyond the immediate theater. Suger
noted the presence o f warriors from Flanders, Ponthieu, the Vexin, and other frontier
regions who fought for Louis VI at no cost; if true, they presumably made up the
expenses o f war from the plunder of Henry’s devastated territories. Suger’s portrayal
of events tried to offset Henry’s eventual imposition of a military decision by framing
the conflict as a Pyrrhic one for the Anglo-Normans.107
In some details, Suger was correct. With little hope of competing financially
with Henry, Louis had to rely on allies with their own reasons for fighting; but Henry
could afford to purchase such motivation. The Flemings who came to Louis's aid
usually did so in the company of their count who, besides being a vassal of the French
king, was in Robert U’s case an uncle to the king. His death in 1111 came during a rout
by Theobald’s household troops. Once old enough, his son Baldwin returned to the
same theater in 1119, this time in support of his cousin the king and more distant
kinsman, William Clito the son of Robert Curthose. Orderic’s portrayal of the brash
count indicates a love o f adventure that unfortunately ran up against the experience of

‘“ Henry's sister Adela had married Stephen o f Blois, the count of Champagne.
Their son Theobald inherited the patrimony while the second, Stephen, went to Henry's
court, presumably entered the familia, and earned great rewards from his uncle. Adela
also sent the youngest son, Henry, to his namesake's court for ecclesiastical promotion.
In time he would become bishop of Winchester.
l07Suger, 110-2. He described Henry as nearly bankrupted by the payroll o f his
knightly garrisons. Louis, on the other hand, had free help; gratuila Flandrensium,
Pontivorum, Vilcassinorum et aliorum collimitancium strenua impiignatione, terram
incendiis, depopulatione agilare non desinebat. Compare ASC, s.a. 1118.
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the Breton and English knights whom Henry had just installed at Bures. Wounded by a
Hugh Boterel, Baldwin retired to Aumale where an evening of revelry apparently
aggravated his injury with fatal consequences.108 Henry had added his stipendiaries
Britones et Anglos109 to the garrison at Bures precisely because he did not trust many o f
the Normans. With the cause of William Clito gaining ground, Henry found treachery in
numerous places, including the familia. Hugh o f Goumay had recovered his ancestral
lands through Henry’s patronage, but he turned against the king even as his sister was
marrying another member of the household, Nigel d’Aubigny. Seizing the castle o f Le
Plessis, he killed Bertrand Rumex,110 yet another member o f Henry’s military household.
Not long after, Henry drove Hugh’s forces from the castle and re-garrisoned it under
“Robert and William, the sons of Amaury ”m On the whole, though, Henry found the
fam ilia and his non-Norman troops reliable. Orderic lists several perhaps known to him
personally who left their own estates at risk to assemble with Ralph the Red at PontEchanfray: besides William o f Ray, William of Fontenil, and Isnard of Ecublei, there was

108OV, vi: 160-2, 190. Hugh Boterel may have been related to a Breton family
which was becoming ever more English in lands and orientation. A William Boterel o f
Cornwall was forgiven a debt of 2s. in PR 31 HI, 160.
109A group which Chibnall has translated as “mercenaries.” As wage-eamers
they might qualify for such a label, but it seems a hasty judgment on Henry’s English
subjects. As for the Bretons, they could have hailed from Breton lordships in England
as well, or been lords like Ralph of Gael, heir to Breteuil in Normandy but resented
because of his Breton descent.
110See OV, vi: 192, n.3: The nickname Rumex refers to a type o f hunting-spear.
As noted above, such nicknames may indicate a lower status for Bertrand.
mIbid., n.6: Another questionable designation as “mercenary captains.”
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one Sancho. Chibnall has suggested Sancho may have come to Normandy with Rotrou
of Perche, who campaigned often in the Spanish kingdoms."2 Perhaps because Suger
was right, and because he was not the spendthrift William Rufus had been, Henry
moved quickly to reduce his armies (and payroll) after the 1120 settlement with Louis
the Fat. He took the cream o f the household with him to Barfleur, however, for a
return to England so he could there “pay generous wages to the young champions and
distinguished knights who had fought hard and loyally, and raise the status of some by
giving them extensive honours in England.”" 3 The sinking o f the White Ship, however,
ended the prospects of many, including Ralph the Red.
Even with the disaster o f the White Ship, Henry’s control over England and
Normandy was firm enough for few to dispute his pre-eminence as a dispenser of
rewards and patronage. His position was both characteristic o f the centralizing AngloNorman administration and a hallmark o f what the latter half o f the century would hold.
The adventurous spirits who fought simultaneously for their own enrichment and that of
William Rufus, Henry and Louis the Fat saw great personal opportunities diminish as
kings gained better control o f the military and social affairs o f their realms. Two
decades of civil war in England would disguise this fact, but on the whole, martial
entrepreneurs would find the scope o f their activity limited within France and England
while better options beckoned along the frontiers of Christendom.

xnIbid., 198, n. 3.
1131bid., 295: et tironibus ac precipuis militibus qui laboriose fideliterque
militaverant largci stipendia erogare, et qnosdam amplis honoribus datis in Anglia
sullimare
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Ill
Years o f Transition
The sport of kings and magnates remained the acquisition o f territories, rights,
and power, but the middle part of the twelfth century saw less room for independent
maneuvering on the part of the non-royal players. Henry I made this lesson clear to all
his vassals with a thorough suppression of rebellion in 1124. His later magnanimity to
some o f the rebels demonstrated not simply his lordship within geographical boundaries
but also his position as final arbiter o f who advanced within his administration. Those
who chafed under Henry’s vigorous management and stem justice had to look
elsewhere to manufacture new opportunities. For many, the most appealing theaters
were those at the far fringes, the bastions of Christendom in the Holy Land or more
reasonably (for the purposes of estate-building) in the Iberian peninsula. Later
adventurers found an arena closer to home in the unsettled politics o f Ireland. Even
with England in the throes of the Anarchy during Stephen’s reign, the violent
opportunism of many nobles and knights actually focused on determining the ultimate
source o f patronage. The jockeying o f England’s aristocracy aimed at establishing
either Stephen or Matilda as Henry’s successor as arbiter of rewards. Even the most
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successful o f the foreign “mercenaries” who came into England, William of Ypres,
found conditions still under his lord/employer’s control. William’s advances only came
after parallel victories for Stephen’s cause. William’s own gambits, whether simple
enrichment or diplomacy with archbishops and counts, typically happened within the
context o f Stephen’s policies. His dismissal at the start of Henry II’s reign signaled the
new conditions for hired warriors. Henceforth, they would be tools o f the king, picked
up for specific tasks and put away when the job was complete.
In the latter part of Henry I’s reign, however, such developments were little
feared by the nobles of northwest Europe, for whom violent advancement was still an
acceptable, even honorable, means of aggrandizement. In the peace that followed the
campaigns o f 1118-19, though, the opportunities grew less for rapid ascent up the social
and administrative ladder. Waleran of Meulan, one of the twin sons o f Robert of
Meulan, had been in his minority during those wars and succeeded to his father’s Vexin
and Norman properties even as Henry and Louis arranged the peace. Overly aware of
his noble ancestry and inflamed by dreams o f chivalric glory, Waleran, along with
Amaury o f Evreux, in 1123 broke the long loyalty of the counts o f Meulan to the
Anglo-Norman kings after a year of “secret” meetings.1
Since June Henry had been back in Normandy and had set the wheels in motion
for assembling an army at Rouen. In October he moved against the castle of Montfortsur-Risle, the stronghold of Hugh de Montfort to whom Waleran had married one of his

‘See David Crouch, The Beaumont Twins (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), 14-5, for an excellent discussion o f Waleran’s motives. OV, vi, 332, 354.
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sisters. Hugh fled to warn Waleran while his brother and wife tried to hold the castle.
The assault which followed resulted in the torching of the town and reduction of all
fortifications except the citadel itself. As the siege dragged into a month, “Robert the
king’s son and Nigel of Aubigny brought a strong force from the Cotentin and other
provinces.” With no help coming from the other rebels, the garrison at Montfort-surRisle made their peace with the king.2 Henry pressed on, aiming next for Pont Audemer
so as to lock up the lower Risle valley and to send a signal to all once he had captured
the most prestigious of Waleran’s castles. By this point both sides in the conflict were
tapping into all available manpower resources. Symeon of Durham confirms the
presence still among Henry’s army of troops from Lower Brittany, while Orderic knew
a number of French notables had come to aid Waleran’s garrison. Among these were
Louis de Senlis, a future under-butler to Louis VII, Harcher, kitchener (cocus) to Louis
VI, and Simon Temel of Poissy, whose father was a courtier of Louis VI.3 The siege
consumed six to seven weeks and resulted in the usual arson of the surrounding town,
which Symeon blamed on the Bretons, but Orderic saw as the normal progression of
Henry’s efforts. Once within the town’s precincts, the Bretons “with the skill which is
the mark of all mercenaries,”4 located the secret caches of valuables left behind by the
former residents. The chronicles agree that despite the length o f the siege, Henry and

2OV, vi, 334-6. Rodbertusfiliu s regis et Nigellus de Albinneio magnum agmen
de Constantino alUsque provinciis adduxerunt. ..
3Symeon of Durham, Historia Regum, Thomas Arnold, ed. (London: Rolls
Series, 1882), 274. OV, vi, 340. Also, Crouch, The Beaumont Twins, 19.
4Crouch, The Beaumont Twins, 18.
86

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

his army pressed it closely. Surrender came when the besiegers rolled a siege-tower, or
belfry, up to the castle walls which enabled their archers and crossbowmen to sweep the
walls of defenders from a greater height. As part of the terms, Henry allowed the
garrison to leave with all their goods and equipment, some of which may have seen use
against him later. Orderic reports that some o f the defenders went to Beaumont, where
Waleran was staying with still more French allies. With winter setting in, Henry set
contingents o f the fam ilia in castles surrounding Beaumont. He also set up a siegecastle to blockade the exposed rebel post at Vatteville.
The complicity of Louis the Fat in the 1123-24 revolt is hard to establish
although he can hardly have wished Henry an easy time of it. Certainly he did not seem
to mind the exodus o f French knights and functionaries to Beaumont. At least two
hundred knights joined Waleran and Amaury there, as well as bishop Simon of Noyon,
Simon o f Neaufle, a distant kinsman of Waleran’s, Guy of Mauvoisin, a younger brother
of the lord o f Rosny, and his nephew Peter o f Maule, and William Aiguillon, another
Vexin lord. Many o f these knights joined Waleran and Amaury in the raid to destroy
Henry’s siege-castle opposite Vatteville.5
The resulting battle at Bourgtheroulde has attracted much attention and for
good reasons. Measured by the numbers involved or the damage done, it was a small
affair, but the speeches delivered before the battle, the known participants, and its actual

sOV, vi, 342. Crouch, The Beaumont Twins, 20-1.
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quick progress, have given historians much to digest.6 As Waleran, Amaury, and their
knightly confederates returned from the Vatteville raid, the dispersed contingents of
Henry’s familia had learned of the raid and come together near Bourgtheroulde under
the command o f Odo Borleng. When the two forces sighted each other on 26 March,
three hundred soldiers of the military household against a larger group o f French and
Norman knights, discussions followed on each side which Orderic magnificently
recreated. On the royal side, Odo challenged his champions to show their courage and
determination (piigilis audacia vigorque). There would be real consequences
otherwise. “We shall deserve to forfeit both our wages and our honour; and, in my
opinion, we shall never again be entitled to eat the king’s bread.”7 Odo’s disposition for
battle reveal the range of warriors who made up the fam ilia. knights and archers, with
both groups split between mounted and dismounted contingents. Seeing Odo’s
preparations, Amaury advised Waleran and others eager for battle that discretion ought
to be the order o f the day. But all that Waleran saw was the glory to be won: they had
the flower o f Norman and French knighthood (militaris flos) on hand, and who were
“these country bumpkins and mercenaries”8 to stand against them. Waleran led the
initial charge o f the rebels only to become unhorsed like many of his fellow knights by

6OV, vi, 346-8. For the significance of Waleran’s and Odo’s speeches and the
composition o f the opposing forces, Chibnall, in ANW, 88. On the contrasting levels of
generalship, Morillo, 173-4.
7OV, vi, 350; Stipendia cum laude nostra meriotperdemus, nec pane regio
vesci ulterius me iudice debemus.
tIbid. . Chibnall, n. 1, demonstrates how qualified her translation must be, as only
context can indicate the exact sense ofpagenses et gregarii in any instance.
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the archers o f the fam ilia who deliberately aimed at the unarmored horses. Following
the collapse o f Waleran’s charge, the battle turned into a rout. The hotheaded count,
his two new brothers-in-law, and nearly eighty other knights soon found themselves
prisoners of the disciplined professionals of the military household. Amaury had the
good fortune to be captured by William of Grandcourt, who abandoned his prominent
place in the fam ilia regis and Normandy itself to let Amaury escape. The rebellion
collapsed with Waleran’s charge, and Henry had only to swing through the troubled
regions with his new prisoner to induce the surrender of the garrisons.9
With the end of the 1124 rebellion, Normandy came to know some o f the same
peace as England for the rest of Henry’s reign. Under his firm rule, the opportunistic
had to settle for a slow rise through the king’s administration or else go beyond the
Anglo-Norman realm to find a potentially faster means of advancement. As
Bohemond’s recruitment showed, southern Italy and the Balkans had an appeal for
those still “on the make” in northern France, Flanders, and Normandy. The same held
true for the Iberian kingdoms. Alfonso I el Batallador was sending to Normandy for
help soon after his 1104 accession to the Aragonese throne, promising generous wages
(large stipendia) to all who served and rich estates (opima praedia) to any who chose
to stay in the kingdom. As a cousin to Alfonso, Rotrou of Perche (and Mortagne) led
several expeditions of Normans and French beyond the Pyrenees to war against the
Muslims there. Among those that Rotrou led south, Orderic noted the career o f Robert

9OV, vi, 348-56. Robert of Torigny, in GND, 233-5. Crouch, The Beaumont
Twins, 23-4.
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Burdet of Cullei who probably arrived in the Iberian peninsula around 1110, participated
in the capture of Tudela (where he and Rotrou won extensive grants within the city),
and rescued Alfonso during the early phases o f the battle at Fraga. He left Aragon in
1128 to become count o f Tarragona at the invitation of the city’s archbishop.10 Orderic
had little but praise for Burdet, his family, and companions because of their success in
returning Tarragona to Christian control.
Tarragona’s return to Christendom was less the result, however, of Burdet’s
crusading zeal than his desire to acquire his own principality. The city’s archbishop had
induced Burdet to defend the city by granting him virtual lordship of it, a concession
that both the archbishop and the count of Barcelona came to wish had never been made.
Robert’s successful re-establishment of Christian dominance in the region caught the
approving attention o f Pope Honorius III,11 but also the jealous eye of RaymondBerengar o f Barcelona who had no intention o f seeing comital rights not extended to
their fullest there. After 1137a new archbishop worked to reduce the Burdet position,
often with covert support from successive Catalan counts. By this time, however,
Robert had brought his wife and sons to the area, all of whom defended their pre
eminence as vigorously as Robert. Following Robert’s death in 1161, his heir William
was forced by the archbishop and the comital court to accept a questionably legitimate
accord of 1151 in which Robert had briefly accepted a reduction of his lordship. The
pressure against the Burdets mounted until William and his brothers retaliated in 1171

10OV, vi, 402-4, 410.
nEspana Sagrada XXII: 116, and XXV: 18.
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by assassinating the new archbishop. Pope Alexander III threatened an interdict upon
the family’s domains, but this was averted when the youngest son claimed sole
responsibility for the murder. He said it was vengeance for the death o f another brother,
killed “because he was a foreigner.”12 The family’s refusal to assimilate or to let go of
privileges once belonging to the archbishopric had taken it from the commendation of
one pope to the anathema of another.13
Attempts like that of the Burdets to put down roots in militarily volatile lands
were mirrored in England and Normandy after the death of Henry in 1135. His lack of a
direct male heir set the stage for a contested throne, an issue which Stephen o f Blois
appeared to settle with his quick dash across the channel and subsequent coronation. By
1139, however, Henry’s daughter and former Holy Roman Empress Matilda began to
oppose Stephen's position vigorously. With vassalic loyalty proving all too fluid, both
sides collected additional warriors from varied sources and with whatever resources
they could muster. If contemporary chroniclers agree on anything, it is that England was
inundated with these men and that their presence served only to intensify the violence
wracking the land. Stephen followed his uncles’ examples and kept the fam ilia regis
full of eager warriors. For the Empress hired warriors brought risks since her position
was even less secure than the king's.14 Except for the brief ascendancy in 1141, her

12Marcelin Defoumeaux, Les Francois en Espagne aux Xle et XIIe siecles
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949), 229.
13I b i d 230.
l4Matilda’s difficulty in finding reliable, effective forces to hire stemmed less
from her position as a female than Stephen’s advantage as a consecrated monarch with
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cause typically struggled uphilL, a situation which did not lend itself to magnanimous
rewards. Thus her stipendiaries were as likely to strike out on their own as to serve her
needs faithfully.
The few candidates from within the Anglo-Norman domains who might qualify
as stipendiaries remain relatively unknown and questionable. The Gesta Stephcmi relates
how in 1144 one William of Dover came to Cricklade on behalf of Robert of
Gloucester, built a castle there, and then with a “large following of mercenary knights”
and archers proceeded to harass quite effectively the king's garrisons at Oxford and
Malmesbury. R.H.C. Davis has identified this William as the William Peverel who was
Robert of Gloucester's castellan at Dover in 1135. Beeler has suggested that Peverel is
an early example of an English “mercenary captain.” For Beeler, Peverel is apparently
guilty by association, but the G estds account does not indicate that Peverel's use of
stipendiaries in any way degraded his own status, merely that his attacks around
Cricklade were especially ferocious. Yet Beeler describes Peverel as “infamous” even at
the moment the latter departed for the Second Crusade.1S Evidence for further
Anglo-Norman examples remains tenuous at best. The role of the de Chesney brothers
at the siege o f Winchester has led Beeler to propose that they were mercenaries for

the backing o f the kingdom’s ecclesiastical establishment. See Matthew Strickland,
“Against the Lord’s annointed: aspects of warfare and baronial rebellion in England and
Normandy, 1075-1265,” in Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy
(Cambridge: University Press, 1994): 56-79.
l5GS, 1 7 0 -1 :"... militibusque stipendiariis, sed et sagittantium turmis . . . "
And n.l for Peverel’s identification by Davis. OV, vi, 218. Beeler, Warfare in England,
1066-1189, 299, 145.
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Stephen. His argument stems from the description in the Gesta Stephani that they were
“not men endowed with large estates but plain soldiers.” Nonetheless, they arrived at
the siege with a “body o f knights and archers very ready for action.” This disparity
between small landholdings and an obviously well-equipped group of fighters is not so
strange if Roger and William de Chesney had been receiving wages from the king for
themselves and their force. But the fact is that they were not “plain soldiers.” The
description, non quidem terris amplificatos, sed in castris tantum merentes,” indeed
implies that the brothers held little, if any, land for military service; but the clause also
notes that so far they had merited the king’s trust by holding castles. Doubtless they
brought their available garrisons to Winchester in much the same way that Henry I’s
garrison commanders had gathered to intercept the rebels of 1124. Moreover, their
relationship with the king went beyond a merely pecuniary connection. The Gesta notes
that during Stephen’s captivity (when wages would have doubtless been quite scarce)
Roger and William kept their faith to the king.16 Whether the de Chesney brothers, like
the royalist forces at Bourgtheroulde, were members of the king's military
household remains unprovable, but the conclusion remains that they were receiving
some support from the king.
Apart from these specific but uncertain examples, we do know that there were
Englishmen who served in the Anarchy for pay. William o f Malmesbury deplored the
spoliation of the Church by the Flemish and Breton knights who rushed into Stephen's

16Beeler, Warfare in England, 123. GS, 130-1, concerning the de Chesneys’
troops: aim accinctissima militum et sagittantium cohorte.
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service, but they had native counterparts, indigene milites, who also plundered
monasteries and churches.17 During Geoffrey de Mandeville's revolt in 1144, the
presence of English soldiers of fortune is implicit. The earl collected all his vassals, but
he also accepted service from “a very strong force of ordinary soldiers and likewise of
robbers, who had collected enthusiastically from every quarter.” Further increasing the
probability that these adventurers included inhabitants o f England or Normandy is the
fact that Geoffrey took as allies “all the king's enemies who had flocked in to him.”18 In
the conditions oflhe civil war, Stephen's opposition came primarily from Anglo-Norman
ranks, with only small bands o f Angevins, Bretons, or Flemings occasionally hired by
the Empress Matilda's party.
Those foreigners that the Empress imported into England tended to give her as
much grief as aid. In her recent study o f the Empress Matilda, Maijorie Chibnall has
noted that the Flemish troops were less reliable than the Empress's Breton knights, who
typically made up her household retinue. The Bretons, however, contributed a smaller
element o f her hired warriors.19 Among the Flemings who gave Matilda cause to wish
she had never hired them, Robert fitz Hildebrand was the most notorious. In 1143
William de Pont de 1’Arche, who had originally given his support to Stephen, quarreled
with Stephen's brother, Henry bishop o f Winchester. Finding himself thwarted by the

17HN, 17.
19GS, 164, 166: “gregariae quoque militiae, sed et praedomim" and “sibique
regis adversariis, quotquot e diverso confluxercmt.
19Maijorie Chibnall, The Empress M atilda (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 120.
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bishop, William sent to the empress for help. This overture created excitement in the
Angevin camp since William de Pont de 1’Arche was considered quite loyal to those he
favored, was very wealthy, and not least, held the castle of Portchester. The empress,
however, was seriously short of manpower and could only dispatch Robert fitz
Hildebrand, a seasoned warrior o f disreputable qualities. The Gesta Stephani has
nothing good to say o f him; besides his low birth, he was “a lustful man, drunken and
unchaste.”20 He brought with him Jlorida militum caterva, a “fine body of knights.”
After being received most graciously and given free run of the castle, fitz Hildebrand
proceeded to seduce William's wife, and together they imprisoned William in his own
dungeon. Robert then made no pretense o f following the empress's cause and occupied
himself with William's castle, wealth, and wife.21 In the opinion of the G estds author,
such horrendous treachery could not go unpunished, even by God. So the author
relates how Robert's vitals were eaten away by a worm that he acquired during his
adultery.
A less colorful but just as perfidious career was that of Robert fitz Hubert. This
Flemish soldier o f fortune made his first appearance little more than a month after the
earl and the empress landed at Arundel in the autumn o f 1139. On the night o f 7
October, fitz Hubert stole into the castle at Malmesbury and occupied it. Some o f the
king's garrison retreated into church o f St. Aldhelm, which delayed their capture for a

WGS, 152: cupidinariusJuit idem, bibax et impttdicus. See Davis, King
Stephen, 3rd ed. (London. Longman, 1990), 77, for Matilda’s shortage of troops in
1143.
21GS, 152: castelloque illius, divitiis et uxore fruens.
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few days. The timing is uncertain, but probably about the time Stephen appeared with an
imposing army, Robert fitz Hubert felt he had to eliminate the opponents within the
castle. John of Worcester writes that he broke into the chapter house of St. Aldhelm's
and ordered the monks to surrender the royalists. The monks, however, stayed
somewhat resolute and only gave over the protected knights' horses. Malmesbury had
been in fitz Hubert's hands for a week when the king arrived; eight days later the
pressure o f the siege, along with negotiations on the part of William o f Ypres, saw the
castle surrendered back to the king.22
Robert fitz Hubert's audacious capture o f Malmesbury (even before he took
service with either side in the civil war) caught the chroniclers’ attention and has thus
left us with more details than normal about a hired warrior. John of Worcester calls him
miles, a knight, the son of a certain noble named Hubert. This assertion o f noble origins
is confirmed by the fact that Robert was a blood-relation, conscmguineus, o f William o f
Ypres, the commander of the king's stipendiaries.23 William belonged to the comital
house of Flanders and had twice asserted claims to the countship before coming to
England. Even though John of Worcester alone provides such details, the explicitness of
his claims lends them credibility.
Following his quick suppression at Malmesbury, Robert fitz Hubert soon hired
himself out to Robert Earl o f Gloucester. The Gesta Stephani is explicit on this point,

UHN, 36; John of Worcester, 61.
BJohn of Worcester, 61: M iles quidam nomine Rotbertus, cuiusdam nobilis viri
Huberti ftlius. .. Willelm. d ’Ipre, ut fertu r consanguineus ipsius Rotberti. . . .
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noting that Robert was the stipendiarius o f the earl. Robert, however, was interested
more in his own aggrandizement, not in either side of the Anarchy. He stole away one
night with his own retainers from the Earl's army just months after the escapade at
Malmesbury. Again relying on stealth, he infiltrated the impressive stronghold at
Devizes through use of unusually crafted scaling ladders made of leather. He surprised
all of the king's garrison save for a few men who had to surrender the inner citadel a few
days later because of a lack of food. The three accounts o f Robert at Devizes remain
irreconcilable in all their particulars as to what followed. The Gesta Stephani alone
relates that the Earl o f Gloucester, upon hearing o f the fall of Devizes, sent his son there
with a force to “assist” Robert in holding the castle. Robert was in no mood for
supervision, however it might be cloaked; all the sources agree that with Devizes as his
base, Robert was preparing to carve out his own principality between the two factions
warring for the throne. He sent to Flanders for more knights (pro militibus) and began
to terrorize the countryside. Somehow in the process of ravaging the district, he ran
afoul o f John the Marshal at Marlborough. John was able to imprison fitz Hubert and
then barter him away to the Earl of Gloucester. What happened next is cloudy, but the
end result was that the Angevin supporters hanged fitz Hubert before the walls o f
Devizes in an unsuccessful attempt to induce his followers to surrender. After these
events the king approached the garrison with a large monetary offer and was able to
regain the fortress without a siege.24

24For the different accounts o f Robert fitz Hubert at Devizes, see HN, 43-4; GS,
104-8; and John o f Worcester, 61-3.
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At this point, fitz Hubert’s exploits provide a fleeting glimpse at some of the
compatriots he brought into England. Robert fitz Hubert had a noble pedigree and was
related to one of northwest Europe’s most distinguished houses. The Gesta Stephani
notes that the garrison he installed at Devizes was composed of relatives and fellow
knights. More specifically, John of Worcester's account tells that before fitz Hubert
went to the gallows, two o f his nephews were also hanged.25 The higher status of
Flemings who came into England during Stephen's reign is also evident among the
contingent which William o f Ypres commanded. At the corporate leveL, contemporaries
agree that the force was a highly trained cavalry unit. E. Warlop's study o f the Flemish
nobility has provided the name and background of at least one mounted warrior serving
under William. Following Thierry of Alsace's eventual victory in the struggle for the
countship of Flanders, he began weeding out those who had opposed him in 1127-28.
This process picked up speed as it became apparent in the early 1130s that William of
Ypres was not going to accept peacefully his exclusion from his grandfather's title. Part
of Thierry's effort included removing from influential positions men in William's former
center of power. Thus the Bailleul family replaced the hereditary castellans o f Ypres
probably in 1132, only a year before William himself was exiled from his wife's castle at
Sluys. Fromold I had held the castellany as late as 1126, although the date is unknown
at which his son, Fromold II, inherited the office. Charter evidence from 1148 and 1149

25GS, 108, calls them cognati et commilitiones. The information on
FitzHubert’s nephews is apparently contained in a Gloucester-based interpolation which
Weaver, John o f Worcester, 5-7, does not think reflects John o f Worcester’s usual
pro-Stephen sympathies. Since the Gesta Stephani contains similar information, I see no
reason to question the nephews’ presence.
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place this second Fromold in England with William o f Ypres. Since he is described as
Fromaldus casteUanus, he may have obtained a reconciliation with Thierry during this
same period as when William also regained control of his Flemish possessions. The
timing was especially fortuitous for Fromold U since the Bailleul castellan had just died
on the Second Crusade.26 Finally, cartulary evidence from Stephen’s reign has yielded
the name o f a brother to William of Ypres which escaped Warlop. Regnier o f Ypres
witnessed a grant to Oseney Abbey in 1139 or 1140 in conjunction with his brother.27
One o f the names to most often head lists of mercenaries in the earlier twelfth
century is that of Stephen’s ally, William o f Ypres. William’s father was Philip o f Loo,
younger son o f Robert the Frisian (Count of Flanders, 1071-1093). Although William
was undoubtedly considered an illegitimate offspring, there is some question whether
this determination arose from an illicit relationship or the lowly status o f his mother.
Louis VI o f France denied William the countship in 1127 ostensibly on these grounds,
elaborating on the point that William's mother not only carded wool for a living, but
never rose above that station. The denial of his grandfather’s title was the second time
William had seen his claim pushed aside. By 1133 William apparently no longer found
this state o f affairs acceptable, and he was raiding extensively from his base at L'Ecluse,
which he held by right o f his wife. Thierry, however, was not about to give William a

26E. Warlop, The Flemish Nobility Before 1300, trans. J.B. Ross and H.
Vandermoere (Kortrijk, Belgium: G. Desmet-Huysman, 1975), 213, 476-477, n. 53.
Warlop's evidence comes from the cartularies of Loo, Berques, and Bourbourg.
21Regesta, II: no. 627. The evidence here is admittedly questionable, however,
since the charter that names Regnier may likely be a later forgery.
99

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

third opportunity at the countship; he moved quickly to push both William and many of
his former supporters from Flanders.28
Until 1137 the details of William o f Ypres’s life remain hidden. R.H.C. Davis in
his study of Stephen’s reign supposed that William went straight from Sluys to
Stephen’s fief o f Boulogne. William o f Malmesbury wrote that Stephen began hiring
soldiers from Flanders before Robert o f Gloucester’s return from Normandy in 1136.29
Since William would eventually command this force, he may well have been present to
play an instrumental role in its employment, especially if (as in Fromold’s case) he was
already familiar with those being recruited. In any case, William had definitely entered
Stephen’s service by 1137 when Orderic Vitalis notes that the king brought him and the
Flemish troops in to help repel Goeffrey o f Anjou’s invasion. During that campaign,
William persuaded Stephen that Robert of Gloucester was not trustworthy. They
prepared an ambush for the earl, but it backfired when word about it somehow spread.
The resulting backlash caused the cancellation o f that year’s campaign in Normandy.
Nonetheless, Stephen sent William back the next year to manage the province's defense
with Waleran o f Meulan, probably the kingdom's most influential man at that time.30
William’s rise to prominence really began once he returned to England. Stephen
had recalled William to England by 1139 when the latter commanded the siege of

28Galbert of Bruges, The Murder o f Charles the Good, James Bruce Ross, trans.
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 187. Flandria Generosa, \nM GH, SS,
IX, 324. Also see Warlop, 213.
^ a v i s , King Stephen, 66. HN, 17.
"OV, vi, 481-483, 515. HN, 21.
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Devizes as part o f Stephen’s effort to break the power of Roger, bishop o f Salisbury,
and his nephews.31 William's precipitate retreat from the battle o f Lincoln in 1141
probably garnered him the most attention by the chroniclers. The pro-Stephen account
of the Gesta Stephani makes its only mention o f William in reference to his performance
there. In his haste to discredit William, the author wrote that he fled the battle even
before the forces came to blows.32 Orderic agrees that William retreated early on, but
he gives the impression that battle had at least been joined. The most detailed account
of the battle is that by Henry of Huntingdon. He credits William with easily dispersing
the Welsh fighters hired by the earl of Chester before being himself repulsed by a
contingent o f infantry led by the earl.33 However it came about, William o f Ypres did
abandon the fray, leaving the king to be encircled and, after a heroic stand, captured.
Henry of Huntingdon attributes William's retreat to his pragmatic assessment that he
could better aid Stephen by staying free to fight another day. Although Henry of
Huntingdon alone of contemporaries relates this, it is significant that Gervase of
Canterbury, who normally never passes on an opportunity to disparage William, follows
the Huntingdon deacon in this interpretation.34

3IOV, vi, 533.
32R.H.C. Davis’s introduction to the Gesta Stephani makes a convincing
argument for bishop Robert of Bath as the author. As a supporter o f Henry o f Blois,
Robert would have had little love for William or his influence on Stephen’s policies.
33GS’, 113; OV, vi, 541-543; Henry o f Huntingdon, 730-6.
m28 I Henry of Huntingdon, 736: Qui cum esset belli peritissimus, videns
impossihilitatem auxiliandi regi, distulit auxilium strum in tempora meliora. Gervase
o f Canterbury, i, 117, quotes Henry o f Huntingdon verbatim.
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As it was, events played themselves out to William’s advantage. While most o f
Stephen’s supporters in the civil war either threw their support to the Empress or at
least stayed docilely neutral, William joined the queen, Matilda of Boulogne, in Kent
where they maintained the king’s cause. With the queen’s naval resources, Kent was a
natural base into which more troops from Flanders could easily be imported.35 At this
point William apparently moved from being the commander of Flemish stipendiaries to a
position o f overall command of the military forces still loyal to the imprisoned king.
John o f Hexham relates that William assumed leadership of the king’s household troops
(familiam regis Stephani) along with Pharamus o f Boulogne, a nephew o f the queen.36
Once Henry o f Blois decided he would be better advised to return to his brother’s
cause, William o f Ypres is the only warrior mentioned by name among the many the
bishop asked for help.37 Once William and the queen, along with a well-equipped force
from London, arrived at Winchester, a siege o f the Empress and her party began in
earnest. William conducted a pragmatic, harshly efficient blockade; aside from
whatever operations others may have led, he burnt the town of Andover plus thwarted
an attempt by John Marshal to break the encirclement at Wherwell. In the sharp

35Henry o f Huntingdon, 738. Davis, K ing Stephen, 54. See also OV, vi, 520, on
queen Matilda’s effective use of sea power to blockade a rebel garrison at Dover.
* 3 1 r John o f Hexham, Symeonis Historia Regum Continuata per Johannem
Hagustaldensem, Thomas Arnold, ed. (London: Rolls Series, 1885), ii, 310: Rexit
autem fam iliam regis Stephani Willelmus d ’Ipre, home Flandrensis, et Pharamus,
nepos reginae M atildae, el isle Bononiensis.
37William o f Newburgh, Historia Rerum Anglicarum, in Chronicles o f the
Reigns o f Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I. Richard Howlett, ed. (London: Rolls
Series, 1884), 41. Henry o f Huntingdon, 740.
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engagement that ensued, the Empress's men retreated into the nunnery there; William
did not hesitate to torch the building. Most contemporaries agree that the defeat at
Wherwell broke the resolve o f the Empress’s party. Unfortunately for her cause, the
retreat from Winchester turned into a disastrous flight and saw the capture of Robert
earl of Gloucester by Stephen’s Flemings at Stockbridge. Significantly, William of
Ypres was not leading the stipendiaries, but rather William de Warenne, earl o f Surrey .38
Events after the victory at Winchester attest to the importance that queen
Matilda and later the king also attached to William o f Ypres. The queen entrusted the
custody of Robert of Gloucester to William of Ypres, who confined him in the castle at
Rochester.39 For a time, Robert himself was the obstacle to negotiations. He felt it was
improper to trade himself for Stephen, as if an earl were equal in value to a king; thus he
wanted other Angevin prisoners traded with himself. In this William of Ypres joined
nobles like Gilbert de Clare in demurring; much as they wanted Stephen’s release, they
also expected proper ransoms for the notables whom they had captured. In the end, the
Empress pressed Robert to accept the equal trade since she could not do without his
leadership.40
Once Stephen gained his freedom, he made plain to whom he felt he owed his
release. Davis notes that when the king held his first Christmas court at Canterbury, it

38Maijorie Chibnall, The Empress M atilda, 113; John o f Hexham, ii, 310;
Gervase o f Canterbury, i, 121, on Robert of Gloucester’s capture by William de
Warenne and the Flemings.
39Gervase o f Canterbury, i, 121.
*°HN, 67-69.
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was a “polite compliment to William of Ypres and his Kentish vassals.

”41 A

contemporary of William's later days back in Flanders recounts that Stephen granted
Kent to William after his release. The Christmas court was the likely occasion since the
writer speaks o f William receiving the honor before “the first men of the kingdom.”42
This Flemish account is the only one to make William’s acquisition of Kent a seemingly
formal feudal investment. Gervase merely credits him with “abusing” the county.
Typically, however, writers admitted his lordship over the county even though he
never held the title o f earl. The Battle Abbey chronicle relates that he “held the county
of Kent;”43 Gervase himself, in a less disparaging moment, notes that Stephen gave the
county into William's keeping. The most telling evidence, as Round pointed out, is that
William himself never added the title comes to his name on official documents.44
By the middle of the 1140s, William of Ypres was no longer directly involved in
the king's military endeavors. Gervase writes that he was starting to lose his sight. But
as he receded from the military picture—although the Flemish stipendiaries continued
actively to serve the king—William became more involved in political affairs. He still

4‘Davis, King Stephen, 70.
42Flandria Generosa, in MGH, SS, IX 325: Rex vero non immemor
beneficiorum, liberatori suo totcan provinciam que dicitur Cantia possidendam
concessit, et inter prim os regni, dum vixit, honoravit.
43Gervase o f Canterbury, 1: 121: Willelmo Yprensi qui Cantia abutebatur. . .;
and ii, 73: Quorum tarns erat Willelmus de Ipre, cui rex totam Cantiam commisit
custodiendam. The Chronicle o f Battle Abbey, ed. and trans. Eleanor Searle (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1980), 145: Cantiae comitatum tunc possidebat.
■
“ Round, Geoffrey de Mandeville, 146, 270-1; and Regesta, 111, passim.
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attended upon Stephen or Matilda, as his sixty-two charter attestations prove. He
became an official member o f the royal household as one of the constables.45 During the
king’s dispute with Archbishop Theobald, William joined the queen in efforts to ensure
that circumstances would not escalate out of control. At one point they arranged for
Theobald to stay at St. Benin’s so that messengers from the king could reach the
prelate.46 William was also taking care of his own personal politics. Some time in the
1140s William repaired his relations with Count Thierry of Flanders and regained
control of his ancestral properties in the county. It most likely took place by 1147 when
William visited Flanders with the queen and Stephen’s eldest son, Eustace.47
William’s rapprochement with Count Thierry gave him a refuge after Stephen’s
death in 1154. Henry II made the expulsion of the Flemish stipendiaries from England
one of his first acts. William accepted the decision and led an exodus of his countrymen
from the island. No doubt part of his acquiescence derived from the fact that he
continued to enjoy his considerable Kentish revenues for another three years. Even
after the loss o f those funds, William lived quietly for close to ten years in his homeland,
continuing to patronize monastic houses until his death sometime in the mid-1160s.48
Presumably, from examples like Fromold, his compatriots also returned to positions

*5Regesta, III: passim, and no. 197 for William’s attestation as constable.
^Gervase of Canterbury, i, 135. This abbey was rebuilt after a disastrous fire
largely through William o f Ypres’s generosity.
*7Regesta, III: no. 196; and Cokayne, 132.
^Cokayne, 132.
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similar to what they had once enjoyed before the troubles which attended the rise o f the
Alsatian comital house.
As Henry II’s firm and extensive control o f England and much o f France stifled
martial opportunism among the lesser nobility, discontented and disadvantaged warriors
had to find new theaters in which to seize the lands and riches that might lifi them to
titles and honors. The best opportunity came with the conquest o f Ireland in the late
1160s through the initiative of Anglo-Norman magnates from Wales. Almost a last
manifestation o f the adventuring spirit that impelled Burdet to Tarragona and fitz
Hubert to England, the subjugation o f Ireland came about similarly by an invitation for
foreign intervention which turned into a permanent, military presence on the “invited’s”
part. In 1166 the king o f Leinster, Diarmat Mac Murchada, found himself exiled from
the island after both internal and external political foes forced him from his throne.
Eventually traveling to Aquitaine in pursuit of the ever-moving Henry II49, Diarmat
found the Angevin king there and reportedly rendered him fealty in return for Letters
Patent that permitted Diarmat to recruit among Henry’s subjects for an expeditionary
force to recover his position.50 The exile wasted no time in returning to Britain and

49Part o f the reason Diarmat turned so quickly toward Henry II may have
derived from Diarmat’s control of Dublin the year before when that city had hired its
fleet out to Henry for the six-month campaign in Wales. Daibhi O Croinin, Early
M edieval Ireland (London: Longman, 1995), 286.
^ h e s e Letters Patent remain a contested issue. The strongest argument against
them still seems to be the fact that Mac Murrough, if he had them, still had difficulty
recruiting among the presumably surplus population o f Bristol. Moreover, the penalties
incurred by Strongbow for going to Ireland make it clear that he did not have Henry’s
permission for the crossing. See Gerald of Wales, Expugnatio H ibem ica: The
Conquest o f Ireland, A.B. Scott and F.X. Martin, eds. (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy,
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began seeking allies in Bristol, but even the reading o f Henry’s letters gained Diarmat no
volunteers. Finally, the lord of Striguil, Richard FitzGilbert, from the Clare family and
called Strongbow, met with Diarmat. Strongbow had been for some time out of favor
with Henry II and doubtless saw an Irish venture as a means of either restarting his
career or at least o f gaining some new means o f influencing his own king. He drove a
shrewd bargain with Diarmat: in return for armed intervention in the upcoming spring,
Strongbow gained the hand o f Diarmat’s eldest daughter, and thereby the kingdom of
Leinster as an inheritance. Regardless of the validity o f Diarmat’s arrangement with the
lord o f Striguil51, it was a turning point in his ability to attract the fortune-seekers of
south Wales.
Perhaps Strongbow’s interest in the affair signaled to others that the odds of
success had been misread, or at the least had just improved with his participation.
Diarmat’s offers o f lands and money, of the accouterments o f war, and of ample daily
maintenance,52 began to attract attention. Among the notables who now approached
Diarmat was Robert FitzStephen, a captive for the last three years o f the Welsh who
secured his freedom by promising to war against Henry II, but then saw Ireland as an

1978) 27, n. 14.
5‘For differing views on whether Diarmat could legally make such an agreement,
and make it binding on his subjects: Goddard Henry Orpen, Ireland Under the
Normans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), I: 91; and Marie Therese Flanagan, Irish
Society, Anglo-Norman Settlers, Angevin Kingship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989),
104-5.
52The Song o f Dermot and the Earl, ed. G.H. Orpen (Oxford, 1892): U. 430438, for Diarmat’s list o f inducements.
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opportunity to escape both his Welsh keepers and his dangerous pledge. To
FitzStephen and his kinsman Maurice FitzGerald, Diarmat promised the city of Wexford
and its hinterland if they would come quickly to Ireland in his cause. In anticipation of
his newfound support, Diarmat crossed back to Leinster in August 1167 only to wait
nearly two years for his allies to rescue him from the continued opposition of the
island’s other princes.S3
When finally the Anglo-Normans did arrive, the first contingents coming in May
1169 under Robert FitzStephen, their activity on Diarmat’s behalf and later more overtly
on their own continually left the native Irish in a political and military shambles.54
Diarmit had sent his appeals across Wales to the whole spectrum of potential
combatants: barons, knights, squires, sergeants, common soldiers on horse and foot,
according to the Song o f Dermot and the Earl. Both the Song and Gerald’s account
vividly describe the varied contingents recruited and led by the Anglo-Norman magnates
and their equipment. The force that Robert FitzStephen led in the capture of Wexford
included thirty knights related to him either by blood or vassalage, another sixty
warriors of unknown status but equipped with mail shirts, and some three hundred

53GeraId of Wales, Expugnatio Hibemica, 31, and n.26. Also, see Orpen,
Ireland under the Normans, 98, on Diarmat’s promise to the Geraldines of Wexford, a
Viking city not even part o f his kingdom.
^Gerald of Wales and the Song o f Dermot and the Earl naturally describe the
repeated disasters that overtook the Irish. See also Robert Bartlett, The Making o f
Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 51-4, 71-2, for an analysis of the
feudal and military impact o f “core” Europe on its peripheries.
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archers on foot, the “military elite o f Wales” (de electa Guallia iuventute)55 When earl
Richard came the next year, he used his passage across south Wales to gather still more
of the region’s well-trained and well-equipped but apparently unattached warriors.56
Eventually he landed at Waterford with two knights and better than a thousand other
followers. The composition of the Anglo-Norman forces is more clear in the Song's
description of the struggle for Dublin. Besieged and outnumbered, Strongbow and his
leading vassals determined to sell their lives as dearly as possible in a sortie from the
city. Miles de Cogan took command of the vanguard, moving first against the Irish with
forty or so knights (chevalers), plus sixty archers and one hundred sergeants (sericmz).
Raymond le Gros came next, and then the earl, each leading contingents of the same
composition and number. All the troops, whether a knight or lowly infantryman, had
the advantage of far-better equipment than their Irish foes.37 Operating with their usual
combination o f quick strikes and methodical pressure by the supporting troops,
Strongbow’s vassals (English and Irish by this time) carried the day.
The victory at Dublin followed the death o f Diarmit and confirmed Strongbow’s
claim to kingship o f Leinster through his marriage to Diarmit’s daughter. The situation
in Ireland had reached a point that Henry II could overlook no longer. As Warren has
pointed out, Henry was doubtless alive to the precedent o f his own Norman forebears in

55Expugnatio Hibemica, 30-1.
56Ibid., 64: electam in partibus illis iuventutem coadunavit.
57Song o f Dermot, 11. 1877-1916, especially 1897-98: M ult esteint ben armez
Chevalers, serianz e soudez. Expugnatio Hibemica, 82-4.
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Sicily and England and the trouble they continued to cause other kingdoms.58 Just as
likely, Henry, who in all his endeavors was a great regulator o f the disordered and
contradictory, could not abide an Anglo-Norman domination o f any place new where
his own royal rights were not clearly delineated. Already, Henry had begun tightening
the screws on these adventurers who had moved beyond his clear authority. Earl
Richard and other Anglo-Norman fief-holders had received a summons to return to
England or face forfeiture; supplies bound for Ireland from English ports had been
embargoed; and no further reinforcements were to travel to Ireland without Henry’s
permission.59 Little wonder that the Anglo-Normans turned to systematic raiding
beyond their immediate dominions to supplement their diets and payrolls. While Henry
was in his continental dominions, Strongbow temporized, but as it became clear that
Henry meant to come to Ireland personally, the earl eventually offered up Leinster as a
territory conquered by permission of the king and therefore due back to him. With this
submission, Henry immediately invested Richard with Leinster as his fief. Even with
this deal, Henry came on to Ireland, as much to ascertain that there were no wrinkles
left to iron out as to escape for a time the Becket controversy. Arriving on 18 October
1171 with close to five knights and an unknown number o f mounted and foot-archers at
Waterford, Henry spent the winter in Ireland accepting the fealty of the adventurers
(Norman, Flemish, and French) and all the native Irish princes save for those o f Ulster.
Henry also spent some time recruiting among the standouts o f the conquest for new

58Warren, Henry II, 114.
i9Expugnatio Hibem ica, 70. Warren, Henry II, 199.
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additions to his fa m ilia 60 Among those who joined the king’s military household were
Raymond le Gros and Miles de Cogan, whose service had been so critical to Strongbow
during the defense of Dublin.61
The complex mixture o f adventure, opportunism, acquisitiveness, and political
acumen that marked the Cambro-Normans in Ireland was essentially the last gasp of a
dynamic that was becoming unfeasible in the latter twelfth century. Henry’s quick
attention to the situation there demonstrated the growing effectiveness of central
authority to safeguard and manage socio-military developments. William of Ypres’s
earlier career in England has often been seen as the beginnings o f “real” mercenary
activity in the twelfth century. What “real” refers to in this sense are the professional
bands of mercenaries, available for hire season in and season out, whose taste for killing
and looting went beyond standards anyone, even those inured to the horrors o f war in
the 1100s, found comprehensible. Obviously, William o f Ypres does not fit such a
category, nor do most of the other combatants who fought for pay in the early part of
the century or in Ireland. These were all R. Allen Brown’s “lordlings,”62 and they
played the sport of their peers and immediate superiors, the shuffle through means
politic and violent to rise higher or reclaim a position in the pecking order. The time
that they spent earning a salary typically followed a setback and preceded a time of

60Expugnatio Hibemica, 88-94. On the ethnic origins of those who were in
Ireland, at least with Robert FitzStephen, Song, 11. 2647-8.
61Expugnatio H ibem ica, 102.
62See n. 3 above.
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recovery when they had become again part of an established patronage network. The
Bretons, Flemings, and other amorphous groups that followed them were often kin and
neighbors who, one can assume, benefitted even as did their chief. The close of William
o f Ypres’ activity in England, Robert Burdet’s in Tarragona, and the early conquest of
Ireland also saw the close, on the whole, of men who fought their way into social and
territorial pre-eminence, even quasi-independence. Nobles and knights who were in bad
straits would still find it advantageous to serve abroad with a new lord, but the
community o f arms which was knighthood changed the game for less-advantaged
soldiers. Henceforth, mercenaries were tools kept and maintained by kings solely for
the aggrandizement of the monarch. When they became inconvenient, they were
dismissed or even destroyed.
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IV
The Professionals
The year 1152 saw two personal triumphs that transformed the political and
military landscape o f western Europe. In Germany the imperial electors chose Frederick
of Hohenstaufen as king. Three years later Pope Hadrian IV sealed this decision by
consecrating him Holy Roman Emperor. Further west, young Henry o f Anjou created a
nightmare for the Capetian kings when he wed Eleanor of Aquitaine. To his lordship of
Anjou and Normandy Henry thus added the expansive inheritance o f his wife; and as
already noted, the kingdom of England came to him only two years after this feat.
Rulers of extensive territories and resources, Henry II and Frederick Barbarossa not
only spent much personal energy campaigning for the rights and privileges they felt were
their own, but also galvanized the administrations, economies, and people of their lands,
as well as their neighbors’, to facilitate those pursuits. With such rivals to either side,
the Capetians had to maneuver cautiously until their own dynasty was strong enough to
compete in similar fashion. To the south, the Iberian kingdoms found themselves drawn
ever more into the orbit of the trans-Pyrenean polities as their own position improved
vis-a-vis the remaining Muslim principalities. The manpower needs o f these aggressive
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monarchs opened up new vistas for those willing to risk themselves; from the lowest
ranks o f society came an increasing number o f men whose willingness to kill and
plunder caught the distressed attention o f many latter-century chroniclers. Doubtless
forced on their own by unfavorable economic conditions at home, some also found
themselves going to war thanks to diplomatic agreements between the leading powers
such as England and overpopulated, politically weaker lands such as Flanders or
Navarre. The presence o f foreign knights and nobles did not necessarily signify trouble
back in their homeland. The growing interconnections o f western Christendom’s lands
saw better-placed men balancing simultaneously the military commitments o f multiple
allegiances. War had always been a speculative business, but its practitioners among the
knightly order were learning to maximize their profits from the brutal game. So also
were the troops who comprised the infantry, siege trains, and missile contingents.
Henry II’s accession in 1154 and the subsequent expulsion of extraneous foreign
warriors gave England a new role with regard to mercenaries. She went from being a
magnet to a conduit. With the exception o f the 1173-74 revolt, Henry’s campaigns
were either on the continent or against the almost mandatory Welsh uprisings. His
English subjects participated not only by their own service, but also by facilitating the
transfer o f royal revenues and troops to the itinerant king. In his 1159 expedition to
Toulouse, Henry, desirous not to burden his rural knights (agrarios milites) with the
long and difficult campaign, levied a fine o f sixty Angevin shillings on knight’s fees in
Normandy and two marks of silver for the English knights who did not wash to
participate. Contributions were taken from all other stations of life as well throughout
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Henry’s dominions. This scutage eventually yielded £8,000 for Henry 1 While he
insisted that his tenants-in-chief participate in the expedition, Henry replaced his feudal
levies with “innumerable paid knights” (solidarios vero milites innumeros).2 The
provenance of these hired troops remains hidden by Henry’s widespread summons to all
his vassals: Normans, Poitevins, English, Gascons, Angevins and Bretons came to the
muster; Malcolm king o f Scotland came with a body of his own warriors, and
presumably, so too did the nameless Welsh prince whose arrival Gervase of Canterbury
noted. Finally, an alliance with Raymond-Berengar of Barcelona brought him north
with a Catalan force. Torigni’s choice to call Henry's hired soldiery m ilites indicates a
knightly contingent, but Henry fleshed out his army with the many military specialists
that characterized his campaigns, although whether he hired them from abroad or
recruited them from within his own dominions is unknowable. In either case, W.L.
Warren’s suggestion that Henry’s massive preparations were meant to cow Raymond
IV of Toulouse has a bearing on the campaign’s lure for hired soldiers. Besides an
assured maintenance, there was every possibility that Henry would succeed through a
show of force, and his troops would see little actual combat. As the campaign lost
headway against Capetian interference and disease, such indeed became the situation.3

'Robert ofTorigny, Chronica Roberti de Torigneio. Ed. Richard Howlett
(London: RS, 1889), 202. Gervase of Canterbury, I: 167.
Robert ofTorigny, 202-3. William of Newburgh makes no mention of any paid
warriors, but notes Henry's invitation to his "friends" all about to join the expedition.
Historia Rerum Anglicarum, Richard Howlett, ed. (London: Rolls Series, 1884) 123.
3For a fuller account of the expedition and possible mercenary participation in its
different phases: Warren, Henry II, 82-87; Boussard, 198-200.
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Henry's next campaign for which there is firm evidence for the presence of hired
forces was his expedition to quell the Welsh revolt in 1165. With nearly a year spent in
preparations, Henry put together an invasion force intended to quash forever Welsh
resistance to Anglo-Norman control. Henry’s barons in 1164 promised him infantry
forces for the projected campaign in the forested uplands. The Pipe Rolls o f the next
two years also testily to Henry’s thorough preparation. Extra soldiers were recruited on
the continent, particularly in Flanders, whose passage into and across England were
covered by the sheriffs of Middlesex. To complement the ground invasion, Henry also
hired a fleet from the Norse settlement at Dublin. Pikes, lances, bows, helmets,
hauberks, and vestments appear in the Gloucester, Norfolk, and London accounts, all
eventually bound for the Welsh marches.4 The evidence from the Pipe Rolls indicates
that while Henry’s barons were providing the warm bodies, the king was responsible for
their equipment. A considerable number of these entries are for arma or targia
coterellorum, from which Jacques Boussard argued that Henry’s mercenaries were
infantry and not cavalry.5 In the instance of the Welsh campaign, this was certainly true,
but it is not a conclusion which can be extended without qualification to other theaters

*PR 11 Henry II (1164-5), 12, 31, 68, 73, 90, 102, 110. From the London entry
for 300 shields {targia), Boussard estimated the imported force at the same number, but
the overall movement of armaments was much larger, thereby hiding the real figure.
5Boussard, 194 and 200: On trouve, en effet, dans le Pipe R oll de cette annee,
la mention de vetements et de boucliers pour les «Cottereaux», et de piques qui doivent
aussi leur etre destinees. . . Tout d'abord, il est visible que ce sont des fantassins;
ensuite, qu 'ils doivent etre doles d'u n armement apeupres uniforme, en tout casfixe
par le roi qui le leurfournit. Verbruggen has followed Boussard on this point of
regularized uniforms and weaponry, 130-1.
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or combatants. These coterelli were not necessarily akin to the later, dreaded
Braban9ons. It would be safer to conclude that the unbelievably bad weather and Welsh
harrying defeated a primarily English army, rather than a horde of Brabangons as
Boussard surmised.6 His experience with the Welsh apparently gave Henry a great
appreciation for their military abilities, and they began to show up in his continental
armies to great effect henceforth.7
Elsewhere, however, the Braban^on companies that would leave such a terrific
impression on chroniclers were starting to make their mark. In 1166 Frederick
Barbarossa returned to Italy again, this time to install permanently his papal candidate.
Paschal III, in Rome. His wish became irresistible when the death o f William o f Sicily in
the spring of 1166 removed Alexander Ill's best support. A number o f German vassals
declined to cross the Alps with their requested contingents, however, and the emperor
turned to Braban^on replacements. The accounts of Frederick's campaign vary widely
on the number hired, ranging from 500 by the Chronica regia Coloniensis to 1,500 by
Vincent of Prague who was present with the emperor’s forces. Both Vincent and

6I bid., 200. Verbruggen, 131, cites 1173 as the earliest mention of Braban^ons
by English sources. For more on the failure of Henry's campaign: William of
Newburgh, 145; Chronicle of Melrose, 79; Warren, Henry II, 100, 163.
7Their first notable appearance came in 1167 during the struggle between Henry
and Louis for pre-eminence over Auvergne. To distract Henry from intervening there,
Louis initiated raids in the Vexin which brought Henry storming northward. Arriving
late, he retaliated by sacking Louis’s heavily fortified arsenal at Chaumont-sur-Epte.
The Draco Normanniais gives a detailed account of how Henry and his knights
distracted the garrison with a traditional frontal assault, and as they were being beaten
back, Henry’s Welsh troops swam up river and snuck into the castle. Once inside, they
set it ablaze at numerous points. Warren, Henry II, 106.
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Rainald von Dassel, who had cause to thank their intervention later, described them as
Brabangons, but other accounts also mentioned Flemings or just sergeants8
In November, Frederick moved through the Brenner Pass, moved into the
Romagna, and besieged the Byzantine garrison at Ancona. While laying before this city,
Frederick dispatched Archbishop Rainald in the spring of 1167 to the aid o f Tusculum
since that city was already warring with Rome and the papacy. Rainald, however, found
himself and his hundred knights surrounded after entering Tusculum. To their aid
Frederick sent Archbishop Christian o f Mainz with more knights and a small force of the
Brabangons. A grueling march saw the relief force arrive in the late afternoon, only to
be attacked immediately by the Romans. Although the Brabangons and some knights
would eventually be driven off, the reports that circulated afterward spoke only of their
bravery and lethal skill on the battlefield. The losses they inflicted on the Romans were
pyrrhic enough that a sortie from Tusculum by Rainald broke the back o f the Roman
army, and the Braban^ons returned with the knights of the archbishop o f Mainz to mop
up the remnants. In a letter to his see, Archbishop Rainald wrote that all the booty from
the battle was apportioned out to the Brabanpons and servants.9
Frederick's attack on Rome would resound north o f the Alps for years to follow.
He arrived on 24 July and immediate began probing the city's defenses. When his forces
were unable to take the castle o f St. Angelo, they tried next to break through the walls

“Marcel Pacaut, Frederick Barbarossa, trans. Arnold Pomerans (New York:
Scribner's Sons, 1970), 120-22. Verbruggen, 131. Grundmann, 442-3.
9Verbruggen, 131-2. Pacaut, 122.
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of St. Peter's Church. Failing at that also, they resorted to burning down the church o f
Santa Maria in Turi. Alexander's forces withdrew at that point to avoid further
desecration o f holy sites, effectively giving half the city to Frederick.10 When a group o f
Brabanpons were wiped out ten years later by the archbishop of Limoges, two facts
stood out to Geoffrey de Vigeois about their leader, William the Cleric: this former
priest had participated in the destruction of Rome under Frederick, and doubtless
received his just reward for that and other crimes when he was hacked to death.11
Frederick succeeded in turning the fickle Roman populace against Alexander III, and
they drove that pope from the city. For less than a week Frederick enjoyed re
arranging both the papacy and the Roman civil government to his satisfaction, but then
plague struck his army in Rome and decimated its ranks. As Rainald o f Dassel was an
early casualty, perhaps there is something to Verbruggen's supposition that many of the
Brabanpons also died at this point. Regardless, Frederick bolted northward from the
city so as to preserve as much of his army as possible. In the eyes of many, he had
suffered God's judgment for warring against the pope and destroying holy places.12
While the emperor tried to keep his Italian policies from completely derailing,
the French had their hands full with the irruption of freebooters across the country.
Those whom the abbot of Cluny described in 1166 as “more like beasts than human
beings” were probably on their way to join Frederick's army in Italy. Others, however,

wIbid.
“ Geoffrey de Vigeois. Chronici Lemovicensis in R H F XII: 446, and note (a).
I2Verbruggen, 132. Pacaut, 124-5.
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either stayed behind or were fresh arrivals in the region when the count of Chalon hired
them for his son to lead in deliberate raids against the abbey. The town and abbey both
suffered as these infm itos praedones, who were otherwise known as Braban^ons,
robbed the clergy of their vestments and reportedly killed hundreds of the townsmen.
Louis VII called up his levies and moved through the region, chastising the count and
hanging all of the plunderers whom he could find without any measure of clemency .13
The problem grew to such proportions that Louis met with Frederick Barbarossa
in February of 1171 at the border o f their realms. They put together a treaty banning
the employment of Brabanpons and Cottereaux by themselves and their vassals in the
regions between Paris, the Rhine River, and the Alps. The geographical focus o f the
agreement thus spared Louis's dominions but still allowed the emperor to employ them
as he wished in Germany and Italy. Any who felt like ignoring the ban faced personal
excommunication and the threat o f interdict upon their lands until they made up the
damages inflicted by their hired forces, or routiers. If that pressure was insufficient,
then the concord called for armed intervention and the ravaging of the offender’s lands.
The exception clauses of the treaty are of further interest. After voiding all existing
contracts between the Braban^ons/Cottereaux and their employers, the treaty let stand
any arrangement wherein the Braban^on had either married into the local populace or
entered into a lifelong contract with a lord.14 Although Louis VII may have curtailed

13Verbruggen, 132. Suger, Historia gloriosi regis Ludovici, RHF XII: 131.
Geraud, “Les Routiers au Douzieme Siecle,” 131.
14Geraud, “Les Routiers au Douzieme Siecle,” 128-9.
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thus the use of routiers by French and imperial magnates along that frontier, plenty of
opportunities remained for them to the west and south in the conflicts of the Plantagenet
dynasty.
The general discontent engendered by Henry’s effective application of royal
government (and its concomitant fines and fees) encouraged a number of his greater
magnates from England to Aquitaine to join his son’s 1173 revolt. Never one to miss an
opportunity to chip away at Henry’s position, Louis VII encouraged all this, gave the
Young King15 refuge in Paris along with his brothers Richard and Geoffrey once they
also rebelled, and helped bring the counts of Flanders, Boulogne, and Champagne-Blois,
plus the king of Scotland into the alliance against Henry II. Although the actual number
of rebels in arms against Henry was not overwhelming, the seriousness of the threat lay
in its dispersal across his lands, defying even Henry’s legendary ability to move fast
enough to counter every opponent.
Henry used the spring o f 1173 to prepare for the blow which he knew was
coming, if not from where. Confining himself mostly to Rouen, he confirmed what
support he could, made certain that many castles underwent quick repairs and received
fresh supplies and full garrisons, and gathered what extra troops he could. Henry
understood the fickleness of even his supposedly loyal vassals and therefore sought out
the Braban<?on troops who, so long as their pay was steady, already had a reputation for

15Henry II had his eldest son Henry crowned as king in 1170, and confirmed it
with a second coronation in 1172. Although intended to secure the succession, the
move instead gave Henry II nearly endless heartaches. Historians, on the other hand,
have been tormented with how to label the younger Henry, who died before becoming
Henry III in his own right.
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unstinting service.16 His reputation as an employer was such even to tide him over lean
financial times. Henry drained his on-hand revenues in the burst o f preparations, for
Geoffrey de Vigeois reported that the king in 1173 gave his coronation sword to the
Brabangons as a promise of wages to come.17 Perhaps to make good his word, he made
a lightning trip to England in the late spring to expedite the transfer o f royal monies to
the continent, as well as to collect supplies for a siege train.18 At some point the king
also sent to Ireland for help which Strongbow quickly rendered in person. He brought
his own knights along, but Henry eventually tapped the garrisons that he had himself
installed at Dublin, Waterford, and Wexford.19
Actual fighting began in May 1173. French forces attacked Pacy, and the
Young King’s followers took Goumay, but efforts in the Vexin ended with these two
episodes. Since Strongbow was installed at Gisors, the infusion of troops from Ireland
may have made the direct approach to Rouen even more unthinkable than usual. Louis

16William of Newburgh, 172, provides a contrast to Richard FitzNigel’s claim
that the king’s reliance on mercenaries was meant to spare his own people the risks of
war: Turbatis ergo rebus arvcius, dum hostes intem i extemique urgerent, iis quoque,
qui sibi adhaerare videbanlur, in graiiam filii remissius agentibus minus se credens,
stipendiarias Bribantionum copias, quas Rutas vocant, accersivit, eo quod de thesauris
regiis, quibus in tali articulo parcendum non esset, pecunia copiosa suppeteret.
17Geoffrey de Vigeois, XII: 443: Patre ac filio per biennium in alterutrum
saevientibus, adeo Rex [Ang/iae seniorj muItis thesauris exhaustis, nauseatus est, ut
Brabantionibus qui ei parebant, pro mercede spatham Regiae coronae in gagium
mitteret.
,8PR 19 Henry II, 33, 50. Henry’s time in England was so short as to merit no
mention by any o f the chroniclers o f the reign: Warren, Henry //, 127.
l9Song o f Dermot. 11. 2864-2881, 2906-2935.
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led his forces first against Vemeuil, entering Normandy from Blois; at the same time
Philip o f Flanders and his brother Matthew o f Boulogne quickly took Aumale and
pushed on to Drincourt. Henry waited with his army to see if and where Normandy’s
defenses would crack. Against the northern attack his investment in well-supplied
castles paid off. On 25 July the Flemish and Bouiognais were attempting to take Arques
when Count Matthew was wounded fatally by one of Henry’s crossbowmen.
Disheartened, Philip o f Flanders let his attack falter and then pulled back into Flemish
territory .20 With the quickness typical of his campaigns, Henry moved directly against
Louis VII once he knew the northern defenses had held. Vemeuil had arranged a threeday truce with Louis VII to determine if Henry could render any help; if not, the city
was to surrender after a long siege. The king was already on his way, his Braban^ons
having taken Conches on 7 August and Breteuil the next day. In this army also were
auxiliary troops from Wales and Ireland.21 Henry was ready to gamble with this mixed
force of stipendiaries and loyal vassals, and he sent word ahead to Louis either to lift the
siege or prepare for a battle.22 Henry’s quick appearance and defiant attitude spooked
Louis into breaking his truce with Vemeuil by burning a portion of the city even as his
army withdrew. Seeing the fires as his army approached the city on 9 August, Henry

20The origin o f the crossbowman (quodam marchione) who killed Count
Matthew remains indeterminate. Ralph o f Diceto, Radulfi de Diceto Decani
Lundoniensis Opera Historica, ed. William Stubbs (London: RS, 1876), I: 373.
2lGesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis, ed. William Stubbs (London:
RS, 1867), I: 51.
■“William of Newburgh, I: 174.
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retaliated by flinging his Brabangons and Welsh (marchiones) against Louis’s rearguard
in a slaughter that ended with nightfall.23
A number of quick actions brought still more rebellious castles into Henry’s
hands before he retired back to Rouen. From there, he sent his Brabangons westward to
ravage the lands of his Breton opponents, particularly Ralph o f Fougeres. They went
about this task with their usual dispatch, arriving quickly and surprising many among the
rebels before they could move their livestock and valuables into forest refuges. Ralph
struck back at the Brabangon supply lines, killing many of those responsible for
provisioning Henry’s troops. This, combined with Ralph’s acquisition o f Dol and
Combourg through bribery, induced Henry to send still more Brabangons along with
some household knights to contain the rebellious Bretons. Once before Dol, however,
the Brabangons showed their aptitude for siege work, and before long, the garrison
under Ralph and the earl o f Chester decided a sortie held better odds than awaiting the
city’s slow reduction.24 The knights found Henry’s forces ready for them, and the
assault became a rout. Those who could, scattered, but a good number o f those on
horse, along with foot-soldiers, were killed in the engagement. As they drove back the

^Roger of Howden, Chronica, II: 50; Ralph of Diceto, I: 375; Warren, Henry
//, 128.
24Although clearly fanciful, Jordan Fantosme’s recreation of the debate among
the Bretons shows the desperation o f men facing determined, efficient besiegers. Jordan
Fantosme, Jordan Fantosme’s Chronicle, ed. and trans. R.C. Johnston (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1981)11. 166-175, 186-7. Despite the conventional wisdom that gives
fortifications all the advantages in this period, those with a reputation for successful
sieges often held the upper hand just by reputation. Henry II had earned such a
reputation, as would his son Richard at an early age. See John Gillingham, Richard the
Lionheart (New York: Times Books, 1978), 81.
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rebels, Henry's forces pushed their own way into the city, finally cornering Ralph, Hugh
o f Chester, and other leading rebels in one tower. They renewed the siege,
supplemented now by townsmen from Avranches. Word reached Henry o f this good
fortune, and the king responded with alacrity, covering the 150 miles between Rouen
and Dol with unprecedented speed and arriving in just two days. The rebels found the
king’s mercy preferable to his hired soldiery and gave themselves into his hands.25
While Henry followed his success in Normandy and Brittany with attempts at
reconciliation between himself and his sons, his lieutenants in England still had their
hands full with Scottish invasion, baronial rebellion, and Flemish involvement in both.
In fact, William the Lion, king of Scotland, had made his participation in the alliance
against Henry dependant on receiving help from Flanders; he had the forces for raiding,
but he wanted the Flemings for their ability to take the castles along his route.26 Count
Philip quickly assented and sent the additional troops. William’s invasion came while
Richard de Lucy, Henry’s justiciar, was still trying to reduce the chief castle of Robert
of Leicester, who was still on the continent with the other rebels. As with so many
previous Scottish incursions, William’s forces lived off the land, looted all they could,
and burned much o f the rest. The Flemings showed their business-like approach at
Prudhoe, advocating a siege there so as to protect the army’s flank and hold the
occupied territory more effectively. William’s advisors, however, counseled him to

25Robert of Torigni, 259-60; William of Newburgh, 175-6; Roger of Howden,
Chronica, II: 51; Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi, I. 56-7.
“ Jordan Fantosme, 11. 417-20.
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continue moving southward and to focus on Carlisle, arguing that Northumberland
would be his to gather in later after victories further south.27 Carlisle proved too hard a
nut to crack, however, and hearing that Richard de Lucy and Humphrey de Bohun were
bringing up the English levies, William eventually pulled back nearly to where he began
the invasion. The justiciar then began ravaging the lands along the Scottish border. He
meant to invade Lothian itself, but had to give William a truce instead when he heard
that the earl o f Leicester had landed in East Anglia with a large force o f Flemings.28
The threat from Robert o f Leicester was considerable. He had already
sabotaged the talks between the two Henrys following the senior Henry’s victories in
Normandy and Brittany. Now he came to England with perhaps as many as four or five
thousand Flemish troops, intending to break Henry’s hold on the kingdom by linking his
own Leicester estates with those o f Hugh Bigod in East Anglia and the captured earl o f
Chester in the west. With the numerical superiority that his Flemish infantry (and some
cavalry) gave him, he had every hope o f succeeding.29 After a check at the small fishing
village of Dunwich, his Flemings had slightly more success in capturing and plundering
the city of Norwich, although the royal garrison managed to hold onto the castle. In
both cases the path o f Leicester’s soldiers was marked by a devastation o f the surround

11Ibid., 11. 603-8.
2SIbid., 11. 788-90, 824-826; G esta Regis Henrici Secundi, 1; 60; Warren, Henry
II, 130.
29For the least exaggerated estimates of earl Robert’s Flemings, Ralph of Diceto,
I; 377. On their composition, William o f Newburgh, I: 178, and Jordan Fantosme, 11.
837-8 and 991-99, where he notes both well-born men and footloose, eager-for-plunder
weavers among the invaders.
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ing farm lands and theft of anything portable. The earl next loosed his troops on the
royal castle of Haughley, a small success but one which extended his influence westward
from East Anglia. In the meanwhile, Hugh Bigod decided that the Flemings were
becoming too burdensome for his territories and yielding too few results; he “invited”
earl Robert to take them to his own base in the Midlands.30 Robert at first balked, but
then decided he had sufficient forces to cross the kingdom without serious risk.
On 16 October at Fomham, near Bury St. Edmunds, he met the armies which
Richard de Lucy and Humphrey de Bohun had just brought south, along with fresh
levies raised by the earls o f Cornwall, Gloucester, and Arundel. Anticipating no such
concentration of forces, Leicester and his forces were proceeding across the country in
fine fettle and little discipline. We have from Matthew Paris the potentially earliest
recorded couplet in Flemish. Fitting nicely with Fantosme’s description of these forces
as weavers come to England purely for the plunder, Paris reported them singing as they
marched:31
Hoppe, hoppe, Wilekin, hoppe, Wilekin,
Engelond is min ant tin.

30William o f Newburgh, 178: Hugo vero ejusdem exercitus, quantum vole bat,
opera usus, demmtiavit comiti Leicestrensi, ut copias peregrinas, quas adduxerat, ad
terram et castella proprii juris traduceret. Also, Jordan Fantosme, 11. 969-990, for an
enjoyable if fanciful recreation of the conference that led to the decision to move out of
East Anglia.
31“Hop along, hop along Billy boy, Billy boy,
England is mine and thine.”
Matthew Paris, H istoria Minor, ed. Sir Frederic Madden (London: RS, 1866), I: 381.
On the antiquity o f this song and the above translation, A.L. Poole, From Domesday
Book to Magna Carta (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 336 and n.l. Jordan Fantosme,
11. 991-999, on the origins of the Flemish, French, and Picards, and their cupidity.
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As the rebels and their allies made their way along dry tracks in marshy land, perhaps
right as they were crossing the Lark River, Humphrey de Bohun attacked with three
hundred knights (militibus solidariis regis). Despite being outnumbered, they earned
their pay, gaining an advantage “in the blink of an eye”32 that Henry’s supporters never
relinquished. Fantosme’s verse races along, describing with much pleasure the fate of
Leicester’s Flemings, how Bohun’s knights took no more time than to run down
whomever they could, leaving the actual killing to the peasants and villeins who
streamed after them with pitchforks, flails and other farm implements. Those knocked
into the ditches were held under until they drowned. Earl Robert found himself
captured, along with his wife and Hugh of Chastel, plus most of the eighty or so
horsemen he had with him. Of his foot soldiers, however, the massacre was near
complete as the peasantry exacted their own cost for the Flemish war against the
countryside. Figures from chroniclers are rarely reliable, but even the lowest estimates
claimed between three and five thousand Flemings who never left England.33 The defeat
at Fomham effectively ended any chance of linking up the rebellious pockets across
England. Isolated in East Anglia, Hugh Bigod sought a truce good through winter and
much of the spring. As part of its terms, he had to release from service all the Flemings
he had in his own pay, all of whom received safe-conducts out o f the kingdom.34

32Roger of Howden, Chronica, II: 55.
33Jordan Fantosme, 11. 1051-60, 1080-85; Roger of Howden, Chronica, II: 55;
Ralph ofDiceto, I: 377-8; Robert of Torigni, 260-1; William o f Newburgh, 178.
34Ralph ofDiceto, I: 378.
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Henry had kept busy on the continent. He continued the pressure on any
wavering Breton magnates by having his Brabangons police the trouble spots. He then
turned with his typical speed to pre-empt the stirrings o f revolt in Anjou, leading his
Brabangons. Geoffrey de Pouances, Ralph de la Haye, and others from Maine and
Anjou soon found themselves in the same straits as the few remaining rebellious
Bretons: forced to continue the struggle from forested hideouts as the Brabangons
leveled their castles.35 Henry moved with the speed that marked both himself and the
Brabangons, capturing the castles at Haye, Pruilli and Champeni around 11 November.
With turbulence in Anjou quickly subsiding, Henry moved next against Venddme,
whose count in a parallel situation had been ousted by his own son. By 30 November,
Henry had added the castle to his list o f conquests and the son to his growing band of
captive foes.36 With most of his internal foes effectively checked, Henry returned to
Normandy to await the next move of the coalition arranged around the Young King.
With the exception of the young Henry’s unsuccessful assault on Seez at the end
of January, the critical conflicts shifted to England in 1174. The elder Henry spent the
late spring in Poitou and Aquitaine trying to bring his son Richard to heel. By June he
had to settle for firming up the garrisons in all the areas Richard might trouble and then
returned to Normandy. There, he learned that his lieutenants in England were having
trouble fending off" a second invasion by William the Lion along with the rebellious
activity o f Hugh Bigod, Roger Mowbray, and the bishop of Durham. With his route

35Robert o f Torigni, 261.
“ Roger o f Howden, Chronica, II: 55-6.
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secured by the defection o f these last two, the Scottish king moved a second time
against Wark. He hoped the fresh arrival of Flemish soldiers would provide the skills
necessary to besiege the place. While his Scots ravaged the countryside, William
surrounded Wark “with his Flemings and his archers, with his catapults, with his sturdy
siege-engines, and his slingers and his crossbowmen.”37 Even with all this machinery
and missile capability, though, the Flemings stinted nothing in a frontal assault through
the ditches and against the outer palisade protecting the castle. Fantosme again enjoyed
telling in rich detail o f their bucklers and shields, the flying pennons and eager rush to
the attack—all counterpointed by the litter of equipment and bodies as Wark’s garrison
defied numerous attempts.38 William eventually decided to leave Wark behind and press
on. The castellan at Carlisle, Robert de Vaux, bargained for a truce, he would send for
instructions, and perhaps for reinforcements, but if neither were forthcoming, he would
give the city and castle over to the Scots. William and his counselors took the offer,
figuring the castle would be theirs one way or another, and pushed further into England.
The castles at Appleby and Brough fell, opening William’s way to the lands of the
rebellious Mowbray.39 But then William turned northward again, obviously intent not
so much to help the young Henry displace the elder as to secure the territories long
claimed by the Scottish kings. Even as all this was happening, Hugh Bigod in East

37Jordan Fantosme, U. 1188-90. Also, Matthew Strickland, War and Chivalry,
298-99, for a direct comparison of routiers and Scots while on campaign.
38Jordan Fantosme, 11. 1201-15.
i9Ibid., U. 1479-82.
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Anglia was causing trouble again, having accepted the services of three hundred
Flemings sent by Count Philip. They arrived on 15 May and helped the earl finally take
Norwich by 18 June.40 Nottingham also came under attack from other rebels and fell.
Struggling to meet so many threats, Henry’s lieutenants decided the king’s personal
attention was necessary and sent word to him in Normandy.
Henry faced a dilemma once he learned how critically balanced matters were in
England. The count of Flanders had already declared his intention to invade the island
no later than 9 July; he had already moved many troops and weapons to Gravelines from
where the Young King intended to help lead the expedition. On the other hand, Henry
also knew from his agents at the French court that Louis was preparing for a fresh
invasion of Normandy .41 Knowing he could not continue against his enemies without
the advantage of the English revenues, Henry chose to risk Normandy while he secured
the kingdom. He paused long enough to strengthen those castles on the Norman march
with France with fresh troops, arms, and victuals; in a few cases he substituted new
castellans for those whose loyalty was suspect. Then Henry moved to Barfleur with his
Brabangons and, defying the same winds that kept the Young King and Count Philip in
harbor at Gravelines, arrived in England the morning of 8 July.42

40Ralph ofDiceto, I: 381.
41On Philip o f Flanders’s plans, Ralph ofDiceto, I. 381, and Roger o f Howden,
Chronica, II: 57. Henry had bought the complicity o f a number of French barons by
this point, and it was they who informed the English king of their own monarch’s
preparations, Robert of Torigni, 263-4.
42Robert of Torigni, 264; William o f Newburgh, 187; Ralph ofDiceto, I: 382;
Gesta Regis Henrici Secnndi, I: 72.
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Before Henry truly had a chance to act, though, the initiative of his northern
supporters ended the last great threat o f the civil war. King William had been stymied at
Prudhoe by the defenders. Thinking perhaps to starve out that garrison, William left a
large portion of his army there to continue the siege while he went to test Alnwick’s
defenses. Meanwhile, a small force led by Ranulf Glanvill, Geoffrey bishop-elect of
Lincoln, and others had come from York, essentially to reconnoiter in force. When they
met the Alnwick castellan, William de Vesci, at Newcastle looking for reinforcements,
they learned o f William’s new position and his far greater numbers. Yet they pushed on.
They moved through the night even as mist covered the countryside, obscuring even
into the morning of 11 July the actual position and make-up of the English and Scottish
groups. When they finally saw one another, the four hundred English knights found that
William and sixty of his knights had become separated from the main force. Once again,
Fantosme’s description o f the ensuing fray glories in the death of William’s Flemish
allies. With their momentary advantage, Henry’s partisans made William a captive in
short order. They sent a messenger to give Henry the tidings while they hurried
southward before William’s forces could consider any rescue attempts.43
It was the effective end o f the crisis in England itself. Hugh de Puiset, the
bishop of Durham, received a force of Flemings under command of his nephew at
Hartlepool the very day William was captured. Giving up hope against Henry’s

43Jordan Fantosme, II. 1721-24, 1793-98. Fantosme’s rhetoric leaves the
conclusion that all the knights with William were either o f French or Flemish origin, the
king having already released his Scots to forage and plunder amide the countryside.
Roger of Howden, Chronica, II: 63; Ralph ofDiceto, I: 67.
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momentum, Hugh dismissed 400 knights and 500 Flemings from his service, arranged
for their repatriation, and then hurried to “explain” his actions to the king. Back in East
Anglia, Henry turned his attention on Hugh Bigod after quelling the rebellious garrison
at Huntingdon. Once again earl Hugh had imported Flemings, and Henry began
preparing to conduct sieges o f Framlingham and Bungay. Five hundred carpenters were
brought in to construct the necessary machines, plus enhance the defenses o f nearby
castles.44 Before Henry had to unleash his Brabangons within England itself, however,
earl Hugh surrendered on 25 July. Among the terms o f this capitulation, Henry allowed
the earl’s Flemish soldiers to return home unharmed.45
The anticipated invasion of Normandy finally began at the end o f July when the
Young King and Philip of Flanders abandoned the idea o f conquering England and
joined Louis VII to besiege Rouen. With all other parts o f his domains secured, Henry
turned his full energy to this last trouble. He added an extra thousand Welshmen to the
Brabangons and knights he already had about him and sailed for Barfleur on 8 August.
Three days later he reached Rouen, which had just barely withstood a French sneak
attack the day before. While Henry entered the city with the Brabangons, he dispersed
his Welsh skirmishers through the woods around the French to interdict their supplies.
The Welsh quickly went to work among Louis’s baggage train, killing over one hundred
of his men. Putting their long practice at avoiding Anglo-Norman armies to use, the
Welsh made themselves appear far more numerous than they were, and effectively cut

“PR 20 Henry II, 38.
45Roger o f Howden, Chronica, II: 64; Ralph ofDiceto, I: 385..
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off all foodstuffs to Louis’s army for three days. At the same time, members of Henry’s
familia joined the civic militia on the walls and resisted all attempts to dislodge them.
With the balance o f the siege having swung so far in the besieged's favor, Louis
abandoned Rouen three days after Henry’s arrival, burning his siege machines and
advising the young Henry to make peace with his father.46
Henry presumably had no further need for his Brabangons unless he installed
them in garrisons. If he did dismiss them, his position was so secure that he faced little
trouble from the now-unemployed soldiers. On the other hand, Barbarossa was
campaigning again in Italy, and word o f the employment to be had there may have been
sufficient to draw many o f Henry’s former troops out of his territory. Certainly, the
archbishop o f Mainz turned again to Brabangon support for his capture o f Bologna and
further campaigns through 1175. But if Henry Plantagenet never turned again to
Brabangons for fresh troops, being content to supplement his armies with the Welsh, his
sons and the son o f Louis VII had seen their effectiveness. The Brabangons, and others
who emulated their careers, were far from gone from the Angevin dominions.47
Ralph ofDiceto reported their return in 1176 when the son o f the count of
Angouleme, Wulgrin Taillefer, gathered a band of the nefarious Brabangons (cohorte
nefaria Brebcmtinorum) and invaded Poitou while Duke Richard was in England with
Henry II. The usual litany o f atrocities followed in their wake, destroyed castles,

“^Roger of Howden, Chronica, II: 65; William o f Newburgh, 195-6; Gesta Regis
Henrici Secnndi, I: 74-5..
47Verbruggen, 134; Robert o f Torigni, 308..
134

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

devastated and depopulated countrysides, burned-out churches, and violated convents.
To meet the threat, John bishop of Poitiers summoned help from all quarters, including
numerous hired troops (stipendiariorum rrumerositate collecta) and the chief of
Richard’s knights during the duke’s absence, Theobald Chabot.48 This force met
Wulgrin’s Brabangons at Barbezieux, not far from Angouleme, and defeated them.
Those not killed on the battlefield retreated into the nearby citadel, but the Poitevins
only preceded to bum them to death within it.49 Richard returned to Poitou in
Whitsuntide and had no trouble collecting a host of knights as word spread of the
generous wages he was offering. In the last week o f May he found Wulgrin, captured
him in battle, and routed the future count’s remaining Brabangons.50
The efforts to curtail freebooting activity in 1176 would be repeated in 1177,
and, indeed, would become a habitual chore in Aquitaine through the last quarter of the
twelfth century. The initiative fell again to local authority in April 1177 when the
Limousin was troubled by groups o f raiding Basques and Brabangons. The abbot of St.
Martial in Limoges issued a call to arms for the general populace; bishop Gerald,
Adhemar viscount of Limoges, and several local magnates also joined the effort to
suppress the marauders. A five-hour battle through the afternoon of 21 April saw the
locals victorious and a reported 2,000 dead among the Brabangons, both men and
women. The demise o f this particular band, however, did not signal any sort of end for

““ Described by Warren, Henry II, 572, n. 1, as a “mercenary captain.”
49Ralph ofDiceto, I: 407.
™Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi, I: 120.
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the marauding groups o f soldiers. On the very same day, a new leader appeared for
them in the person o f Lobar (also called Lupatius or Lupescar) who captured Segur
and, under the direction o f the count o f Turenne, destroyed its fortifications..51
Pressure continued to mount against the use of these troops, so reliable and
effective in battle, but a threat on so many other counts to their employers and their
territories. The lords of Aquitaine were only too ready to import extra troops, whether
from the traditional sources in the Low Countries or beyond the Pyrenees, to prosecute
their wars against one another or to resist the increasing efforts of Henry II and Richard
to control them. Lobar came from Provence under the auspices of Raymund of Turenne
by at least 1177. He was still sacking small towns in 1181, this time on behalf of the
count o f Ventadour in the Limousin.52 Basques had already begun appearing in the
same neighborhood, and the opportunities for violence and plunder drew others from
the Iberian kingdoms.53 As the interests of the count-kings o f Barcelona moved across
the Pyrenees, so too did their forces. In 1167 the king o f Aragon came to Beziers and
besieged the city unsuccessfully in an attempt to punish the citizenry for the murder of
Raymond Trencheval. Repulsed, he later responded to the invitation of Raymond’s son

51Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF, XII: 446. Lobar is the Provencal form of his
name, but in all cases the root form o f lupus continues to appear. See Geraud, “Les
routiers au douzieme siecle,” 132, and n. 3.
52Geoflfrey de Vigeois, in RHF, XII: 448.
“ Jonathan Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade (London: Faber & Faber, 1978),
23: “Between 1179 and 1185, eastern Languedoc was bitterly fought over by the
mercenaries o f three nations . . . A northern abbot who passed through the region in
1181 spoke o f the ‘vast desolate emptiness left behind by mercenary troops, the image
of death and the smoke o f fire hanging over every town’.”
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William to send troops to him. William had recovered his father’s position in the city
but wanted vengeance. Alfonso II sent William a considerable number of his fiercest
fighters (non parvus gentis ferocissimae copias), which William persuaded the
townspeople to accept having quartered among them. At a given signal, the Aragonese
rushed to their arms and slaughtered as many of the citizens as they could find. In
return for this bloodletting, William gave the Aragonese the option to make Beziers
their new home.54
Little wonder then that this level of rapine, coupled with the Cathar heresy in the
same regions, drew down the condemnation o f the Third Lateran Council in 1179.
Following hard on the heels o f the anathema against the heretics of the Albi came the
excommunication o f the marauding Brabangons, Aragonese, Navarrese, Basques,
Cottereaux, Triaverdini, and any who employed them.55 Pons, the archbishop o f
Narbonne, urged all the abbots and priests o f his diocese to excommunicate publicly all
heretics and foreign soldiers as well as the princes, castellans, and knights who retained
them. He went on to name names: Raymond of Toulouse, Roger viscount o f Beziers,
Bernard viscount o f Nimes, Lobar, and the lord of Terrazone, plus the already named
bands o f foreign hirelings.56
While clerical chroniclers recorded the prohibitions of the Council in full, the
politicians of the age hardly let it affect their military dispositions. The very year of

MWilliam o f Newburgh, 129-30.
S5Ibid., 208-12; Roger o f Howden, Chronica, 175-9.
^Geraud, “Les routiers au douzieme siecle,” 134.
137

permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Third Lateran saw the first appearance of these professional fighters in Germany, led by
no less an ecclesiastic than Cologne's archbishop. Philip von Heinsberg brought some
4,000 infantry against Henry the Lion’s fortress of Haldensleben, wreaking
unprecedented destruction across Saxony in the process.57 Back in Poitou that same
year, the twenty-one year old Richard hired a mixed force of Basques, Navarrese, and
Brabangons to quell again Wulgrin o f Angouleme and his ally Geoffrey de Rancon.
They proved their worth again in the critical field of siege warfare, enabling Richard to
isolate the citadel o f Pons and then turn in May against the reputedly impregnable
fortress at Taillebourg. Within three days, he pressured the garrison into a sortie which
Richard not only repulsed, but which he chased in person back into the castle before the
gates could be closed. It was a reputation-making triumph, and the Limousin lords
submitted grudgingly to their young count. At the end of the campaigning season,
Richard went to Henry II in England and dismissed his hired forces. In his absence they
celebrated the successful campaign by sacking the suburbs of Bordeaux.58
Poitou was far from pacified, however, and it lured unemployed soldiers through
report of the unrest. They in turn aggravated the turmoil, as at Bordeaux. Richard was
not one to tolerate such behavior. When he captured a force o f Basques under William
Alard in 1182 whom the ever-rebelling lords of Angouleme had hired, he made certain
they would never trouble his territories again. At Aixe on the Vienne River, he

57Verbruggen, 135.
58Robert o f Torigni, 282; Ralph ofDiceto, I: 431-2. Gillingham, Richard the
Lionheart, 80-2.
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drowned a portion of his captives, had another group of them cut down, and saved
eighty of them for blinding, doubtless so they could carry the report back to their
homelands.59 But others still came to hire themselves out. Adhemar of Limoges and
Raymond o f Turenne found two especially eager warriors in Sancho of Savagnac and
Curbaran,60 who led a host o f seasoned marauders into the city o f Limoges in early
February 1183. With his hold on Limoges re-established, Adhemar then took his new
forces with him to attack Pierre-Buffiere. A three-day siege sufficed for that city’s lord
to capitulate and allow the banners o f King Henry, Adhemar, and Curbaran to be raised
over his towers. From there, Sancho and Curbaran went on to assault Brioude,
although Geoffrey de Vigeois omitted whether Adhemar had a role in this endeavor 61
Between the attempts of the Poitevin nobility to turn Henry II against his son
Richard and the last rebellion of young Henry against his father, mercenary activity in
the region not only reached unprecedented levels, but also triggered popular reactions.
The death of Louis VII in 1180 had brought Philip II Augustus to the French throne and
a change in the military practices o f the Capetians. By 1183 Philip had pushed royal
finances to the point o f being able to hire mercenaries. In January of that year “legions
of hell” in his pay came to the city o f Noaille where the local populace taunted this
group, called Palearii in this instance, with memories of the slaughter of Braban^ons at

59Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF, XVIII: 213.
“ An interesting name, and certainly one adopted as a nom de guerre, being as it
is the Westernized version o f Kerbogha, the Turkish emir who threatened to annihilate
the First Crusade at Antioch. See OV, V: 94.
61Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF XVIII: 214.
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Malemort in 1177. The result was almost predictable: Philip’s forces made a sudden
assault on the city, accounting for at least 153 dead in a long day of fighting.62 Six
months later, as Geoffrey de Vigeois was doubtless thrilled to report, these “ravagers of
the land” received their due reward. As the Palearii moved through Berry, the knights
and populace of the region who had formed a peace-association, the Paciferi,
surrounded them on 20 July near Dun-le-Roi. The victory was quick and total with so
many mercenaries killed as to require a vast, common funeral pyre. Naturally, Geoffrey
could not resist the parallel between that conflagration and that which awaited this
human chaffin hell. God’s judgement was not finished, however. Within twenty days
of the Palearii massacre, Curbaran apparently was captured by Henry II’s or Richard’s
forces and hanged with fifty of his followers: On almost the same day, Raymond le
Brun, uncle to William Alard and himself a mercenary captain, died by the sword.63 In
the Auvergne another peace confraternity, this time made up of the local nobility, finally
turned on a group o f Brabangons who had inflicted rapine and carnage for a number
years on the region. Robert of Auxerre claimed the Brabangon dead to have been close
to three thousand while—not surprisingly in such accounts—the guardians of the peace
suffered not even one wounded brother.64

621bid., 215: tartareas legiones.
a lbid., 219. Typically full of details whenever the Limousin’s oppressors are
killed, Geoffrey is unfortunately laconic in the relating o f these deaths.
^Robert o f Auxerre, Ex Chronologia Roberti Altissiodorensis, in RHF XVII1:
251.
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Even before these events, another popular movement against mercenary
depredations had sprung up in the small town of Le Puy.65 The closest observer o f the
phenomenon of the White Capes, both geographically and chronologically, was
Geoffrey de Vigeois, who unfortunately left off from his chronicle just as the
confraternity was growing far larger than many could have expected. In essence,
though, the Virgin Mary appeared in a vision to a carpenter named Durand and directed
him to form a peace-association with a distinctive white cape which carried an image o f
herself. In addition, those sworn into the group had to contribute six deniers to the
association and report when summoned for combat against menaces to the general
peace. The popularity o f the movement gave authorities some pause, but eventually the
bishop of Le Puy gave it his support with a sermon at Assumption. Knights, even some
“princes,” other bishops, abbots, clergy, as well as unmarried women, associated
themselves with the confraternity. Some in the group moved to besiege Chateauneuf
right after the bishop’s message. Unfortunately, they met there one who was just
starting a twenty-year career of fighting. Mercadier, whom Geoffrey describes as a
prince of thieves (princeps latronum), gave the movement a serious check by killing a
great many o f the Capuciati through some vague, but apparently underhanded, means.66
Still, antipathy towards the bands of mercenaries drew many to adopt the White Cape

6SGervase o f Canterbury, I: 301: In brevi itaque tota civitate Podii cum
adjacente regione conversa, in infinitum tandem multiplicati, non solum Braibacenis
sedet omnibus injuriam sibi facientibus viriliter restiterunt.
“Ibid., especially n. (d) from the codex regius: Quosdam ex istis quidam prin
ceps latronum (forte Mercaders) occidit, super quibus Dommus ostendit multa signa.
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and pewter badge o f membership, plus pay the six denier dues. A sum as large as
400,000 livres was raised in two months as the association spread across Aquitaine and
Provence. When the movement moved into northern France the next year, however, the
lack of mercenary activity there at that time led to suspicion o f what other trouble such
a popular, lower-rank association might attempt. The magnates of those regions
quashed the “insolence” o f the White Capes sect, ironically hiring the mercenary captain
Lobar to handle the unpleasant task.67
To the south, however, the presence of hired warrior bands continued, although
the death o f the Young Henry in 1183 removed both a focal point for rebellion-minded
magnates and a ready employer of footloose soldiers. Geoffrey Plantagenet led a
Brabangon force in support o f those revolting against his brother Richard. The Young
King went one step further once he also joined those lining up against Richard; he hired
every mercenary he could find on the simple logic that if he did not, his father would do
so once he came to settle the intra-family war. He thus brought Palearii to Limoges
while that city’s viscount, Adhemar, supplemented them with Basques and Brabangons.
Unfortunately for the younger Henry, his finances were not up to the demand of his
recruiting policies, and he spent as much time securing his payroll as he did conducting
any real campaigns. He took a loan from the citizens of Limoges which quickly ran out.
From fear both of betrayal and losing any initiative, the Young King let his troops

67Georges Duby, The Three Orders, or Feudal Society Imagined, Arthur
Goldhammer, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 328-333. Rigord, Gesta
Philippi Augusti, in Oeuvres de Rigordet de Guillaume le Breton (Paris. Librairie
Renouard, 1882), 37-40. Robert of Auxerre, in RHF XVIII: 251.
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plunder a number of ecclesiastical sites so as to keep them content, including even the
shrine of St. Martial’s at Limoges which they were ostensibly defending. As his supply
o f cash and purloined valuables grew smaller, the younger Henry ranged further afield
for plundering opportunities, first a monastery at Grandmont, then an abbey near
Angouleme, and finally the shrine at Rocamadour. When the Young King suddenly fell
sick and died in the first weeks of June, the hand of God was so obvious that not even
Geoffrey de Vigeois belabored the point. As for the Palearii whom Henry’s brother-inlaw, Philip Augustus, had sent to him, they received their judgment in the alreadymentioned massacre at Dun-le-Roi.6*
The focus o f the 1183 crisis, the young Richard the Lionheart, showed the
present and future of mercenary activity in his own policies. His brutality to Adhemar’s
rented soldiery at Aixe signaled an unmistakable “zero tolerance” toward any
mercenaries working for the wrong (i.e., losing) side. According to Geraud, those
killed in Berry were doubtless fleeing Richard’s vengeance once the mopping up of
Henry’s rebellion gathered speed.69 Having lost his partner Curbaran, Sancho de
Savagnac joined forces with Lobar, and the two veterans moved out of Richard’s
territories. They took the time in their passage, however, to ravage Exidens and to start
off the next year by extorting 25,000 sous from the monastery o f the warrior-saint
Gerald of Aurillac. Only after the young count of Toulouse, Raymond VI, offered them

“ Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF XVIII: 216-9. Roger of Howden, Chronica, II:
277-8.
69Geraud, “Les routiers au douzieme siecle,” 141.
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employment did they dare the Limousin again in lightning raids.70 Richard understood
the value of hired warriors, however, particularly when he found one upon whom he
could rely. Like Lobar, to whose pre-eminence he succeeded, Mercadier hailed from
Provence, but that is all that is known of him before he appeared in Richard’s service in
1183. From that point on, though, he was hardly ever to be found far from the duke’s,
and later king’s, side. His continuous association was the benchmark for the century’s
later mercenaries; in a similar fashion Cadoc would be associated with Philip Augustus,
and Fawkes de Breaute and the Athee family with King John o f England. Moreover,
Mercadier and the forces he commanded exhibited less enthusiasm for plunder and more
awareness o f a campaign’s goals beyond their role in the violence. About him was an
aura of pride in his career, and he has left words to that very effect. In a charter
Mercadier described his relationship to Richard: a servant, perhaps a vassal {famulus) to
the king, who had fought for him faithfully and zealously, abided by his will, and
become dear enough to that king to be made chief of his army {dux exercitus), not just
of the hired swords.71
All in all, Mercadier’s self-assessment was reasonably free of exaggeration. His
first appearance may have been as early as August 1182 when the Capuciati had their
setback at Chateauneuf.72 By October 1183 he had clearly made himself indispensable

70Geofffey de Vigeois, in RH F XVIII: 223. Geraud, “Les routiers,” 147.
71Mercadier’s charter reprinted by H. Geraud. “Mercadier.Les Routiers au
Treizieme Siecle” in Bibliotheque de I'Ecole des Charles 3 (1841-2): 444-5.
^Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF XII: 219, and above.
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to some of the Limousin lords who, if not actually partisans of Richard’s, aided his
cause with their own raids against those in support of the Young King. Still something
of a parvenu, this “prince o f traitors” (princeps proditorum) devastated the territories o f
Archambaud o f Combom, reportedly sparing neither the elderly or infirm, livestock or
agriculture, nor even churches. Next, he moved against the castle of Pompadour, taking
it by a ruse. He continued to ravage the area, now in company with Constantine de
Bom and Ralph o f Castelnau. The suppression o f the young Henry’s former supporters
continued through early 1184, with Mercadier operating more evidently under Richard’s
orders (sub umbra Ducis). He secured the city o f Angouleme for Richard, apparently
by use o f another sly strategem. Then he took a more direct tactic with his band against
Adhemar of Limoges, wasting, his lands and storming Exideuil on 26 February.73
Unfortunately, Geoffrey de Vigeois’s account breaks off immediately after the
taking of Exideuil, and Mercadier disappeared from the chronicles for ten years. He
may well have been part o f the host of Braban^ons that Richard led against Toulouse in
1188, but there is no way o f knowing surely. But if so, the seventeen castles captured
in that campaign show the remarkable siege talents of Richard and his favorite comradein-arms. Geraud has proposed the next year, perhaps because of Richard’s accession to
the Angevin empire, as when Mercadier received from Richard the lands o f Adhemar o f
Bainac, who had died without heirs.74 Again, though, this date is little more than an
educated guess. Finally, there is the question o f the Third Crusade. More than one

73Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF XVIII: 220-3; Geraud, “Mercadier,” 422-3.
74Geraud, “Mercadier,” 423, and Ralph o f Diceto, II: 55.
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historian has concluded from Mercadier’s quick reappearance after Richard’s return
from crusade that Mercadier, so obviously inseparable from Richard from 1194
onwards, went on the expedition with his patron. Geraud rightly called this assumption
into question in the middle o f the nineteenth century, but the tradition persists.75
The last years of Henry II’s reign saw continued use of mercenary contingents.
Philip Augustus’s early efforts to increase royal revenues were yielding enough funds
for him to hire extra forces for his 1187 capture of Chateauroux. His reputation as an
employer doubtless plummeted among the Brabangons the next year when he dismissed
these forces and sent them to Bourges to collect their wages. On their arrival there,
other troops of Philip’s surrounded them, took their horses, arms, and money from
them, and then ejected them from the city virtually naked.76 Henry’s responded to
Philip’s raids by summoning an army from all his territories, and as the treasury was
flowing, knights poured in. In addition, Henry led Welsh skirmishers back to the
continent and loosed them in Philip’s borderlands where they burned several castles,
plus numerous small villages, tore up vineyards, and left quite a few dead in their
wake.77 Although he brought Philip to talks, Henry was having trouble holding the
initiative in the on-going game of raid and counter-raid; some time in the summer he had
to let many of his Welsh collect their final pay and return home. He kept some with

7SGeraud, “Mercadier,” 422. Verbruggen, 136. Grundmann, 474. Biographers
of Richard, however, have avoided this supposition.
76Roger o f Howden, Chronica, II: 345.
77Ibid., Gervase of Canterbury, I: 432-4; Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi, II: 48.
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him, however, because they suffered the heaviest casualties once Philip and Richard
combined to drive Henry 11 from Le Mans on 12 June 1189.78 Henry’s fortunes (in both
senses) were at their lowest ebb, and he sent Glanvill back to England specifically to
recruit those knights in poor and extenuating circumstances; Henry as paymaster
doubtless needed cheaper help. Before Glanvill could transfer these men over to the
king, however, Henry II’s ability to resist his foes had broken. He gave in to Philip and
Richard’s terms on 4 July, and died two days later.79
The Third Crusade gave northwestern Europe a brief respite from campaigning,
but only just, and when Richard returned from captivity in Germany, Philip’s attempts to
carve away parts of the Angevin lands brought the Lionheart back to combat with zeal.
At Richard’s side was Mercadier, plus some new faces on the Plantagenet payroll.
Richard came back to England in March 1194 and proceeded to milk the Exchequer and
every offender o f any rank for extra revenue. At the end of April he was at Portsmouth
with a army o f Welsh and Brabanpons ready to do his bidding.80
Richard reached Barfleur on 12 May and quickly set about recovering the
initiative in the newest round of the Plantagenet-Capetian struggle. Philip had been
besieging Vemeuil, but he abandoned the attempt on 28 May upon reports of Richard’s
imminent arrival there. As part of his efforts to distract Richard, Philip had his troops

7sGesta Regis Henrici Secundi, II: 50. Roger o f Howden, Chronica, II: 364.
79Gervase of Canterbury, I: 447-8; Warren, Henry II, 625-6.
“ Roger o f Howden, Chronica, III. 251. Richard had probably gathered the
Braban<;ons during his progress across the Rhenish principalities on the return to
England. Interestingly, William of Newburgh, 417, described the army as “English.”
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bum Evreux; apparently most of Philip's army balked at setting fire to a certain church
there, but Philip had a group with him called the Ribaldi, who did not scruple over the
Icing's wishes.®1 Meanwhile, Richard himself headed south to secure the Touraine. He
had help already on the scene in the person of his new brother-in-law, Sancho of
Navarre, who had come north with a force including at least 150 crossbowmen, plus
knights. The death of the king of Navarre had drawn Sancho back home for his own
coronation, but he sent the troops onward to besiege Loches along with some
Braban^ons. Richard joined these southern allies at Loches on 12 June and stormed the
castle successfully the next day.®2 Philip's troubles were hardly begun. He shadowed
Richard's movements and drew too close early in July, triggering a headlong pursuit by
Richard near Freteval. As the French forces drew away, Richard rode a succession of
horses to exhaustion, but Mercadier kept him supplied with fresh mounts during the
day-long rout. The loss o f his baggage-train and much treasure induced Philip to begin
negotiations for a truce. Meanwhile, Richard went to chastise his vassals in Aquitaine
with more resources than he had ever used when only duke. He, and presumably
Mercadier along with the Navarrese auxiliaries, captured many of the Angoumois
strongholds and broke the long, troublesome alliance o f Geoffrey de Rancon and
Angouleme's counts.®3 Mercadier finished off the hostilities by invading Berry,

81William of Newburgh, 418.
®2Roger of Howden, Chronica, III: 252; William of Newburgh, 419-20.
®
3Roger of Howden, Chronica, III: 256. Gervase o f Canterbury, I: 524.
Gillingham, Richard the Lionheart, 250-1. Ralph of Diceto, II: 117, on the composition
of Sancho's forces. Richard had already found the Iberian kings to be useful allies
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capturing Issoudun and installing a garrison there, a coup which induced Philip to
accept a truce until November 1195 based on the status quo.84
The contest between Philip and Richard broke out again briefly in late 1195
around Issoudun, but Philip again had to accept an imposed settlement by Richard in
January 1196. Gillingham is probably right to assert that the peace o f Louvier was
temporary in Richard's eyes so long as Philip held any former territory of Richard's, but
it was Philip who broke it first after gaining the advantage o f attaching the young count
of Flanders and Hainault, Baldwin VI, and Renaud de Dammartin, the count of
Boulogne, to his cause.85 Given the long Flemish reputation as skilled besiegers, Philip's
subsequent battering o f Aumale into surrender should come as no surprise. Richard
continued to have a bad time o f it through the first half o f 1196. When he attempted to
recover more of the Vexin, he found himself blocked at Gaillon by Philip's own
counterpart to Mercadier, Cadoc. In this case, Cadoc was not a mercenary just
defending an assignment, but a castle given him by Philip II. As Richard rode about the
castle's perimeter seeking the easiest approach for an assault, Cadoc wounded the king
in the knee with a crossbow. Richard spent a month recovering from the injury and, as

before his Navarrese marriage. In 1183 the king of Aragon had crossed the Pyrenees at
Richard's request to help suppress the Limousin uprisings. Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF,
XVIII: 218.
84William o f Newburgh, 456-7: Quippe per stipendiariam militiam, quam Rutas
vocant, expngnato et capto Ysouduno a m quibusdam aliis munitionibus. . . . On the
French side, Rigord, 132, described Mercadier as dux C otarellonm , and William the
Breton, Chronicon, 198, opted for qui imperat ruptariis et Cotarellis Marchaderus.
85Gillingham, Richard the Lionheart, 260-1.
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the French came to lament, nursed his anger all the while. In the meanwhile, he also
sent again to Wales for more o f that people who preferred war to peace, in the
judgement o f Philip's panegyrist William the Breton.®6 Also, Richard had been
negotiating with the archbishop o f Rouen for some time over Les Andelys, but in 1196
he seized the island in the Seine River and surrounding hillsides. There, he began the
construction of Chateau-Gaillard, the “Saucy Castle,” both to lock up the direct
approach to Rouen and to provide a base for his recovery o f the entire Vexin from
Philip. Richard's personal interest in Chateau-Gaillard has long been noted, not only by
his own design of the defenses and defiance of ecclesiastical rights to build it, but also
by his continued residence there after its completion. An indicator o f Mercadier*s
position with Richard comes from Chateau-Gaillard where Richard named the bridge
which approaches from the north after his comrade.87
Stymied for once on the battlefield, Richard turned to the diplomatic arena for
means to discomfit Philip. Having received such a rough military and political education
in Aquitaine, Richard knew better than to leave it alone too long, but Normandy and
especially the Vexin required the bulk o f his attention. So Richard ended nearly forty

®
6William the Breton, Philippidos, in Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le
Breton (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1882), Book V, 11 258-85. The poet's tendency to
exaggerate the numbers o f the foe is supported in this instance by the English Pipe
Rolls. PR 8 Richard I (1196) is unusually full of receipts for the passage of Welsh and
marcher troops across England and their transfer across the Channel: 18-9, 41-2, 88,
138, 290.
®7Roger of Howden, Chronica, IV: 14. Gillingham, Richard the Lionheart, 2635. Verbruggen, 137. William the Breton, Chronicon, in Oeuvres de Rigord et de
Guillaume le Breton (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1882), 208, n.4.
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years of conflict between the Angevins and counts of Toulouse by converting the latter
into an ally. The price was Richard's recently widowed sister Joan as bride for the new
count Raymond VI, plus the return of Quercy and Cahors to Toulousain control. In
addition, Richard gave Raymond the county of Agen as Joan's dowry, for which the
count not only owed five hundred knights’ service for a month in Gascony, but for
which the count performed the long-contested homage claimed by the dukes of
Aquitaine. Not only did Richard thus pacify his long-troubled southern borders, but he
also made up for the lack o f armed help available just then from the Iberian kingdoms.
Sancho o f Navarre was then warring with Castile, and the formerly helpful Alfonso II of
Aragon had just died.88 The nut which Richard really wanted to crack, however, was
Flanders. Beginning in 1195 but increasing in pressure throughout 1196, Richard
imposed a trade embargo with Flanders. The Pipe Rolls, especially of the latter year,
are replete with fines of those who were caught trafficking with “the king's enemies in
Flanders.” The Lincolnshire accounts show a number of merchants paying to regain
“the king's peace” after selling wool to Flemings. Flemish property in England,
particularly goods freshly arrived in London and East Anglia, were seized and sold off
by royal agents. The estates held by Flemings in England reverted to the crown
automatically.89 Even as he applied the stick, however, Richard also held out the carrot.
Count Baldwin had been among the many to pledge themselves to Richard during the

88Gillingham, Richard the Lionheart, 266.
89PR 7 Richard I (1195), 80-1, 106. PR 8 Richard I (1196), 93, 213, 237, 274,
286.
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king's 1194 return to England. The Pipe Roll of 1197 indicates that while Richard's
other imperial allies were still receiving their annuities, Baldwin's was being held in
England. Messengers shuttled back and forth until Richard's appeals (and the lure of
5,000 marks of silver) proved irresistible. In August Richard made a gesture of his
good faith by sending 250 sergeants to Flanders to help Baldwin deflect a punitive raid
by Philip.90 In September 1197 Baldwin, followed by Renaud o f Dammartin, abandoned
their alliance with Philip and tied themselves to Richard. It was an incredible coup for
Richard: unlike the many previous Anglo-Flemish agreements, this was the first where a
count o f Flanders agreed to take the offensive against his feudal lord, the king of
France. In Renaud's case, the turnaround was far more personal since he owed his
position at Boulogne to Philip Augustus's heavy-handed intervention there.91
Even as Richard was simultaneously punishing and wooing Philip's vassals in
1197, he and his lieutenants were also turning the military tide against Philip. Richard
burned the port of Saint-Valery in April. On 19 May Mercadier caught the attention of
nearly all the Anglo-Norman chroniclers when he captured Philip o f Beauvais, bishop of
the same city, cousin to Philip Augustus, and a perennial threat to Richard s Norman

90PR 9 Richard I (1197), xxii-xxiii, 62, 152-4, 164, 167, 225-6, 239, 240.
Roger o f Howden, Chronica, IV: 19-20, for the 5000 marks paid to Baldwin.
91William the Breton, Chronicon, 200. Rigord, 137-8. Gaston Dept, Les
Influences Anglaises et Francoises dans le Comte de Flandre au debut du XIIF siecle
(Ghent: Recueil de Travaux Publies par la Faculte de Philosophic et Lettres, 1928), 24.
Henri Malo, Un Grand Fondateur: Renaud de Dammartin et la Coalition de Bouvines
(Paris: 1898), 30, 35. On William Marshal's role in the negotiations, L'Histoire de
Guillaume le Marechal, ed. Paul Meyer (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1901), III: 141.
Roger o f Howden includes the Champenois among many other French vassals whom
Richard brought over to his side, Chronica, IV: 19, 54.
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borders. Roger o f Howden reports that Mercadier and Prince John were raiding with a
cavalry force around Beauvais when the bishop tried to interrupt their destruction.
Presumably, though, Mercadiers Brabamjons were in the vicinity since Ralph of Diceto
describes him as surrounded by the nefarious marauders. Binding Philip in chains,
Mercadier and John conveyed him to the castle of Milli which Richard and William
Marshal had just captured.92 Philip Augustus's woes continued to mount. His pre
emptive strike in August against Baldwin o f Flanders not only bogged down literally
near Ypres, but he had to beg the count for a safe withdrawal back to French territory.
Once Renaud of Dammartin also turned against his former patron, he hired Cottereaux
and others inimical to the French king. With these forces he visited destruction and
rapine upon the royal domains.93
As was becoming rote, Philip asked for a truce which kept the two sides apart
through the winter but was broken once the weather allowed fresh campaigning.
Diplomacy continued through the summer, but Richard began applying military pressure
against the French Vexin and especially the fortress of Gisors. Philip responded with a
raid into Normandy which Richard, based at Chateau-Gaillard with Mercadier, handily

92Roger of Howden, Chronica, IV: 16; Ralph of Diceto, II: 152; Gervase of
Canterbury, I: 544; HGM, III: 147-50, on the capture of Milli and the presence of
routiers with Mercadier. William of Newburgh, 493, alone does not mention who
captured the martial prelate. Mercadieris harsh treatment o f Philip should not be
assumed quickly just to be Brabanfon cruelty; besides giving Richard, who hated the
bishop, the pleasure o f the scene, Mercadier and the rest o f Richard's servants had the
recent example of William de l'Espinay, whom Richard hanged for letting Hugh de
Chaumont escape. Roger o f Howden, Chronica, IV: 15.
93Rigord, 138. Powicke, Loss o f Normandy, 120. Verbruggen, 339, for Baldwin
DCs defensive triumph over Philip Augustus's invading army.
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repulsed. Richard then forced the issue by gathering his scattered forces and invading
the French Vexin, taking the castle o f Courcelles-les-Gisors on 27 September. Philip,
only hearing that Courcelles was endangered, gathered three hundred knights plus the
levies of the closest communes and marched toward Gisors from Mantes. Richard left
his own account o f the rout that followed in a letter to the new bishop of Ely. The
English king was moving ahead of the bulk o f his forces, and he had Mercadier and a
local knight scouting even further ahead along the Epte River. They found Philip's
approaching host and reported back to Richard not only its greater size but that an
attack was nonetheless advisable. Richard sent Mercadier back to bring up the full army
while he moved on to judge the risk himself. He obviously agreed with Mercadier1s
assessment because he led an immediate charge without even awaiting the troops he had
hurrying up behind him. Richard's joy and talent in combat shines through his letter, as
he listed the notables he unhorsed himself with a single lance, besides all the others
captured. It became a debacle for the French, who fled for the safety of Gisors, pressing
so thickly to get into the fortress that their weight broke the bridge. Philip himself
reputedly went into the river along with many of his knights. Even Mercadier, hastening
back to the scene with his routiers, was able to capture thirty knights to complement the
hundred for which Richard had accounted.94
Besides a few loyal and spirited vassals like William Marshal, whom Richard
reputedly had to restrain from overindulging himself in the “sport” at Milli, Richard

"“Ralph o f Coggeshall, in RH F XVIII: 82. HGM, III: 144-145. Howden,
Chronica, IV: 55-9, where Mercadier is present cum ruta sua. Ralph of Diceto, II: 164.
Powicke, Loss o f Normandy, 121-2. Gillingham, Richard the Lionheart, 272-3.
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found his best support coming from the professional soldiery at hand. To continue the
pressure against Philip, he sent Mercadier and the routiers into the Flemish borderlands
where the latter ruined the French merchants at the fair of Abbeville. He came back into
Normandy laden with spoils and captives to be ransomed, but then sped on to Brittany
where Richard wanted his influence re-established following the death o f Alan of Dinan.
A Breton chronicle laconically noted that Mercadier arrived with a great army and many
fatalities followed.95 Back in the Vexin, Richard policed the territory with routiers, this
time under the command of William le Queu, a longtime vassal who held grants around
Niort and was castellan of Lyons-la-Foret near Les Andelys. Howden reported that in
one raid against Neufmarche, William captured eighty horse-sergeants and forty footsergeants who were part of Philip Augustus’s familia. Richard's control over the Vexin
grew tighter thanks to William’s patrols; the Histoire de Guillaume le Marechal
claimed that the garrisons which Philip still had in the Vexin did not even dare come out
of their fortresses to draw water, or worse, to collect rents from the surrounding
districts.96 At Christmas of 1197, Richard had Hubert Walter inform his English vassals
that the king required not the whole feudal levy, but only three hundred knights who
had to serve with him for a year at everyone else’s expense. At the least, his vassals
owed him the funds to hire the equivalent of this demand .97

95Roger of Howden, Chronica, IV: 60; Ex Brevi Chronico Abbatiae
Panispontis, in RHF X V III: 332.
^Roger of Howden, Chronica, IV: 78; HGM, III: 157, and n. 2.
97Roger of Howden, Chronica, IV: 40; PR 10 Richard I (1198), xix-xxiii;
Gillingham, Richard the Lionheart, 271-2.
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The five-year truce of January 1199 did not leave Mercadier and Richard at
loose ends. Mercadier used the lull to check on the estates given him by Richard in
Perigord. Moving through lands under Philip’s control, however, he was attacked by
four French counts, was apparently wounded severely, and lost many of his men. What
motivated the attack is unknown, although Mercadier’s reputation or past could well
account for it, as could the fact that he had at least some of his routiers with him.
Richard saw the attack as an attempt by Philip to subvert the truce, and by making
preparations for renewed conflict, forced the French king to swear publicly that he had
no foreknowledge of the attempt on Mercadier.98 By April Mercadier had joined
Richard at the siege of Chalus in the Limousin. Richard as usual took personal direction
of the siege and was amused by the nerve o f one crossbowman among the defenders
who attempted to fire occasionally at the besiegers. The distraction earned Richard
another crossbow wound, this time fatal. Hit in the shoulder, he retired to his tent
where Mercadier sent his own surgeon to dress the wound. The extraction was a messy
affair with overtones in the chronicles of bungling by Mercadier’s doctor. Within a few
days the wound turned gangrenous and Richard asked for communion. On 7 April he
died after directing that his slayer be forgiven. For the first and only time, Mercadier
disobeyed the will of his lord, friend, and employer: he went after the seemingly
reprieved man, hanged him, and then had him flayed.99

98Roger o f Howden, Chronica, IV. 80.
99Ibid., 82-4. On Mercadier’s horrific treatment o f the crossbowman:
Marchadeus, rege nesciente, injecit manus in eum, et tenuit, et, post obitum regis,
excoriatum suspendit
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With Richard’s passing, Mercadier found himself eclipsed by those warriors
whom John preferred to patronize, but his abilities were still too well-proven for John
not to use. As the Angevin territories began to splinter, some declaring for John and
others for his nephew Arthur, Eleanor o f Aquitaine threw her support to John. Anjou
had moved into Arthur’s camp under William des Roches, but Eleanor joined with
Mercadier and the routiers to devastate the province and especially the lands o f any who
adhered to Arthur. On 19 April they recaptured Angers itself from the castellan Thomas
Furness.100 The rest o f Mercadier’s career, as Geraud noted, was spent in Plantagenet
service but far from the new king. While John was in England securing the crown there
for himself, he began the financial arrangements to raise an army supposedly 30,000
strong; Mercadier’s troops received orders to repair to Gascony to become part o f this
expedition. The bishop of Bordeaux loaned King John much of this sum, and as he
grew desperate for its repayment, actually directed some of the ecclesiastical spoliation
around Bordeaux by the routiers. Such behavior not surprisingly got the attention of
Innocent III, who sent a sharp censure.101 We know little else of Mercadier’s actions in
Aquitaine until April of 1200, when he made his last appearance in the chronicles.
Eleanor was traveling northward with her granddaughter Blanche of Castile and stopped
in Guienne for Easter. Mercadier came to the city the next day, 10 April, to pay his
respects. There, an assassin employed by another routier captain, Brandin, struck
Mercadier down. The most telling effect o f the murder was the lack of controversy

looIbid., 88; Geraud, “Mercadier,” 435.
I01Geraud, “Mercadier,” 435-6.
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surrounding the deed and the fact that Brandin continued in John’s pay and would
eventually become seneschal o f La Marche and Gascony .102
Of course, John had far more pressing problems than the death of one mercenary
captain; with pressure coming from anew from Philip and augmented by Arthur’s
position as a rival claimant to the Plantagenet inheritance, John was hard put to hold
onto his continental domains. Both in the first phase of their contest (1199-1204) when
Philip broke the Angevin dominance and the latter effort by John (primarily 1214) to
recover his territories, mercenaries played an integral part. Richard had already
determined by his request for three hundred knights and their upkeep that Normandy
would be defended by hired professionals. John continued in the same vein,103 and as
Capetian revenues grew, Philip used the same tools for breaking Normandy’s defenders.
Based in great part on the three surviving Norman exchequer rolls of the late
twelfth century, plus fragmentary rolls from 1184 and 1203, Sir Maurice Powicke’s
analysis of the Angevin military in Normandy on the eve of Philip’s victory remains a
marvel of exposition and understanding. What Powicke found was an army that was
levied, staffed, and maintained by nearly any means imaginable. On the whole, the bulk
of the soldiers involved received wages from the crown, although Powicke refrained

102Roger o f Howden, Chronica, IV: 114; William the Breton, Philippidos, Book
VII, 11. 165, and n. 1. Geraud, “Mercadier,” 437-8.
103Roger o f Wendover, Chronica Rogeri de Wendover liber qui dicitur Flores
Historiarum, ed. H.G. Hewlett, 3 vols. (London: RS, 1886-9), I: 285: Johannesfrater
ejus, et comes Moretonii, servientes fratris sui universos militesque stipendiaries cum
honore retinuit, multa eis donativa promittens. . . .
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from seeing all these as mercenaries.104 Knights in Normandy earned six shillings a day,
balistarii (who may have been either crossbowmen or siege engineers) four shillings a
day, the mounted man-at-arms 2s.6p., and the man-at-arms on foot from eightpence to
one shilling.105 From these figures, Powicke confirmed the fact that even in such a hotly
contested region as Normandy, the armies measured in the hundreds, not thousands.
The institution of thefam ilia continued also, constituting still a professional corps (and
core) for Plantagenet armies and doubtless operating throughout this period at the upper
limits of its manageable expansion. Besides keeping the familia at full strength and
paying it,106 John also had to contend with the vagaries of military obligation in
Normandy itself—who owed how much duty at which castle, how long could local
levies be kept in the field, and so on. Given this complexity, his and Richard’s
preference for contingents ready to serve year-round makes perfect sense. The

104Powicke, Loss o f Normandy, 218: “The defense of the March was the chief
task of Normandy, and this required permanent garrisons.” And 223: “The great
majority, however, o f the men in John’s service were, apart from the mercenaries,
knights and men-at-arms who fought for a fixed wage.”
105Ibid., 223. In the case of the men-at-arms, the word serviens covers both
categories, leaving them to be determined apart by either the occasional clue o f equites
or pedites, or the fact o f their wages.
,06From his analysis o f the Norman Exchequer, Powicke, 223, concluded that
John assiduously kept his troops’ payroll timely and regular. John apparently kept the
bitter lessons of 1185 in mind when he later employed soldiers. In that year Henry II
had sent John to Ireland to “complete” the island’s subjugation (i.e., to reconfirm
Plantagenet suzerainty over the ever-expanding territories of the bellicose AngloNorman magnates). Gerald of Wales, Expugnatio Hibemica, 240, who went on the
expedition, reported the dissolution of John’s stipendiaries in imitation of the young
prince who used their salaries instead to finance his revelries and hunts. The Gesta
Regis Henrici Secundi, I: 339, went further, saying the paid troops actually deserted to
the Irish when John did not pay their wages.
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provenance of such troops usually remains in the realm o f conjecture, but a number of
these men put down roots in the Angevin dominions. As it became apparent that John’s
1200 settlement with Philip was not going to hold, John sent through Simon de Havret a
notice to all the knights of Flanders, Hainault, and Brabant that those who came to his
service fully equipped and with mounts would be rewarded with lands and money.107
John reached even further afield to find the crossbowmen who were so useful in castle
defense; a number o f Genoese and Gascon balistarii found the offers of the English
kings worth relocating. Adam de Gurdon, who perhaps came from Gascony, was
himself a crossbowman and later commanded a force of the same for John in return for
an estate in Hampshire. The Liberate Rolls of John’s reign list payments for crossbows
imported from Genoa and generous wages for at least one native of that city.108
Many of the names which would become infamous later in John’s reign also first
appeared during the breakup of the “Angevin Empire.” John split the administration of
Anjou and gave the county of Touraine into Gerard d’Athee’s control as seneschal.
Gerard found William des Roches’s hold on the district hard to contest, however, and
within the year John was ordering the destruction o f all castles not immediately under
his seneschal’s control. Gerard himself managed to hold out until Loches was stormed
in 1205. Brandin, the hand behind Mercadier’s death, was seneschal of La Marche.

l07Rotuli Litterarum Patentium in Turri Londinensi Asservati, ed. Thomas
Dufiiis Hardy (London; Public Record Office, 1835), 12. Powicke, 221, described,
Havret as one o f John’s “recruiting sergeants,” an appellation that seems too misleading
for the marshal o f Flanders, PR 10 Richard I (1198), 96, 117, 198.
l08Round, The K ing’s Sergeants, 16-7, and notes 3-4.
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Less than a month after learning of Martin Algais’s capture and the destruction o f most
o f his band, John apparently ransomed the Provencal and then installed him as steward
of Gascony and Perigord. Savari de Mauleon, who would by 1206 become one of
John’s most stalwart supporters in Poitou and later the leader of Poitevin troops in
England, was among the magnates captured in 1202 at Mirebeau and shipped across the
Channel to imprisonment at Corfe. And making a short but vivid impression on
contemporaries was Louvrecaire (Lupescar), whom John used as a bailiff in Normandy
and later entrusted with the defense of Falaise, birthplace of William the Conqueror and
critical to Normandy’s defense.109
Trying to explain John’s loss of Normandy and the Angevin patrimony, the
writer of William Marshal’s verse biography put much of the blame on treacherous
vassals. Despite their given paroles, many o f the Poitevins released after Mirebeau
nonetheless sought alliance with Philip. The Histoire wrote it off as typical Poitevin
behavior. But the defections encompassed far more than Poitou, and John was well

!09W.L. Warren, King John (London. Eyre& Spottiswoode, 1961), 79, 91, 97.
Powicke, Loss o f Normandy, 154-5, 160, 229. On Martin Algais’s capture. Rot. Litt.
Pat. I: 20, and stewardship of Gascony, ibid., 1: 21. On Savary’s capture and
imprisonment, see the work possibly written by himself, Histoire des Dues de
Normandie et des Rois d'Angleterre, ed. Francisque Michel (Paris: Societe de 1’Histoire
de France, 1840), 97. Interestingly, the HGM, III: 170, notes Savary’s long
imprisonment, a situation which ironically kept Savary apart the spate of betrayals that
plagued John in 1203-5. On Louvrecaire’s position as a Norman bailiff, Rot. Litt. Pat.,
24, 25, 32. Geraud, “Mercadier,” 421, saw this Lupescar as the same person
(Lobar/Lupatius) who so outraged Geoffrey de Vigeois in the 1180s before being
eclipsed by Mercadier, but no one else has seen a similar connection. See William the
Breton, Philippidos, Book VII, 1. 148, and n. 1, for a direct refutation. Delaborde
traced his name there as Lou Pescaire but probably also of southern origin. Geraud,
429, also placed Louvrecaire at the capture o f Philip of Beauvais with Mercadier and
John, but I have found no chronicler yet to confirm this.
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aware o f it.110 John’s solution was to rely even more on paid troops. As Warren
pointed out, however, it was a vicious cycle; as John turned in some desperation to
hired soldiers, he further alienated the populace he was trying to defend. The Marshal’s
biographer criticized John in language that echoed nothing so much as William of
Malmesbury’s critique o f William Rufus. Asking why John had been unable to retain
the love of his people, he answered himself. “It was because Louvrecaire mistreated
them, pillaging them as though he were in an enemy country .” If he appropriated their
wives or daughters, his position in John’s administration made redress of any grievance
that much harder."1 The abbess of Caen finally offered John forty marks for protection
against Louvrecaire’s exactions and to facilitate the return of previously seized
properties."2 John himself made his affection for his mercenary captains obvious in the
letter that went to the remaining members of Martin Algais’s band after the latter’s
capture. He wrote the surviving routiers that nothing more tragic had occurred since
the start of his wars than Algais’s imprisonment. “And know that the service of Martin
Algals we esteem more highly than the service of any other person, and we praise it.”" 3
Nonetheless, Louvrecaire and Algais were among the first and few of John’s

U0HGM, III: 170.
m Ibid., Ill: 171. For one instance, however, where John reined Louvrecaire in
and ordered the return o f seized goods, see Rot. Litt. Pat. I: 35. The temptation is
strong to read a sarcastic twist into John’s seemingly complimentary statement
regarding the baronial testimony on how Louvrecaire took care o f his district.
" 2Warren, King John, 91.
niRot. Litt. Pat., . 20. And Warren, King John, 91, for much of the above
translation.
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mercenaries to desert him. Louvrecaire gave Falaise and his own services to Philip
Augustus after enduring only a week’s siege in 1204, while Algais eventually retired to
Gascony. Most of John’s other captains, including Gerard d’Athee and Fawkes de
Breaute, joined him in England where they continued to enjoy not just steady salaries,
but also grants of castellanies and shrievalties.
Philip Augustus may well have not taken Normandy without the help o f his own
mercenaries, but immediately upon its submission, he began weaning himself of the
warriors. With finances that long lagged behind the Angevins, Philip had habitually
divested himself of extraneous forces as quickly as possible. Mention has been made
already o f Philip’s dismissal of a Braban^on band in 1188.114 Following Richard’s death,
Philip diverted some of his Cottereaux into the war between the count of Nevers and
Hervey o f Douzy. Not only did Philip thus avoid the perennial trouble of what to do
with unemployed mercenaries, but he thus bought a role in the mediation between the
two lords.115 As for the capture of Normandy, the most prominent o f Philip’s hired
soldiers were Cadoc and his band of routiers. His skill with a crossbow at Gaillon has
already been noted, and amid Philip’s 1203 and 1204 offensives, he continued to render
valuable service to the French king. His troops joined William des Roches for the
capture of Angers in late October 1203. Philip then recalled them to the Vexin, where
they participated in the difficult capture of the island-town of Andelys below Chateau-

u*Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi, II: 50.
115Ralph o f Diceto, II. 167.
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Gaillard.116 Afterwards, they were the first opponents to enter Richard’s marvel of
fortification. Perhaps no greater testament to the critical role of hired forces appeared
than when this band o f routiers was the first to place their flag atop the “Saucy Castle,”
a castle they reached over a bridge named after another mercenary.117
While he firmed up his grasp on Normandy, Philip essentially mothballed Cadoc
to Pont-Audemer as bailiff of that district. Whether the king still paid a salary to the
entire band is unknown,118 but Cadoc almost certainly kept them about and probably
added to their maintenance from the proceeds which he squeezed from his new office.
The Romance o f Eustace the Monk, although it erroneously identified Cadoc as
seneschal of Normandy, otherwise described a raid on Cadoc by Eustace that may have
taken place in 1205. Eustace came upon Cadoc at Pont-Audemer, who had with him
three hundred men-at-arms with which he guarded the bridges over the Seine.119

116WiIliam the Breton, Philippidos, Book VIII. 11. 272-6. For the capture of
Andelys, Book VII: 11. 391 ff. William mentions alongside Cadoc’s troops a Waltersis
legio, which Delaborde supposed to have been another band of adventurers in the pay
of Philip.
111Ibid., Book VII: 11. 723-727. Edouard Audouin, Essai sur I ’armee royale au
temps de Philippe Auguste (Paris: Champion, 1913), 111, concluded from this incident
that Cadoc had become already a knight banneret, probably as lord of Gaillon. But
remember the banner which Curbaran had raised with those of Henry II and Adhemar in
1183 at Pierre-Buffiere.
1I8William the Breton, Philippidos, Book VII: 11. 396-8, claimed that Philip was
paying Cadoc’s troop one thousand pounds daily, an obviously exaggerated figure. The
more likely figure was the 4,400 livres Angevins which the General Account o f 1202
listed for annual wages. Audouin, 109-10, 185.
119Denis Conlon, Li Romans de Witasse le Moine: roman du treizieme siecle, in
University o f North Carolina Studies in the Romance Languages and Literature 126
(1972). 11. 1960-9. John Baldwin, The Government o f Philip Augustus (Berkeley.
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Whether these men were Cadoc’s former routiers is virtually unanswerable, since he had
also acquired the fief o f Tosny in April 1205 from Philip, and they may have been drawn
from the local levies.120 As for his management o f the baillage, Cadoc missed no
opportunity for exacting the price of justice. Although some have hinted at his
appropriation o f locals’ widows and daughters for his mercenaries (even as Louvrecaire
was also charged),121 complaints against him focused more on his financial and real
estate extortions. In many cases, the plaintiffs acknowledged the validity o f the debts
owed to the crown, but they or their forebears refused to turn the money over to
Cadoc.122 On occasion, Philip still called upon Cadoc for military affairs. When Guy,
count of Auvergne, finally had to be reined in for pillaging local churches, Philip sent
Cadoc, Guy o f Dampierre, and the archbishop o f Lyons against him in 1210. In 1213,
as Philip and John were gearing up for renewed conflict, Philip had Cadoc join the
forces gathering at Damme for the invasion o f England. While the fleet delayed sailing,
Savari de Mauleon, who was then indulging in a piratical phase, induced Cadoc to
pillage the Flemish coastal cities. While they were about it, though, the English fleet

University o f California Press, 1986), 168, has concluded from the typical Sd. rate of
pay for foot-soldiers that Cadoc’s band probably had a campaigning strength close to
three hundred.
120“Baillis de Pont-Audemer” in RH FXX1V: 130-2.
121Auguste Canel, Histoire de la ville de Pont-Audemer, 2 vols. (Pont-Audemer:
Imprimerie Administrative de l’Hospice, 1885), 63, cited in Glyn Burgess, Two
M edieval Outlaws (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1997), 18.
l22Querimoniae Normcmnorum, in RH F XXIV: 6h, 10j, Ilk, 12bc, 14a, I6e,
36k, 38ci, 42f, 65j, 66ce, and 67a.
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appeared and wrecked the virtually undefended French fleet at anchor.123 Geraud
thought Cadoc had died in the battles around Damme, but he survived only to take the
battlefield one last time years later. Philip imprisoned him in 1219 or 1220, most likely
for the abuses o f his bailiffs office, and he stayed in prison until 1227. The last record
of him actually comes from late in Louis IX’s reign, which noted his participation in the
1227 siege o f Avignon.124
If Philip Augustus divested himself in the main of mercenary troops after
acquiring the heart of the Angevin lands, the opposite was true for John. For his 1206
expedition to Poitou, John began assembling an army at Portsmouth in late May. Its
composition appears to have been primarily English, but to carry it to La Rochelle, John
was willing to put most anyone on his payroll. Letters went out to his agents in the
Channel Islands that they assure any interested navigators and sailors of generous
treatment by the king. Letters of safe-conduct had to be sent out specifically for
Eustace the Monk, a former cleric who had run afoul of the count of Boulogne and
once dispossessed, had turned to banditry and then piracy to maintain himself. His skill
on the open sea, however, was John’s only concern.125 The Romance would have us
believe that John immediately outfitted Eustace with thirty galleys with which the latter

123William the Breton, Chronicon, 235, n.4. Philippidos, Book IX: 11. 293-6,
393-8, 457-63. Roger of Wendover, II: 78-9.
124Geraud, “Mercadier,” 419. “Baillis de Pont-Audemer,” in RHF XXIV: 132-3.
125Roger o f Wendover, II: 13, wrote primarily of English soldiers in action
during the siege o f Montauban. On John’s recruiting, see R o t Litt. Pat., I: 65. For the
most recent synopsis and translation o f Eustace’s career: Burgess, Two Medieval
Outlaws.
166

permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

reconquered the Channel Islands for John. The timing of this raid remains unresolvable,
but at some point Eustace did establish a base on Sark from which he preyed on most
any Channel shipping, including the occasional vessel from the Cinque Ports.126 The
king was on his way, to use Warren’s description, to acquiring “the maritime equivalent
of his mercenary troops.”127
In the years leading to the battle of Bouvines, John continued his nearly
inseparable mixture of overseas diplomacy and mercenary recruitment. As early as 1209
John made his first overtures to the count of Boulogne, Renaud de Dammartin,
ironically through the same Eustace the Monk whom Renaud had dispossessed in
1204/5.128 Renaud had allied himselfbefore with Richard and John, and Philip had good
reason to suspect his protege. He forbade Renaud and his other northern barons to
have any dealings with Eustace, Hugh de Boves, and the other “brigands” known to
recruit for John.129 Renaud stalled, trying not to confirm any definite break, but in

I26Burgess, 16, 20-2. Malo, Renaud de Dammartin, 93.
127An apt description except that John was also financing the building o f galleys
and transports along the southern coast which would form the nucleus of a permanent
royal navy.
128Despite this opening round of mediation, Eustace apparently still had no
stomach for his former lord, and once Renaud was firmly allied with John, Eustace
abandoned the English and tied himself to Philip Augustus’s son, the future Louis VIII.
Malo, 156, supposed that Renaud joined the Cinque Ports sailors in blackening
Eustace’s standing with John.
129Descended from the old comital family o f Amiens, Hugh was the son o f
Robert de Boves, who had died at Acre in 1191. He had been a partisan of John’s since
killing the chief of Philip Augustus’s prevots. The French chroniclers were unstinting in
their hatred of him, this nefandus proditor who fled from battle. William the Breton,
Philippidos, Book II: 11. 285-9. English chroniclers were scarcely more kind. Roger of
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September 1211, Philip decided he could no longer trust Renaud. He dispossessed the
count of his Norman honours, of the Dammartin family estates and Aumale, and
marched on Boulogne. Seeing no means of accord with Philip, Renaud abandoned the
county along with his brother and fled to their cousin the count of Bar. By January
1212 the break with Philip was complete, and Renaud threw in his lot with John. He
prepared the ground by becoming in advance one of John’s best diplomats. He
convinced his cousin to join the Angevin cause, made overtures to the Flemish count,
and had an especially successful time among the nobles o f Hainault and the Flemish
knighthood. After a visit to John’s cousin, the emperor Otto, Renaud had much of the
alliance in place that would face Philip in 1214. Only then did he cross to England
where John naturally welcomed him and made his efforts worthwhile. The Close Rolls
reveal that John granted Renaud a number of estates in East Anglia, Oxfordshire,
Suffolk, and Lincolnshire. Roger of Wendover estimated their value at £300, for which
estates Renaud made his homage to John and swore him fealty. In addition, John
ordered his treasury officials to pay out £1,000 a year for three years to Renaud.130
Henceforth John’s coffers flowed. Besides forty marks of silver for their own
benefit, Renaud and Hugh de Boves both received five hundred marks on 26 May for
equipping cavalry units. John rewarded Renaud’s family and allies likewise, giving

Wendover, II: 105-6, described him as a valiant but cruel and proud knight who spared
neither women nor children. See also Malo, 138.
130Malo, 137, 141-5. Rotuli litteranm clctusarum in turri Londinensi asservati,
T. Duffus Hardy, ed. (London: Record Commission, 1833-4), I: 116-7. Roger of
Wendover, II: 59..
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Simon de Dammartin a money-fief worth one hundred marks.131 John used Renaud to
court the duke o f Louvain. By September the duke of Limbourg had come into the
Angevin camp and received a fief o f 400m. of silver. His son joined the family’s
conversion in May 1213 and oversaw the holdings in England besides collecting 200m.
himself. John’s next wrote the king of Aragon in the hopes that help from that quarter
would create quite a disturbance for Philip. He also issued a safe-conduct for the count
of Flanders so as to encourage him to come to England and renew the Anglo-Flemish
alliance. At the same time, letters went across the Low Countries which encouraged
Flemish barons, knights and sergeants to come to England where any agreements made
by Renaud, Hugh de Boves, Adam de Keret, William de Cresec and William Brewer
would be honored. Walter Buc and Walter of Sotteghem put together a band o f
Flemings (milites and servientes)to which Henry de Vere was ordered to advance 400m.
if they enrolled in John’s forces. A Francon d’Arquennes led a Braban^on troop
(including four knights and eighteen sergeants) for whom the sheriff of Kent had to find
naval transport. In his wake came at least two more Brabangon notables leading groups
of knights and their retainers. Although John’s letters indicated that interested knights
should come with their own horses and arms, he also provided mounts, plus undertook
to pay the ransoms o f any knights captured in his service.132
The English victory at Damme sufficed to pull Ferrand into the alliance against
Philip, and like the others, he benefitted from John’s prodigality. His messengers to

lilRot. Lift. Claus., I: 118-9.
l32Rot. Lift. Pat. I: 92-4, 98, 134, 145. Rot. Lift. Claus., 1: 138-9. Malo, 150-4.
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John received gifts ranging as high as 500m., while John shipped enormous sums to the
county. The Close Rolls reveal a steady movement of money across John’s dominions as
he pulled in revenues from Ireland and the furthest counties, and had money and
material shifted to the southern coastal ports. William of Salisbury received 2000m. for
his troops in August o f 1213. In November of the same year, John sent 3,000m.
through Fawkes de Breaute for Flanders’s defensive needs. In the summer of 1214 as
all the allied hosts took the field, the English Exchequer poured out 10,000/n. to Hugh
de Boves for his warchest in Flanders. Two weeks later at the end o f July, another
5000m. went to the forces in Flanders.133 John was also tying many magnates to himself
through loans. The question almost becomes one of who was whose mercenary—of
who was using whom. Renaud had English soldiers in his pay by the spring of 1214
when he ordered them to bum and raze the castle o f Guines.134 Count Ferrand of
Flanders was accepting John’s subsidies in order to defy his feudal lord Philip,
something which could only improve his relations with the Emperor from whom he held
the rest of Flanders. At the same time, John’s loans to the countess Matilda or to the
burgesses o f Ghent135 made Ferrand’s cooperation with John a means for the
Portuguese-bom count to ingratiate himself with his new territory.
On 27 July 1214 the battle of Bouvines defied all o f John’s preparations, set him
on the road to Magna Carta, and confirmed Philip’s acquisition of Normandy. John was

uiRot. Lift. Claus., I: 139. Roger of Wendover, II: 98-9. Malo, 187.
134Malo, 185.
l35Ibid., 187.
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with one army in Poitou while his many allies composed the second, which attacked
from the north. The story appears in both French and English accounts o f the battle of
how Renaud initially opposed taking the field that Sunday against the French, but then
Hugh de Boves mocked him and called him a traitor, reminding Renaud of the lands and
gifts he had from King John. The count’s reply was just as sharp, a declaration that he
would show his worth by fighting if necessary until dead even though he expected Hugh
to flee as he customarily did. Philip met them with an army made up of French knights
and levies from the communes of northern France. As Georges Duby has pointed out,
for contemporaries Bouvines was the trial by combat par excellence; the French victory
vindicated Philip’s policies and showed both the injustice of John’s invasion and the
divine reward due to traitors like Renaud and Ferrand or to those who relied on
mercenaries.136 Hugh de Boves did indeed flee early on in the battle along with a critical
number o f just-recruited soldiers, but the Brabangon troops he had hired did not.
Renaud took them and arranged them in a two- or three-ringed hedgehog formation
which became essentially an impromptu fort on the battlefield. He and others who were
still mounted charged out repeatedly from this circle of spears to slash at Philip’s troops
and then retreated just as quickly back within the formation. Not only did Renaud
nearly manage the capture or death o f Philip himself, but within hours he was the only
one o f the allies still contesting the field. Philip finally had to turn 3,000 of his soldiers
against the seven hundred. As usual, where Brabanqons were concerned, the battle

136Georges Duby, The Legend o f Bouvines, trans. Catherine Tihanyi (Berkeley:
University o f California Press, 1990) 84, 111-2.
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ended only with their deaths. Renaud, despite his best efforts to die in battle, was
captured and spent the rest o f his life enduring the hospitality of Capetian prisons.137
Bouvines effectively spelled the end for years to come of employment
opportunities for mercenaries in northwest Europe. Philip’s control of France and,
through his capture of Ferrand o f Flanders, the Low Countries was too strong to permit
the extended operations that drew footloose adventurers. To the south, however, the
Albigensian Crusade was already in full gear and would draw a great many warriors
from society’s highest and lowest echelons. The backlash of Bouvines created another
arena almost immediately in England, however, where John’s decade of overly efficient
governance had again come up short of achieving its continental goals. Many of John’s
agents were still in Flanders, Brabant, and Hainault, only they would soon be sending
the region's surplus military population to John rather than recruiting for local
campaigns.
Resistance to John’s demands was strong even before he returned to England in
October 1214 and began chastising those of his barons who had not paid the scutage
levied for the Poitevin expedition. Outright opposition began among the northernmost
barons, but soon spread to pockets across the kingdom. In the spring of 1215 John sent
his half-brother William of Salisbury (ransomed after Bouvines) with Flemish soldiers to
break an uprising centered on Sherboume, but they proved unable.138 As the rebel party

137Roger of Wendover, II: 107-9. William the Breton, Philippidos, Book XI: 11.
252-5, 559-72, 585, 605-23; and C.hronicon, 285-90.
138Warren, King John, 225, 229. Histoire des dues de Normandie el des rois
d'Angleterre, 147-9.
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increased and began making demands, John stalled while he sent to Poitou for forces.
They came under the leadership of Savari de Mauleon, who since the debacle at
Damme, had again returned to John’s service. John shunted them off to Ireland so as
not to antagonize his foes but nonetheless to have them near. Even so, he almost
overplayed his hand and had to dismiss some o f the Poitevins as a conciliatory
gesture.139 The rebels tried to intimidate the king with a siege of Northampton, whose
castle was defended by Geoffrey de Martigny, one of several relatives whom Gerard
d’Athee had squeezed into John’s service. While they spent two fruitless weeks there,
John had Savari’s troops cross to England and ordered William of Salisbury and the
Flemings with him to secure London. Unfortunately for John, the rebels anticipated him
and rushed into London ahead o f John’s forces. For the moment, they had the
momentum and John conceded it to them.
On 15 June 1215 John gave his agreement to the Magna Carta. Buried near the
end o f the document were clauses 50 and 51, which dealt with John’s all too efficient
military imports. The former called for the expulsion of Gerard d’Athee and his
numerous kin, so that they should never hold offices in England again.140 In clause 51
John pledged to remove all foreign knights, crossbowmen, sergeants, and stipendiaries

xi9Rot. Lift. Pat. I: 130, where they are described as nostri barones et bacheli.
140J.C. Holt, Magna Carta (Cambridge: University Press, 1965), 330: Nos
amovebimus penttus de balliis parentes Gerardi de Athyes, quod de cetera mdlam
habeant balliam in Anglia; Engelardum de Cygoniis, Andream, Petrum et Gyonem de
Cancellis, Gyonem de Cygoniis, Galfridum de Martyni et fratres ejus, Philippum M ark
el fra tres ejus, et Galfridum nepotem ejus, et totam sequelam eorumdem.
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from the kingdom once peace had been established.141 Interestingly, Magna Carta itself
did not call for the removal o f Fawkes de Breaute, one of John’s most notorious
captains. When Roger of Wendover set down his copy of the charter, he rectified this
omission, calling for the removal of Fawkes de Breaute and “all the Flemings and
routiers who are in the kingdom to its harm.”142 Fortunately for John, not only did
Innocent III overturn the Charter of Liberties, but John’s own attempts to abide by it
saw some of his officials injured in the process.143 His trusted foreigners stayed, and
John called for more.
The seemingly inexhaustible Hugh de Boves went out again, this time with
John’s own seal, to recruit along the borders of John’s overseas territories. With him
went John’s most trusted administrators. They were to promise anything necessary to
bring soldiers to John at Dover at Michaelmas. John himself sent letters to the duke of
Brittany, dangling the prospect of the return of the honour o f Richmond if the duke
would come to his aid with knights and sergeants. John waited three months in the Isle
of Wight before his new forces were ready and then turned against Rochester. In tow
he had Savari again with the brothers Geoffrey and Oliver de Butevill and the Poitevin
and Gascon knights and men-at-arms. Walter Buc, Gerard and Godeschal of Soceinne,

Ullbid.: Et statim post p a d s reformationem amovebimus de regno omnes
alienigenas milites, balistarios, servientes, stipendiaries, qui venerint cum equis et
armis ad noam entum regni.
142Roger o f Wendover, II: 134, . . . Falconem, et Flandrenses omnes et
ruptarios, qui sunt ad nocumentum regni.
143The Barnwell Chronicle, in Memoriale Fratris Walteri de Coventria, 2 vols.
William Stubbs, ed. (London: Roll Series, 1873), 222.
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who came from Brabant and Louvain, led three battalions of knights and crossbowmen
“who thirsted for nothing more than human blood.”144 Plus there came to Dover many
who saw the opportunities to be grasped in a brewing conflict.
Arriving at Rochester, John and his forces set about the siege with vigor,
blocking all the potential exits, arranging stone-throwers all around, and bombarding the
castle incessantly in shifts. His army grew large enough that the king sent detachments
to break the sieges of Northampton and Oxford.145 John meant for Rochester’s fall to
be a signal to his foes, and his troops were up to the challenge. Besides the grueling
pace they kept and high casualties in assaults on the outer walls, they pressed on for
seven weeks. When only the keep remained in the garrison’s hands, John set his sappers
to work. They brought down a comer of the tower, but the garrison still remained
defiant. Surrender only came on 30 November when the defenders faced death by
starvation. John at first wanted to hang all the garrison, but Savari de Mauleon
counseled him strongly against it, arguing that no one would be cowed by the
executions and that more likely John’s troops would begin to desert for fear o f facing
the same penalty if caught.146 John eventually relented, kept the greater prisoners to
himself, and let his captains take charge o f the rest of the garrison. He did hang one of
the defenders, however, a crossbowman whom John had raised from a youth within his

144Roger of Wendover, II: 136, 147. Rot. Litt. Pat., I: 152.
,4SAnd this despite the death o f Hugh de Boves at sea in a storm that also
wrecked the fleet of reinforcements he was bringing John. Wendover, II. 147-8.
l46Roger of Wendover, II: 146-50. Barnwell Chronicle, 226.
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own household.147 Doubtless the severe penalty derived as much from John’s personal
sense o f betrayal as from the crossbowman’s low social position.
John then decided on a twofold strategy. William of Salisbury, Savari and the
Poitevins, Fawkes de Breaute, William Brewer, and Walter Buc with his Brabangon
troop stayed in the area to contain the rebels in London. John took the rest of the army,
including the Flemings and crossbowmen, northward to harry the estates of the rebels
and to counter a half-hearted invasion by the Scottish king. It was a tightly controlled
expedition of pillaging; on the lands o f rebels, John’s troops had free license, but
elsewhere they suffered severely themselves if they stole from the king’s loyal (or
neutral) subjects.148 Back in the south, John’s lieutenants made arrangements for
blockading the approaches to London, and then they too went after the king’s enemies,
if not with the same care for bystanders. Wendover reported the rapine and pillage, the
extortion of protection money, and devastation of the countryside that usually followed
the marauding bands of the continent. Fawkes applied himself to thornier problems, and
began reducing the last castles still held against John. Naturally, he filled them with his
men as they surrendered. Walter Buc and the Brabangons raided Ely, but were not long
alone. The king’s half-brother William o f Salisbury appeared with Savari and Fawkes to
cut off any escape routes. Not even churches provided any sure refuge.149

l47Bamwell Chronicle, 227.
148Roger of Wendover, II; 161-2. Warren, King John, 248-50.
149Roger of Wendover, II; 165, where he calls John’s imported soldiery membra
diaboli who came as locusts over the land, and 167, 171-2. Barnwell Chronicle, 229.
John’s biographers have noted the probable disruption by this point of the Exchequer’s
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Their backs against the wall, the barons made their last throw and invited Prince
Louis of France to cross to England and become their new king. They were gambling
that, since many in John’s armies hailed from French territories, they would demur from
opposing the Capetian heir. Eustace the Monk assembled a fleet at Calais for Louis and
transferred the prince and his forces (which contained a great many knights gathered
from the retinues o f French nobles hungry for a bit of adventure) to the Isle of Thanet
on 21 May 1216. John was himself back at Dover by then, but refrained from attacking
Louis precisely because he was unsure of the loyalty o f his non-English forces. As the
initiative passed over to Louis and the barons, John’s hesitancy appeared well-founded.
The Flemings and many other continental soldiers chose either to go home or join the
growing French presence in London. Only the Poitevins remained with John, plus his
long-standing servants.lS0 While John’s cause appeared to be in utter disarray, Ingelard
d’Athee held out for him at Windsor, Hubert de Burgh at Dover, Walter de Godardville
(one of Fawkes’s men) at Hertford, and Walter the German at Berkhamstead. By late
summer John was trying to recover the lost ground. Campaigning lasted till October
when he grew ill and had to retire to Newark. His death there on 18 October was also
the death-knell o f the revolt and of French designs on England as that alliance lost its
focal point. The Poitevins escorted his remains across England to Worcester while the
royalist party hurried to crown John’s nine-year old son as Henry III on 28 October.

ability to bring in revenues, doubtless accounting some for the amount of plunder taken
in these months. Warren, King John, 249.
,soRoger o f Wendover, II: 180-2. Histoire des dues de Normandi et des rois
d ’A ngleterre, 165-70.
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Campaigning continued into the next year, but now the onus o f misbehavior fell
more to the rebels, and particularly to their French allies. Roger o f Wendover made his
first mention o f ruptarii among Louis’s forces at the end of April during a raid on St.
Albans. The French infantry were praedones all, well-known to be the refuse and scum
of that kingdom.151 All that remained was the “Fair of Lincoln” to break the opposition
to Henry Ill’s accession. William Marshal, now regent of the kingdom, led forces to the
relief of Lincoln which had to be in the main paid troops since he took many o f them
from castle garrisons. There was also a large crossbow contingent under command of
Fawkes de Breaute. The details of the rout at Lincoln are unnecessary here, but two
points deserve mention. The enthusiasm o f William Marshal, by then at least seventy, to
join the melee had often been noted, but Fawkes himself showed no less zeal,
outstripping his own troops in a headlong charge to engage his young lord’s foes. After
the battle, one of Fawkes’s knights who died in the fray was buried with honors at the
monastery of Croxton. As a counterpoint, a nameless sergeant fighting for the rebels
was buried outside the city in an intersection, as befitted an excommunicate. Coupled
with the defeat of a reinforcing fleet and the death of Eustace the Monk by the nascent
royal navy, Louis and the French abandoned their enterprise in England.152
The fate of the anonymous sergeant at Lincoln highlights one o f the issues at the
heart of any concept of “mercenary” in the twelfth century: the vocabulary. Was this

151Roger o f Wendover, II: 209, 211: pedites de regno Francorum, qui quasi
spurcitia Ulus regionis et spuma erant.
lS2Ibid., II: 211-7, 222. Barnwell Chronicle, 238.
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serviem a mounted soldier or an infantryman; did he receive payment for his service on
a regular basis, or just as a supplement; had he come with his own weapons, or were
they provided him? What factor earned him the scorn of his foes, who eventually were
magnanimous enough to let most of the French return home unmolested? As this
chapter and the previous have attempted to show, there was an incredible vagueness in
the nomenclature of the paid warrior. It ran the gamut from stipendiarius to ruptarius,
from miles to praedonus, and the terms were all too often interchangeable, even as their
subjects sometimes were on the battlefield. It is a problem too long overlooked or
treated superficially, perhaps because it requires attention elsewhere than the hurly-burly
of combat.

179

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

V
Terms o f Employment
The preceding survey o f the twelfth century’s military affairs in western Europe
makes one thing quite clear: a bewildering variety of men were willing to fight for pay,
and they went by as nearly as wide an array of descriptions. Some o f these labels had an
unmistakably pejorative sense, some were more neutral, and others still escape any easy
definition. Their use varied, as one would expect, depending on the social rank and
imminent threat of the warrior being so labeled and the prejudices and assumptions of
the chroniclers and poets who chose between the available terms. Precision in terms
also increased across the century as new vocabulary arose to describe the increasingly
sophisticated military institutions of the period. At the same time, as in so many
medieval subjects, some words seemingly can apply to almost anything* Additionally,
we have a growing number of vernacular sources, particularly troubadour poetry and
verse histories, from the later twelfth and early thirteenth centuries to complement our
understanding of the Latin chroniclers.
The variety of terminology derives from the already mentioned fact that the
twelfth century had no word exactly equivalent to our own mercenary. The root word
mercenarius existed, indeed, and its meaning was consistently pejorative, but it lacked
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Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the military association integral to its current definition. Du Cange defined it succinctly
as just another term for merchant, allowing the possible viability o f mercer as a
translation.1 J.F. Niermeyer refined this definition into three options, all related to
commerce, of which mercer was the last. He also found that it refers to leaseholders as
well as to a merchant’s servant, or commercial agent.2 The underling sense was the
most common, and also the one which came closest to the word’s pejorative use in
scripture. In the gospel of John, Jesus criticized the hireling (mercennarius) who
abandoned a flock of sheep upon the appearance of wolves, as opposed to the genuine
shepherd who would not let his sheep be scattered. One o f the few times mercennarius
appears in twelfth century sources is in John of Worcester, where it reflects this
passage. In this case, however, the one accused of acting like a hireling is the bishop of
Bath. He had captured Geoffrey Talbot in 1138 when Geoffrey was using Bristol as a
base to raid Stephen’s supporters. As Stephen rushed with the fa m ilia regis to take
possession of Geoffrey, the bishop released him after being threatened by partisans from
Bristol with the destruction o f his own estates. In this role reversal, the bishop became
the one abetting the further devastation of the flock, as opposed to Stephen’s
professional corps of warriors.3

3Du Cange, Glossarium M ediae et Infimae Latinitatis, 10 vols. (Niort: 1884):
see under mercenarius.
2J.F. Niermeyer, M ediae latinitatis lexicon minus (Leiden. 1954). see under
mercennarius.
3John 10:12. mercennarius et qui non est pastor cuius non sunt ovespropriae
videt lupum venientem et dim ittit oves et fugit et lupus rapit et dispergit oves. John of
Worcester, 50: Oua de re presul, vice mercenarii sibi suisque timens, educto de
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The one term which does appear often and across the entire period under
analysis here is stipendiarius, either as a noun itself or as an adjective typically
modifying miles. but in both cases underlining the essential component of any definition
of mercenary: his wages. Yet neither the term’s widespread use nor its coupling with
miles yields any precise clues about those fighting for pay. In the first instance, the
presence of a salary does not necessarily classify the recipient as a mercenary. As for
the latter, it still leaves a number o f questions open regarding social origins and status.
Although usually translated as “knight,” miles in the first half of the twelfth century still
referred to a heterogenous body of warriors, some of whom were acquiring the traits
and trappings customarily thought o f as knightly, but others of whom might just be
well-armed foot soldiers or wandering adventurers owning little more than their own
weapons. Thus medieval chroniclers utilized a number o f adjectives to distinguish the
different ranks among the professional fighters: milites gregarii or agrarii for the least
well-off warriors, m ilites armati, milites equites, milites mediae ttobiles and a host of
other descriptions for those of middling rank, and milites primi or principes militum as
examples of the nobility’s increased adoption of the knightly label.4 Just whom the term

ciistodia Gausfrido et illis reddito, voluntati illorum cedit.
4The reading on this topic is extensive, but for the sources of the appellations
mentioned, see P. Guilhiermoz, Essai sur I'origine de la noblesse en Frattce an Moyen
Age (Paris. Picard, 1902), 337-342, 370; Georges Duby, “The Origins of Knighthood,”
in The Chivalrous Society, trans. Cynthia Postan (Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1977), 159, 170; K.J. Leyser, “Henry I and the Beginnings of the Saxon Empire,”
in M edieval Germany and her Neighbors, 900-1250 (London: The Hambledon Press,
1982), 11-42; Sally Harvey, “The Knight and the Knight’s Fee in England,” in Past and
Present 49 (November 1970), 28. One of the more recent and thorough surveys is that
by Jean Flori, L ’essor de la chevalerie: Xle-XIle siecles (Geneva: Droz, 1986).
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referred to naturally differed from region to region: in Germany and the Low Countries,
the knighthood was long dominated by the ministeriales, that armigerous class o f unfree
servants;5 in the Iberian kingdoms, the milites or caballeros were often little more than
armed peasants or townsmen.6 In the Capetian domains, most mentions of milites made
them out clearly to be mounted warriors, but enough exceptions remained to leave the
question open.7 In England, many o f the fief-holding knights were little better off than
the free peasants.8 From knight to foot soldier, miles was “used in Domesday Book to
describe persons of every imaginable level of wealth, social status and military
training.”9
Thus stipendiarius remains a functional designation which, if not neutral in
meaning, rarely smacks o f approval and occasionally leans more to the negative. Nor
does it denote any particular social background. Orderic grouped William Rufus’s
stipendiaries with lechers and whores in his summary of the king’s demise. William of
Malmesbury, on the other hand, did no more than contrast their easy position with that

5Flori, L 'essor de la Chevalerie, 29; P. Bonenfant and G. Despy, “La Noblesse
en Brabant aux Xlle et X llle siecles,” in Le Moyen Age 13 (1958): 27-66.
6Flori, L 'essor de la Chevalerie, 35; Angus MacKay, Spain in the M iddle Ages
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), 47-8.
7P. Van Luyn, “Les milites dans la France du Xle siecle,” in Le M oyen Age 26
(1971): 5-52.
8Harvey, “The Knight and the Knight’s Fee in England,” 15, 20-1.
9Hollister, M ilitary Organization o f Norman England, 115.
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of the country people who eventually provided their salaries.10 In Henry’s actions,
however, we find a few clues. William of Malmesbury called the Bretons whom Henry
hired at his brother Robert’s behest stipendarios suos. Describing Henry’s close
reliance on the Bretons, William noted that conditions were so poor in Brittany that they
were eager to seek even the most laborious work abroad. With this manpower pool in
such straits, Henry was thus able to buy the fidelity of an otherwise perfidious people.11
More so than the issue o f humble origin, the specter of questionable faithfulness and
aggressive opportunism lurks in the label of stipendiarius. Nobly bom, Robert fitz
Hubert became the stipendiary of Robert of Gloucester as the civil war deepened in
England between Matilda and Stephen. To observers, he had no identification with
either side of the conflict; he merely accepted pay from the empress’s party until more
convenient means of aggrandizement offered themselves.12 Nor can we miss Orderic’s
cutting assessment of Geoffrey of Anjou when the latter invaded Normandy in 1137; he
came with four hundred knights, acting “as his wife’s stipendiary commander” in his
depredations across the Norman march.13 The label held onto its unsavory connotation
throughout the century. William o f Newburgh introduced Henry II’s Braban<?ons of

10OV, iv. 292; GR, ii: 379. In both cases, milites stiperuiiariis.
UGR, ii: 478: Hujus consuetudinis ille non inscius, si quando opus habuisset
stipendiariis militibus, multa perdebat in Britones, fidem perfidae nationis nummis suis
mutuatus.
l2HN, 36, 43-4; GS, 104-8; John of Worcester, 61-3.
13OV, vi: 482: . . et stipendiarius coniugi suae fa ctu s ingentem maliciam
exercuit.
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1173 as stipendiaries,14 while Gerald of Wales had little good to say of the garrisons o f
stipendiaries who were stationed in the Irish cities closest to the Welsh coast. They
were “slaves to wine and to lust” who abandoned the gains won further inland by the
first Anglo-Norman adventurers. Roger o f Howden went further, noting that they sold
out to the Irish as soon as their wages ran out.15 Likewise, John worried about the
reliability of the stipendiaries he had recruited on the continent when he faced Prince
Louis’s initial arrival in England.16
Stipendiarius cannot, however, become a byword for faithlessness; numerous
instances also occur where stipendiaries rendered remarkably devoted service to their
employers. The oft-cited example of Bridgnorth in 1102 naturally has to be mentioned
once more. There, while their employer stayed safely away, the stipendiaries o f Robert
of Belleme withstood Henry I’s army for three weeks until betrayed by the townsfolk
and feudal levies in the garrison.17 It was to Breton and English stipendiaries that Henry
I turned in 1117 when he knew that many o f his Norman vassals were likely to betray
him.18 The last partisans o f Stephen in Normandy were stipendiaries in the pay o f the
earl of Warenne, who had installed them at Drincourt. Even after the earl himself had

■“William of Newburgh, 172; stipendiarias Bribantionum copias.
I5Gerald of Wales, Expugnatio H ibem ica, 240. Roger of Howden, Chronica,
II; 304-5.
,6Roger of Wendover, II; 180:.. .quoniam alienigenisfuit stipendiariis vallatus
et militibus transm arinis.. ..
17Prestwich, “War and Finance,” in ANW, 68. OV, vi: 24.
18OV, vi: 190.
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surrendered Rouen to Geoffrey of Anjou, these soldiers held out until the combined
forces o f Geoffrey, the count o f Flanders (supposedly with 1400 mounted knights), and
the king of France came against them.19 As for the stipendiaries whom John carefully
did not throw against their nominal lord, John had no such reluctance at Rochester,
where their willingness to undergo tremendous hazard has already been noted.
Another group often designated as mercenaries, the milites gregarii, likewise
showed a remarkable willingness to risk themselves in combat or endure considerable
hardships. Their classification as mercenaries derives mostly from Chibnall’s work as
editor and translator of Orderic Vitalis. Working from the speeches of Waleran of
Meulan and Odo Borleng before the battle o f Bourgtheroulde, she determined the
paganses and gregarios derided by Waleran to be mercenaries on the basis of Odo's
admission that they accepted wages from Henry I.20 It is a most plausible argument, but
not one that admits of application in many other situations. Waleran meant his disdain
for “country bumpkins” and knights whose pedigree could not match his own, not
necessarily for mercenaries.21 In other instances, the milites gregarii seem even further
removed from viable consideration as mercenaries. While Henry I was besieging
Bridgnorth, a number of his magnates began to advise him to come to a settlement with

I9Robert o f Torigni, 148. stipendarii comitis Warenne.
20OV, vi: 350, especially n. 1; and Chibnall, “Mercenaries and the fam ilia regis,”
vnANW, 88-9.
21See Chibnall’s own reference to Guilhiermoz’s “chevaliers de la petite
condition,” 340. Also, Crouch, The Beaumont Twins, 12, for Waleran’s ability to trace
his ancestry back to Charlemagne.
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the lord o f Belleme. Their counsel derived mostly from their own fear that Henry would
parlay his suppression of Robert of Belleme into tighter control of all his vassals. Three
thousand “country knights" (as Chibnall translated gregarii milites here) shouted down
the nobles’ advice, denouncing it as traitorous and virtually demanding to be flung
against Robert o f Belleme. The numbers of knights reputed to be on hand, plus their
advocacy o f a policy that benefitted not just Henry but the country as a whole, support
Chibnall’s avoidance of the mercenary label. But it crops up again elsewhere, in the
description o f “common mercenaries and lawless bandits”22 who came like wolves upon
Normandy immediately after Henry I’s death; or the eight “stipendiary knights”23 who
were defending Pont-Echanfray in 1137. In the first example, the mercenary
designation is possible, but hardly necessary; the invaders were opportunistic warriors,
most likely from poor conditions and in search of quick plunder but little different in the
latter respect from the rest of the knighthood. As for the garrison at Pont-Echanfray,
they were starving when Rotrou, count of Mortagne and himself on Stephen’s payroll
(pretio conductus), came upon them. It is hard to see them as stipendiary knights when
they were not even receiving basic necessities from their unknown patron. As the last
heirs of Ralph the Red immediately lost possession of his estates upon Pont-Echanfray’s
surrender, it seems likely the milites gregarii who had been in the castle were the locals
responsible for castle ward there. Certainly, they were undergoing more privation even
without a siege than any mere hireling would countenance.

“ OV, vi: 472: Gregarii namque milites et indomiti piratae.. . .
231bid., 534: octo gregariis militibus.
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From the Gesta Stephani come two examples, however, o f m ilites gregarii who
were serving for pay or the promise of plunder. As both sides scrounged for forces to
decide the control of Winchester in 1141, Stephen’s brother Henry o f Blois hired a force
of “ordinary knights” at great expense.24 The author unfortunately yielded no more
information than this, leaving us to counterbalance the possibly humble origins o f these
knights against the London militia which arrived for the siege outfitted in chain mail and
helmets. Two years later Geoffrey de Mandeville revolted against Stephen, ravaging the
lands of East Anglia and the Fens. He drew to his rebellion “a very strong force of
ordinary soldiers and likewise o f robbers.”25 Geoffrey’s despoliation o f several
monasteries drew the chronicler’s attention far more than would the pay o f his soldiers,
but it is worth remembering that Henry o f Blois had himself removed a costly crucifix
from Hide Abbey at nearly the same time that he hired his milites gregarii26
By mid-century, the m ilites were well on their way to an established social pre
eminence, and the habit of describing some o f the group’s members as “common fell
out of practice. On the other hand, there were still plenty of warriors whom
circumstances (anything from being a younger son to bad political gambles or just

2*GS, 128: sed et m ilitibus gregariis plurimo aere conductis.
25Ibid., 164: gregariae quoque militiae, sed et praedonum. . . .
26Annals o f the Church o f Winchester, trans. Joseph Stevenson, in Church
Historians o f England (London: Seeleys, 1856), 363-4. The monks o f Hide complained
to the pope of both their own abbot’s and Henry’s role in the removal o f the ornaments.
Henry went to Rome in 1151 to defend himself against the charges, and not only cleared
himself of the accusations after much gift-giving, but eventually consecrated a new cross
in 1167.
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limited family wealth) had kept in reduced straits. For these men new terms became
prevalent in the latter half of the twelfth century. Relatively young, typically without
marital attachments and only nominal territorial allegiances, many o f these were the
“bachelors” or juvenes whom Duby has so well described. This time of “youth” was
often a long period, marked at the start by the dubbing o f the knight and at its terminus
not so much by marriage as by actual fatherhood.27 Duby singled out the vagabondage
o f these adventuring warriors as one of the group’s defining characteristics, and it is a
point well worth comparing to the rootlessness o f many mercenaries. In both cases,
they typically traveled in bands, the one in search o f employment, the other for
adventure— a division that existed less for the juvenes than the stipendiaries. The
fam ilias de militibus stipendiaries who offered their service to Stephen came in search
o f a steady maintenance.28 When William Marshal found himself at the center o f a
three-way bidding war for his tournament prowess, renown as much as the next meal
was a critical consideration.29 In their roving bands, the toumey-going youths enjoyed
much that the church frowned upon: gambling, hunting, plays, and a reputation for
loose morality. In Duby's summation, “they stirred up turbulence and provided

27Georges Duby, “Youth in aristocratic society,” in The Chivalrous Society,
Cynthia Postan, trans. (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1977), 113. For the
occurrence o f married “bachelors,” Jean Flori, “Qu’est-ce qu’un bachelerT’, in
Romania 96 (1975): 289-314.
28Richard of Hexham, RS, 145.
^HGM , III: 72.
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manpower for any distant expedition."30 One and all, they sought glory for one
purpose: to attract the attention o f a patron who might reward them with estates,
usually through marriage to an heiress in their wardship. The parallels with the
mercenary bands of the later twelfth century are hard to miss: the accusations of lewd
behavior, blasphemy, and addiction to dice; and perhaps most interestingly, the hints
that Louvrecaire and Cadoc both sought to secure wives for their followers.31
The most ardent and rambunctious of chivalry's practitioners, the bachelors still
displayed similarities with the soldiers from whom they were distancing themselves by
donning the official chivalric disdain for money.32 Commenting on Richard’s decision to
allow tournaments within England for the first time in decades, Ralph of Diceto spoke
of the juventes who were eager for renown but not for money; Richard in fact was
counting on this zeal to overcome the stiff fees he imposed on the tournaments.33 This
careful disdain for money (even though they were ever seeking funds) has helped to hide
the presence of many bachelors who doubtless served in the armies of the twelfth
century. From John’s request in 1214 to Savari de Mauleon for barones et bacheii,

^ u b y , “Youth in aristocratic society,” 115.
3lGervase of Canterbury, Historical Works, I: 369-70; and above, chapter III,
nn. 129, 139.
32The problem with bacheler, as with so many o f the terms under discussion
here, is the wide spectrum o f referents. Flori, “Qu’est-ce qu’un bachelerV, 307, found
the term lacked any specific economic or social denotation: Ce que I'on souligne, par
ce mot, c 'est I 'ideal de jeunesse, la vaillance, I 'enthousiasme, I 'elan impetueux. C 'est
le contraire de I'immobilisme, de la stagnation, le contraire de la vieillesse, mais aussi
de la lachete, de la faiblesse, de I'avarice.
33Ralph of Diceto, II: 121.
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however, comes proof that this particular category of unattached warriors were sought
after when armies were assembled.34 The greatest participation of bachelors came
earlier from the conquest of Ireland which, beginning as something o f a grand adventure
with the respectable goal of recovering Mac Murchada’s throne, offered the more likely
prospect of winnable glory as opposed to the drudgery o f siege or garrison duty on the
continent. Gerald of Wales’s history of the conquest abounds not just with the deeds
but also the words and attitudes of the juventes whom Gerald knew as kin and peers.
Repeatedly, Gerald described them not only as “youths,” but also as the best warriors
that the Anglo-Normans of south Wales could produce. Robert fitz Stephen recruited
his initial invasion force from the “military elite” o f Wales (de electa Guallia iuventute),
a group consisting of related and neighboring knights, plus well-armed retainers and
archers on foot. Recruitment continued in the same circles as Strongbow prepared for
his expedition.35
Once in Ireland, the desire for battle (a means both for glory and permissible
enrichment36) saw the bachelors repeatedly throw themselves successfully at the
typically more numerous and surprised Irish. Gerald noted the pivotal role of the
juventes in the capture of Dublin; forced almost immediately afterward to defend the

“Rot. Litt. Pat. I; 130.
3SGerald of Wales, Expugnatio Hibemica, 30, 34, 64.
36Ibid., 60. The speech which Gerald has Raymond le Gros give on behalf of the
captives taken at Waterford spells this out explicitly, describing the ferocity which ought
to attend a man in battle, but mercy afterwards not only enhances a noble reputation,
but provides ransoms which conveniently augment a knight’s pay (militum stipendia).
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just-acquired city, the Anglo-Norman forces marched out. The Song o f Dermot
described their composition in detail, noting among the “friends and companions” of
Earl Richard a variety of combatants: barons, vassals, knights, sergeants, and hired
soldiers. Some sixty archers were also present, but their position as companions of the
bachelors is most doubtful.37 It was to a similar force that Robert fitz Stephen had
directed an earlier exhortation, stressing the former battles that bound him to the
adolescentes electi of south Wales. They were not mercenaries, he implicitly argued,
for they came not out of a desire for wages (non stipendiorum ambicio), but to restore
a king cheated of his throne. The grants in perpetuity o f lands for themselves and their
children were natural gifts that bound them to Diarmat’s cause.38 He echoed the
standard concerns of the bachelor: a strong patron and the acquisition o f one’s own
estates.
Another group of warriors also fought in Ireland alongside the bachelors, as well
as in most o f the latter twelfth and early thirteenth centuries’ campaigns. Even more so
than the juvenes, sergeants have often come under the mercenary label. And the wide
range of combatants who served as sergeants likewise should make the label’s
application questionable.39 In some ways, they represent a continuation of the milites

37Ibid., 66-8. Song o f Dermot, 11. 1889-1906: baruns, vassals, chevalers,
serianz, souder. On the archers’ relations to the rest o f the forces, compare the
admonition o f Roger Stuteville to his bowmen at Wark in 1174, where he exhorted
them to defend themselves like noble knights. Jordan Fantosme, 11. 1231-33.
38Gerald o f Wales, Expugnatico Hiberttica, 48.
39ChibnaII, “Mercenaries and the fam ilia re g isf in ANW, 88. “The word serviens
at this date was far from being a precise technical term; it could certainly be applied to
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gregarii, often being distinguishable from knights only by the finery, sophistication, and
weight o f their armaments. As knights became ever more specialized warriors, the
servientes came to make up larger components o f medieval armies, being more easily
adaptable to a variety o f tasks. Thus they appeared on foot as often as on horseback, as
operators o f siege equipment, and amid the archer and crossbow corps.40 For all these
tasks, there is plentiful evidence that they received monetary compensation, and on the
basis o f these payments Boussard relegated many o f the sergeants who appeared in
Henry II’s Pipe Rolls to mercenary status.41
Caution ought once again to have the upper hand, however, because many of the
contingents which Henry II imported to critical sites were nonetheless composed of his
subjects and quasi-subjects. The Welsh in particular fell in the latter category since
often their origin in still independent regions or the partly subjugated marches is
unknown. Henry was already relying on these warriors, seasoned in the incessant
border warfare, by 1167 when they burned the Capetian armory at Chaumont. The Pipe
Rolls have nothing to reveal about that band, but several conclusions might be applied
carefully from the troops transferred to the continent during the 1173-4 crisis. One

mounted men more lightly armed than mailed knights as well as to those who owed
other than military service, and in Normandy in particular it may also have been applied
to the ‘young’ knights in the household troops.”
^ o r a contemporary lament on the displacement o f knights by these other
troops in actual campaigns, see Guiot de Provins, “Bible,” in Les Oeuvres de Guiot de
Provins, ed. John Orr (Manchester, 1915), II. 181-99. Also, Rogers, Latin Siege
Warfare, 243, for an analysis of Guiot’s intimacy with medieval military affairs.
4‘See liberationes servientum in the index of Henry’s, Richards, and John’s Pipe
Rolls. Boussard, 193, 194.
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example shows how the tides of fortune could sweep these soldiers along; the
redoubtable Miles de Cogan led a group o f Welsh marcher sergeants back out o f Ireland
and as far as London, whose sheriff accounted for their wages and maintenance. Other
groups were o f course drawn directly from the Marches. The usual variety of armament
also showed up: infantry and cavalry sergeants both appeared, including a contingent of
the latter who actually went into garrison duty. Another group of sergeants with mail
shirts appeared in the Winchester accounts, while the knights and sergeants of the
Portchester garrison received iron helmets and some sort of siege-equiptnent for their
munitions.42 Throughout these years, no paid sergeants appeared to have come from
deep within Wales, but only the English-controlled peripheries. Even then, assumptions
that these sergeants were Welsh in origin must be hedged; the Pipe Roll of the previous
year saw Henry move troops to the region, doubtless to forestall Welsh participation in
the coming storm.43
An examination of chronicle and verse evidence also reveals the ambiguous
status of sergeants. They appear in most instances in the company o f knights,
suggesting that m ilites et servientes may have replaced the equites et ptedites o f earlier
in the century, but there are enough servientes equites to prevent this from being a
standard interpretation. Translated variously as “retainers,” “attendants,” or
“followers,” in these cases, servientes might be better understood by a more inclusive, if

n PR 20 Henry II: 8, 108, 132, 136.
A3PR 19 Henry II: 107-8. On the other hand, the Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi,
I: 51, indicates the presence o f several northern Welsh princes, including one described
as rex, with Henry in Normandy during the opening hostilities of 1173.
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vague, term like “soldier7,44 This would serve to stress their position in the host, and
their relationship with the commander/employer, more than a relationship with the
knights, which if it existed was probably somewhat antagonistic. On the French side,
the king was initially more likely the commander or lord than an employer, even if he did
pay his troops some sort of daily maintenance. Louis VII, whom Rigord indicated did
not have the funds to hire mercenaries, had milites et servientes with him at Rouen in
1174 where they directly confronted similar Anglo-Norman forces while the Welsh
conducted nocturnal ambushes.45 Capetian reliance on sergeants continued under Philip,
although they tended to figure in English accounts of captives taken by Richard and his
lieutenants. In September 1198 Philip lost twenty knights and eighty servientes and
equites near Vernon, besides much infantry. As Richard pushed his good fortune, Philip
summoned troops under threat of excommunication, drawing together a French army
not only of knights and sergeants, but also the communal militias. They in turn met
defeat at Richard’s hands, plus pursuit by Mercadier’s force.46 One o f the continuators
to Gervase of Canterbury described the forces which Philip had collected at Damme in
1213 for the invasion of England as being composed of milites et servientes, but even
though Cadoc was there, it is doubtful that the term referred to his troops.47

■
“ See Chibnall, “Mercenaries” in ANW, 87, for other contexts o f “sergeants”.
*5Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedictis Abbatis, I: 75.
^Roger o f Howden, Chronica, 55-9, and 78 for the capture o f servientes
equites and pedites from Philip’s household retinue. Ralph of Diceto, 164.
47Gervase of Canterbury, Historical Works, II: 107. William the Breton,
Philippidos, Book IX: U. 393-8.
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On the English side, however, serviens had its ambiguity also, but referred on
several occasions specifically to foreign troops hired by the king. William of Aumale’s
garrison in 1173, composed o f milites et servientes was likely part of the count’s local
levies since he was defending the caput o f his honour. But the knights and sergeants
installed by Henry II along southern marches o f Normandy the next year were more
likely imported, seeing how the king intended for them to “remind” the local populace
of their loyalty.48 Immediately after Richard’s death, John retained “with honor” all the
paid soldiers and knights whom Richard had hired and promised them further gifts.49
When Hugh de Boves died in a storm in the English Channel leading a freshly recruited
army to John’s aid, his body washed ashore near Yarmouth along with innumerable
militibus et servientibus. These troops had reputedly been promised new homes and
estates in Norfolk and Suffolk as their payment. Roger o f Wendover provides another
explicit mention o f mercenary soldiers at the time o f Prince Louis’s invasion. At that
point, John lost the knights and sergeants from Flanders and his continental territories
when they either reverted to their former loyalty or returned home.50 Only the Poitevins
under Savari stayed with John, and these knights and soldiers of the king applied
themselves to rooting out his adversaries in the Fenlands.51

**Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi, I: 47, 72.
49Roger o f Wendover, I: 285:.. Johannes frater ejus, et comes Moretonii,
servientesfra tris sui universos militesque stipendiaries cum honore retinuit, multa eis
donativa promittens. . . .
50I bid., II: 147-8, 182.
slBamwell Chronicle, 232: milites et servientes regis.
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In vernacular sources, the servientes appear as sericmz or some close variant.
From the Song o f Dermot and the Earl come further examples of the varied service
performed by the sergeants. They appear again on horseback as well as on foot. The
same Miles de Cogan mentioned above had a group o f serianz who used both lances
and bows. At Dublin the sergeants fought alongside knights as readily as they
coordinated with the archer corps. The poet often mentioned them in the same breath
with squires, vassals, and other members o f a particular mesnie, or military household.
In every instance, though, they were in Ireland for enrichment, either through a steady
salary, or to win the lands and heiresses originally dangled before them by Mac
Murchada.52 For Jordan Fantosme, a similar greed earned the Flemings o f 1173 their
grisly end in the marshes around Bury St. Edmunds. The Flemings who came to
William the Lion’s aid in 1174 were a different breed, however, professional soldiers
instead o f the weavers and brigands who so excited Fantosme’s disdain the previous
year. Not surprisingly, Fantosme accorded some of them the label of serjanz. It was
the Flemish serjanz who endured such tremendous losses in their assaults on Wark, but
after all (in Fantosme’s view), they were facing English serjanz, men so redoubtable that
Roger Stuteville did not demur from counting himself among them.” The biographer o f
William Marshal, likewise praising the valor o f English soldiery, would have us believe
that two hundred serjanz gladly received the regent’s command to stand ready to

52Song o f Dermot and the Earl, 11. 425-38, 1100-1, 1272-5, 1359-61, 1889-954,
2345-52.
53Jordan Fantosme, U. 1211-15, 1229-37.
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slaughter their own horses if a barricade became necessary.54 Fortunately for the horses,
the troops led by Fawkes de Breaute made the sacrifice unnecessary.
One of the last general terms sometimes translated as mercenary was often in the
company of servien serjart. The Latin solidarins and its vernacular derivatives came, as
is well known, from the classical unit of pay, the solidus, and that etymology probably
formed the basis o f the mercenary translation. But again, while salaries are integral to
any definition of mercenary, money is not the final determinant. Faced with Philip’s
papally blessed invasion attempt in 1213, John summoned every able-bodied man in the
kingdom with their weapons to the Dover-Portsmouth littoral. Those who held no land
were not to consider themselves unfit to serve if they could bear any arms; John pledged
to take them on as solidatas nostras, soldiers certainly in defense of their own country,
but hardly mercenaries.55 Likewise, Stuteville addressed himself at Wark to his serjant e
soldeiers, a garrison which held the honor of successfully resisting William the Lion
three times in two years.56 In Wark’s case, Henry II may well have despatched extra,
even non-English troops to a region he knew was imminently threatened and made
arrangements for their maintenance, but that would involve too much supposition. Even
less likely to have been mercenaries were the seven milites soldarii who formed part of
Dover’s garrison in 1161-2, years which were not only peaceful, but also not too far

™HGM, III: 230.
55Roger o f Wendover, II: 66-7.
^Jordan Fantosme, 1. 1229.
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removed from Henry’s very public expulsion of foreign mercenaries from England.57 Or
again from the 1173 crisis, we have the combined evidence of the Pipe Rolls and several
chroniclers that Humphrey de Bohun led a contingent o f milites solidarii regis at
Fomham against the Flemings. These knights of the king were 118 in number when the
officials at Northampton accounted for their salaries, but had grown, as so often
happens in the chronicles, to three hundred in number by the time they reached
Fomham.58 Credited with the opening charge against Leicester’s forces, these knightly
soldiers unsurprisingly earned no disapproval from English observers of their role in the
battle.
None o f the above should whitewash solidarii completely; in the final account,
they were hardly to be found far from their paymasters. The king of Ossory lured
Maurice de Pendergast and his soldiers (soudeis) into service apart from the other
Anglo-Normans with promises of good wages. In time, these salaries triggered an
attempted revolt by the king's subjects who resented paying for the English troops.
Orpen oddly enough chose to emphasize the monetary question during the battle of
Dublin when he translated souder as “hired soldiers.” In this instance, however, the
question of salaries paled against the greater one of survival against the Irish; moreover,
the soldiers at Dublin certainly showed more trustworthiness than had Maurice de

51PR 8 Henry II, 53.
5*PR 20 Henry II, 51-2. Roger of Howden, Chronica, II: 55. Gesta Regis
Henrici Secundi, I: 61. As to the number actually at Fomham, the three hundred
suggested by the chronicles is not necessarily faulty, particularly if Humphrey de Bohun
culled more solidarii from royal garrisons on his way to Fomham, even as Henry I’s
fam ilia had done on the way to Bourgtheroulde.
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Pendergast.59 When the salary became the defining mark o f the soldier was also the
moment that solidarius became a mark of opprobrium. The author of the Gesta Regis
Henrici Secundi disparaged the Brabangon and other mercenary troops of Geoffrey
Plantagenet in 1183 as an army of solidariorum.60 John lost much of his army in Ireland
two years later when he did not pay wages to his solidariis.61 Part of the disdain for the
souldeiers doubtless also came from their lower social origins. Orpen interpreted the
word to mean variously foot-soldiers (ioude a pe), hired soldiers, and common soldiers
(souders) since in most of its appearances, the word came toward the end of any lists of
an army’s members. Knights, squires, sergeants, vassals, and retainers held precedence
over the “soldier.”62
In a number of cases, the term defies any easy understanding. This is especially
true of the English who were willing to fight for their king in defense of his continental
possessions. For his expedition against Raymond of Toulouse, Henry tapped his subject
for monetary contributions, knowing full well he would never get effective help from
feudal levies that rarely stayed beyond the mandatory term o f service. With the
collected funds he hired innumerable milites solidarios. What began as a pragmatic
maneuver by Henry II soon became in English eyes an accepted practice. Robert of
Torigni ascribed the ploy to Henry’s wish not to “inconvenience” his subjects. Richard

"Song o f Dermot, n. 1063-5, 1098-101, 1273-81, 1898.
°°Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi, I: 293-4.
6IRoger of Howden, Chronica, II: 304-5.
62Song o f Dermot, II. 2386, 2877, 3366.
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fitz Nigel wrote that Henry, in his wisdom, preferred to risk mercenaries (stipendiaries)
to war’s hazards than his own subjects.63 Richard’s 1198 demand for three hundred
English knights, or at least enough funds to pay three solidos per day to whomever he
could hire was eventually met. Hugh of Lincoln’s resistance to the demand, however,
highlights the growing reluctance of some to serve outside the patria. The reluctance
became still more pronounced in John’s reign, as early as 1201 when John still appeared
to have the upper hand on the continent against Phililp. He summoned his barons with
their troops to Portsmouth for a mid-May crossing of the Channel. They immediately
countered with a refusal to serve without guarantees that certain lost prerogatives
would be returned to them. Although John denied their claims, and cowed them into
appearing at Portsmouth, he doubtless also saw how little active service he would
receive from the levies. So, like Flambard had done a century before, he took the
money from them that they had figured to spend in Normandy, and sent most o f the
them back home. Probably from the assembled host, though, he recruited three hundred
milites solidarii. One hundred he sent throughout Normandy under William Marshal’s
command, another hundred under Roger de Lacy to Normandy’s borders, and the final
hundred under his chamberlain to guard England’s border with Wales.64
The verses o f the troubadour and Poitevin noble Bertrand de Bom show just
finely balanced “soldier” sits on the knife edge between respectability and scorn.
Bertrand participated in the military affairs o f his day, not only taking the part o f the

“ Robert o f Torigni, 202-3. Richard fitz Nigel, D ialogusde Scaccario, 52.
“ Roger of Howden, Chronica, III: 40, 160-3.
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young Henry against Richard in 1183, but fighting directly against Mercadier who was
allied with Bertrand’s brother Constantine. His most recent editors took the consistent
course o f translating soudadier in every instance as mercenary, but unfortunately missed
some subtle nuances thereby. Certainly, it is an acceptable sense o f the word when
Bertrand spoke o f how Lent and Advent allowed soudadiers to get rich, presumably
when “good” warriors respected the restrictions of the liturgical calendar.65 In the poem
“Pois lo gens terminis floritz,” Bertran’s use o f the word is harder to decipher. His
invective against Alfonso of Aragon, coupled with the Third Lateran Council’s
condemnation of Aragonese mercenaries, merits the less complimentary meaning, but it
is hard to see how Aragonese serving under their own king should deserve the
mercenary label.66 O f course, in Bertran’s view, Alfonso himself was the mercenary, the
king who hired out to the count of Poitou only for the sake of gain.67 In Bertran’s
lament for the death o f prince Geoffrey, soudadier is even more problematic. Certainly,
the young duke o f Brittany hired mercenaries in droves, especially in the campaigns of
1183-4 against his brother Richard, but Bertran was celebrating the chivalric world of
the tournament in the relevant stanza, not the bands of ready-for-hire Brabangons whom

65Bertran de Bom, “S’abrils e fixoillas e flors” in The Poems o f the Troubadour
Bertran de B om , 11. 85-8.
“ Bertran de Bom, “Pois lo gens terminis floritz,” in Poems o f Bertran de Bom ,
11. 1-9.
67Bertran de Bom, “Qan vei pels vergiers despleiar,” in Poems o f Bertran de
Bom , 11. 57-64. See also “Molt m’es dissendre car col,” 11. 33-8, where Bertran
criticizes Alfonso for preferring coins to honor.
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Geoffrey loosed on the family’s patrimony.6* The same situation occurred again when
Bertran complained that the Third Crusade had drained Europe of those who had made
war glorious. In such a paean to chivalry, it is hard to imagine Bertran besmirching its
practitioners with the charge of hiring mercenaries.69
Bertran participated in the wars of Poitou too successfully not to know or admit
the necessary role of money in their prosecution. The varying ways to understand
soudadier demonstrate the fine line between acceptable recompense and a greed for
unmerited gain. Bertran did not begrudge the solidarius, soldeier soudadier his honest
wages, but any warrior, however accomplished or well-born, with too sharp an eye for
profit, earned Bertran’s invective. Given the relatively low social position of “soldiers,”
in those cases where Bertran thought of them as mercenaries, he was likely referring to
the roving bands that so troubled Poitou in the last quarter o f the twelfth century.70
They made such an impression on contemporaries that the remaining terms used to
indicate mercenaries in this period all refer to these loathed infantry contingents.
Between the pronouncements of the Third Lateran Council and Geoffrey de
Vigeois's zealous attention to anyone with a mercenary taint, we have many of the
terms by which the later twelfth century designated its undesirable soldiers-for-hire. If

“ Bertran de Bom, “A totz die qe ja mais non voil,” in Poems o f Bertran de
Bom , II. 52-6.
69Bertran de Bom, “Volontiers fera sirventes,” in Poems o f Bertran de Bom , 11.
33-40.
70See another o f Bertran’s complaints against Alfonso, “Miez serventes vueilh
far dels reis amdos,” in Poems o f Bertran de Bom , 11. 1-4, where he notes Alfonso’s
need for sodadiers after coming north, instead of bringing his subjects with him.
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these labels hold less confusion as to whom they specifically refer, a number of
questions still remain open as to what information this vocabulary, deriving as it mostly
did from the vernacular, might also be providing. While all the groups in the lists of
either pope or abbot served for money, it was again other characteristics which caught
the attention of contemporary observers. The fact that the terms were so interchange
able, that Brabangons were often linked with routiers, Flemings with cottereaux,
Basques with heretics, or any other combination, begs the question of what trait linked
these different, or not so different, groups.
Even though its use became widespread after the mid-point of the twelfth
century, coierellus appeared well before then in Flanders and England. In England it
had no overt military significance, but referred instead to cottager homesteads in
Domesday Book.71 This usage continued in the English Pipe Rolls from the reigns of
Henry I and Henry II, primarily with Coterel appearing as a surname, but also as
recipients of arms from Henry II on occasion.72 Given the mostly peaceful years in
which cottereaux received weapons from the king, this latter example should be seen
more as part o f Henry’s policy to keep England’s levies at full defensive potential (as
evidenced by the 1181 Assize of Arms) than as the king needing mercenaries.
Moreover, the term appears in none of the English chroniclers of the twelfth century,
thereby supporting its narrow definition within the kingdom.

71Neirmeyer, see under coterellus.
72PR 31 Henry I, 148, 150; PR 7 Henry II, 19; PR 8-11 Henry II for entries
related to Walter Coterel; and PR 11 Henry II, 102, 110, for the king’s procurement of
arma coterellorum.
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The low social position o f coterelli deserves notice, however, especially when
the term next appeared in Flanders following the assassination of Count Charles the
Good in 1127. In his attempt to retain lordship o f the county, William Clito came to
Ypres in early 1128 to suppress the revolt there. He brought with him militibus et
coterellis, “knights and mercenaries” in Ross’s edition of Galbert o f Bruges.73 It seems
premature, however, to equate coterelli with mercenaries with certainty in Galbert. Just
before Clito marched on Ypres, he had called together his knights, but also the citizens
o f Bruges, who pledged to aid the new count. Their militia, doubtless not as finely
equipped as the knights but sufficiently enough so to impress Galbert, may have
constituted the coterelli of this passage. That townsmen could be so labeled is bom out
by the example of Lambert Benkin, who participated in the events surrounding the
actual death o f Count Charles and the subsequent siege o f the assassins. Benkin earned
his first notice from Galbert during the spate o f killings that followed hard on Charles’s
murder; at that point he was described as a citizen o f Bruges {civium nostrorum).
During the siege, where he displayed remarkable skill as an archer, he came under
Galbert’s criticism as one who joined the hostilities out of hope for spoils and money.74
By the time that the count’s avengers had broken into the castle at Bruges, the label of
coterellus sufficed for Galbert in identifying Benkin. He escaped for a time the wrath of

73Galbert o f Bruges, The M urder o f Charles the Good, 270. Migne, PL,
CLXVI, 1025-6: Igitur ad diem ascendit comes martu armatu et implevit Ipram
militibus et coterellis, praeparatis et ad pugnandum accinctis.
1XPL, CLXVI, 958 and 977. In the latter passage, he is called tirunculus, thus
reflecting again the need of the juvenes to prove themselves and to grasp somehow the
means to establish themselves.
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the besiegers, but eventually fell into their hands, at which point this coterellus was tied
to a wheel, hung from a tree, and left to die.75 Others like Guy of Steenvoorde were
similarly executed, the focus of the violent end being on their treachery and not their
social position.
Whatever qualifications ought to surround coterelli in Galbert, and they are
slight ones, the appearance of coterelli cottereaux in the latter part o f the century was a
horrible phenomenon to contemporaries, a besmirching of the trial by combat that war
ultimately should be, a profanation by the unsuitable in search of the unmerited. They
were “evil-doers” in the treaty between Louis VII and Frederick Barbarossa, “thieves”
in histories from the Toulousain, identical with the routiers who devastated whole
territories, tormented priests, and practiced every wickedness. The Third Lateran
Council proscribed them for the cruelties they practiced against Christendom. Coming
from origins so obscure that none knew their provenance, they garnered attention once
their bands grew too large to ignore. One group began to make its presence felt around
Toulouse right at mid-century. There, the annalists named them Cultellarii after the
knife (cultellus) with which so many o f them were armed and quite proficient.76
Obviously a serious problem by the time o f their bans in 1171 and 1179, their numbers
continued to grow until peaking in the intra-family struggles of the Plantagenets in the
1180s. Rigord called those who died at Berry in 1183 Cotarelli, and William the

15Ibid., 1014, 1015. If Lambert Benkin is the same as Lambert Archei, who
escaped from Bruges in chapter 48, then his close association with Borsiard may imply a
similarly unfree status as that of the Erembald ministeriales.
76Du Cange, see under coterelli. Roger of Howden, Chronica, II: 179.
206

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Breton, following him, explicitly equated coterelli with routiers77 The French
chroniclers were also only too willing to point out Richard’s reliance on such troops, the
lesson being that Philip was not losing to Richard’s martial ability, but his vast wealth.78
Writing about the capture of Issoudun by Mercadier, Rigord described him as dux
Cotarellorum,79 a designation which, when compared with Roger of Howden’s choice
of princeps Braibancenorum for Mercadier,80 or the Rutariorum princeps o f Nicholas
of Trivetto,81 shows again how interchangeable the terms were to medieval writers.
Where cottereau may indicate the origins of these lethal foot-soldiers, or their
most effective weapon in one instance, routier focuses more on the activity o f these
groups. Deriving from the Latin Ruptarii, which in turn came from the verb rumpere
(to break up land, particularly with a plow), routier and associated Latin terms cover a
number of elements pertinent to these bands of soldiers-for-hire. Most obvious in the
French is, of course, the idea of route, a suggestion only too appropriate for these
companies which traveled not just widely but with surprising speed. The vestigial
implication in the Latin of turning the land over is unmistakable, although doing so with
a view to planting something new has obviously been jettisoned. The ruptarii either

77Rigord, 36; William the Breton, Chronicon, 182.
78Rigord, 135, where he emphasizes Richard’s bribery of the garrison at
Nonancourt before proceeding further against Philip with suis Normannis et Cotarellis.
79Ibid., 132.
“ Roger of Howden, Chronica, III: 256.
81Du Cange, see under rumpere.
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practiced the economic warfare of medieval Europe’s most adept commanders, or
during unemployed phases, they lived off the territories through which they had to
travel. The chronicle of Laon reported that a group passing through Auvergne in 1185
destroyed the land. The fact that they traveled in packs is likewise in the Latin word,
having come into it from the German root or rote, forms which originally signified the
pay o f the soldiers, but as ruta, also came to designate bands of troops. Even though
Mercadier stressed his leadership of all Richard’s troops, the chroniclers confined his
command to the mercenaries, ruta su a 82 O f the crimes most often charged against the
routiers, their unquenchable thirst for plunder was paramount, and the Germanic roots
again passed into Latin, this time as rupa which signified booty or spoils.83
Besides cottereau and routier, a number o f other terms also appeared to
designate groups obviously similar to the roving bands of infantry. Geoffrey de Vigeois
was particularly concerned with the activities o f the Pailler or Palearii, a “hellish
legion” collected from diverse regions by Philip Augustus and sent into the Limousin to
aid the Young Henry. According to the prior o f St. Martial’s, their name came from the
Latinpalea, or chaff, and doubtless in Geoffrey’s eyes, the term explained their worth
to the rest o f Christian society.84 The Third Lateran Council’s canons provide another

82Ibid. Also, Roger of Howden, Chronica, IV: 59, 60. William the Breton,
Philippidos, Book V, II. 331, 357. On rotten, Verbruggen, 141, and Grundmann, 42832. Note, however, Verbruggen’s liberty in attributing the use of rotten to William of
Newburgh, 172, when his term was actually the Latinized Rutas.
83Niermeyer, see under rauba. For comparison, see PR 20 Henry II, 52: in
Robis servientum Flcmdrensis.. . .
“ Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF XII: 450, and XVIII: 215, 219.
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appellation, Triaverdini, which obviously refers to the mercenary bands, but appears in
none of the chronicles which typically have covered their activity. Du Cange supposed,
even as coterellus might have come from cultellus, that Triaverdini might be related to
trialemellum or triacuminis cultellus, another dagger with a wicked reputation, this
time built upon its three-bladed construction.*5 Geoffrey de Vigeois noted several other
appellations which the canons o f the Third Lateran Council missed such as Hanmtyers,
Asperes, Turlau, Vales, and Roma. The references to Hainaulters, Welsh, and Romans
(this last being a singular occurence) are obvious enough, but Asperes and Turlau have
so far escaped identification.
The lists of undesirables put together by the Papacy and Geoffrey de Vigeois,
along with mentions by other chroniclers, were full o f another type of label, national or
geographic designations. The Low Countries held the dubious distinction of being
named most often as Brabangon and Fleming became nearly synonymous with
mercenary. The Third Lateran Council also held up the Aragonese, Navarrese and
Basques for condemnation, their crime being the cruelties they had committed against
fellow Christians. Chroniclers from earlier in the century had already noted the
readiness of Bretons and Flemings to hire themselves out.86 The thread which links such
disparate groups was their very foreignness amid the populations that they troubled, an
alien quality which they compounded in the chronicles by their repeated disregard for
the inviolability of clerics and church property.

*sDu Cange, see under triaverdini, trialemellum, and triacuminis.
“ William o f Malmesbury, GR, 468, 478; and HN, 17.
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Even before such specific ethnic labels became common in the latter part o f the
twelfth and early years of the thirteenth century, the author of the Gesta Stephani had
deplored the “savage crowd of barbarians” who had come from “the most distant
regions” to afflict England.87 In contrast, Orderic noted without any over judgement
how Stephen turned to French and Flemish forces to defend against Angevin incursions
when he no longer found the Normans trustworthy.88 By the time of the 1173-4 revolt,
however, and despite longstanding commercial relations, resentment in England of
Flemish mercenaries was running high, at least if Jordan Fantosme’s rhetoric was any
barometer. Some o f this animosity was no doubt a legacy of Stephen’s reliance on
William of Ypres and his forces, and part o f it may actually have stemmed from the onand-off close relations between England and Flanders.
Treachery was a standard charge levied against foreign allies,89 and in this case
the sense of betrayal would have been quite fresh. When it came to Braban^ons, the
attitude of English chroniclers lacked the virulence of continental writers, reflecting the
fact that the island did not experience their violence until John imported several
companies toward the end of his reign. Even then, a certain resignation marked
attitudes towards John’s Braban?on and Poitevin soldiers, betraying a reluctance to

87GS, 154-5.
88OV, vi: 482. Although Orderic was often an impartial observer, in this
particular view o f foreign auxiliaries, Orderic was likely influenced more by his feeling
than anybody was preferable to the Angevins.
89Compare William of Malmesbury’s comment, GR, 478, on how Henry I had
bought the fidelity o f the otherwise perfidious Bretons.
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deny the king’s right to hire such forces. For the warriors brought over by the
rebellious barons and their French allies, no such restraint clouded the rhetoric. At the
siege o f Berkhamstead, a German named Waleran commanded the castles defenses and
was praised for his abilities and zealous resistance, especially for sending a great many
o f the excommunicated French to their deserved place in hell .90 Soldiers who came in
search of plunder, rather than for any cause they truly held, were the filth (spurcitia) and
scum (spuma) of their homelands,91 a refrain given by Roger o f Wendover in which he
but echoed the complaints o f continental writers against other nationally, ethnically, or
linguistically based contingents.
Some historians have already suggested that Brabangon had become less than
specific by the time of its proliferation Mercadier may have been a “prince” of
Brabangons, but his band actually drew its members from all over. The term tended to
cover contingents from Flanders and Hainault as well as Brabant proper.92 It remained,
nonetheless, a euphemism for foreignness coupled with a taste for atrocity and plunder.
Celestinus III commiserated with the archbishop of Arles over the presence of
Aragonese, Brabansons, “and other foreigners” who were raiding across his district.93
When John finally unleashed Braban^ons on his own subjects (something Henry II and

90Roger of Wendover, II: 201: On Waleran, miles in opere martio probatus,
cum suis commilitionibas viriliter resistenles multorum animas ex Galligenis
excommunicatis ad tartara direxenmt.
91Ibid., II: 211.
“ Verbruggen, 136, 140. Duby, Bouvines, 79.
“ Verbruggen, 139.
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Richard had scrupulously avoided) their opinion was little different from that of
continental victims o f these soldiers. They enjoyed nothing more than drinking human
blood, wrote Roger of Wendover .94 The Braban^ons were not alone in the hatred which
they excited, and again, the immediacy o f the threat or experience, heightened the vitriol
of chroniclers and poets.
The Basques already had an evil reputation, and their name was synonymous
with thievery. Bertran de Bom, who had doubtless faced them as foes during the loss
and recovery of his patrimony, lumped them with whores and cowards in his poems.95
Geoffrey de Vigeois claimed no greater evil had descended on the land since the
Vikings, and that the Basques set the example for all the mercenaries who followed.96
Less imperiled by them, Robert of Torigni laconically noted their participation in the
1179 sack of Bordeaux alongside Navarrese and Brabanson peers.97 In one of the most
interesting comments on the Basques, Gerald of Wales (who was not in the habit of
complimenting the Irish) re-asserted that the Irish had descended from the Basques.98

’■
‘Roger of Wendover, II: 146-7: venerunt etiam ex regionibus Lovaniae et
Brabantinorum viri strenuissimi, Walterus Bucc, Gerardus de Soceini et Gedeschallus,
cum tribus armatorum et balistariorum legonibus, qui nihil potius quam humanum
sanguinem siliebant.
^See Du Cange, under Bascli, where he defines them first as thieves and
routiers before discussing them as inhabitants o f lower Gascony. Bertran de Bom,
“Mailolin, joglars malastruc,” 11. 29-35, and “Ar ven la coindeta sazos,” 11. 25-8, in
Poems o f Bertran de Bom.
^Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF XII: 450.
97Robert o f Torigni, 282.
98Gerald o f Wales, Expugnatio Hibemica, 148.
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Despite the fulminations o f the Third Lateran Council, however, Anglo-Norman
chroniclers appeared less disposed to see Iberian natives as mercenaries, doubtless
because o f the Plantagenet family’s marital ties to the various kingdoms. Even Bertran
de Bom, whose hostility to Aragon’s king was noted above, took a less negative stance
toward “Catalans and the men o f Lara” whom Alfonso had forced to serve with him in
Poitou.99 Finally, the idea that routiers, Braban<;ons, and Aragonese are all synonymous
should be reconsidered. Conditions in the Iberian cities not allowed, but actually forced
many townsmen to own horses for military service.100 There is no telling what portion
o f Alfonso’s trans-Pyrenean hosts that these caballeros villanos composed, and
although they might offend northern assumptions in the later twelfth century as to who
belonged rightfully on horseback, they certainly were not the same as the infantry bands
who were disrupting both the military and social structure across northwestern
Christendom.
Military historians have remarked on plunder’s role in the motivation o f soldiers
to risk the dangers of battle.101 Medieval writers recognized this paradigm and railed
against it. It is the attribute which links all the labels discussed above, the one which
really underlies the slurs intended by national designation or the acceptance of a salary.

"Bertran de Bom, “Qan vei pels vergiers despleiar,” 11. 57-64, in Poems o f
Bertran de Bom.
l00Joseph O’Callaghan, A History o f M edieval Spain (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1975), 287-8, 290. Derek W. Lomax, The Reconquest o f Spain (New York:
Longman, 1978), 38, 99.
I01Keegan, Face o f Battle, 115.
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Indeed, regular wages were not the issue, but ravenous appetites for spoils or booty.
Orderic called the foreign interlopers in Normandy “lawless bandits”; William of
Malmesbury decried those who came into England as “men full o f greed and violence”;
for Bertran de Bom, the peasant who gained riches would be driven mad by the wealth;
from Geoffrey de Vigeois comes a litany o f pillaged ecclesiastical houses, attended by
adverbs like violenter and irreverenter.102 Many writers turned to metaphor for
adequate descriptions of the appetite of foreign soldiery for violent enrichment. The
prior o f St. Martial’s felt Aquitaine was being devoured by the teeth o f these cruel
peoples.103
The most common ascription to such plundering troops was the ever-ravenous
wolf, although a number o f carrion-eaters were also mentioned. When Louis the Fat
called up even his commoners in an attempt to rebound after Bremule, Orderic noted
that these folk responded “like wolves eager for prey, and the moment they were out of
their homes began to seize whatever they could.”104 Stephen’s Flemish auxiliaries were
especially so labeled after Henry II’s accession to the throne; Gervase of Canterbury
wrote that “in the manner of famished wolves they strove to reduce the fecundity of

I02OV, vi: 472. William of Malmesbury, HN, 17. Bertran de Bom, “Mout mi
plai quan vey dolenta,” 11. 9-12, in Poems o f Bertran de Bom. Geoffrey de Vigeois, in
R H F X V III: 216-7.
‘“ Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF XII: 450: quorum dentes et arma omnem pene
Aquitcmiam corroserunt.
,<MOV, vi: 245.
214

permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

England to nothingness.”105 William o f Newburgh repeated nearly the same charge even
as he credited Henry II with either expelling these beasts, or transforming them into
sheep.106 Perhaps medieval observers sensed the wolfpack element in the routier bands,
the more sophisticated and cooperative practices of war’s changing face, but as
ecclesiastics in the main, they were more concerned with the threat to their “flocks.” To
war for plunder was patently intolerable, but to devour church property and personnel
was proof o f the ultimate treachery, a betrayal of Christendom. It was this perception
which brought down the excommunications o f the Third Lateran Council.
For those who want a simple socio-military picture of Europe across the twelfth
century, the wealth o f terms and categories which contemporaries had at hand ought to
be sufficient caution. Even though knights were distinguishing themselves in literature,
society, and on the battlefield, they were not always dominant and even more rarely
alone on campaigns. Moreover, they accepted payment for their service as readily as
the less well-equipped and lower-born combatants. Terms like stipendiarius, solidarius
and the vernacular soudadier evince the already vital role of currency in medieval
military payrolls, but the concern of chroniclers and litterateurs lay in other areas as
well. After all, the growing presence of sergeants (serviens) presented the problem of
crucial fighters who had honorable backgrounds but served almost always for pay. In a
world inured to much violence, the molders o f opinion had other criteria for determining
who went beyond the pale of military activity. Social origins might be called into

I05Gervase o f Canterbury, Historical Works, II: 73.
l06William o f Newburgh, 101-2.
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question, as the designation of coterelli indicated. The use of unusually lethal, often
proscribed, weaponry also received notice as Triaverdini or coterellus again indicate.
Foreign birth or descent likewise combined with monetary reward as a mark of
opprobrium. Violence that went beyond all tolerable norms was the most enduring
hallmark o f the century’s undesirable warriors. Those who ravaged not just their foes,
but also, it seemed, the very land itself, were the routiers whom the Church eventually
outlawed when it could not control them as it had the formerly untamed knighthood. In
all these examples, either actively or passively, one characteristic continued to appear.
For one reason or a combination o f reasons, these groups were outsiders, wolves to
Latin Christendom’s sheep. For these last, their military profession was a result of that
exclusion, and something which led to further marginalization, but not its original cause.
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VI
The Enterprise o f War
Therefore, a soldier or merchant, or whoever has accepted the office, because
he may not exercise it without s in . .. might recall that he cannot fu lfill a valid
penance unless he lays aside his business, or forsakes his duty, and banishes
hatred from his heart, and restores the property he has wrongfully taken.1
—Pope Gregory II I (1078)

In the century following Gregory VII’s declaration that trafficking in either war
or commerce naturally implied the commission o f sins, the twelfth century’s great
systematizers o f canon law and doctrine often cited his seminal opinion, and thereby
continued to color the two professions in less-than-Christian hues. Not surprisingly, the
pairing was even worse in the case of the mercenary, whose commerce was fighting, not
to mention the hatred and thievery which attended him constantly.2 The problem

‘As quoted by Peter Lombard in Sententiarum Libri Ouatuor, in PL 192: 878-9:
Ideoque miles, vel negotiator, vel alicui officio deditus, quod sine peccato exercere non
possit, si culpis gravioribus irretitus ad poenitentiam venerit, vel qui bona alterius
injuste detinet, vel qui odium in corde gerit, recognoscat se veram poenitentiam non
posse peragere, nisi negotium relinquat, vel officium deserat, et odium ex corde
dimittat, et bona quae injuste abstulit, restituat.
2Besides Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Gratian also cited Gregory VTI’s opinion,
Decretum, D epoen., D.5, c.6, Falsas. Peter the Chanter saw fit, however, to hone
Gregory’s statement in his own writings by changing miles to mercenary soldier. John
W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes, and Merchants: The Social Views o f Peter the Chanter
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exercised the attention of many contemporary clerical writers who had to grapple not
just with dilemmas of warfare or monetary affairs, but with the increasing symbiosis of
the two. Richard fitz Nigel had spelled out the situation graphically in his mid-century
exposition of the English exchequer. Rulers who have wealth, however they come by it,
are predators; those without are the prey. The realm’s defense called for money to be
“lavished” on fortifications, troops’ wages, and myriad expenses.3 Other clerics like
John of Salisbury would come to reconcile themselves to the necessity, even the virtue,
of paying troops, but the wealth to be garnered in times of war continued to be suspect.
From the Church’s standpoint, any war (even the mock war of the tournament) fought
for gain alone was illicit. The attitude among the laity was, unsurprisingly, a bit more
diverse.
Emblematic of the regular clergy whose houses were so often the target o f
military “requisitions,” William o f Malmesbury held up the reported behavior o f the First
Crusaders as both proof of their righteousness and lesson to the knights and warriors
still in western Christendom. As they passed through Christian territories, these men on
negotio Dei, the business of God, had not even the desire to plunder.4 Of course,
William was not so concerned with verifying such information as reminding
Christendom’s most bellicose and wayward that such restraint was possible and
admirable. Less incredible, however, were the attitudes displayed by the English,

and his Circle (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1970), I: 57 and II: n. 100.
3Richard fitz Nigel, Dialogns de Scaccario, 1-2.
4William of Malmesbury, GR, 431.
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German and Flemish crusaders who detoured in 1147 to aid Afonso of Portugal in the
capture o f Lisbon. Written by an anonymous Anglo-Norman cleric who not only
attended the expedition but participated in even its most harrowing moments, the De
Expugnatione Lyxbonensi betrays an intimate understanding of canon law’s opinions on
just war at mid-century and an appreciation of the practical necessities of waging such a
war.s The Bishop of Oporto used the language of Gratian’s Decretum in his recruiting
sermon to the just-arrived crusaders. He praised them for putting aside the weapons
which had till then only taken the property of others and having now assumed weapons
of righteousness; under God’s direction they warred now to prevent atrocities and
especially to defend and avenge the ravaged church of the Iberian kingdoms.6 There
was no sin in their endeavor, not even the taint o f murder, since even Jerome had taught
that “there is no cruelty where piety towards God is concerned.” Only abandonment of
the expedition could bring censure.7 But even warriors in such an officially approved
cause had no qualms about demanding wages in order to stay in the field. Just as their
assaults on Lisbon were proving more and more irresistible, William Viel announced the
imminent withdrawal of himself and his coterie unless they received sufficient provisions
from some sponsor. Failing that, they were willing to become stipendiaries of the king

5On the identity of the De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi's writer, see C .W. David,
“The authorship of the ‘De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi’,” in Speculum 7 (1932): 50-57.
6All themes to be found first in Cicero, then expanded in Augustine’s theories of
just war, and summed up in Gratian. See Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the
Middle A ges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
7De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, 78-80.
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of Portugal or another lord of the crusade so as continue on at the siege. Significantly,
the writer o f the history attached no condemnation to this maneuver * With regard to a
less exalted expedition, Gerald of Wales lamented that his adventurous kinsmen could
not escape the taint of greed for plunder. That they had managed to accomplish so
much was both deplorable and amazing in light of their eagerness to attain more than
their due recompense.9
The importance of regular wages which the cleric at Lisbon and Gerald o f Wales
observed in the field was also being admitted by other clergy. Orderic Vitalis saw no
real clash between money and honor in the speech which he had Odo Borleng give
before the battle of Bourgtheroulde.10 Moreover, no less an authority than John the
Baptist had instructed the soldiers of his time to be content with their wages.11
Augustine in his nineteenth homily repeated this admonition, and from there the
propriety o f knightly salaries passed into the body of medieval thought. Men like
Gerard of Cambrai, Alan of Lille, and Abbo of Fleury all accepted the combined
approval of Christ’s herald and Augustine; in Abbo’s case, the justness o f a miles's
salary did depend somewhat on his behavior, especially toward the church and those

*Ibid., 110.
9Gerald of Wales, Expugnatio Hibernica, 154-6.
I0OV, vi: 350: Stipendia cum laude nostra merito perdemus, nec pane regio
vesci ulterius me iudice debemus.
1‘Luke 3:14: Interrogabant autem eum et milites dicentes: ‘Q uidfaciem us et
nos? ’ Et ait illis: ‘Neminem concutiatis, neque calumniam faciatis et contend estote
stipendiis vestris
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unable to protect themselves.12 Writing in the 1130s, Bernard of Clairvaux asked in his
sermon on chivalry what madness possessed knights to fight for no pay at all, but just
from a love o f violence. But neither was Bernard holding up wages as entirely
meritorious; he would have preferred all knights to fight like the Templars for faith
rather than gold.’3 Like those mentioned above, Bernard also cited John the Baptist’s
counsel that the legionnaires be content with their pay; in Bernard’s case, he wanted to
see the increasingly distinctive knightly order cut back on its ostentatious displays.
The writings o f John of Salisbury provide the fullest expression not just of
ecclesiastical resignation to mammon’s role in military affairs, but are also symptomatic
of the growing bureaucratization of the twelfth century. Educated in the Paris schools,
an intimate o f archbishops and popes, and finally the bishop of Chartres, John was rarely
far from many o f the pivotal events of the period, and the practical experience which he
accumulated amid royal and papal courts manifested often in even his speculative
writings. He hearkened back to Roman military models in order to produce his theory
of what constituted the good soldier.14 It was more than wishful thinking, however, to
pose such paradigms when the Plantagenet and Capetian monarchies were managing

12For Abbo’s use of Augustine, see PL 139: 5-6-7.
13Bemard o f Clairvaux, “Liber ad Milites Templi de Laude Novae Militiae,” in S.
Bemardi Opera, vol. Ill, Tractatus et Opuscula, ed. J. Leclercq and H.M. Rochais
(Rome. Editiones Cistercienses, 1963), 205-39.
,4John o f Salisbury used the word m iles more with reference to the Roman
soldiers whom he had studied than to the knights of his own day. Yet it was the latter
whom he wanted to recast as the former, and for this reason his latest editor was correct
to translate m iles as soldier. John of Salisbury, Policraticus, Cary J. Nederman, trans.
(Cambridge. University of Cambridge Press, 1990).
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administrations and military systems that were quickly outstripping the feudal theories
that purported to explain them. In the Policraticus, John held up the example o f the
disciplined, trained, and paid Roman soldier, the servant of public authority, as the
surest means of martial success for twelfth century lords. There were, of course,
corollaries to the re-establishment of such ideal soldiery: the Church naturally now
constituted the pinnacle of authority, the legitimizing agent behind any secular prince’s
use of violent force; also, private war was a theoretical impossibility, being relegated to
simple brigandage and piracy. In this system, John of Salisbury actually turned the
soldier’s receipt o f wages into a virtue, a verification along with an oath of public
service, that he was subordinate to proper authorities and not likely to commit
independent acts of violence. Even as public servants were maintained by fees, so no
shame attached to warriors who accepted pre-arranged salaries. Provisions after all
were a necessity, and what soldier would not understandably refuse faithful service if his
pay was not forthcoming?15 Thus the burden of maintaining armed hosts fell to kings
and emperors, and those who took up the sword without being chosen by the proper
prince only courted scripture’s prescribed death by the sword. Naturally, as the
guardians o f Christendom, secular lords were bound in John of Salisbury’s view to
exercise restraint and avoid enriching themselves or their forces from illicit gains at
others’ expense.16

15Ioann is Saresberiensts Episcopi Camotensis Policratici, Clemens C.I. Webb,
ed., 2 vols. (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1965), Book VI, chapters 1, 19.
l6Ibid., Book VI, chapter 8. Later theologians would even build a case for the
legitimacy o f the church’s monetary contribution to military levies on the basis o f
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Just what constituted wrongful reward was, of course, a matter of some
contention between ecclesiastical theorists, canon lawyers, the purveyors o f the
emerging chivalric culture, and the practitioners themselves of the warrior’s profession.
Although officially disdainful of money, chivalric culture hardly kept its distance from
the resurgent money economy of the twelfth century. Quite the opposite in fact No
less so than the pragmatic bureaucrat fitz Nigel, the jongleurs and toumament-goers
knew the role of money in their martial affairs. Bertran de Bom had no trouble
admitting its pivotal role in who made war, and how. Complaining about the truce of
1187 between Henry II and Philip Augustus, Bertran pointedly wrote that “Not men of
Anjou or Maine, but sterling coins, were the first troops to defeat the men o f
Champagne.”17 Even the emerging star o f chivalry, Richard the Lionheart, could not
ignore financial constraints, but Bertran hoped fervently in 1188 that Henry II would
loosen his purse strings and thereby give Richard the means to quell yet another
rebellion in the Limousin.18 In one o f his most famous poems, the graphic “Be«m plai lo
gais temps de pascor,” which begins with an idyllic praise of spring before moving on to
depictions of riderless horses and impaled knights, Betran enjoins his fellow lords to
“pawn their castles and towns and cities before you stop making war.”19

regalian lands which church houses might have in their possession. See Robert of
Courson in Baldwin, Masters, Princes, and Merchants, 217.
l7Bertran de Bom, “Pois als baros enoia en lur pesa,” in Poems, 11. 26-8.
,8Bertran de Bom, “Non puosc mudar mon chantar non esparga,” in Poems,
11. 29-30.
,9Bertran de Bom, “Be»m plai lo gais temps de pascor,” in Poems, 11. 77-9.
223

permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The counts o f Flanders were among chivalry’s foremost proponents, but they
survived in their precarious place between England, France, and the Empire by being
able warriors also. In Jordan Fantosme’s account, count Philip gave detailed counsel on
how best to defeat an opponent, especially one so hard to beat in direct confrontation as
Henry II. “First,” he declared, “lay waste the land.” It was the surest method to render
a foe “impotent.”20 The “flower of chivalry,” William Marshal, practiced war in the
same fashion, relying on misdirection o f his foes so he could destroy their resources in
the meanwhile with impunity. Richard the Lionheart preyed no less on the riches o f his
enemies, although that wealth could often be counted as the strongholds he often took
in lightning-fast raids. Such tactics had the double benefit not only of impoverishing the
foe, but enabling the successful raider to reward his own followers with the collected
spoils.21
This combination of strategic warfare and old-fashioned plundering mirrored the
overall transition then taking place in Latin Christendom, the changeover from a gifteconomy to a profit one. Even as the church’s thinkers had trouble accommodating the
new circumstances, so too did those developing the chivalric ethos. No one eschewed
the winning o f material wealth, but the honor o f largesse, of caring little to save money,
competed with the need to keep bringing it in. William Marshal learned the lesson early
in his career, being chided by the Earl o f Essex shortly after being dubbed a knight for

“ Jordan Fantosme, 11. 449-52.
21John Gillingham, “War and Chivalry in the History o f William the M arshaF in
ANW, 256. And by the same author, “Richard I and the Science o f War in the Middle
Ages,” in ANW, 200-1.
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not taking more care to collect his due prizes in the course o f a successful day in battle.
His own sponsor and cousin delayed replacing William’s lost war horse so as to impress
still further upon the young knight the entrepreneurial benefits that should attend
combat. By the poem’s chronology, William took the instruction immediately to heart,
and at the tournament at Le Mans held soon afterwards, he captured three knights
whose complete equipage he held for himself or for ransom.22 William Marshal’s ability
to translate his martial prowess into material gain reached its peak in 1177-79 when the
now accomplished toumeyer formed a partnership with a fellow member of the Young
Henry’s fam ilia. With Roger de Gaugi, Marshal spent two years on the circuit of
tournaments held all over France and the Low Countries. They encountered such
success that they had to have the young king’s clerk keep track o f their winnings for
them; in one ten-month period Wigain noted the capture o f 103 knights and their
belongings. Even amid this accomplishment, however. Marshal’s biographer could not
avoid a twinge over the blatant quest for riches; he attributed it therefore to Roger being
a little too concerned about making money.23
Even more so than the Histoire, Bertran’s verse displays the unease of the lay
elite over the resurgence of currency and its effect on their professed raison d ’etre, a
monopoly of legitimate force. Several elements acted simultaneously to exacerbate this
tension. As Bertran was fighting and composing his poems, the knighthood was

22HGM, III: 15-22. Sidney Painter, William Marshal: Knight-Errant, Baron,
and Regent o f England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1933): 21-4.
13HGM, III: 43-4.
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entrenching itself in its newly pre-eminent position. At the same time, however, the
nature o f war itself in the Middle Ages was shifting again. The focus on raids led to an
increased emphasis on static points of defense and refuge, thereby increasing still more
the already vital role of the castle, a fortification now leaving the motte-and-bailey,
wooden phase and being upgraded to complex piles of masonry with multiple lines of
defense and pre-arranged lines o f fire and enfilades. It was this development which lay
behind Guiot de Previns’s complaint on the increased role of engineers, miners, and the
other specialists of siege warfare. William the Lion agreed to invade England in 1173
only if he received such professionals from Flanders.24 Few such men enjoyed the highly
personal bond which supposedly bound knights to their immediate lord; for the right
sum, however, they were willing to sell their services and bodies. It smacked too much
o f the marketplace25 and not enough o f the nobler incentives. Bertran admitted that war
had the potential to ennoble a peasant, but more likely they would just become the
“rotten rich.” They had the habits o f pigs, he declared, and those who became rich were
driven mad by their wealth.26 Money itself was not the problem, just the behavior which

24See above, chapter 5. Jordan Fantosme, 11. 417-420.
25See the analysis of Max Weber, “Class, Status, Parties,” in From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology, H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. and ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1958), 193: “From the contrariety between the status order
and the purely economic order mentioned above, it follows that in most instances the
notion of honor peculiar to status absolutely abhors that which is essential to the
market: higgling. . . therefore, everywhere some status groups, and usually the most
influential, consider almost any kind of overt participation in economic acquisition as
absolutely stigmatizing.”
“ Bertran de Bom, “Gerr’e trebailh vei et afan,” 11. 9-16, and “Mout mi plai quan
vey dolenta,” 11. 1-3, 9-15, in Poems.
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it seemed to engender in the worst sorts. Bertran consigned the rich man who sold “his
gifts” to the hangman’s noose; likewise sterling pennies were distasteful i f they came by
fraud. Toumeyers with too much of an eye on the financial bottom line also came under
Bertran’s censure; “honor and courage [were] not for him” whose sole concern was to
make off with ransoms only, who would go so far as to fix tournaments even to the
detriment of his own vassals. For Bertran the cash nexus was by itself an evil thing, but
not when conjoined with other attributes. “I wish rich men knew how to hold knights
with love and good deeds and honor,” he wrote. And if they were “noble and gracious,”
in short “good givers,” then all would be well.27
O f course, the attitudes of John of Salisbury, Bertran de Bom, and William
Marshal’s biographer all reflect the latter twelfth century and early years of the
thirteenth. The tension was less evident in the first half o f the century when knights had
yet to disassociate themselves thoroughly from other combatants, and the return of
coinage was just beginning to be felt in all quarters. But the same elements were
present nonetheless, friendship and money being the “twin pillars” of the precocious
Anglo-Norman military system.28 In Flanders, William o f Ypres apparently accepted
five hundred English pounds from the assassins of Charles the Good as the price of his
not joining in with the count’s avengers in March of 1127. William spread the word
through his agents, however, that he had the money directly from Flenry I, along with

27Bertran de Bom, “S’abrils e fuoillas e flors,” 11. 67-88, and “Ar ven la coindeta
sazos,” 11. 25-8, 31-2, in Poems.
28Morillo, Warfare, 13.
227

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

three hundred knights on loan. Whatever William of Ypres’s involvement in the count’s
death (and Galbert thought it was deep and wholehearted), he saw less risk to his bid for
the countship in accepting English funds than allying with the wrong countrymen and
appearing faithless. Moreover, the decision to see William’s auxiliaries as mercenaries
seems hasty, since the origins, social status, or any affiliation of the solidarios whom he
recruited remains hidden.29 In the near civil war conditions of Flanders in 1127, many
were doubtless casting about for a legitimate successor to the late count.
A decade later, even as the social rise o f the knighthood continued, its higherranking members still did not scruple to accept wages.30 William of Ypres himself, after
encroaching blindness removed him from active campaigning, kept his hand in the
business side o f Stephen’s military affairs. Charter evidence reveals that William
became the king’s constable sometime in the five years following his last recorded
campaigns in 1142. According to Richard fitz Nigel’s description of the Exchequer
offices, the constable’s office had the responsibility o f overseeing payments to the king’s
hunting establishment and royal stipendiarii. The lack of Pipe Rolls from Stephen’s
reign has unfortunately left us unable to determine if William’s considerable revenues in
Kent were actually meant to be passed on as the wages of his Flemish compatriots.31 If

^Galbert of Bruges, PL 166: 990. Galbert’s passage again demonstrates the
interchangeability o f terms, where he first describes William’s milites, but then later
calles them solidarios.
“ See chapter 3 above, on the presence of castellans and blood-relations o f the
Flemish count among the forces of Matilda and Stephen in England.
31William’s total revenues of £439 8s. 7d. would have allowed a force o f around
300 infantry to be kept in the field for one year. Such computations do not account,
228

permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

they remained to him alone, however, he demonstrates just how lucrative were the
opportunities in the first half of the twelfth century for the militarily talented who could
establish themselves with a patron.32 It compared quite well to the 400 mark retainer
which the counts o f Flanders had received from Henry I after 1110; admittedly, the
counts rarely had actually to earn their pay, and the effects o f any possible inflation
cannot be measured, but it was nonetheless a sixteen-fold increase in compensation.
No small part o f what has left the debate open for scholars as to who should be
labeled a mercenary has been the various combinations o f gifts and salaries by which
lords (or were they employers?) brought men into their service. Members o f a fam ilia,
whether royal or baronial, served in anticipation o f either or both, as Chibnall pointed
out through Anselm’s words.33 As noted earlier, this combination reflected western
Europe’s economic transformation in the period as the vestiges of a gift economy
continued to operate alongside the novel methods of a profit economy .34 Unfortunately,

however, for William’s own personal remuneration, nor that of the knightly friends and
relatives he had with him in England. The revenues from Kent would have paid for less
than forty mounted warriors at J.H. Round’s estimated pay-scale of 8d. per day (The
K ing’s Sergeants, 101) with nothing left over for foot soldiers. What seems most
probable is that Stephen’s largesse enabled William himself to operate as something of a
patron to warriors needing employment, but that their regular wages came through the
Exchequer.
iZRRAN, 111:197; and Cronne, 148. Richard fitz Nigel, Dialogusde Scaccario,
20: Item eius officium est ut cum ad scaccarium stipendiarii regis uenerit pro stipendiis
suis. . . computet eorum liberationes et de retractis fidem suscipiat et residuum solui
faciat.
33Chibnall, “Mercenaries and the fam ilia re g isf in ANW, 91.
^Lester K. Little, Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in M edieval
Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 8, 19.
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the phenomenon shows up mostly among the elite whose actions have come down in the
chronicles, whose values appeared in the increasing literary production, and whose
actual earnings came to the attention of royal financial agents. Rare are the glimpses of
what rewards the less wellborn expected to achieve through military service.
The situation in Ireland at the time o f the Anglo-Norman conquest, however,
presents some interesting permutations and questions just as this peripheral region was
dragged into the business of “core” E urope35 The warriors from south Wales, from
lowly foot soldier to knightly magnate, doubtless saw opportunities across the Irish Sea
to win feudal titles and advantages which Plantagenet policies were making more
difficult to attain in England; they entered a society not dissimilar for having quasi
institutionalized forms of clientship, but for basing it on movable property instead of the
landed fief. Thus the nature of Irish warfare: the repetitive cycle of raid and counterraid in search of plunder with which a lord could rew ard his followers. Into this ready
made milieu came the Anglo-Norman adventurers, who quickly began creating the
forms of Cambro-Norman feudalism, but in the meanwhile slipped right into the Irish
methods o f campaigning, typically at the behest of their own Irish contacts or their
neighbors, so as to finance their efforts. AH the Anglo-Norman “volunteers” were
essentially at the level of “free clientship” which differed from “base clientship” by the
right to partake of the lord’s hospitality or to impose upon base clients for the same.36

35Bartlett, The Making o f Europe, passim, but especially 23, 71-2, 239, 306-8.
^See the comments of Flanagan, Irish Society, 182-8, 198, which echo so much
those o f Odo Borleng at Bourgtheroulde on the potential forfeiture o f the fam ilia
members o f eating with their lord if they did not give battle that day.
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The criticisms against Mac Murchada and other Irish kings focused not on any taint of
money or goods he gave the English, but on their foreignness and the fact that they
were getting the wages instead of Irish warriors. Thus the men of Ossory planned to
betray Maurice Pendergast and his troops because they were having to turn their pay
over to them.37 What drew the Anglo-Normans into the morass of Irish politics and
raiding was the opportunity to display their prowess before potential patrons, a chance
for the basebom that did not exist in the peace of Henry II’s dominions. More than
anything else, circumstances in Ireland offered a prospect that was diminishing in the
rest of Christendom. Robert Bartlett wrote of all the peripheral military actions, but
perhaps nowhere more accurately than o f Ireland that, “The dream of every footsoldier
in these armies was to get on a horse, to make the magical transition from the dusty
pedites to the galloping equites ”3* The nature of the fighting in Ireland did not make
such a transformation inevitable, but it often blurred the lines between categories of
combatants. Orders often went out for all available men to mount up, whether barons,
archers, squires, or sergeants. In such groupings, these various combatants became the
companions (compaignun) and comrades (druz) of the lords who oversaw the dispersal
of spoils. Even those troops who remained on foot had the distinction (which they
probably would never enjoy on the continent) of being part of the mesnie o f the AngloNorman magnates.39

37Song o f Dermot and the Earl, 11. 1272-81.
3*Bartlett, The M aking o f Europe, 45.
i9Song o f Dermot and the Earl, 11. 1359-61, 1889-904, 2385-6.
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Such personal contact had important ramifications in another arena o f reward,
the ultimate accolade that banished the need for tenuous, daily maintenance by a lord
whose coffers might dry up without warning: the acquisition of land and established
wealth through an heiress. As Duby has shown, the madcap turbulence of Europe’s
juvenes was a means to violent pre-eminence so as to move closer to such prizes, to be
in a lord’s mind when he was considering the arrangement of marital alliances.40 Ties to
a particular region contributed to, or broke, the careers of several eleventh and twelfth
century adventurers. Robert Guiscard, essentially in southern Italy as a mercenary,
dropped his ties to Normandy along with his first wife and married into the Lombard
nobility. Nearly a century later, Strongbow arranged through marriage to Mac
Murchada’s daughter for Leinster to fall his way after helping Mac Murchada recover
the kingdom.41 William of Ypres and Robert Burdet provide contrary examples. In the
former’s case, William had a Flemish wife to whose castle at L’EcIuse he retreated after
the failed attempt to secure the comital title. He therefore apparently never used a
marital alliance to secure his position within England. In Burdet’s case the evidence is
clearer; he brought his Norman wife Sybille to Tarragona where she took a vigorous
role in governing the city and defending her husband’s interests during his absences.
The family held onto its Norman heritage and thereby kept apart even into the next
generation, depriving itself doubtless of some local support when the new archbishop

40Duby, “Youth in aristocratic society,” in The Chivalrous Society, 119.
41On Guiscard, see Donald Matthew, The Norman Kingdom o f Sicily
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 18. For Strongbow, Gerald o f Wales,
Expugnatio Hibemica, 52-4, 66.
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began contesting the Burdet privileges in the city .42 In the opening years of the
thirteenth century, the stories that circulated about Louvrecaire’s and Cadoc's bestowal
of local women as wives upon their soldiers likely were unverifiable rumors, yet some
benefits might have attended such actions after the initial resentment. Not only would
the captains have been dispensing far more than wages to their troops, but they would
have also been establishing sorely needed ties to the regions in which they had
intruded.43
As military establishments grew throughout the century, however, the
opportunities for such reward, let alone even catching the attention of a patron, became
ever more rare. For most of those who served in the armies of either Henry II, his sons,
Philip Augustus, or even their predecessors, the tie that bound was the daily wage.
Service in a castle garrison, or "watch crew" as Morillo described the minimal peacetime
contingent, may have not been the short path to wealth and renown, but it did provide
regular wages.44 If his critics were to be believed, William Rufus let his soldiers have
whatever salaries they might demand.45 More likely, though, he struck his
contemporaries more by the numbers he retained than by the amount he actually paid
the individual warriors. By the third decade of his brother’s reign, the rate of pay for
military service had yet to become standardized, as J.H. Round concluded for the mid

42Defoumeaux, Les Franqais en Espagne, 225-30.
43See chapter 4 above.
^Morillo, 76.
4SWilliam o f Malmesbury, GR, II: 368-9.
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century mark, at one pence per day for foot soldiers. For knights, though, they appear
to have already reached the rate of eight pence per day. The Pipe Roll of 1130 showed
Roger o f Mowbray’s castles o f Burton and Lanesdale still in royal custody, and the
sheriff of Pembroke accounted for the wages of their garrisons of one knight, ten
sergeants, a janitor and watchman. The total payroll of £21 5s. lOd. does not permit the
knight or sergeants to receive Round’s otherwise acceptable figures. An entry for the
watch-crew at the castle of Brichelawa, however, indicates that janitors and watchmen
earned a halfpence per day. If sergeants received the same pay as other non-knightly
garrison members, even as they did in the Welsh castles of the 1160s, then the knights at
Burton and Lanesdale were earning 8d. already.46
Fred Suppe has shown that the castles o f Clun, Ruthin and Oswestry had regular
garrisons of probably twelve sergeants and one knight receiving salaries from the royal
exchequer by the early 1160s. Moreover, these small contingents were in keeping with
the garrisons at other "second-rate" fortresses in Normandy and the Welsh marches.
Suppe's most important conclusion, however, is the determination that these paid forces
constituted the regular garrison and not a wartime injection of extra defenders.47 While
the chroniclers tended to notice William II’s and Henry I’s wartime additions to castle
forces (and that of richer magnates like Belleme), the Pipe Roll of Henry’s thirty-first

46PR 31 Henry /, 138. For the accuracy o f Round’s figures, see the use o f them
by Fred Suppe, M ilitary Institutions on the Welsh Marches, 54, to determine the
garrisons of castles around Clun.
47Frederick C. Suppe, Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches: Shropshire,
A.D. 1066-1300 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1994), 53-56.
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regnal year shows a number of castles in royal hands whose garrisons were receiving
pay from the exchequer. Miles of Gloucester, who started his ascent to the shrievalty
from within the fam ilia, accounted for £14 5s. 7d. to pay the wages of a knight, and
several sergeants, janitors and watchmen at St. Briavel's. For the more substantial
garrison at Caerleon, Hildret accounted for £42 7s. 7d., plus the pay of a watchman at
Penuesel tower. To the north Geoffrey Escolland, Henry's agent for the vacant
bishopric of Durham, was responsible for the wages o f sergeants who staffed Norham
castle. The sheriffs who had the farm for London likewise reported the salaries of
watchmen and sergeants at the.48 Even those far from the Exchequer understood how
much of the royal revenue went to the complements o f castles, especially those in
contested regions. Suger, having seen so much of Louis Vi’s energy spent in the
reduction o f castles o f overly independent vassals, saw Henry’s success in Normandy as
similarly based. Both a cause and symptom o f his triumph was Henry’s destruction o f
many castles in Normandy. Those which he left standing, he filled with his own men
and maintained at his own expense.49
Little else can be said of pay scales in the early twelfth century since the only
surviving account from Henry I’s reign rarely gives the breakdown of actual knights or
sergeants in the few garrisons mentioned. An engineer named Geoffrey appeared in the

**PR 31 HI, 76, 141-2, 143, 152. Also, 137-8 for the porters and watchmen at
four of Roger de Mowbray's former castles. On Geoffrey Escolland at Durham,
Regesta, II: no. 1604.
49Suger, 102: hue accedit quodfere omnes turres et queque fortissimo castra
Normannie, que pars est Gallie, aut eversum iri fe c it ant suos intrudens et de proprio
erario procurans aut, si dirute essent, proprie voluntati subjugavit.
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London account with a salary o f £10 12s. lid. for a daily wage o f seven pence.50
Presumably he was engaged in work on the Tower or the city’s walls, but this
information remains unknowable. As for actual warriors, though, the fact that nonknightly wages doubled in the next three decades while that of the knights themselves
held steady testifies yet again to the increasing importance in the latter twelfth century
of those who did not fight in the ever-more restricted manner of the tourneying
knighthood.
The trend was evident even in reigns which have left no financial records.
Although Suger rarely noted the presence of any but knights in the retinue of Louis the
Fat, the beleaguered king constantly faced not just knights, but foot soldiers, archers,
and crossbowmen in the castles o f his independent-minded vassals.Sl Within his first
regnal year, Stephen was already reaching beyond England for the military specialists
necessary to siege warfare. When he pressed a full attack against the rebellious Baldwin
de Redvers at Exeter, Stephen did require his barons to join the siege with their levies,
but he did not wait for them. He resorted to slingers whom he “hired from a distant
region” (qui e diverso conducti fundi toribus), as well as engineers (artifices) who
helped destroy one bridge into the castle and who built “with wondrous art” great
wooden structures that enabled Stephen’s troops to harass the defenders on Exeter’s
walls. As the siege lengthened, the king sent for miners in an attempt to undermine the
castle’s walls. The chronicler believed that Stephen’s expenses during the siege

50PR 31 Henry /, 143.
51Suger, Vie de Louis le Gros, 18, 72.
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eventually mounted up to 15,000 marks, a figure which exhibits the usual medieval
penchant for exaggeration.52 Even if Stephen had 400 knights on hand at 8d. per day
(double the force he dispatched during the siege to cow Plympton into surrender), he
would have spent only 1800 marks on their wages; the combined wages of infantry,
slingers, archers, and the engineering corps, plus costs o f the raw materials of the siege
engines and other munitions could hardly make up the difference. The point, as it
usually was with numbers in medieval narratives, was the very stupendousness o f the
amount expended by the king. Similar exaggerations would take place among French
chroniclers during Philip Augustus’s reign as they had to get accustomed for the first
time to paid soldiery among the royal hosts.53
In the meanwhile, the English monarchs continued not only to be reliable
paymasters but also to have a host o f positions that needed warm bodies in them and
were not especially dangerous. Moreover, the pay rates were beginning to creep
upward even in Henry II’s reign. J.H. Round’s figures are on the whole acceptable as
standard rates of pay, but there were deviations all across the kingdom, doubtless as the
result of custom in places, increased demand in others, and simply sharp bargaining by
the soldiers themselves. The Shropshire accounts tended to quite specific over half a
century as to whose salaries were being paid off. Thus we know that by Henry II’s
second year, the porters and watchmen at Bruges and Shrewsbury had seen their pay
double to one pence a day since the records o f Henry I’s reign. A year later the porters

52Gesta Stephani, 32-40.
53William the Breton, Philippidos, book II: 11. 396-8.
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and watchmen of Rockingham castle were earning the same daily rate. The keeper of
Stratton castle, Engelard, who was probably not required to be at the post itself,
nonetheless received just over two and a half pence per day. The castellan’s position,
being often one in which the king had an interest and some say, showed the differences
attributable to personal negotiation. The castellan at Salisbury earned nearly five pence
per day in 1157, while the castellan of Wristlesham just three years later saw a salary of
eleven pence a day. All the while, and for years afterward, Engelard’s pay remained
frozen at two and a half pence.*4
The anchor of Anglo-Norman pay rates continued to be Dover castle, whose
garrison of knights, sergeants, porters, and watchmen earned wages that stayed closer
to Round’s estimates, and for a longer period, than anywhere else. The rate for all nonknightly garrison members in 1160 was one pence, while the knights were earning eight
pence. Wages the following year actually rose one-third of a pence for the porters and
watchmen, but stayed the same for knights and sergeants. A contingent of
crossbowmen began serving at Dover in 1161 at a rate just less than that of the knights,
seven pence. From this the conclusion has to follow that the sergeants at Dover were
wholly on foot. During the crisis of 1173-4, the records provide not only the exact
number of the garrison, but also the surprising fact that Henry was able to retain them at
the same wages as during peacetime.55

*PR 2 Henry II, 43; PR 3 Henry II, 77, 103; PR 7 Henry II, 35; PR 19 Henry
II, 107.
55PR 7 Henry II, 61, PR 8 Henry II, 53; PR 19 Henry II, 3-4.
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In the field, however, rates escaped such tight royal control, especially when the
odds o f violence had obviously increased. Before the actual hostilities o f 1173 broke
upon England, Henry’s lieutenants were raising troops at the usual rates in the counties
least likely to see invasion. Knight and sergeants from Staffordshire enrolled for 133
days o f service (more than three times the standard knight’s obligatory service) at eight
pence and one pence respectively. In the marcher counties, where warfare was rarely
far away, the specter of Welsh collusion with the king’s many other foes caused salaries
to jump quickly upward. Likely, there may have been a shortage o f manpower in the
region too, with Henry having drawn some away to continental service and others
having joined the adventurers in Ireland. Shropshire contributed some 330 sergeants at
the unprecedented pay rate o f nearly nine pence to the army that gathered to forestall
any revolts in Leicestershire.56 In addition, another group of sergeants, who were
notable for the mail hauberks they owned, had gone to the muster earlier, but at a rate
not quite of four pence a day. Finally, a contingent of archers was also raised at the rate
o f two pence a day. Salaries also went up for knights: the milites solidarii whom
Humphrey de Bohun led against Leicester’s Flemings were serving for twelve pence, a
rate till then usually only in the purview of castellans and court officials. Even knights
in garrison at Norham castle (Northamptonshire) were receiving twelve pence wages.57

^ h e temptation here is quite strong to claim a mistaken entry, and that the Pipe
Roll should read militum instead of servientum, especially in view o f the mail-clad
sergeants who followed in the pay scale. Additionally, the trend was for the regions
further from London, Dover, and Winchester to pay less than those areas for the same
categories of soldiers. PR 19 Henry II, 107.
51PR 19 Henry II, 107; PR 20 Henry II, 51.
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For the most part Richard was able to hold salaries at nearly the same levels as
his father and even to drive them back down in some locales. Three knights serving at
Windsor in 1194 received the same wages as had de Bohun’s force. Their wages may
have reflected the still unsettled conditions in England, however, before Richard’s return
caused the last of John’s partisans to surrender. In the later years o f his reign, Richard
pushed the remuneration of knights who had custody of castles down possibly to six
pence, although the porters and watchmen in the same post had wages then up to one
and a half pence. He particularly profited from the peace in England and along its
borders in the low wages that again went to the marcher recruits. In contrast to the
1173-4 salaries, Richard hired foot soldiers (pedites) from Wales at the rate of two
pence. Sergeants who fought on horseback received six pence a day, while a knight in
charge of such a company earned the standard twelve pence (or one shilling) for his
pains.58
The situation changed dramatically in John’s reign, however. Inflationary
pressure had been building since late in Henry II’s reign and doubtless continued under
Richard’s enormous demands on the English economy. When John did not bring back
the same laurels o f victory as had his father and brother, he found he could neither keep
the lid on military expenses. The earliest years of his reign had shown promise, though,
of continuing along the same lines as the previous reigns. Horse sergeants recruited in
Dorsetshire for service in Normandy received lower rates (4d.) than Richard’s
Welshmen, but the knights and foot sergeants crossed the Channel for the same salaries.

5*PR 6 Richard I, 251; PR 7 Richard 1, 59; PR Richard /, 41-2.
240

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

John even raised scutage rates for those who demurred from continental service to two
marks on each knight’s fee, a rate double his father’s and one-third greater than the
most Richard had dared to squeeze from his subjects.59 It was actually a quite
reasonable increase since scutage, computed on a forty-day term o f service, never
sufficed at a one-to-one ratio to hire replacement warriors for the extended campaigns
that marked Richard’s and even John’s offensives. Without victories in the field,
however, John met with no success in raising scutage rates to three marks in 1214. By
that point, inflation had driven knightly wages to two and three shillings, while footsoldier salaries had doubled to two pence. Nor were these rates out of line: since 1180
the price o f com, cattle and other basics o f life had doubled if not tripled, and the
military payroll was only just catching up.60
Many of these troops whose wages (liberationes) were reported to the
Exchequer officials were on their way to fight in, or at least guard the defenses of, the
Plantagenet domains in France. In these contested regions, information on salaries is at
its most scarce even as it would be at its most instructive. Only the Chancery Rolls
from Normandy in John’s second and fourth years survive, and the latter is but a
fragment. From them, however, Powicke has determined the salaries in livres angevins
which the troops received. On the French side, the Compte generate of 1202 and the
Frisia Servientum of 1204 enable us to track the wages which Philip Augustus was

"PR 1 John, 242. Warren, King John, 145-8.
“ P.DA. Harvey, “The English Inflation of 1180-1220,” in Past and Present 61
(November 1973): 3-30. Warren, King John, 148.
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paying to a nearly permanent standing army, and to compare those salaries with their
Anglo-Norman equivalents.61
The Rotnli Scaccarii Nomanniae shows that John was paying his knights in
Normandy at the rate of six sous angevins per day (roughly one and half English
shillings), while horse sergeants received two sous and six pence (just over seven pence
sterling) and foot sergeants from eight deniers to one sous (two to three pence sterling).
The growing importance of experts in siegecraft also manifested in the Norman records.
Balistarii or ingeniatori like Master Ivo or Lupillin saw salaries as high as four sous
(one shilling). John had an abiding interest in tying men to him personally, and money
was but one means. The king advanced loans to his soldiers with little hesitation, both
to aid them offset unexpected expenses while campaigning but also to create the lever of
obligation which John’s records show he used to great advantage. In addition, John
granted fiefs alongside wages to many whom his agents recruited; the loss of revenue
was compensated for in John’s eyes by the personal tie thus created to the king and the
territory.62 Unfortunately and interestingly, the Norman accounts do not reveal the
wages o f bands like Louvrecaire’s or of the contingents of Genoese crossbowmen
whom Richard and John both employed.
In the meantime, Philip Augustus had successfully revamped Capetian finances
so as to become quite an employer himself. Although standardized rates hardly existed

61As a general rule, the sous and deniers of livres angevins or parisis can be
approximated to English pound sterling at a 41 ratio. See Peter SpufFord, Handbook o f
M edieval Exchange (London: Royal Historical Society, 1986), 180, 194, 206, 209.
62Powicke, Loss o f Normandy, 223-5.
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even in theory, those in the French pay seem to have generally enjoyed slightly higher
wages than their counterparts in Plantagenet service. Knights served at six or seven
sous parisis per day, with knights banneret at the higher rate of ten sous a day. The
sergents a cheval had a broad range of recompense from two and a half sous up to the
handsome sum of five sous a day (John’s servientes equites occasionally saw salaries of
four and a half sous, but more commonly served at two or two and a half sous). Philip’s
reliance on crossbowmen becomes apparent in their breakdown into mounted and
infantry corps, plus their generous salaries. Crossbowmen with mounts had wages
equal to those of the horse sergeants (with English rates again lagging just behind the
French), while those on foot typically earned one and half sous. The bulk of Philip’s
army, the infantry, usually received eight deniers although the rate sometimes went up
to nine or dropped to seven. John’s foot soldiers worked for the same wage, but did
enjoy more dramatic upswings (as high as ten or twelve deniers) when the
circumstances dictated. Philip’s clerks kept detailed records for the engineering corps,
even down to the men overseen by the master ingeniatorii. Pioneers, miners, and
workers/smiths all received fifteen deniers a day for fortress repair; unfortunately, there
is no indication is their pay was the same for fortress reduction during actual hostilities.
As a last point of comparison, archers were remarkably rare in the French account rolls,
demonstrating already the Capetian preference for crossbowmen.63
The Compte generate affords a rare glimpse into the payment of one of the
mercenary bands of the latter twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. William the Breton

“ Audouin, Essai sur I'armee royale, 52, 63-4, 74, 81-3, 92-3.
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had claimed that Cadoc’s routiers were the recipients o f one thousand pounds a day
simply as their wages.64 A sum virtually impossible except in William’s poetic
imagination, the Compte generate explains his figure through Cadoc’s receipt from
Theobald of Chartres o f 4,400 livres angevins, an amount which converted to 3,290
livresparisis. Audouin felt this sum to have been Cadoc’s annual payroll which, if
disbursed three times a year, would allow some truth to William’s claim that, at least on
that day, Philip paid his foremost mercenary one thousand pounds. Unfortunately, the
entries for Cadoc give no indication o f the size of his force, so no calculation can be
made for individual wages of the band. If their daily maintenance stayed within the range
o f Philip’s other foot-sergeants, the sum from the Compte generate would easily cover a
troupe anywhere from 240 to just over 300 men, well in accord with the three hundred
men that the Romance o f Eustace the Monk put in Cadoc’s following. Whatever his
force’s size, it was large enough, however, to require sixty salted hams a day as part of
its provisions.65
All of the foregoing information leads again to a conclusion which hardly needs
belaboring for the twelfth century: money was an integral and common means of
facilitating military service. This being true, the question still remains of how to tell the
mercenary apart from the salaried soldier who deserves no such label. While grappling
with this issue, Stephen Brown posed the idea that “if the physical tools of combat of
the vassal were seen as somehow the possession of the one to be served, absolute

^William the Breton, Philippidos, Book VII: 11. 396-9.
65lbid., 109-10.
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ownership o f arms may be the hallmark of the true mercenary.”66 Brown’s observation
derived from the increasing evidence across the twelfth century that vassals expected
their lords to recompense them for any material and equipment losses incurred while on
campaign. From this attitude, however, it is hard to agree with Brown that vassals saw
their armaments as ultimately belonging to the king. Their right to carry weapons was a
fundamental characteristic of their free status. Even the 1181 Assize of Arms
recognized this not as a privilege but a responsibility of freebom citizens. In the end,
the ability not just to wield the tools o f violent persuasion, but as importantly to furnish
them, goes beyond questions of freedom and right to the heart o f who gets to dominate
within society.67 Brown’s point, therefore, is quite important even if not wholly
accurate. The mercenaries of the early twelfth century were not only those with an
aptitude for violence, but also brought the means of doing so with them. In part, this
was due to the lesser complexity of weaponry earlier in the century, but it also came
from the fact that those who sought foreign adventure and patronage were typically
those who could afford do so. Bohemond was relying more on his personal charisma
and promises of future riches to lure soldiers to his Byzantine expedition. The future
Henry II was so strapped for cash when he “invaded” England in 1151 that Stephen

“ Brown, “Military Service and Monetary Reward,” 37.
67Among the hallmarks of the “state,” according to Weber, is its successful claim
to “the monopoly o f the legitimate use o f physical force within a given territory.”
Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in From M ax Weber, 78. Compare also with the
comments of Andreski, Military Organization and Society, 35 . “The preponderance of
medieval knights was based on the exclusive possession o f costly arms and not on
organization.”
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actually paid off his soldiers and sent them home. It is doubtful Henry was able to
provide their weapons in such circumstances. In both cases, the ruling monarch was
concerned about the defection of his magnates and rambunctious knights, men who
already owned the weapons of their profession. Robert Burdet arrived in Aragon as a
Norman lord with his retinue, come to help against the infidel and certainly not begging
for weapons.
For the latter half of the century, the question becomes much more pertinent.
The Plantagenet administration, already far ahead of its peers in financial development,
continued its centralizing tendencies. Chief among these was the provision o f weapons
by the royal government for the troops it enrolled.68 Boussard has already shown from
the Pipe Rolls of Henry II’s reign that he was providing pikes, lances, mailshirts, and
helmets for new recruits.69 An important distinction must be made here, though.
Henry’s arms were destined for his cottereaitx, but these were the “cottagers” of
Domesday Book nomenclature, not the cottereli of the continent who were synonymous
with the routiers. The willingness o f the English monarchs to provide the tools o f war
showed most clearly during the near-invasion of England in 1213. In desperate need of
men to guard the southern coasts, John had his agents proclaim that even the most
recently freed serfs (culveltagii) who could bear arms should answer his summons to

“ See Andreski, 88: “The change-over from self-equipping hosts of warriors to
troops equipped by the government is a necessary condition of centralization.”
69Boussard, “Les mercenaires au Xlle siecle,” 200.
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muster. There, they would receive the necessary implements and a salary.70 Men
serving under these circumstances hardly merit the label o f mercenary, but those from
society’s lower echelons who presented themselves for hire with their own weapons,
they were a different breed altogether. They looked upon war with the same
entrepreneurial spirit with which William Marshal approached a tournament. They
carried the threat of social turmoil in their hands, presumed to intrude on the martial
preserve staked out by the knighthood, chose to make a living through violence (as
opposed to chivalry’s stress on service to the inermes, the unarmed), and were thereby
suspect. Such were the routiers and coitereamr, the Braban^ons and other ethnic
designations, who troubled the later twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.
Despite the fulminations of chroniclers, however, such groups were hardly out
to destroy the fabric of Christendom. Certainly a love of adventure or dire judicial
circumstances drove many not-so-reputable elements into the routier bands, but were
the risks worth it? Was there really that much plunder to be had on the all too rare
battlefield? Keegan’s question should be asked again in a different way: instead of why
do men kill one another, what compels a person to hazard his own well-being
professionally? The answer in the early 1100s is obvious enough: the ones doing so for
new patrons were continuing in the careers to which they had been bom. As early as
the battle o f Bremule, knights were taking care not to harm one another irreparably, and
the riches to be had were in the fields and castles o f one’s foes. The foot soldier of the
latter 1100s is harder to comprehend. At a time when the average salary o f the

70Bamwell Chronicle, 209; Roger of Wendover, II: 66-7.
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servientes pedites was between one and two pence daily, what lured recruits from the
town or the field? A potterer could make the same amount safe behind his wheel. The
keeper of a vineyard or a gardener likewise earned one pence a day. The possibility
existed o f doubling that wage if one moved over to the transport or sale o f wine. Even
an all-purpose laborer could take home a penny each day, while a carpenter could see
wages of two pence during peak demands.71
The answer is the unimaginative one of necessity. William of Malmesbury had
already remarked early in the century on how bad conditions in Brittany forced the
native population to move abroad in search o f employment. Verbruggen has been one
of the few historians to seek after the particular key to the mid-century irruption of
Brabanpon bands; besides the usual answers of overpopulation in the Low Countries
and momentary underemployment, he posed the end of the Grimburg War as another
cause. This quite localized, but very hotly contested strife within Lorraine and Brabant
saw a great deal o f devastation ruin the livelihood of the peasantry. In turn, this same
populace may have taken to soldiering to substitute for their lost subsistence.72 From
the end of John’s reign comes a sad example of the hopes that drove the routiers to
abandon their various homelands. After signing the Magna Carta, John sent the
indefatigable Hugh de Boves back to the continent to gather any troops that could be
induced to cross the Channel. While John was besieging Rochester, Hugh brought an

11PR 2 H enry II, 51 , P R 3 Henry II, 71, 73, 95; PR 4 Henry II, 134; PR 19
Henry II, 178.
^Verbruggen, 142.
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immense number of recruits to Calais, and there embarked. The fleet ran into a storm
and was largely destroyed. Besides the enormous number of deaths wreaked
(Wendover estimated with the usual medieval flair that 40,000 had drowned),
contemporaries were struck by the number of women and children who had come as
part of the expedition. The explanation lay in the supposed promise of John through
Hugh that whosoever came to the king’s aid would be granted permanent residence in
Norfolk or Suffolk, even to the detriment of the populations then living there.73
Whether John or Hugh de Boves actually made, or meant to fulfill, such an outlandish
offer, is less important than the belief that drew knights and lesser soldiers with their
families to join John’s agent at Calais. Nearly eighty years before another beleaguered
inhabitant o f the Low Countries had recovered his political and material fortunes by
going to England; the example o f William o f Ypres may well have lingered in his
homeland and held out the prospect of what was attainable in foreign climes.

^Wendover, II: 147-8.
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Questions o f Community
Deciding who may or may not qualify as a mercenary is such a tortuous process
primarily because of the multiple perspectives involved. At a minimum, there are three:
the interests o f those for whom a soldier fights, those against whom he fights, and his
own personal motivations. One party sees him as an inspired volunteer, whose
willingness to risk himself is further proof of their cause’s righteousness. For the
opposing side, he represents the inherent weakness o f the foe, besmirching their effort
since he can by definition be little more than a self-serving cutthroat on the hunt amid a
misfortunate contest. As for the soldier himself he may be either as nobly or baseminded as painted, or he may be seeking nothing but each day’s meal. Typically, the
contending viewpoints each have some validity, and the primacy of one does not
exclude the others. Only the opinion of the soldier can be the true weathervane, but two
glaring problems attend this resolution: first, the nearly total silence in the twelfth
century o f the mercenaries themselves as to why they fought, and second, the naturally
suspect truth o f their protestations. The historian thus has to measure the combatants of
the twelfth century not just by their actions, but also by their connections to myriad
networks, thereby to determine the sum total o f gains and losses which the soldiers
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themselves were also trying to gauge. Such questions were intimately tied to the issue
of who constituted the “we” and the “they” in any contest .1
Of course, determining the position of a combatant relative to a certain
community does not tidily resolve his status. As Susan Reynolds recently noted,
scholars of the Middle Ages must remember that inclusion in one group does not
remove all others from consideration.2 Moreover, the twelfth century hosted a tension
between long-standing particularism and a world growing quickly international in its
affairs and outlook. Historians are just now coming to appreciate the amount of
itinerancy that characterized much of medieval society, and at earlier dates than
previously admitted.3 What sort of presuppositions thus came along with foreign
soldiery from distant regions, whether that frontier was geographical or social? For
many of the potential mercenaries in the period under analysis here, vestiges of
association with former regions remained even while they served with zeal in new lands.
In another set of examples, ties to a homeland were never severed as recruited knights

'See the summary of Michael Gelven’s “we-they principle” in Chapter I.
2Reynold, Kingdoms and Communities, 330: “Some modem scholars, perhaps
influenced by Rousseau’s belief that solidarity with one group rules out any other, have
believed that medieval people can have felt no loyalty except to their lord or local
community. Anyone who belongs at the same time to a family, a town, a university, and
a nation-state—and may even support a football team into the bargain—ought to find
this idea implausible.”
3BartIett, The M aking o f Europe, 111 -6, 271. One of the most startling
examples concerns a serf who in 1095 fled his home in Brabant, traveled to England and
there found a wife, but who eventually chose to return home, and evidently suffered no
penalty for his waywardness. J. De Sturler, Les relations politiques et les echanges
commerciaux entre le duche de Brabant et I 'Angleterre au Moyen Age (Paris: Librairie
E. Droz, 1936), 73, and n. 24.
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fought with the full permission, even encouragement sometimes, of their liege lord for
another lord. The Angevin conglomeration o f territories presents still another facet of
the problem as the Plantagenet kings were able to use personal ties with their
dependants so as to induce them to serve in theaters well away from their homelands.
Finally, the phenomenon of the routier bands creates still another question of
community: the potential creation of a new community, one potentially disruptive to the
social order, one with which the mercenaries might identify amid all the others.
Recent scholarship has highlighted the importance of community in medieval
history, both in general studies and monographs o f particular groups. People in both
rural and urban environments turned increasingly to collective action: in the former, the
change came as growing economic and population pressures demanded better returns
from arable land; in the towns, the movement derived in part from the desire of recent
transplants to establish themselves within a new social setting and in part from the
pursuit o f a means to avoid arbitrary justice and exactions. Thus, within towns lay
fraternities and guilds experienced tremendous growth, while the towns as discrete units
sought charters from kings and regional magnates to govern themselves as communes.
The strength and skill of such movements could be surprising. The serfs at Rosny-sousBois kept a legal battle with their lords for half a century and even had the wherewithal
to send representatives to argue their case in Rome.4 The commune at Laon which so
excited the invective of Guibert of Nogent during its 1112 revolt would continue to

4Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities, 72-3, 122, 133, 134.
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prove troublesome throughout the century.5 After their brutal suppression, the burghers
nonetheless secured a new charter in 1128. The serfs o f the region followed that
example and were able to induce Louis VII to grant them a commune in 1174. It hardly
proved adequate protection, though, when three years later the bishop of Laon had the
help of local nobles in slaughtering many of these serfs near Comporte as an object
lesson to any seeking to slip out from under their local lords’ authority. They tried
again sometime between 1185-90 and secured a new charter briefly from Philip
Augustus. When he later revoked the commune so as to placate the local ecclesiastical
hierarchy, the serfs eventually demonstrated the vitality and mobility of the lower
orders. In 1204 the serfs o f seventeen villages (the whole o f those beholden to the
bishop of Laon) moved en masse into the territory of Enguerrand de Coucy who happily
welcomed the immigrants. Although legal wrangles would eventually force them back
to their homes,5 the fact of the exodus is no less remarkable. It is little wonder, then,
that the elites of the period feared the potential outcome o f any collective activity by
townsmen or peasantry.
The typically ecclesiastical chroniclers and annalists expressed fear of other
communities than just those that might be posed by society’s lower orders. The
foreigner (aligenus) rarely appeared save as a threat. The preference which William
Rufus showed for foreign warriors over the well-being even of his peasants brought

5Guibert ofNogent, S e lf and Society in Medieval France, John F. Benton, trans.
(Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1989), 167, indicted the commune as “new and
evil,” neither o f which was complimentary in his parlance.
6Luchaire, Social France, 407, 412.
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down William of Malmesbury’s negative appraisal of that monarch.7 Orderic, an
Englishman by birth but practically Norman by virtue of his strong loyalty to his
monastery at St. Evroul, likewise criticized Rufus for his preference o f foreigners and
strangers over his own subjects * At the other end of the period under analysis here, we
have the indictment o f the Barnwell Chronicle against John, which assigned his loss of
support, presumably in Normandy as well as in England, to the munificence and
confidence he showed to his foreign troops (exteros and aliena)9 The provisions of
Magna Carta showed a similar concern, although the real thrust of the clauses which
meant to exile John’s mercenaries arguably derived as much from the nobles’ wish to
remove rival office-holders as to clear their most effective foes from the realm.10
Certainly, the rhetoric shifted against the rebellious barons once the perception grew
that their imported soldiery constituted the real threat to the kingdom’s peace and
prosperity .11 Leah Shopkow’s study o f Norman historical writing as both an expression

7GR, 368-9, 379.
*OV, v.200-2.
9Bamwell Chronicle, 232.
'“Warren, King John, 189-90. Also, J.C. Holt, The Northerners: A Study in the
Reign o f King John (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 18, 33-4, 216-7, 234-6, where
Holt shows how John’s reliance on his favorites (often parvenus like Gerard d’Athee or
the Cigogne kin) made the patronage network appear “impenetrable” to the magnates of
England who felt the sinecures o f the realm were deservedly theirs first to claim.
"The most telling passage in Wendover, II: 201, concerns the siege of
Berkhamstead, where the German commander in royal pay is portrayed most favorably
against the “excommunicated” French. Another passage, II: 211, focuses on the
atrocities of French and Flemish supporters of Prince Louis. Also, Barnwell Chronicle,
243.
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of, and formative influence on, one particular community provides a qualifier, however,
to this apparent xenophobia. The episodic and localized production o f Norman
historiography across a two-century span pointed to the conclusion that narrative
histories tended to be by-products o f crisis; in other words, they came about in order to
bolster and reconfirm the status quo at just those times and in those places which felt
their traditional roles and customs were being threatened.12 The presence of foreign
soldiery would naturally be felt more acutely at such junctures regardless of whether
their numbers actually grew during such crises. Thus, not only when wamors are
moving across borders, but also the times when various communities (in this instance
often synonymous with recognized polities) are at peace, deserve examination.
Along with the Norman duchy, two of northwest Europe’s most other cohesive
regions were England and Flanders. Once the fortunes of England and Normandy, and
later still Anjou, became intertwined, the relations of these communities with Flanders
became critical to the affairs of all four as well as the Capetian domains. The
vicissitudes of Flanders’s relations with the Anglo-Norman rulers can easily cloud any
assessment of a community of interest between Flanders and her neighbors. Among the
“mercenaries” whom William the Conqueror enrolled in his army were a number of
Flemings, but their particular relation to the Norman duke is hard to establish. Since

I2Leah Shopkow, History and Community: Norman Historical Writing in the
Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1997) 56-7,
178-9. Sir Richard Southern’s comments on English historiography after the Conquest
are likewise applicable here. “Aspects of the European Tradition of Historical Writing:
4. The Sense of the Past,” in Transactions o f the Royal Historical Society 23 (1973),
5th ser., 245-56.
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several o f them were richly rewarded in England after Hastings, it seems most likely that
they came to William’s attention, or vice-versa, through his wife Matilda, the daughter
o f Count Baldwin V of Flanders.13 That marriage marked the first rapprochement
between the competing dukes and counts. Men from the Boulonnais, Pas-de-Calais,
and on through Flanders proper received lands and titles across England, including at
least two earldoms eventually.14 Lesser known countrymen, usually described in
Domesday Book or the earliest extant Pipe Roll, as Flcmdrensis, settled in considerable
numbers across Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, and Somerset.15 The alliance between Flanders
and Normandy broke down in 1071 when Robert the Frisian displaced his nephew
Amulf from the comital title. The keystone o f Flemish foreign policy was always to
curb the rising power of immediate neighbors; thus Robert turned against his brother-inlaw William and the Anglo-Norman realm. When the Conqueror’s heirs divided the
territory, Flemish policy warmed again towards England both to spite the Capetian
kings and as a check against the ambitions of Robert Curthose.16
In England itself, relations with the inhabitants o f the Low Countries continued
to show two faces. William Rufus renewed the money-fief with the Flemish count
which his father had let lapse, and Henry I confirmed the treaty again while he was still

13William o f Malmesbury saw it thus years afterward. GR, 477: Plures enim, qui
tempore patris pro m atema cognatione confluxercmt. . . .
l4Douglas, William the Conqueror, 75-7, 266-7.
15David Nicholas, Medieval Flanders (New York: Longman, 1992), 54.
l6Ibid., 57. Dept, Les Influences, 19-20.
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only king of England. Henry was too astute, however, to misunderstand Flanders's
position with France, and thus the county’s volatility as an ally. His removal o f blocs of
Flemings from England to the Welsh and Scottish borders early in his reign was thus
doubly expedient; besides using one set of foreigners to guard against another, he also
broke apart potential centers of trouble if and when the Flemish counts reverted back to
a traditional policy of opposition to Normandy. He welcomed still more Flemings to
England as settlers in 1111 when floods wiped out their homes; yet he was quick to
send them northward.17 Unfortunately, there is scant evidence from this period as to
what extent Flanders had yet become dependant on English wool for her nascent textiles
industry. Henry’s caution proved to be merited when Baldwin VII became the next
count of Flanders following Henry 's re-unification of England and Normandy. He
doubtless felt Henry's influence needed to be checked. Besides the cross-Channel
regnum, Henry had exceptionally good relations with many Breton magnates. To
counter this, Baldwin gave his support to William Clito, the landless son o f Robert
Curthose, and allied with Louis the Fat. His policy cost him his life, however, during
the 1119 hostilities, and the next count, Charles the Good, chose to maintain an easy
neutrality with the Anglo-Norman realm. Perhaps his stance derived from Henry’s new
marital alliance with Louvain,18 but more likely his wait-and-see policy grew out of

X1GR, 365-6, 477. Nicholas, M edieval Flanders, 107-8.
18Henry I married Adeliza, daughter o f Godfrey duke of Louvain, in 1121 after
the death of his son on the White Ship. OV, vi: 302; JW, 15. She would stay in
England after Henry’s death, become the wife o f the earl of Surrey, and settle at
Arundel.
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concern over the Capetian king’s steadily mounting ability to interfere successfully
beyond the Ile-de-France. Following Charles’s assassination in 1127, that ability
manifested itself in Louis’s installation of William Clito as the new count of Flanders.
Henry dispatched his nephew Stephen of Blois, already count of neighboring Boulogne,
to counter Clito’s elevation in addition to the funds he may have released to William of
Ypres. In the end, though, neither Henry nor Louis could arrange the county to their
satisfaction, and a popular revolt eventually saw the death of William Clito and the
succession o f Thierry o f Alsace to the county .19 Thus matters stood between Flanders
and her Anglo-Norman rival at the time when Stephen became king o f England and
numerous Flemings found military employment with him or Matilda.
A sense of the Flemings as a specific group of unwanted interlopers in England
is hard to detect within Stephen’s reign itself. Certainly, the chronicles denounced
foreigners as disturbers of England’s long peace, but no one group particularly drew
criticism more than another. That came afterwards. In Normandy, however, which had
not enjoyed England’s respite during Henry’s reign, the violence that followed
Stephen’s accession did aggravate Norman animosity toward all foreign groups, not just
Angevin or Manceaux invaders. Orderic reports that Stephen's quick turn to French
and Flemish supporters alienated his new Norman subjects. Their envy of the king’s
reliance on outside knights grew to such proportions that they not only would not join
William o f Ypres or Waleran of Meulan in punitive (and presumably lucrative) raids

19Galbert of Bruges, in PL 166: 1042-6; Vie de Louis le Gros, 246-50; OV, vi:
370-2.
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against Angevin territories, but they began to act against their erstwhile allies.20 The
situation only worsened the following year when Norman magnates kept Geoffrey of
Anjou posted on the whereabouts and plans of Stephen’s lieutenants. William and
Waleran’s frustration finally reached the point that they unleashed their soldiers within
Normandy itself, mostly in simple retaliation although there was the faint hope of luring
Robert of Gloucester out from the safety of Caen.21
Back in England, the irruption of military activity elicited general condemnation,
but specific condemnation of William or his Flemish friends and relatives came during
the reigns of Henry II and Richard. Robert of Torigni, who laconically noted Henry II’s
expulsion of Stephen’s Flemings along with other reforms, began his chronicle in 1154
and continued working on it until 1186. Unfortunately, we cannot date when he wrote
that particular passage. One o f the most famous descriptions of the Flemings of the
Anarchy was penned by William of Newburgh, who consumed the years 1196-8 with
the creation o f a history o f England since the Conquest. William charged the Flemings
with having come to England for booty and praised Henry for expelling these “ravenous
wolves” (lupi rapaces) who so burdened the country. Gervase of Canterbury’s
broadsides against William date from sometime after 1185, the date when his chapter
asked him to compose a history. He followed afterwards with the Gesta Regum which,
when it focused on the conclusion of Stephen’s reign, adopted the lupine metaphor also
to describe the Flemish descent on the kingdom. Coming as they did so far downstream

“ OV, vi: 482-4.
21Ibid., 514-6.
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from the actual events o f Stephen’s reign,22 the interpretations of all these chroniclers
reflect far more the prejudices of the latter twelfth century than the century’s mid-point.
The Flemish weavers who invaded England in 1173 with the Earl of Leicester were
more on their mind than the knights and castellans of the 1130s and 1140s. The Dover
Treaty o f 1163, which earned Henry II no opprobrium from English observers, bears
out some o f this interpretation. In that accord, Henry and Thierry regularized the
service o f Flemings who accepted English money-fiefs at thirty marks of silver for the
service of ten knights in England itself.23
Before turning to the Flemings o f the latter twelfth century, early perceptions of
another group who often appeared as mercenaries deserve attention: the Bretons.
Beginning with the Conqueror’s imposition of effective control both within the duchy
and along its borders, Anglo-Norman relations with Brittany were quite close. The
incidence o f rebellion among local magnates should not cloud this fact anymore than the
repeated insurrections within Normandy actually meant to overthrow wholly the duke or
king. The cadet branch of the Breton ruling house acquired the earldom of Richmond
from William and his sons, and numerous Bretons settled in England throughout the
reigns of the Conqueror, his sons, and Stephen. Certainly, they were foreigners, as
Orderic skillfully paralleled the pariah status of Henry I among his brothers with the
Bretons. Essentially a stranger (extem us) where he should not have been, Henry

^Robert o f Torigni, 183; William o f Newburgh, 101-2; Gervase of Canterbury,
Historical Works, I: 121, II: 73. Antonia Gransden, Historical Writing in England,
c.550 to c. 1307 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 247.
•^Dept, Les Influences, 29.
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naturally turned to strangers (exteri) for support.24 They in turn were quite willing to
support him in struggles that did not have to concern them, but criticism from
contemporaries was scant. A element of empathy mixes with the expected
condescension in Anglo-Norman descriptions of Brittany and the conditions there.
“They are a race of men,” wrote William of Malmesbury, “so destitute in their homeland
that they have to seek after a laborious life of wage-earning abroad.”25 Desperate as
they thus were, the Bretons did not have the luxury o f judging the righteousness of their
employers, only whether the payment was timely and sufficient. Henry I was notable for
keeping the loyalty of this faithless people (fidem perfidae nationis), even if he did so
through lavish wages.26 Bretons continued to serve the Anglo-Norman monarchs after
Henry I, including Stephen, but their role as outsiders became less critical once Henry II
engineered the marriage of his son Geoffrey and Constance, heiress to the duchy.
The situation with Flanders became ever more complex as the century
progressed. Count Thierry accepted a marital alliance with Geoffrey Plantagenet’s
sister Sybilla in keeping with the traditional Flemish policy o f checking Anglo-Norman
expansion. After Geoffrey managed to carve Normandy away from Stephen’s lordship
by 1141, Thierry’s policy made the usual shift back in favor of the isolated English

24OV, iv: 256.
2SGR, 478. E st enim illud genus hominum egens in patria, aliasque externo
aere laboriosae vitae mercatur stipendia. . . .
26Ibid. Compare with the repeated denunciations later in the century of the
treacherous Basques, whom no one credits with keeping faith with any employer.
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monarch now that the Angevin bloc was gaining too much ascendancy.27 When
Geoffrey’s son managed against ail expectation to succeed not only to Anjou and
Normandy, but also to his mother’s claim on England, Thierry faced a situation every bit
as daunting as the one usually presented as facing only the Capetians. He chose to
support his nephew and attended Henry II’s coronation, but he stayed away from a firm
alliance with the new king. As the decades passed, first Thierry and then his son Philip
maintained a careful position vis-a-vis both England and France, but the Plantagenet
dominance made a tilt towards France barely avoidable. The pressure of keeping
everything in balance was made worse by the mounting economic interdependence o f
England and the Low Countries. It was a lever of which the Plantagenets were quite
fond. The Pipe Rolls contain numerous references to seizures o f Flemish property in
England by royal agents, almost always at those junctures when English policy needed
Flanders to stay or avoid certain courses. Besides punishing Flemish merchants, who in
turn pressured their count to go along with Plantagenet wishes, the ploy o f course
yielded quick sums of always-needed, interest-free cash.28
The seizure o f Flemish goods within the kingdom and an embargo on English
products, especially wool, going to Flanders did not suffice to prevent Count Philip
from siding with Louis VII and Henry’s sons in 1173. The lure of breaking up the

27Such a shift accounts for William of Ypres’s ability to regain his Flemish lands.
28In particular for the 1173-4 crisis, see Pipe Roll 19 Henry II, 50, 130, 196;
Pipe Roll 20 Henry II, 14, 54, 103, 131; and Pipe Roll 21-23 Henry II for on-going
receipts o f seized property. It is tempting, but unprovable, to see the money which
Henry extorted from the Flemish merchants as going to the wages of others from the
Low Countries with whom Henry then defeated the count of Flanders.
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Angevin dominions proved stronger; moreover, Henry’s economic squeeze served to
put many Flemish weavers momentarily out of work at a time when population pressure
was straining the region’s ability to feed and employ the growing numbers.29 Thus,
when envoys from Scotland and the earl of Leicester approached him for help, Philip
had an available, even eager, pool of recruits for expeditions to England. The anxiety
which manifests so clearly in Jordan Fantosme’s verses came no doubt much from the
very novelty of warfare in England for the first time in a generation, but coupled to it
was a strong fear o f social disruption. The earl of Leicester compounded his guilt not
by bringing foreign knights into the kingdom, but by dragging along the rabble as well
with carte blanche to ravage what they willed. The foreignness of the invaders was
exacerbated by their violence; they had not come to England to practice chivairic games
of prowess with ransom being the usual penalty for failure. Fantosme doubtless echoed
English perceptions— if not the actual facts—when he reported the Flemish desire to
“destroy” Henry and take the wool of England. At Fomham, the knights did not bother
with the actual slaughter o f this crowd; that was left to their English counterparts. In
Fantosme’s final opinion, “They would be better off hanging from a rope in Flanders,” a
fate reserved to traitors and society’s lowest members.30 In contrast, this attitude did
not extend to the Flemings in the pay of Hugh Bigod in Norfolk or William the Lion;

29Nicholas, M edieval Flanders, 108-9. From Galbert o f Bruges comes evidence
that Flanders was already importing food by the early twelfth century, while comparison
of Flemish grain yields with neighboring Picardy or England shows that the increased
productivity o f fields that marked Europe in this period lagged in Flanders.
fa n to sm e , 11. 991-9, 1029-31, 1051-60, 1080-85.
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these groups were given safe-conducts through England to Dover where they quit the
kingdom without further penalty.31 Presumably these combatants hailed from better
origins than the Flemings at Fomham and thus gained better terms from their English
counterparts.
Even though Henry II eventually triumphed over his rebellious sons and the
foreign coalition against him, the balance of power between the Angevin dominions,
Flanders, and Capetian France remained virtually level for several years yet. Historians
see the latter 1170s and early 1180s as the apogee of Flemish autonomy. The territories
under the count's control reached their largest extent, and no one o f the three powers in
northwest Europe acted without a reciprocal movement from the other two. Henry II’s
Assize o f Arms was followed by similar statutes in Flanders and France. Emissaries to
the court of Frederick Barbarossa could count on rival envoys following soon after from
the other two camps.32 Count Philip enjoyed an ascendant role at the French court
during Louis VII’s last days and the earliest phase of Philip Augustus’s reign, seemingly
cementing his position with the marriage o f the new king to his niece Isabella o f
Hainault. Disputes over dowry lands along with the machinations o f other interests at
the French court soon engendered a backlash against Flemish influence. Unable to
withstand Capetian military force, Philip o f Alsace soon swung Flanders firmly into
Henry II’s camp. By the Treaty of Boves (1185), Philip had accepted anew the

3,Ralph o f Diceto, I: 381.
32Dept, Les Influences, 21; Nicholas, M edieval Flanders, 72. Philip o f Alsace’s
territories reached at this point to within 25 kilometers of Paris, a proximity on par with
the Norman dukes’ intermittent possession o f the French Vexin.
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traditional money-fief which previous counts had held from the English kings. He
honored its complicated provisions just two years later, sending the required
complement o f Flemings to guard England while he reported to Philip Augustus with
the minimum levy demanded o f him.33
English chroniclers are silent on this large influx of foreign soldiers, reflecting
the firm control which Henry II always maintained over his hired troops, but perhaps
also the growing realization in both camps that their interests were so closely aligned as
to mitigate any differences due to perceived foreignness. Within a decade, the new
count Baldwin IX took the unprecedented step o f tying his county’s fortunes entirely to
the Angevin cause by signing with Richard the first offensive treaty against their nominal
overlord, Philip Augustus. Richard granted Baldwin an annual pension of 5000 marks
as part of the arrangement, but whether this bought Baldwin’s loyalty or was meant just
to underwrite his military endeavors is unknowable. The Bretons and Champenois
joined the accord, also agreeing that none would make a separate peace with the French
king.34 The death of Richard in 1199 and Baldwin’s departure for the Fourth Crusade
and subsequent death allowed Philip Augustus to break the otherwise firm AngloFlemish alliance. Even so, the entente held for some time. John continued his brother’s
money-fiefs to Flemish notables.35 So closely tied to one another were the two
countries that before he lost Normandy, John had written to the bailiffs of Flanders in

33Dept, Les Influences, 22.
u Roger o f Howden, Chronica, IV: 19.
35Ibid., 93, 95. Dept, Les Influences, 60.
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1202, asking them to enforce in their districts the service of those of their countrymen
who had accepted English money-fiefs.36 One of the few glimpses into the motivations
behind the acceptance o f a money-fief comes from this period of John’s reign: Alard de
Strepy accepted one from the English monarch, but the confirmation letter from John’s
chancery records that Alard meant eventually to acquire a landed fief from the king37
Only Baldwin’s death in captivity saw the Flemish barons begin to accept money-fiefs
from Philip Augustus.
For John, part of the campaign to recover his patrimony involved a restoration
of common interest between England and Flanders. He had the advantage o f the
groundwork laid down by his brother and father, who had to no small extent made the
Flemish knighthood dependant on English money-fiefs.38 For many other Flemings,
England had been an open market either for their goods, while Flemish sergeants knew
the king was always ready to hire them. The Flemish towns thus remained fertile
ground for John to sow with trading privileges in England, and on this foundation, he
built up a renewed parti Anglais throughout the county.39 Working through the

*Rot. Lift. Pat., 16
llIbid.
38A need which Philip Augustus was quick to fill. See the comments of
Luchaire, Social France, 325, on the nearly permanent, borderline bankruptcy of the
nobles and knights o f the period.
39The towns even promised to find knights for John’s campaigns: omnes illos
quos poterimus, tam de Flartdria quant de aliis terris attrahemus ad servitium et
fidelitatem vestram. Dept, Les Influences, 106, and 129, where Dept notes that Philip’s
taking of hostages in 1213 from many Flemish towns served to exacerbate their
animosity against French royal interference in Flanders.
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burgesses was particularly effective in Flanders where the “aldermen,” a group of
representatives from the major cities, had an unusually heavy influence on the count’s
domestic and foreign policies.40 John lavished gifts and easy loans upon the nobility so
as to draw them back even informally into the Plantagenet orbit. Just as he used loans
within England to bend men to his will, John did likewise with his Flemish debtors.41 He
thus built up a widespread network of supporters across Flanders and Brabant. His
agents, who were typically men of the region and thus knew which of their neighbors
were in need of funds or political leverage, had letters in which the king promised to
meet whatever terms his recruiters promised.42 For many Flemings, the opportunity was
too rich not to accept. By 1210 they were attending John during his return to Ireland:
the financial accounts of the expedition show knights (often in groups of kinfolk) from
Saint-Omer, Bailleul, Courtrai, Ghent, and Lampemesse serving in John's fam i/ia *3
When Count Ferrand found himself at cross-purposes with Philip Augustus in 1213, the
current was already running strongly among his advisors and populace in favor of
alliance with John.44 John had not so much bought the count as he had the county itself.

N icholas, M edieval Flanders, 150-1.
4IHugh of Bailleul, by entering John’s service, got a debt of 80m. to the king
forgiven. Dept, Les Influences, 102.
*2Rot. Litt. Pat., 93: Rot. Litt. Claus., I. 119.
43Dept, Les Influences, 108-9.
**Ibid., 125: En effet, les interets de Ferrand et du roi Jean sont maintenant a
tel point identiques, qu 'il est impossible de distinguer la (ache d'un simple vassal du
comte, de celle d'un partisan anglais. In fact, John wrote his Flemish partisans even as
Ferrand was moving to the English camp and enjoined them to serve their count with
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Moreover, the methods of John and his predecessors would not have struck the
Flemish knights as extraordinary. Gislebert of Mons reveals that the Flemish counts
liberally rewarded their vassals, both the greater magnates of the land and the
reputation-seeking member of the fam ilia, with gifts of horses and arms, fine garments
and wages paid in silver.45 Money-fiefs were common. Count Baldwin assigned 600/.
to one vassal, 400/. to another. In another case, a vassal accepted a 20/. pension and a
landed fief, which he later parlayed into a lordship near Valenciennes with an annual
income of 700/. In most other cases, the funds dedicated out of the comital treasury
averaged 20-30/. per knight.46 In the latter awards, the daily maintenance actually
turned out slightly higher than the typical wages offered by either the French or English
monarchs, perhaps reflecting a need on the count's part to outbid royal recruiters to
keep his own subjects at home.47 The situation thus remains hard to decipher. Within
the context of a Flemish desire for autonomy, campaigning with the Angevin monarchs
up through the defeat at Bouvines conveniently served the advancement of Flemish
interests, the policies o f the Plantagenets, and the advancement of the individual soldier.
Where the lines lay between these interests is hardly worth trying to debate, but the
Flemings who chose to go with John to Ireland likely had moved across one o f them.

zeal and fidelity. Rot. Litt. Pat., 160.
45Gislebert de Mons, Chronicon Hcmonieme (Brussels: Kiessling, 19xx ), 328.
^Luchaire, Social France, 336.
47An estimate only, based on later thirteenth century rates of exchange between
Flemish Iivres and English pounds sterling. Spufford, Handbook o f M edieval
Exchange, 209
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Although the Low Countries were indeed the primary recruiting grounds o f the
Anglo-Norman and Capetian monarchs, both—but especially the former—went further
afield to find the troops they needed.4* The reputations o f Rufus’s and Henry I’s courts
drew men from beyond the Alps, let alone the Bretons, French and Flemings they
actively enrolled in the familia. Stephen likewise drew from neighboring regions
although his position as count of Boulogne naturally turned his focus toward Flanders.
In all three reigns, the Welsh showed up sporadically as hired shock troops, but their
employment became regularized under Henry II, who used their native skills much more
effectively. The amalgam of territories which came about under Henry II created a new
situation, however. Disparate lands and cultures now found themselves conjoined
politically and militarily. Not only did different communities often serve as allies under
Henry II’s banner, but the frontier between societies, both within the “Angevin Empire”
and along its often indeterminate borders, shifted dramatically. England and Normandy
had to adjust to a much wider, cosmopolitan world.49 Even then, how concerned would
an Englishman have been over the actions of a Provencal captain like Mercadier as he
led a troop o f Braban^ons among the ever-rebellious Poitevins? So long as the kingdom
or duchy were not disturbed, it was just news from a distant place. Nonetheless,

^Dept, Les Influences, 106. “Parmi tous les mercenaires, les Flamands et les
Brabangons etaient les plus estimees du roi.” For Philip Augustus’s recruiting in
Hainault, see Verbruggen, 141.
49Shopkow, 111, posed this transformation as the cause behind Robert of
Torigni’s decision to abandon Norman dynastic history (thus ending two centuries of
Norman historiography), since the deeds of the Plantagenet dukes could hardly be
covered accurately within the confines o f Norman history alone.
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Englishmen did serve with Henry II or his sons on the continent, and thus rubbed
shoulders with different nationalities. Did they see them as mercenaries? The question
is hard to answer in the person of Sancho of Navarre, whose supportive 1194 invasion
of Poitou would have been understood clearly in the context o f his sister’s marriage to
Richard the Lionheart. The forces which the count of Toulouse promised Henry II
would likewise have been questionable mercenaries since their provisioning came about
through the settlement of a longstanding feudal claim between duke and count.
About others, however, there can be little question of their mercenary status.
No other label could fit Mercadier in his earliest appearances. Coming from lands well
beyond Plantagenet influence, he sold his military talent and the soldiers he apparently
already led to then-duke Richard. His later career gives pause, however, even if he
always remained a commander of Richard’s Brabangon troops. He became a propertied
man within Plantagenet territory, described himself as one of Richard's most loyal men,
and in all respects made the Angevin cause his own.50 On the French side, Cadoc
followed a similar path to landed reward. His mercenary origins played a role in his
eventual removal from office and fief, however. His judicial and financial exactions
were not out o f the ordinary, but as complaints mounted against him, he did not have
the web of familial and political support which other officeholders, typically from
families which the king needed to reward, surrounding him. Another Navarrese, Martin
Algals, began his career with Richard, but did not particularly distinguish himself during

^Geraud, “Mercadier.Les Routiers au Treizieme Siecle,” 442-3.
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the Lionheart’s reign.51 At the time his brothers fought with him, but they disappeared
from the record while Martin rose quickly in the estimation o f King John, who did not
demur from paying a huge ransom for the captured Navarrese.52 Within a few years,
however, he left John’s service and settled in the Albi where he would fare even more
poorly in the conflicts o f the Albigensian Crusade. Besides the major captains, the
records of John’s reign yield the names, and little else, of many individual soldiers hired
and distributed across his lands and forces. Their sobriquets reveal their origins: Amald
le Gascon, Henri d’Espagne, Lucas d’Espagne, Andrew of Pamplona, not to mention
the numerous Genoese and German balistarii53 The remarkable thing about these
troops is their appearance primarily in the administrative records of Richard’s and
John’s reigns. With the exception o f Mercadier’s exploits, or the fact that William
Marshal had to deal with the disreputable Louvrecaire, the mercenaries of 1189-1216
attracted less notice than their numbers might indicate was due them. The explanation
rests partly on perspective, the fact that the wars of the Angevins mainly took place not
just on the continent but in regions distant from the Anglo-Norman core. Coupled with
that situation, however, is the fact that Richard and John as kings, even as had their

slBertran de Bom questioned his zeal for Richard’s cause in “A1 nou doutz
termini blanc,” 11. 52-3, in Poems o f Bertran de Bom.
52See above, chapter 4, for the careers of Cadoc and Algais. The entry of
Provencals like Mercadier and Alai's into Angevin territory and politics may date from
Henry II’s 1172 attempt to set up a marriage alliance between his son John and the
daughter of Count Humbert o f Maurienne, whose lands bordered Provence. The threat
of this alliance brought the Count of Toulouse and Alfonso II, king o f Aragon and lord
of Provence, to the bargaining table. Warren, Henry II, 117.
53Rot. Litt. Pat., 20; Dept, Les Influences, 105.
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father, kept a tight rein on their hired troops. They served at the Plantagenet whim, and
at different times, Richard and John showed clearly that they brooked no trifling with
their wishes.
The dynamic changed after 1204 when the focus o f Capetian-Plantagenet
conflict moved to the Channel and potentially, England itself. This shift served to
sharpen a sense o f Englishness in the chronicles and on the political scene,54 and there
was a nuance in the new attention to foreigners that highlights both the new situation
and previous conditions. A well-documented resentment built against John’s parvenu
military captains as the king entrusted his faithful servants with a growing list of
shrievalties and other offices within England. More to the point here, however, is the
nature of the criticism against John’s imported soldiery when he turned those troops
against his own rebellious subjects. An infestation had occurred which threatened the
nature of England, and the fear of social disruption which had been remarkably absent
from Anglo-Norman chroniclers suddenly appeared with the same vituperation that
marked continental narratives four decades earlier. The accord with Flanders had come
apart after the debacle at Bouvines, and Magna Carta, as Roger of Wendover reported
it, called for the removal o f “all Flemings and robbers who were in the kingdom to its
detriment.”55 John’s riposte to Magna Carta resulted in the creation of a polyglot army

^Donald Matthew, “The English and the Community of Europe in the
Thirteenth Century” (Reading: The Stenton Lecture, 1996), 7.
S5Roger o f Wendover, II. 134. . . Flandrenses omnes et ruptarios, qui sunt ad
nocumentum regni.
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of “lawless people who neither feared God nor regarded man.”56 While John moved
northward to ravage the lands of rebels there, his adherents in the south turned to
rapine, destruction, and extortion of any and all. Some of John’s individual native
supporters, like his brother William of Salisbury, are mentioned by name, but as a
whole, the agents o f this mayhem were not Englishmen. Fawkes de Breaute and
Savaric de Mauleon led raids against the inhabitants and churches around Ely. Walter
Buc and his Braban^on contingent had preceded them, inflicting “the most cruel
torture” on the people and clergy, and forcing the cathedral church’s prior to pay nine
marks of silver to preserve the building from the torch.57 Three centuries before,
Regino o f Prum had already delineated four criteria for determining community:
common lines o f descent, customs, language, and law.58 The English chroniclers of
John’s reign, in their diatribes against the king’s mercenaries, implicitly stressed the
commonalty of these things among the English, while John’s troops had none o f these in
common with one another, let alone with those on whom they warred.
Interestingly, some o f John’s captains managed to avoid a complete tarnishing of
their reputations. As already noted, Savaric de Mauleon appeared in the records and
narrative when he unsuccessfully supported Arthur’s claims against John at Mirebeau.
A Poitevin noble, Savaric displayed a remarkable ability to stay ahead of the multiple

561bid., 162: . . .nationibus perversis, qui necessary Deum timebant, nec
homines reverebantur.
51Ibid., 163, 171-2. Barnwell Chronicle, 226-9, 231.
58Bartlett, The M aking o f Europe, 197.
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claims on his loyalty. Somehow he became one o f John’s most stalwart captains in
Poitou even as the Plantagenet cause there was crumbling and spent six years, often to
his own detriment, battling Philip Augustus's partisans. He next led a force of 2,000
Basques by John's command to the aid of the count o f Toulouse only to meet defeat at
the hands of Simon de Montfort’s crusaders. His efforts on John’s behalf apparently
saved his reputation, because no Anglo-Norman chronicle noted his career of piracy in
the years just before Bouvines. In fact, William the Breton alone records his collusion
with Cadoc at Damme, not against the English per se. but more as a bit of private
enterprise against available Flemish victims.59 Perhaps he was able to construe his
distraction of Cadoc at Damme as a deliberate service to John’s cause, or more likely,
John in 1216 was in no position to quibble over the actions of a man ad tempus varians
more Pictomim. Constancy, however, became his hallmark during the conflicts after
Magna Carta. Alone o f the continental notables, Savaric did not abandon John once
Prince Louis took the field in England. Moreover, by his counsel of leniency at
Rochester, he set himself apart from John’s lesser-born captains who would have shown
their zeal for the king by slaughtering the garrison. Savaric, the noble and troubadour,
by contrast, could not escape the bonds o f the chivalric community. Although in the
company of the same foreigners who drew down such heated condemnation, Savaric
was commended for his nobility and prowess.60

59William the Breton, Philippidos, Book VIII, 11. 294, 347, 364, 864-875, and
n.3; Book IX, 11. 199-202, 380-98.
60Roger of Wendover, II: 136: vir nobilis et bellator.
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Fawkes de Breaute displayed a similar ability in the end to identify himself with
the “right" cause and thereby shed much opprobrium. At the height of combat between
John’s and Louis's adherents, Fawkes was “the most evil robber” (praedopessimus),
preying in part on baronial garrisons, but more commonly on ecclesiastical houses which
only wanted to be left alone. With John’s death, however, Fawkes transferred his
allegiance to the infant king and kept his depredations in line with the military policies of
the regency. His lieutenants put up spirited defenses at every castle in their custody,
while he himself showed a nearly suicidal zeal at the battle o f Lincoln. His efforts netted
him the hand of the Countess of Wythe and a prominent place in the early years of
Henry Ill’s reign. When, in 1224, he was caught in negotiations with Louis VIII, the
remembrance o f his services to the crown saved him from execution. Unfortunately for
him, exile back to his native Normandy only put him within reach of Capetian justice,
which had no fondness for him. Fawkes disappeared from historical view once Louis
VIII imprisoned him.6'
For all their opportunistic habits and questionable fidelity, Savaric de Mauleon,
Fawkes de Breaute, and others like them62 did not bring in their wake the specter of
society’s dissolution. As great as their toll on the realm was, it nonetheless fit the
pattern of war as practiced by the period’s most effective commanders. Some o f that
fear did attach to the Brabangons led by Walter Buc, and a great deal more went to the

61Ibid., 200-1, 205, 211-4, 217. Barnwell Chronicle, 253.
“ Among whom perhaps should also be mentioned examples like William of
Ypres, Robert Burdet, Gerald of Wales’s kinsmen in Ireland, Gerard d’Athee and his
relatives in England, and even Mercadier.
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forces under Hugh de Boves that, in the medieval perception, had obviously been intent
on such a nefarious purpose or God would not sent the storms which wrecked their
fleet. The English fear of the Brabangon threat to society at large was never as strong
as on the continent. Strong control by the Plantagenets had sown the assumption that
mercenaries could, and typically would, be kept under control.63 The military
apprenticeship o f Richard and especially his older brother Henry on the continent in the
1170s and 1180s had taken place, however, in far different circumstances. At that time,
the fear was quite strong that the social fabric was coming undone, and the Brabangons
appeared to be doing the lion’s share of the tearing. Not only were they present in
virtually every conflict, but their contingents appeared more as new communities, small,
novel societies that threatened the received order o f how society ought to be.
Walter Map’s criticism of the Brabangon contingents went right to this point:
they had made a law for themselves against all law and thereby attracted to their bands
all the seditious elements of society.64 There was truth in Map’s analysis; the example
of William the Cleric bears out the latter point,6S while the fact that the Brabangon
troops operated as sworn associations was apparently common knowledge. When
Raymond fitzGerald constrained his troops in Ireland all to take an oath to share their

“ Henry II and Richard had brought Brabangons, albeit briefly, into the kingdom,
and both kept them under the strictest control while there.
“ Walter Map, De Nugis Curialium, M.R. James, ed. (Oxford. Clarendon Press,
1914), 56. neon in prim o latrunculi egressi legem sibi fecerunt, omnino contra legem,
et associati sunt eis propter sedicionem fugitivi, clerici falsi, monachi evasi, el
quicumque Deum aliqtto modo derelinquunt horrendis eorum adherent cetibus.
“ Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF XII: 446, and chapter 4 above.
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acquired riches equally, with an extra portion for himself as leader, his chief rival,
Hervey de Montmorency, used the fact of this oath as a basis to slander Raymond to
Henry II, alleging that Raymond was forming bands of soldiers after the fashion of
Brabangons.66 Besides the oaths by which they bound themselves together, the routiers
had every appearance of a miniature, if mobile, community. The camp which the peacemen of Berry plundered during their slaughter o f Brabangons in 1183 contained large
numbers of women and children. Geoffrey of Vigeois dismissed the women as
prostitutes, especially since they had the effrontery to wear ornaments stolen from
churches, but his bias only disguises the potential marital relations that did exist in the
roiitier camp.67 Moreover, the routiers had all about them, presumably as a makeshift
palisade, the heavy carts in which them moved their noncombatants and possessions.
Georges Duby has portrayed this particular group, and the many like it, as a dissolute,
spoil-laden pestilence that threatened the good order of Christendom as contemporaries
understood it.68 Nor is he necessarily wrong, but he missed some interesting
comparisons with the very towns which he saw as disgorging this excess population
onto the roads.
The chief crime o f the Brabangon contingents, even if never explicitly stipulated
by medieval writers, was that they had slipped out from under a hierarchy somewhere.
Nor was even that a completely damning maneuver, but their reluctance to submit anew

“ Gerald o f Wales, Expugnatio Hibernica, 158.
67Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF XVIII: 219.
68Duby, The Legend o f Bouvines, 80-2.
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was. The communal levies already operated as sworn associations and with materials
and weapons not dissimilar to the roving Brabangon bands. As early as 1127 the civic
militias of Ghent and Saint-Omer appeared in Galbert o f Bruges as a communio, or
brotherhood in arms bound by a mutual oath. It was admittedly a sporadic occurrence
since the amicitia at Aire did not require an oath o f its citizens. The men of Ghent
responded in such numbers to the opportunity to besiege Bruges and avenge Charles the
Good that they required thirty wagons to transport their equipment. The men o f Ghent
took pride in their abilities and were especially renowned for their talent at reducing
fortresses.69 The pride of the communal levies continued to manifest later in the century
when they went forth under Philip of Alsace with banners affixed to their wagons and
eager to engage the knights o f Philip Augustus.70 The French king himself relied on the
communal levies of northern France, and indeed granted many of the commune charters
of the region precisely to nurture spirited, local defense. The accounts of 1202 and
1204 show the French communes fielding forces in much the same manner as the
Flemings, having even determined the necessary ratio of baggage wagons to infantry.
Significantly, Philip Augustus turned to his communal levies at Bouvines, after his
knights proved ineffective, to break the Brabangon formation from behind which

69Galbert o f Bruges, in PL, CLXVI: 975. The wagons (piaustra) may not
belong solely to the army from Ghent since they attracted so many unsavory elements
(but not necessarily the mercenaries o f Pirenne’s interpretation, since none of the usual
appellations are in Galbert’s litany o f plunderers and thieves) joined their expedition, but
it is hard to see the burghers providing the wagons save to their own. See also Ross,
The Murder o f Charles the Good, 160, n.2, and Verbruggen, 149.
70Verbruggen, 150.
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Renaud de Dammartin continued to imperil the king himself.71 The Plantagenets
likewise within their kingdom showed little reluctance over arming their burghers and
even the lowest ranks o f society.72 In all these cases, however, the military activity o f
these non-feudal elements was, if indispensable, nonetheless kept within channels useful
to the king; the militias were always allowed to revel in their patriotic participation in
national defense.
The major attention of this chapter has been on the latter twelfth and early
thirteenth centuries, an emphasis due partly to the lack of earlier evidence but more so
to the later conditions which allowed so many different figures to hire themselves out
for military service. Certainly William Rufus spent much of his father’s treasury to
attract soldiers to his retinue, but we know next to nothing of those who actually
received these payments. The role of money in procuring service remained constant
throughout the period, but much else was changing. The influence of the AngloNorman rulers was spreading, almost making the Breton affiliation with Henry I a
natural bond. Moreover, it seems pointless to describe someone like Ralph the Red of
Pont-Echanfray as a mercenary just because he accepted a salary from Henry I. His
patrimony was within the Anglo-Norman realm; his ultimate political fortune always lay
with the very community for whom he fought. He became a mercenary only for the

71William the Breton, Philippidos, Book XI, 11. 605-33. Gesta Philippi Augusti,
285-90. Audouin, Essai sur I'armee royale, 23.
n See above, on Henry II’s Assize of Arms in 1180, the numerous Pipe Roll
entries for com a coterrellorum, and John’s willingness to provide weapons to even the
most recently emancipated serfs.
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time he attended Bohemond’s expedition against the Eastern Roman Empire. With
Stephen’s reign, however, the question of mercenary status grew more complicated
quickly. For the Breton elements, the quandary derives from their long association not
just with the kings themselves, but the fiefs they held within the realm. As for the forces
from Flanders and Boulogne, the question is only slightly clearer. Stephen doubtless
had personal ties with many of those whom he recruited through his wife’s inheritance
o f Boulogne. Such recruiting would have been on a par with Henry’s and Rufus’s
methods, but the greater number of Flemings probably came of their own initiative.
Some, like William of Ypres, displayed a remarkable record of devotion to their new
lord and showed a causal identification far beyond their salary. In the end, though, the
Anglo-Norman community did not accept William. Whatever his ultimate intentions may
have been, he ended his Career in England as he began it: as a foreigner.
Attention to this trait became more acute as Europe’s frontiers expanded
externally and internally. A less locally focused Europe did not entail a less
particularistic Europe. The Crusades had initiated a dynamic towards unity which
caused the communities of Christendom to take a greater interest in one another and
engage in more cooperative ventures than before.73 The old associations never died,
however, and in the conflicts of the Plantagenets and Capetians they grew sharper. The
fact that our lens on this situation is situated almost solely within monastic houses
makes this tension even more interesting. The reform movements of the eleventh and
twelfth centuries tended to make the orders international in character and outlook. The

73Bartlett, The M aking o f Europe, 260, 267-8.
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individual houses, by contrast, remained unrepentantly local in their focus.74 Thus the
English reports on the 1173-4 revolt have their dichotomous rhetoric: a deep interest in
the military affairs o f Henry II on the continent which is narrated almost impassively, but
a strident account o f the perfidious Flemings and Scots who came to trouble England
itself Again, the ravages of Brabangon bands which so horrified Geoffrey de Vigeois
had no parallel in England or Normandy until John unleashed his Brabangons on the
local populace. The firm perception that only foreigners could commit such violence
marked all the chronicles. Those with ties to a community would not descend to the
same level; thus even the questionably loyal Savaric de Mauleon argues for clemency at
Rochester. As for the faithless foreign, however, no evil was beyond belief. The
destruction of Prince Louis's relief force off Sandwich in 1218 was heralded with joy
not least because o f the death of Eustace the Monk, the former ally who sold himself to
the French and practiced the blackest sorcery.

74A fact that shows clearly in their writings. Orderic Vitalis and Gervase of
Canterbury both began their histories during crises for their houses, and despite the
wide-ranging interests o f both, give large amounts of attention to the disputes of their
houses over questions o f property, lordship, and ecclesiastical autonomy. See the
comments of Shopkow, 241. and Bartlett, The M aking o f Europe, 226-7.
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VIII
The Taint o f Heresy
No out-group status carried a greater onus, of course, than that which was
outside the bounds of Christendom, and understandably, the heretic was even further
beyond the pale than Jews, Saracens, and the heathens beyond the farthest, wildest
frontiers. He should have benefitted from being within the fold of the Church’s care and
teaching but had chosen instead, particularly after his errors had been made manifest, to
deviate from that norm. He became a cancer within the spiritual body which had to be
cut out after he resisted correction. Certainly the Church dealt with heresy in every
century, but it was in most cases (after the great doctrinal debates o f antiquity had
finally settled down) the sporadic result of an individual’s re-interpretation o f specific
theological points, not the formulation o f thorough-going belief systems to rival that of
Rome. Along with all the other changes wrought in the twelfth century, the epoch also
saw the emergence of the first great heresiarchs since antiquity .1 Even though the
terrified ecclesiastics of the twelfth century misunderstood the origins of the Cathar or
Albigensian sect in Languedoc, they had no illusions of its threat to the “cultic and ritual

'R.I. Moore, The Origins o f European Dissent (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1985),
82-3.
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uniformity” which Rome had mostly been successful in inculcating across much of
Europe. Christendom had grown to have a “quasi-ethnic meaning”2 which deepened the
traitorous overtones o f heresy. As mercenaries likewise grew more prevalent and
powerful across the period, there is almost no surprise in the fact that they became
linked with heretics either as employees or as religious deviants themselves, particularly
since the chroniclers of their activities were themselves churchmen. The eventual
association of mercenaries with both sides o f the Albigensian Crusade served to
accentuate their chameleon-like characteristics. It was the final confirmation of their
faithlessness and essential threat to the temporal order established by God.
At the beginning of the century, however, the ecclesiastical cry focused not on
the theological threat of heresy but on the physical danger to church personnel and
property by all members of the armigerous or do The Peace of God movement had
begun in the tenth century and peaked in the eleventh, but its echoes were still quite
loud in the twelfth as chroniclers decried the depredations of armed men against
churches and monastic houses. Part of the problem stemmed from the legal extortions
allowed under banal authority to local lords3 and another part from outright thievery
practiced by younger sons of the lesser nobility. In different ways, the success of the
Peace o f God, plus the birth of the Crusades and creation of the chivalric ethos, tamed
this bellicosity or gave it someplace else to indulge its energies. The re-channeling of

Bartlett, The Making o f Europe, 243, 248-9, 251.
3Hans-Wemer Goetz, “Protection o f the Church, Defense o f the Law, and
Reform,” in The Peace o f God, 264. R.I. Moore, “Postscript: The Peace of God and
the Social Revolution,” in The Peace o f God, 313.
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Christendom’s violence was far from complete in the twelfth century. If nothing else,
the physical structures of the Church offered not so much tempting targets as places of
refuge for one group of raiders from another. This phenomenon decreased across the
century as secular lords converted their redoubts to masonry or built new castles of
stone. In the meanwhile, criticism o f the soldiers who fought for the Anglo-Norman
kings and their Capetian counterparts typically showed these factors at work.
Both Orderic and Suger knew from close report or eyewitness evidence how
easily warfare could destroy years o f improvements on church lands. The summaries of
Rufus's career made implicitly clear a relationship between his reliance on stipendiaries
and the hard times he thereby had to force on the church in order to finance his payroll.4
On occasion, though, the effect of his perennial campaigning was much more direct.
During his 1098 campaign to bring Maine back under Norman control, Rufus based his
marauding army on the Coulaines estates of the bishop of Le Mans, whom the king
hated for his involvement in the repeated revolts. Orderic’s narrative demonstrates how
the patterns of medieval warfare naturally led to the destruction o f ecclesiastical lands.
The king had his archers and crossbowmen spread across the vineyards with obvious
orders to interrupt all traffic in the region. Before long interdiction turned into strategic
destruction as the royal troops destroyed the countryside’s productivity.5 Suger’s
account was that of an eyewitness at Toury, an estate belonging to Suger’s abbey of St.

4See above, chapter 2. OV, v:200-2. GR, 368. Eadmer, Historia Novorum, 25,
43.
sOV, v: 242, and n.5.
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Denis Louis VI sent Suger there to oversee the troops he was basing there for an
attack on Hugh of Le Puiset’s castle. From fear of the fire which Hugh was expected to
bring against the manor, Suger joined the king in procuring knights and infantry which
he placed all over the estate. Toury was at that point unfortified and luckily escaped the
suppression of Hugh, but the dangers o f the region prompted the monks o f St. Denis to
change that situation quickly. Less than a year later, when Hugh again threatened
Toury with hastily recruited troops, a three-story tower now rose above the fields o f the
manor. Although Hugh did not succeed in his stated goal o f razing the manor buildings,
his encamped forces doubtless did much damage to the crops roundabout before raising
the siege.6
The conditions of Stephen's reign saw ecclesiastical establishments undergo the
full range o f military risks from straightforward looting to being the site of sharply
contested battles. William of Malmesbury deplored the spoilation o f the Church by the
Flemish and Breton knights who rushed into Stephen’s service,7 but it was a native-born
son, Geoffrey de Mandeville, who provided the sharpest lesson on the penalties God
exacted from those who persecuted his own. As he raised rebellion against Stephen in
1143-4, Geoffrey enrolled “a very strong force o f ordinary soldiers and likewise of
robbers, who had collected enthusiastically from every quarter.”* With these troops, he
took to ravaging the churches and monasteries o f East Anglia and the Fens. His attack

6Suger, Vie de Louis le Gros, xx-xx.
7HN, 17.
*GS, 164: gregariae quoque militiae, sed et praedonum. . .
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on the abbey of Ramsey in particular earned him excommunication by a legatine council
headed by the king’s brother. While besieging the castle o f Burwell, he received a
seemingly slight head wound which quickly worsened. His partisans immediately began
restoring the materials stolen by Geoffrey, but to no avail. He died excommunicate, and
twenty years passed before his heirs were able to secure his burial in consecrated
ground.0 Robert fitz Hubert earned a similar reward according to William of
Malmesbury when John Marshal hanged him after the sacking of the Wilton convent and
the monastery at Malmesbury. “Wondrously was God’s judgment exercised upon a
sacrilegious man,” wrote the affected monk.10 A year later, the engagement which saw
Stephen’s supporters regain the initiative in 1141 also resulted in the destruction of a
convent by the king’s most-well known Fleming, William of Ypres. As William and
Queen Matilda were drawing the siege of Winchester tighter around the Empress
Matilda, the latter’s forces attempted to break the cordon, either to escape themselves
or to open a way for relief forces and supplies. John Marshal, father o f William
Marshal, led the Empress’s sortie but found himself outmatched by William of Ypres.
At this point the different accounts o f the engagement become irreconcilable, and each
reflects the partisanship o f its author. William of Malmesbury, never one to pass on an
opportunity to blacken Stephen’s cause, reported without elaboration that William of
Ypres, homino nefando, burned down the nunnery at Wherwell after claiming that some
of the Empress’s adherents were inside the place. William Marshal’s biographer claimed

9I bid., 164-6. KS, 80-2.
X0HN, 44: M iro circa sacrilegum Dei iudicio concitato.. . .
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that only John Marshal and one remaining knight fled into the church’s tower after being
unable to hold a nearby riverbank against William o f Ypres’s forces. John’s companion
wanted to surrender in this version, a claim which naturally made William’s destruction
of the convent all the more unnecessary and unforgivable. It also served to accentuate
John’s bravery and sacrifice, particularly if he did lose an eye from lead melting off of
the roof in the ensuing conflagration. From the pro-Stephen accounts of the Gesta
Stephani and John of Hexham comes the justification that while William’s troops
surrounded the convent, but demurred from attacking, the Marshal’s soldiers decided to
harass them with missile fire. For Stephen’s commander, this danger was not only
intolerable, but was also an act that voided any claims to sanctuary. He gave the order
to bum Matilda’s partisans and the nuns out o f the convent.11
William of Ypres’s attitude toward the English church showed itself in other
affairs which he supervised. The key element here is the focus o f William’s
ecclesiastical allegiance because his behavior was little different from other magnates of
his day. They gave generously to those houses which had traditionally received theirs or
their family’s patronage, but they stole as liberally from those houses with which they
had no affiliation. William indulged in the same pattern once he became the virtual lord
of Kent. John of Salisbury’s correspondence12 shows that William felt the church at
Chilham was his to grant to the Abbey o f St. Bertin back in Flanders. St. Bertin's also

"HN, 60. HGM, III. 3-7. GS, 130-2. John of Hexham, II . 310.
I2John o f Salisbury, The Letters o f John o f Salisbury, ed. W.J. Millor and HE.
Butler (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1955), 37-9, 258.
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gained the church at Throwley, courtesy of William’s patronage. Beyond Kent, William
applied a heavier hand to the church. Sometime between 1139 and 1146 William joined
the earls o f Surrey and Arundel plus William Martel in threatening to bum down St.
Albans. The monks bought them off with a table made o f gold, silver, and jewels.13 In
another case, Stephen heard o f a large cache of coins being held at Abingdon Abbey.
He sent William to secure a “donation.” The monks at first barred the door to William,
but then let him in when he expressed a need to pray. Once in, he strode to the money
chest, broke it open with an axe, and requisitioned fifty marks o f gold and five hundred
marks of silver.14 These latter depredations were not peculiar to Flemish warriors
abroad; similar incidents abound in the pages of all early twelfth-century chroniclers, and
most often the perpetrators were local nobles.15 Nonetheless, the foundation was set
upon which the later reputation o f Low Country soldiery would be built, especially the
repeated tales of their penchant for robbing and desecrating ecclesiastical sites.
During the reigns of Henry II and his sons, but not exclusively within their
territories, the stories of Braban^on/rcn/t/er atrocities toward the Church began to pile

l3Round, Geoffrey de Mcmdeville, 206, dated this event to 1143 and made it part
of the confusion surrounding Geoffrey de Mandeville’s arrest by the king at the abbey.
See also the Gesta Abbatum S. Albani (RS), I: 94.
UChron. Abingdon (RS), II: 292. See also, Cokayne, “Kent” in The Complete
Peerage (London: St. Catherine’s Press, 1929), 131.
15O f interest here is Strickland’s excerpt from Girart de Roussillon, a chanson
probably written in the 1170s. Speaking o f his hero, the poet wrote: “He does not leave
a good knight alive . . . nor treasure nor monastery, nor church, nor shrine, nor censer,
nor cross, nor sacred vessel; everything that he seizes he gives to his companions.” See
War and Chivalry, 159, for analysis o f this poem’s acceptance o f warfare’s natural cost
to the Church. .
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up, becoming more lurid with time. Occasionally, propertied nobles still appeared in
such tales, but more typically they were absent or distracted, thus allowing the lowbom
combatants to indulge their hostility toward ecclesiastics.16 The archbishop of Rheims
reported that the routiers who ravaged his territory in 1162 had burned thirty-six people
alive in a church. Four years later, the Brabangon irruption around Cluny resulted in the
slaughter of unarmed townsmen and clerics who were in a procession replete with relics
and icons meant to deter the routiers hired by the count of Chalons. After the carnage
ended, the Brabangons robbed the dead clergy of their vestments.17 Betraying a vestige
o f respect for formidable opponents, Fantosme opined that the Flemings would have
triumphed in England but for their vast thievery, on account of which God abandoned
them to die miserably. Their actions only worsened the next year when they violated
northern churches to carry off women who had sought refuge there.18 The memory of
Flemish ecclesiastical depredations lasted well into the thirteenth century (or were as
likely bolstered by the recent ravages o f Walter Buc’s Brabangons in the eastern and
home counties) when the long arm o f St. Edmund punished a Fleming in Prince Louis’s
entourage for blaspheming the memory of the saint within his own sanctuary.
Immediately after the Fleming expressed doubt on the nobility of the martyr’s death, he

16Geraud, “Les routiers au douzieme siecle,” 127, suggested that the violence of
Brabangons and routiers towards the Church was a direct reaction to the Church’s
program o f anathematization and even extermination (through the Peace organizations)
o f the footloose warriors, but the argument needs more proof.
17Ibid., 128. Grundmann, 445-6. Strickland, War and Chivalry, 301.
l8Jordan Fantosme, 11. 1059-60, 1167-70.
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was struck by a piece of masonry falling from the upper structure of the church.19 The
stories were innumerable and repeated by chroniclers far apart. Gervase of Canterbury
told the same story as Rigord about an incident during the campaign o f 1187 for distant
Chateauroux. A number of Henry II’s Brabangons were gambling in a church dedicated
to Mary, and a fracas broke out when one of the players resented his continued losses.
One of those involved threw a stone which struck a statue of Jesus and Mary, breaking
off the arm o f the infant. The fallen arm began to bleed, while the offender died almost
instantly in a seizure and his comrades went mad. Ironically, in the fierce competition to
acquire this new relic, the monarch most noted for his reliance on mercenaries, John,
would gain the arm.20
Of course, it was not as fortified sites or impromptu gambling halls that
ecclesiastical houses suffered most; it was as well-known repositories o f easily
convertible wealth, the deposited monies of nobles, plus the chalices, pyxes, crucifixes,
and other ornaments often made of precious metals and stones. Such resources
attracted outlaws like Geoffrey de Mandeville, rebels like the Young Henry,
independent bands of Brabangons, and servants of money-starved kings who could not
afford to scruple over raiding the church’s treasuries. Mention has been made above of
the Young Henry’s sacking o f St. Martial’s in Limoges to finance his troops, plus
further spoliation which eventually taxed God’s patience with the short-lived prince.21

19Bamwell Chronicle, 243.
“ Gervase of Canterbury, Historical Works, I: 369-70; Rigord, I: 79-80.
21See chapter 2 above.
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Of the many other examples which could be paraded here, the most striking are the
exactions which St. Albans underwent. The abbot paid out numerous small amounts,
plus several larger settlements, so as to protect the town of St. Albans, the abbey and its
surrounding estates. Word obviously spread that the abbot could be easily threatened.
Prince Louis came by to be bought off, as did John’s commanders Fawkes de Breaute
and Engelard de Cigogne, along with a number of local magnates and one group of
French routiers. All this took place within a five-month period until the final group
arrived in April 1217 and, determining that the extorted funds were not enough, pillaged
the monastery. Strickland’s comment on the whole affair is most cogent: “Instead of
suffering a single act o f despoliation, the abbey was being spared by all protagonists so
that it could by repeatedly milked for bribes and ‘gifts’ to avoid destruction.”22
Like their knightly counterparts, the most successful mercenaries eventually
returned some of their “requisitions” to the Church. For William of Ypres, himself a
member of the knightly order, the patronage flowed back to Flanders. Besides the
above endowments to St. Bertin’s, he also paid to have the venerable abbey o f St. Omer
rebuilt after it was destroyed by fire.23 In Mercadier’s case, we have charter evidence
for his donation to Cadouin abbey o f the revenues from a local fishery.24 These types of

"Strickland, War and Chivalry, 84. With the irony that seems always to
envelop John’s reign, St. Albans was also the site previous to all these raids, where John
met with his captains to map out his two-pronged campaigns and also to arrange for the
payment of his troops. Wendover, II: 161-2.
BCokayne, 132.
24Charter reprinted in Geraud, “Mercadier. Les routers au treizieme siecle,” 426,
442-3.
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gifts prompted Luchaire’s critical remarks that these “robber-princes” were ever-ready
to give to the church as they approached their final reckoning, thinking of their crimes
only when they could no longer avoid judgment.25 For the most part, though,
Luchaire’s critique was too severe on this specific group, for they differed little in this
display o f spiritual anxiety from any other professional warrior of the age. William
Marshal, on his deathbed and having already taken the vows of a Templar monk,
complained o f the gifts that priests wheedled out o f the knighthood because o f their
unease over salvation. “They shave us too closely,” he said to his retainers, who had
wondered if he should return all the arms and equipment he had acquired over the years.
The final opinion o f the “flower of chivalry” ran thus: “If for this reason the kingdom of
God is closed to me, I can do nothing about it, for I cannot return my booty.

Unless

the clergy desire my damnation, they must ask no more.”26
The spiritual crisis expressed by William Marshal over his wartime gains lay at
the heart o f a centuries-long effort by the church to come to grips with the potential
legitimacy o f war. By the thirteenth century a process which Augustine primarily
initiated had neared completion, but the Marshal’s situation occupied one o f the last
gaps in ecclesiastical thinking on the issue: private gain from warfare. Christian
uneasiness with the place of war had caused the church’s thinkers to turn to Roman
concepts o f just war as well as examples from Hebrew scriptures. Augustine had denied

2SLuchaire, Social France, 9-11.
26HGM , III: 259-60. For the translation, Sidney Painter, William Marshal:
Knight-Errant, Baron, and Regent o f England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1982 reprint), 285-6.
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private individuals the right to exercise legitimate physical force. The proper application
of violence remained the purview of public authority and its duly constituted troops.
Among the characteristics of war which attracted Augustine’s condemnation were the
love o f violence, a “lust for rule”, and the acquisition o f booty.27 These very traits
exercised the twelfth century’s best canon lawyers and thinkers as they tried to hammer
out a formula which comprehended war’s place within Christendom and restrained it
within proper bounds. Gratian did not attribute any “inherent and inescapable moral
stigma” to military service and even went on to argue that Christianity did not exclude
warfare except where soldiers sought rewards beyond their legitimate wages. Like
Augustine, he limited the just war to one waged by a legitimate public authority for the
avenging or reversal of an injury28 John of Salisbury’s comments were noted above on
the necessity of paying medieval combatants both to ensure their loyalty but also as a
means for secular lords to control their knights.29 Among the Parisian circle of
theologians, Robert of Courson admitted implicitly that there was no sin in accepting
wages for fighting; the sin lay in acquiring anything beyond that maintenance. Peter the
Chanter likewise accepted the legitimacy o f hired soldiery, although only as a last
resort.30

27Russell, The Just War in the M iddle Ages, 16, 18, 22, 27. For Augustine’s
specific comments, Contra Faustum M anichaeum, XXII: 74.
2*Ibid., 60-1, 69. Baldwin, Masters, Princes, and Merchants, 206.
“ Above, chapter 6.
B aldw in, Masters, Princes, and M erchants, 221-2.
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The crux o f the issue then, particularly as it haunted William Marshal but even
more so for mercenaries, was not the wages they had earned, but whether the collection
of spoils in battle imperiled their souls. Typically, the Parisian theologians were the only
ones to tackle such a grey question. Peter the Chanter inferred from Abraham’s
campaigns that the expenses of an expedition, but not extra rewards, could be defrayed
by loot taken in a just war. Robert of Flamborough saw no reason to deny extra spoils
to soldiers during a just war so long as the goods did not come from ecclesiastics or the
defenseless. Thomas of Chobham went further, allowing clerics to be plundered if they
resisted soldiers with weapons themselves. Courson countered these positions by
noting the difficulty in determining the provenance o f booty (did it come from a church
or not?) and opting for the illegitimacy of all plunder.31 From such a welter o f differing
opinions no easy answer settles out. If he had been so inclined and informed, William
Marshal could have argued that the issue did not apply to him since he made his
acquisitions not in wartime, but in tournaments.32 For the mercenary who actually lived
long enough to worry about the state of his soul, several other problems were at play
simultaneously. The just war was in most definitions a defensive one, a burden forced
upon the public body by an external aggressor. In such situations, the hired garrisons of
castles doubtless received no ecclesiastical censure for their efforts to defend the patria,
even if it were not their own. The bands of routiers that marked the 1170s and 1180s,

31Ibid., 222-3.
32An argument which would have won him nothing since tournaments were still
under repeated papal anathemas.
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however, were another matter. Not only did they operate independently of public
authority, but they contributed to the continuance of aggressive wars by seeking hostile
theaters. Injury piled upon injury thanks to their agency, and only in the rare case o f a
prince like Henry II did they operate as instruments o f justice and stabilization. It
followed then that their gains—even their wages, perhaps—must fall outside the
Church's approval.
In its attempts to control the nature of organized violence within Christendom,
the Church continued to struggle with another problem that was often not too distant
from mercenaries in this period. The relationship of many clergy through association or
family with the arms-bearing laity made it difficult for some clerics to refrain from
picking up the sword themselves, sometimes without first laying aside their priestly
vows. On more than one occasion such clerics attracted less than reputable warriors to
their side. As Robert Curthose found Normandy increasingly harder to hold in 1106, he
accepted 140 marks o f silver from a certain Robert to become abbot of Saint-Pierre-surDive. This "simoniac” and “ravening wolf’ then turned the abbey into an independent
base, fortifying the place and filling it with knights. Henry I eventually expelled the
bellicose cleric, but not before he had resorted to selling off the church’s ornaments in
order to pay his soldiers.33 The phenomenon continued in Stephen’s reign against a
rising tide of criticism for martial priests. Henry of Huntingdon had harsh words for the
king’s brother and bishop of Winchester, Henry of Blois. An intriguer in the kingdom’s
affairs even in the days o f Henry I, as well as an employer himself of numerous knights,

33OV, vi: 72-4, and n. 2.
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Henry of Blois figured as “a new kind of monster” in the archdeacon’s De Contemptu
Mttndi. He was an unacceptable composite of monk and knight.34 As Normandy
slipped from Stephen’s tenuous grasp in the 1140s, only a few places tried to resist
Count Geoffrey o f Anjou; among them was the castle of Arques which was under the
command of a Flemish monk named William. There is no mention in Torigni’s account
of any monetary links between Stephen, the monk, and the garrison, and in fact, the
monk had sworn his fealty to the English king. In the end, though, he received the due
reward of a fighting cleric when an arrow “accidently” killed him.35 This particular
breed o f transgressors grew progressively more evil in the eyes o f contemporaries.
William the Cleric led Brabangon bands against the Holy See itself and kept the
company of pariahs and prostitutes. When he died in the massacre of rentiers in 1177
outside Malemort, he was rightfully cut to pieces (trucidatus).“ The worst example
occupied the final years o f this period; Eustace the Monk was a military and spiritual
terror in the early thirteenth century. His cunning and violence enabled him first to
outwit and survive the count of Boulogne’s persecution. Then during a phase as one of
John’s clients, he helped in the recovery of the Channel Islands. Once established there,
however, he showed less care about his targets, and English ports and shipping suffered
nearly as much as the French from his piracy. When he finally sold his services to Prince
Louis, his reputation was utterly black in English eyes. The myths that surrounded him

“ Henry o f Huntingdon, Historia Anglorum, 608-10.
35Robert o f Torigni, 149-50.
“ Geoffrey de Vigeois, in RHF XII: 446.
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attributed the blackest sorcery to him, although his most common trick was simply to
make himself and his followers invisible to foes. The folk version of the battle of
Sandwich hinged the battle’s outcome on Eustace’s death, at which point the rest o f the
invasion fleet became visible to the English vessels.37
The social models o f Christendom’s theorists, umbrage over ransacked churches
and monasteries, the need to restrain private warfare and direct Europe’s violence into
desirable channels—all these elements came together in the anathemas pronounced by
the Third Lateran Council (1179) against the routier bands. The previous Lateran
Council (1139) had declared crossbowmen excommunicate because their chosen
weapon was too lethal to be used among Christians, but the evidence o f the Pipe Rolls
and the chronicles showed the long-term ineffectiveness o f those canons. In fact,
Orderic complained within just a few years that both princes and subjects were blithely
ignoring the prohibitions.38 For practical warriors like Henry II or Frederick
Barbarossa, the 1179 anathemas held the same negligible weight on the battlefield. In
popular perception, however, they set the stage for equating the mercenary bands with
the enemies of Christ. The structure and wording of the canons made a clear link
between the heretics of Languedoc and routiers; in places it is difficult to determine
which crimes are being attributed to which group. Walter Map showed this association
when, before describing the “follies” of the Cathars and Waidensians to his readers, he
introduced his comments on Brabangons under the rubric “Concerning a sect of

37Burgess, Two M edieval Outlaws, 6.
38OV, vi: 538.
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heretics.”39 Map’s descriptions o f Brabangons and Cathars in fact was little more than a
retelling as narrative fact of the charges against both groups by the Council.
The charges were damning and ensured that these soldiers on the fringes of
society would never achieve mainstream status. Topping the almost-mandatory litany of
atrocities was the disrespect of all the disparate groups (Brabangons, Aragonese,
Navarrese, Basques, coterelli, and Triaverdini) for the sanctity o f churches and
monasteries. By these violations, they proved themselves the equivalent of infidels and
as deserving o f excommunication as the Cathars. In regions afflicted by these bands, the
anathema was to be published every Sunday and festival day until the soldiers abjured
their association with either group, or were eradicated. In addition, the canon called for
the excommunication of any lord who employed such soldiers and absolved all vassals
of their obligations to such lords until the same repentance was shown. Besides these
spiritual penalties, the Council arranged for a temporal solution to the infestation. The
prelates enjoined the faithful to resist “these pestilent men,” even offering a two-year
indulgence to any who took up arms against them. Local bishops could offer greater
indulgences in regions that were suffering exceptional mercenary activity. The most
striking penalty was the Council’s permission for any captured routiers to be sold into
slavery, a punishment also reserved in another canon for those who supplied the
Saracens with arms, material for warships, or skilled pilots for those ships.40 For
Christendom’s shepherds, all three transgressions were equally traitorous.

39Walter Map, De Nugis Curialium, 56-7.
B o w d e n , Chronica, 176-9; William of Newburgh, 208-9, 212.
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The fruition of Rome’s opposition to the mercenary bands would require several
more decades to become apparent. The kings o f England and France as well as the
German emperor continued to utilize the very soldiers proscribed by the Third Lateran
Council without suffering the threatened penalties. The popes and anti-popes could not
afford thus to antagonize Christendom’s secular rulers. Even when there was no rivalry
for the papal throne, popes still wanted the support, if not the actual participation, of
these monarchs in further crusades to the Holy Land. In the 1190s, however, the
papacy began applying pressure in regions where monarchial power was little felt.
Celestine III (1187-98) wrote the archbishop of Arles in language similar to, but even
stronger, than the Lateran canons: “I know that your province is the prey of Aragonese,
Brabangons, and other bands of strangers; smite them, but smite also those who hire
these brigands and receive them into their castles and villages.”41 Attention to the Midi
increased with the pontificate o f Innocent III (1198-1216) who meant to solve the
endemic heresy of the region. He began by sending preachers into the region to correct
the Cathar beliefs. Sympathy in Languedoc for the upright lives of the Cathars, even
among Catholics, was too strong, however, to be so easily re-channeled. Innocent’s
legates and missionaries pushed for sterner measures, and in 1208 the legate Peter of
Castelnau finally excommunicated Raymond VI, count of Toulouse, on the grounds of
his sympathy for the Cathars and continued employment of mercenaries.42

41Luchairt, Social France, 12.
42Peter of Vaux-de-Cemay, Historia Albigensis, in RHF XIX: 1-11. William of
Tudela and Anonymous Successor, Song o f the Cathar Wars, trans. Janet Shirley
(Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1996), 12; and Chanson de la Croisade Albigeoise, ed. E.
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Bom o f misunderstood conditions in Languedoc, frustration fueled Castelnau's
excommunication of Raymond VI and set events in motion that transformed both the
Albigensian question and the position of mercenaries within Christendom. The political
structure o f the region defied the assumptions that Innocent’s agents (and the northern
aristocrats to come) tried to force upon it. Part o f the region fell under imperial
authority, another under the count-kings of Aragon, still more under the nominal (at
best) lordship o f the Capetian kings, and even the Anglo-Norman monarchs had their
interests in the region because of an alliance with Toulouse. Multiple loyalties were the
norm. In addition, the patina of feudalism that lay over all this barely functioned as a
means to levy armies or to bind vassal and lord. Rather than report for military service,
most who held fiefs opted to pay rents to their lord. The fact that women often
inherited southern fiefs without male wardship testifies further to the non-military nature
of these tenures. With their economy more attuned to currency and few subjects willing
to answer a military summons, the magnates o f the region naturally turned to mercenary
soldiers to constitute their armies and garrisons. The latter were particularly numerous
as Languedoc was undergoing the encastellation that had transformed northwestern
Europe politically, socially, and militarily in the previous century.43 Raymond VI, like
most other notables of the south, used mercenaries out o f necessity and certainly not out
of contumacy.

Martin-Chabot, 3 vols. (Paris: 1960), 14, which notes Raymond’s patronage of roters,
the Occitan form o f routiers. See also Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, 66-76, and
Jane Sayers, Innocent III (New York: Longman, 1994), 159-60.
43Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, 19-21.
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The count o f Toulouse immediately protested his loyalty to Rome and began
negotiating with the legate for an accommodation that would lift the excommunication
without stripping him of all military capability, but events overtook both sides. A knight
known to be from Raymond’s household assassinated Peter of Castelnau after a fruitless
day of negotiations, an act which caused Innocent to abandon his pacific overtures to
the Cathars and launch the Albigensian Crusade. The promise of indulgences went out,
especially to Philip Augustus’s court and territories, which when coupled with the wellknown wealth of the south, attracted many northern crusaders to the Midi. In the
contests which ensued, several different threads came together. For the knights, who
had doubtless encountered Braban^on foes during the Capetian-Plantagenet struggle,
the bitter sieges in Languedoc proved again what lethal foes they faced in these men
who had no reason to mind the conventions of tournament warfare. As Strickland and
Keegan have pointed out, the moment o f capitulation is actually one o f the most difficult
to survive.44 In the Albigensian Crusade, it typically did not matter. It became in short
order a war of extermination. This new level of ferocity owed its genesis to the
canonical underpinnings of the crusade. The plain existence of heretics within
Christendom constituted the injury which was necessary to all the competing definitions
of the just war. Hugoccio of Bologna, a one-time mentor of Innocent III, wrote that
wars against heretics had the support o f both human and divine law. Summa from
different schools in Europe agreed with his position. In addition, the avenger in a just

“ Strickland, War and Chivalry, 175.
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war was granted much latitude in how he waged that contest. Ambushes were legal,45
and in the specific case of the Albigensian Crusade, the Paris theologians went so far as
to resuscitate the role o f the crossbow, sanctioning its use against Cathars.46 Innocent
directed his legates to “use cunning and deception as weapons, for in the circumstances
deceit is no more than prudence.”47 The patience o f the Church had been abused, and
the opportunities for repentance squandered. In evidence of this, the chronicles and
songs of the crusade reached new levels o f polemic and atrocity-reporting. Nor should
they be discounted as thirteenth-century jingoism; the nature of the conflict, and even
the retelling o f originally fictitious crimes, doubtless led to the commission of other
actual offenses. Fortunately, we have sources from both sides of the conflict with which
to check the mutually excessive rhetoric.
Throughout 1208 and 1209 the creation of a crusading army gathered
momentum while Raymond VI tried first to stall the invasion and then to deflect it. The
complex conditions of Languedoc began almost immediately to cause the temporary,
strange alliances that left observers often bewildered and prone to charge participants
with rampant, even malicious, faithlessness. Raymond approached both of his feudal
overlords, Philip Augustus and Emperor Otto IV, neither of whom could afford to be
distracted by Languedoc from their contest with one another. With only hostile forces

45Russell, The Just War in the M iddle Ages, 90, 92, 95, 112-3. Sayers, Innocent
III, 22.
^Baldwin, Masters, Princes, and Merchants, 223.
47Sumption, 81.
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to be expected from the north, Raymond then turned to his troublesome nephew
Raymond-Roger Trencavel, viscount of Beziers and Narbonne. Trencavel chose to let
his uncle face the crusade, a decision he would later regret. In desperation Raymond VI
finally bowed to the stringent demands o f Innocent III and the abbot of Citeaux.
Besides turning much of his county over to ecclesiastical control, Raymond also
promised to end patronage of Cathars and mercenaries within his domains, as well as
undergoing a public ceremony of humiliation and absolution. His return to the Church’s
fold, however, came even as the crusade was mustering near Avignon and might have
been insufficient to keep the crusaders from attacking his lands. So Raymond took the
cross himself, a maneuver that immediately covered his lands with papal protection and
also served to leave his nephew exposed as the major protector of Cathars in the Midi.
The chronicler Peter de Vaux-de-Cemay gave no credit to the sincerity o f Raymond’s
crusading vows, describing him as a lying and perfidious wearer of the cross.48 Even
though later events apparently supported the chronicler’s opinion, the shrewdness of
Raymond’s ploy did not mean he had no support for the crusade. In many ways, the
only way for the count of Toulouse to make good on his promises to Innocent’s legates
was to gain an unprecedented, firm control o f the area. By sacrificing his volatile
nephew to the crusaders, Raymond might have enjoyed just the power vacuum to create
such a situation.49

48Vaux-de-Cemay, in RHF XIX: 18-9: O falsum et perfidissimum crucesignatum!
49Sumption, 80-5.
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A prologue to what awaited the crusaders took place in the Agenais while the
main armies were assembling in Provence. William o f Tudela alone reported the
expedition by the count o f Auvergne and archbishop of Bordeaux into Raymond V i's
westernmost lands. After initial successes which sent the local Cathars into headlong
flight, the invading army came up against Casseneuil, a fortress recently re-garrisoned
by Seguin de Balenx with Gascon crossbowmen and javelin-throwers. The latter were a
specialized force called dardasiers after the small spear they threw with lethal effect
even against chain mail. Many of the crusaders saw too much risk in an assault of
Casseneuil and, because forty days of service sufficed to earn their indulgence, wanted
to negotiate a settlement with the town’s defenders since starving them into surrender
was hardly viable. They could then move on to easier pickings. The archbishop,
however, opposed this tactic, and the western thrust against Languedoc quickly broke
up in dissension.50
As the summer o f 1209 approached, the main crusade departed Avignon with
Raymond VI in attendance almost as a guide against the Trencavel dominions. At this
point mercenaries are absent from the three major narratives of the conflict, but the
horrors visited upon the residents of the Midi, whether Cathar or Catholic, indicated the
probable fate of any routiers who faced the crusading host. There is no need to revisit
here the sack o f Beziers, the truce with Raymond-Roger Trencavel which the crusaders
broke, Trencavel’s subsequent death in prison, and the refugee flight ahead o f the

^The Song o f the Cathar Wars, 18. Chanson, 40-2, and n. 9, which notes the
effective use o f the dard by Gascons, Basques, and Navarrese, who typically carried
three o f these spears with them into battle.
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crusader armies. Following the capture of Carcassonne, the crusading army paused to
elect Simon de Montfort as Trencavel’s successor in the Narbonnais. It fell to Montfort
to hold onto the Catholic conquests while many of the crusaders, their forty-day
obligation met, returned northward to Capetian France, the Low Countries, and the
German principalities.
The stage was thus set for Languedoc's descent into chaos as winter closed the
campaigning season for the northern knights. Already Simon felt the need to turn to
hired help, and even the sympathetic Tudela reported that a Peter of Aragon made quite
a profit by occupying Montreal and Fanjaux for the crusaders.51 Support from the Albi
lords, never that zealous, quickly evaporated as the crusader numbers declined. The
count of Foix abandoned his reluctant alliance with Montfort and began forcibly
recovering his lost castles. As for Raymond VI, his accommodation remained an
albatross around his neck under the relentless pressure of Amaud-Aimery, abbot of
Citeaux and one o f Innocent’s more fanatical legates. He hounded the count of
Toulouse to fulfill to the letter and quickly those promises which had secured the
reversal o f his excommunication. The legate attempted another excommunication of
Raymond in 1209 even while Raymond was with the crusading army. An appeal to
Innocent resulted in the overturning of Amaud-Aimery’s decision in 1210. The legate
and his associates continued to work against Raymond until they succeeded in early

5lLa Chanson, 82-3, and n. 2. Although he does not appear often in the
narrative sources, this Peter apparently joined the ranks of successful mercenaries as
indicated by his substantial gifts to the monastery of Prouille. See also Vaux-de-Cemay,
in RHF XIX: 24, for confirmation of the Aragonese at Fanjaux.
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1211 with presenting the count such an improbable list of demands that he stormed out
of the conference. No one had ever proven Raymond to be a Cathar sympathizer, but
he knew he could not hold his county if he either persecuted the sect or released his
mercenary garrisons.52
While Raymond of Toulouse fought a losing political and spiritual contest to
hold onto his lands and titles, the war across the Midi continued its cycle of atrocities
begetting still more atrocities. Both sides suffered, but for the crusaders, the crimes of
the mercenaries against the divinely sanctioned army grew less distinguishable from the
overall crime of the Cathars against God. Montfort had already begun reducing the
isolated castles spread across the count of Foix’s territory, refuges described as
“receptacles of heretics and routiers.”53 The crusade’s propagandists put no sin or
blasphemy beyond the count’s mercenaries. One group, after it had ransacked a
monastery in the county of Urgel dedicated to Mary, reputedly lodged their horses in
the church nave. One of the routiers equipped a crucifix with his own armor and then
proceeded to joust against the image. Another summed up the fears of the Church,
declaring, “Since we have destroyed Saint Anthony and Saint Mary, now the only thing
left is to destroy God himself.”54 Little wonder, then, that Montfort’s victory at
Minerve was followed by a mass burning of Cathar elite, the Perfecti, who refused to

“ Sumption, 107-10, 119-21, 125-8.
S3Vaux-de-Cemay, in RHF XIX: 25: Castrum illud haereticis et ruptariis erat
receptaculum, el erat de dominio Comitis Fuxensis.
»Ibid., 42.
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recant.55 News of Simon’s implacability likely served to strengthen the resolve o f other
garrisons. The defenders at Termes came from all over: Aragon, Catalonia, Roussillon,
and a force of Brabangons, who of course may have been from anywhere. William of
Tudela admitted to the casualties inflicted by this redoubtable garrison: damaged
equipment, knights killed, and trophies o f war carried back into the castle.56 A relief
force from Cabaret haunted Montfort’s army, picking off his outlying troops and
sending the “lucky” ones back to Simon’s camp with their eyes gouged out and their
noses split.57 During the siege o f Lavaur, the count of Foix surprised a group of
German crusaders on their way to join Montfort. Almost to a man, his forces killed the
Germans and left them scattered through the forest of Montgey. Several days later,
Montfort retaliated by trying to hang the entire garrison o f Lavaur, a harsh fate for many
of noble blood. After the hastily-prepared gibbet broke, he settled for having them all
killed by the sword. The lady of the castle and an unrepentant Cathar, Giraude de
Laurac, fared as badly, being thrown down the castle well which the crusaders then
filled with stones.58

S5Ibid., 32. The Song o f the Cathar Wars, 33, which left no doubts as to the
crusader attitude: “Afterwards their bodies were thrown out and mud shoveled over
them so that no stench from these foul things should annoy our foreign forces.”
56The Song o f the Cathar Wars, 36; La Chanson, 134-7.
57Vaux-de-Cemay, in RHFX1X: 35.
$sIbid., 46. William of Puylaurens, Chronique: Chronica Magistri Gtiillelmi de
Podio Laurentii, Jean Duvemoy, trans. (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique, 1976), 70. Montfort’s decision to hang the defenders’ commander,
Aimery de Montreal, may have been bom in part from the perceived treason o f Aimery,
who had earlier sworn allegiance, albeit reluctantly, to Montfort as the new viscount of
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As Montfort reduced Cathar and mercenary outposts across Languedoc, the
excommunicated count of Toulouse found it harder to pretend even to any community
of interest with the northern crusader, and Raymond began seeking military support
from all quarters. With Toulouse itself divided into factions, Montfort attempted to
take the city in June 1211. Many of the magnates o f Languedoc had come to see,
however, that Raymond’s defeat would be a prelude to their own, and he thus had many
supporters on hand in the city: men from the Albi, Beam, the Carcasses, the counts o f
Foix and Comminges, and a band of Navarrese routiers. One estimate gave Raymond
five hundred knights in the city alone, plus numerous foot-soldiers. In addition, Savari
de Mauleon had promised to come with his forces.59 For two weeks, Montfort’s army
attempted to besiege Toulouse but to no avail. He could not blockade the city
effectively, and the citizens were able to receive foodstuffs and munitions by riverboat.
In the meantime, the crusading army stripped the countryside round about o f everything
edible, as well as destroying the vines and productive capabilities o f the citizens’ farms
outside the walls. When Montfort abandoned his effort against Toulouse, the reputation
which often served to attract allies had been seriously damaged. Even more hurtful to
his cause, the actions of the crusaders had served to drive the Catholic citizens of
Toulouse firmly into the camp of their excommunicated lord.
The cyclical expansion and contraction o f the crusading host left Montfort’s
supporters fearful each year that all would be lost, and in 1211 this threat appeared

Beziers and Narbonne.
59The Song o f the Cathar Wars, 39, 45; La Chanson, I. 152-5, 186-7.
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closer to fruition than ever before. Raymond of Toulouse had drawn in help from every
side, including no small number of mercenaries, and Montfort was on the defensive even
before his northern crusaders began going back home. The tone o f the crusade's
partisan chroniclers reached unprecedented levels of outrage over these (as they
perceived them) hired interlopers. William o f Tudela was the most objective, although
his repeated lists o f Raymond Vi’s helpers were probably meant to underline the count’s
own weakness. In addition, the fantastic sums he reported Raymond as offering added
to the aura of greed surrounding the mercenaries. As the count’s army went on the
offensive, it held not only most of the local magnates, but all the routier contingents
they could muster. These came from Navarre, the valley of the Aspe, and the Agenais
under the command o f the castellan of Penne.60 The force that came with Savari was
quite considerable, although its actual composition is hard to determine. Savari himself
in a poem, but likely as a boast, claimed that he had five hundred knights, plus Basque
and Brabangon infantry, to bring to the aid of the countess of Toulouse.61 The Occitan
Song credited him with bringing Norman knights, while Vaux-de-Cemay’s narrative
gives some credence to Savari’s own claim, noting both well-armed warriors and others
with crossbows.62 Whatever the composition, his arrival caused great rejoicing among

60The Song o f the Cathar Wars, 48-9, and La Chanson, I: 204-11, for the lists of
auxiliaries, and where Raymond reputedly sent 100,000 solidi to Savari de Mauleon for
the Poitevin’s assistance.
61La Chanson, I: 153, n. 3.
62Vaux-de-Cemay, in RHF XIX: 55: infmitos hostes armis et baiistis
munitissimos. . . .
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Raymond’s coalition, a relief which may be measured by the reciprocal scorn poured
upon him by Montfort’s apologist. In what was not an isolated passage, he introduced
Savari to his readers thus:
And there came with these adversaries that worst of apostates, that evil
prevaricator, the devil’s son, a minister o f the Antichrist, namely Savari de
Mauleon, exceeding all the other heretics, worse even than an infidel, a warrior
against the Church, an enemy to Christ. A man who is now the worst poison!
This Savari, I say, a scoundrel and lost cause, a man prudent and imprudent,
running against God with great energy, who has even dared to fight His holy
church! O man, prince o f apostasy, artisan o f cruelty, author of perversity! O
accomplice of wicked men! this man, the opprobrium of men, ignorant of virtue,
a devil-man, more to the point, the devil himself.
Not even the count of Foix, whose position as an indigenous magnate mitigated his
reputation as an employer of routiers, came in for this kind of criticism.63
In the pivotal struggles around Castelnaudary, while Raymond demurred for
unknown reasons from crushing Montfort with his superior numbers, mercenaries
played critical if less-than-exemplary roles. In his scramble to find sufficient forces with
which to dare Raymond’s counter-offensive, Montfort turned to mercenaries also.
Martin Algals, who had been absent from the battlefield since leaving John’s service
after 1206, answered Montfort’s call for help and brought with him his reconstituted
band of soldiers. Joining with the forces of Montfort’s liege-man Bouchard de Marly,

63Ibid., 51: Veniebat etiam cum adversariis ille pessimus apostata, ille
praevaricator iniquus, filiu s diaboli, minister Antichristi, Savaricus videlicet de
Malleone, omnem excedens haereticum, omni deterior infideli, impugnator ecclesiae,
Christi hostis. O virum, immo virus pessiumuml Savaricum dico, qui scelestus et
perditus, et pudens et imprudens, currens adversus Deum exerto collo, etiam
impugnare ausus est ecclesiam sanctam Dei. O hominem apostasiae principem,
crude litatis artificem, perversitatis actorem! o hominem malignorum participem ! o
perversorum consortem! o hominem opprobrium hominum! o virtutis ignarum! o
hominem diabolicum, immo totum diabolum !
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Algai's’s troop approached Castelnaudary by circuitous routes but were nonetheless
detected by scouts of Raymond Vi’s army. The next morning the count of Foix led an
overwhelming contingent to wipe out these reinforcements near St. Martin Lalande.
With him went '‘all the mercenaries," vying not to be left behind. Their attack was
nearly irresistible and became wholly so once Algai's exclaimed “We are all dead!” to the
bishop of Cahors and abandoned the fray. Two things changed the outcome of the
engagement: Montfort’s personal intervention and the eagerness of Raymond’s own
routiers to stop and begin ransacking the dead and wounded. In such a disorganized
state, the Spanish soldiers had no chance to withstand Montfort’s charge with a fresh
unit of cavalry. Algals returned immediately after, claiming that he had been running
down isolated groups of Foix’s mercenaries. “Thus he covered up his own villainous
behavior,” concluded William of Tudela. While Montfort was in the field rescuing his
own relief force, Savari attempted to take the lightly garrisoned castle within
Castelnaudary. The defenders put up a stout resistance, however, and Savari eventually
withdrew from the whole campaign.64 Montfort’s seeming ability to be everywhere put
Raymond's force in great despair; some deserted, and many slept in their armor for fear
of a nocturnal attack. Two days after his victory at St. Martin Lalande, Montfort
looked out to see the Toulousains burning their siege equipment and breaking camp.65

64At some point in his withdrawal, Savari captured Raymond Vi’s son and held
the lad hostage until Raymond delivered as a ransom the back pay he owed the Poitevin
noble and his knights. Song o f the Cathar Wars, 61.
6SS o n g o f the Cathar Wars, 50-3; La Chanson, I: 215-33. Vaux-de-Cemay, in
RHFXIX: 54-6.
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Simon de Montfort used his freshly regained initiative to ravage again the lands
of the count o f Foix and then to move through the Albigeois and Quercy so as to isolate
Toulouse further. As fresh crusaders came to him in the spring o f 1212, he expanded
his operations, but he also took the time out to handle a piece o f business that mattered
to him personally and as the leader of a crusade. Following his performance at St.
Martin Lalande, Martin Algais had retired from fighting again back to his castle at
Biron.66 He effectively took a neutral stance in the Albigensian wars, a position which
was tantamount to treason in Montfort’s eyes. His army arrived before Biron and began
setting up trebuchets and other machines so as to reduce the castle to rubble. The
routiers within knew the fate that awaited them, and Montfort used this to gain his goal
quickly. He promised to spare the garrison’s lives if they handed over their leader. The
deal was struck, and Algais briefly became Montfort’s captive. Partly to accentuate the
mercilessness o f his own career, Algais was given the opportunity for a last confession;
then his captors tied him to the tail of a horse which dragged him out o f town. In a field
below the castle, they cut him loose from the horse and then hanged him.67 For over
three years, Montfort had been creating object lessons for the residents of Languedoc,
and this one was unmistakable. Breaking faith with the crusade was unforgivable.

66A castle which he actually held from Raymond o f Toulouse. Like the other
great mercenary captains, Martin Algais had settled into a local power structure by
marrying well. In this case, he gained possession of Biron through his marital alliance.
Once settled in, he behaved much as any medieval lord, squeezing all he could from his
estates and patronizing local monasteries for the good o f his soul. See Sumption, 149,
although Cadouin was Mercadier’s especial beneficiary and not Algais’s.
67Song o f the Cathar Wars, 59. La Chanson, I; 260-1. Vaux-de-Cemay, in RHF
XIX: 65-6.
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Officially, the Albigensian Crusade still had for its focus the extermination of the
Cathar and routier threat, but the difficulties o f warring in the Midi had clouded the
latter issue as even the high-principled Montfort had to employ mercenaries. William of
Tudela made their fate clear in the battles of 1212 that preceded Muret. The Aragonese
and Navarrese garrison at Penne fought Montfort out of fear, and only their imminent
starvation induced them to negotiate with the crusader. The siege of Moissac took
place only because the citizens had requested help from Toulouse, which sent “a
considerable troop o f routiers” to their aid. Once encircled by Montfort, the citizenry
wanted to capitulate, but the mercenaries would not allow it. The crusaders battered
the city with their engines until the citizens finally sold out their defenders. Tudela
estimated that over three hundred routiers were executed as part o f the surrender.
Another group o f routiers were caught while raiding and drowned in the Tam River. In
the debates o f the Fourth Lateran Council, the bishop of Toulouse reiterated the
pernicious role o f routiers in allowing the Cathar heresy to survive.68 The attitude of
Tudela’s anonymous continuator, however, diluted the rhetoric. Almost rabid in his
hatred of Montfort, he naturally noted the presence of mercenaries among the crusading
hosts, something which Peter of Vaux-de-Cemay was loth to do in his chronicle. The
continuator betrayed how commonplace mercenaries were in the wars of Languedoc by
his neutral tone. He spoke of their presence at Beaucaire and Toulouse without
condemnation and dispassionately covers Montfort’s financial difficulties in retaining

69Song o f the Cathar Wars, 58-63, 74, 77. La Chanson, I: 254-60, 262-76, 2828; II: 50 and 62, where the poet places mainaders e sirvens with the heretics.
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these soldiers. Even the zealous Bishop Foulques of Toulouse recognized the need in
time, consoling Montfort during the second siege of the city with the prospect o f hiring
mercenaries (mainaders) in the coming year. The continuator saved his scom for the
“foreigners” (i.e., Bretons, Flemings, and other northern groups) who were destroying
his country.69
The considerable talents of Tudela’s continuator were not going to redeem the
routiers in Christendom’s eyes, however. They were not his concern, anyway, since the
focus of his iyrical energy remained the vilification of Simon de Montfort. Moreover,
his objective treatment of the hired soldiery on both sides took place in Occitan, a
language virtually foreign even in Paris, let alone the other major centers of Latin
Europe. Instead, the die had been cast when the Church took on the daunting task in
the eleventh century of bringing the violence of its flock under control and o f cutting the
wolves out from among the sheep. Amid all the changes of the twelfth century, the
Church was indeed becoming a state— to borrow Maitland’s proposition70—with all the
attendant baggage of one, including the codification of laws. As ecclesiastical thinkers
worked out systems that explained the relationship of their contemporary world and the
celestial one, they legitimized something we conveniently call feudalism. This lordvassal network, which was typically reserved to knights who had been through a quasi
religious dubbing ceremony, theoretically provided the only military resources of Latin

69The Song o f the Cathar Wars, 91, 107, 127, 141-3. La Chanson, II: 126, 2024, 296; III: 58-61, 66..
70Cited in Sayers, Innocent III, 4.
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Europe and also provided protective constraints for the Church. In fact, it never
worked according to anyone’s model. Whether displaced knights or society-threatening
marauders of unknown origin, hired soldiery consistently remained outside the social
constructs of the church’s philosophers. Nor was their violence likely to bring them in
from the margins or frontiers. The m ilites o f the eleventh century had made the
transition by virtue of their secular primacy, even if their behavior differed little from the
Brabangons of the late twelfth. The constructs had hardened, though, by that time, and
the routiers remained pariahs because o f their defiance o f them. If not inevitable, the
association of the mercenary bands with Rome’s greatest medieval enemy was quite
natural. For the reformers, systematizers, and unifiers of Christendom, they gave off the
same stench and deserved to be buried together.
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IX
Conclusion
Within a specifically military context, there is little new to say o f twelfth-century
mercenaries that has not been covered already this century either in scholarly analyses or
by the publication o f original sources in translation. So pervasive were paid warriors
throughout the 1100s that they can hardly be described as antithetical to feudalism,
particularly at this juncture when feudalism as a model is under serious attack. Even if
the High Middle Ages never had a perfectly ordered system o f fiefs which yielded a
sufficient host of mounted knights every campaigning season, the lord-vassal relation
did form one o f the essential structures o f the time. It will certainly survive the current
revisions. It was not, however, the standard by which to measure the normality of all
other arrangements. Even within lay aristocratic society it was the rarest achievement.
As the studies of Duby, Morillo, Chibnall, Prestwich, and others have shown, and as the
narrative sections o f this study demonstrated, men obligated themselves to fight through
numerous, often overlapping means. In every case, whether the tie was marital,
political, strictly feudal, partially or wholly monetary, the underlying issue was the daily
maintenance o f the retained warrior. It borders almost on the pointless then to
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emphasize the salaries of certain groups in the twelfth century. Contemporaries would
never have equated the Brabanpons or routiers with William Marshal or Richard
Strongbow. Other attributes set them apart, characteristics which medieval observers
knew placed some combatants beyond the pale of acceptability.
Money-based loyalty served as a convenient means of denigrating the
uprightness o f opposing camps and their salaried forces, but the very terminology o f the
chronicles makes it clear that it was scarcely an indelible stain. The terms stipendiarius
and solidarius particularly illustrate this point. Chroniclers denigrated Henry I’s
Bretons as stipendiaries and also Robert fitz Hubert during the Anarchy. In both cases,
however, another element was more actively at play: a past record of treachery. In
other instances, these labels have a definitely honorable aura untainted by the presence
of wages. The stipendiaries at Bridgnorth earned the commendation o f both Henry I
and clerical writers for their steadfast service. The three hundred milites solidarii regis
whom Humphrey de Bohun led at Fomham were doubtless heroes to contemporaries.
The sergeants who appeared in such numbers in the latter part of the century served
almost exclusively for pay since they had not yet attained a fief. No taint really attached
to this designation either, as the record of their involvement in Ireland and in the
Plantagenet-Capetian conflicts attests. Moreover, they were often the choicest men
(electi) o f a region, hardly distinguishable from Duby’s bachelers.
Medieval writers turned to other terms when they really wanted to accentuate
the negative qualities of certain combatants. There is no question that routiers,
coterelli, Braban^ons, and associated groups fought for money. The criticism o f these
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groups centered on the idea that such reward was their only reason to be on the
battlefield. War for profit was reprehensible, hence the condemnation even of
tournaments. Through their dedication to violent, illicit gain, these bands o f fighters
showed their lack of allegiance to any legitimate cause. They typically compounded this
transgression through treachery, not to their employers but to more fundamental
elements o f society. According to the theories of twelfth century thinkers, the coterelli
showed their disdain for the natural order by going to battle, a task to which such lowranking men were not bom. The same was true of the routiers. As for the Braban^ons,
and all the other groups noted by their geographic or linguistic origin, they were inter
lopers. By their very willingness to intrude in affairs which were not truly their own,
they demonstrated a weakness for knowing their own, and thus defending the same.
Michael Gelven described war as a paradox because of our willingness to go to
war even as we hate its occurrence. His analysis bears repeating.
On the one hand, we treasure life and the respect of it: this is our instinct for
peace. On the other, we esteem whatever is meant by the we as opposed to the
they: this is our instinct for war. Only if there is genuine support for both sides
can there be a true paradox. Whether such values are correct and whether such
belligerence is justified, this is, at least, the fact. This is the way war is thought
about.1
The mercenary of the twelfth century as well as the twentieth occupies a crucial place
within this paradox. If he fights only for money, even in a conflict which is existentially
valid by Gelven’s definition, what does this say about the human capacity for violence?
Can the mercenary even be said to be truly at war if his support lacks the genuine

'Gelven, War and Existence, 8.
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adherence that marks other participants in a conflict, or is he just a murderer with a
temporary license to indulge? The ecclesiastical thinkers of the Middle Ages sensed the
answers, as the long process to justify certain forms of warfare proves. As the concept
of just war became more palatable to clerics through the speculations o f the canon
lawyers, certain elements relevant to mercenaries were jettisoned. Purely aggressive
war was certainly beyond the pale, as was private initiative in any violent enterprise save
immediate self-defense. While ambushes and some offensive actions were allowable, the
overall thrust of a just war had to be either defensive or centered on the avenging o f a
recognized injury. Was it proper to hire mercenaries to retaliate for injuries which had
not affected them? Unfortunately, medieval theorists never asked this exact question.
On the other hand, their restriction that a just war can only be authorized and waged by
a public authority instinctively recognized Gelven’s point that warfare is an action
between an “us” and a “them.”
It is this issue of “we” and “they” which mandates a look at the larger political
and social world o f a long twelfth century. The political and national divisions o f the
1100s were nowhere as clear as they appear today, and this fact must inform scholars’
use of the term mercenary. The Bretons of the early twelfth century had a long history
of virtual independence from the Frankish dynasties. Their association with the Norman
dukes, and later English kings, was a natural one given the mutual benefits to be had.
Once established, many Breton families became inseparably involved in Anglo-Norman
affairs, and not as interlopers. As chapter seven showed, a similar situation played out
for Flanders, a region politically divided between France and the Holy Roman Empire,
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but economically tied to England. Trying to guide his ship of state through such seas, at
what points was the count of Flanders an astute politician, a loyal vassal, or just hired
help? The circumstances by 1214 were at their most tortuous, when the accidents of
birth left the Flemings with a Portuguese prince for their newest count. For the Flemish
knights and merchants who trafficked with John, their goal was not self-enrichment
alone, but also to persuade Ferrand that his French suzerain was also his greatest threat.
On the social front, the potential in the latter half of the twelfth century for the
mercenary bands to disrupt medieval society has been well-noted. Were weapons in the
hands o f social inferiors such a threat, though, to the “we” o f the lay aristocracy? We
have the evidence o f both Louis VII’s and Philip Augustus’s reliance on communal
levies, plus John’s willingness to arm even the most servile men to safeguard his realm.
Henry II’s Assize of Arms and the Pipe Rolls likewise show English cottagers being
obligated to keep minimum armaments ready for use while the king was prepared to
supplement their weaponry. The issue was not primarily one of social inferiors carrying
weapons and thereby threatening the place o f knighthood; under proper supervision,
they were necessary complements on the battlefield. Such supervision was the crux of
the issue; the routier and Brabangon bands had escaped such authority and were
perhaps on the eve of constituting a new “we” among the established components of
Christendom.
It was this threat, as well as the actual damages visited upon ecclesiastical sites
and personnel, which drew the condemnation of the Church upon the later mercenary
bands. Earlier in the century, widespread legislation had not focused on salaried
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combatants, but only on particular weapons like the crossbow which posed so great a
threat to the lives o f the Church’s adopted protectors, the knights. At that point, it was
still nigh impossible to distinguish one sort o f warrior from another as knights were still
in the process o f becoming such specialized cavalrymen. Moreover, as the examples of
Odo of Bayeux and Philip of Beauvais demonstrate, the Gregorian reformers had yet to
prevent all priests from enjoying combat themselves. For those like William the Cleric
and Eustace the Monk, though, who not only fought but left the ecclesiastical fold to do
so, their betrayal o f their vows earned the most bitter diatribes.
The entire twelfth century experienced an unprecedented rise in the number of
popular movements across society and in the surprising appeal of these movements.
Some of the tamer sort terrified Guibert of Nogent early in the century, but the
incidence of popular religious and political activity grew to new proportions in the later
half of the 1100s. Among the factors which account for such growth were the increased
population and new religious fervor as a result both of Gregorian reform and the new
scholasticism in the universities. Combined with the strained resources o f districts like
the Low Countries, these dynamics sent many on the road away from their homes. Thus
the phenomenon o f the mercenary bands not only coincided with the growth of Cathar
and Waldensian heresy, but typically was tied to the success of especially the former
group. The combination was frightening in its efficacy and immediately intolerable to
the Church. The Third Lateran Council denounced the various mercenary groups in
1179 not long after their irruption, and church officials began slowly building
momentum for the extermination o f both groups in the early thirteenth century. The
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Third Lateran Council consigned the bands of BrabanQons/roi/Z/ers/Cottereaux to
permanent out-group status with the perpetual threat of excommunication and even
slavery. If they did submit to the Church’s authority, including local secular lords, by
putting aside their weapons, they faced physical destruction as the prelude to spiritual
damnation. The resistance o f many mercenaries during the Albigensian Crusade may
have had little actually to do with support for the Cathars, but their involvement sufficed
to taint them with the worst offense yet, the betrayal of God.
The last words on all this should be left to medieval writers themselves. Among
the strongest images they left in their works of the untamed, salaried warriors were the
comparisons o f these men to wolves, especially in light of their ravenous appetites.
Lupus can hardly be found without rapax. It was a creature more than “eager for prey.”2
According to one mid-century bestiary, “they massacre anybody who passes by with a
fury of greediness... Whatever they pounce on, dies.” And to drive home the point:
“Wolves are known for their rapacity, and for this reason we call prostitutes wolves,
because they devastate the possessions o f their lovers.”3 More than a morality lesson,
this was also practical advice which Richard the Lionheart could have used before
dismissing his Brabangon troops in 1179, only to have them ransack the suburbs of
Bordeaux in his absence. Henry of Huntingdon, writing in the early 1100s, left no doubt

2OV, vi: 244. “...ut lupi ad praedam avide perrexerunt...”.
3T.H. White, ed. and trans., The Book o f Beasts (London. Jonathan Cape, 1954),
56; also worth noting, Gerald o f Wales, The Journey through Wales, Lewis Thorpe, ed.
and trans. (New York: Penguin, 1978), p. 130: “A dog’s tongue has healing powers, but
that of a wolf can cause its death. If a dog is hurt, it can heal itself by licking the places,
but a w olf s tongue only infects the wounds.”
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of the w olfs violent hunger in verses he rather liberally borrowed from Virgil and
applied to an early Anglo-Saxon king:
He rose up and gnashed his teeth
As when the wolf, full of wrongful anger.
Comes down upon the fold, slaughtering and devouring the
gentle creatures in their innocence;
Its mouth streams with bloody gore, each flank drips with
blood,
And the savage beast stays on and does not leave until he
has laid everything low at once.4
The w olf s appetite encompasses physical possessions as well as life itself. According to
Orderic Vitalis, the new abbot of Saint-Pierre-sur-Dive in 1105/6, after turning the
abbey into a fortress, was a “ravening wolf' who “sold the church ornaments which the
faithful had provided, and simoniacal castellan that he was, used the proceeds to pay his
troops.”5 Gervase o f Canterbury stressed the point further in his criticism of the
Flemings, especially William of Ypres, whom Stephen called to his aid in England. They
came, and in the “manner of famished wolves they strove to reduce the fecundity of
England to nothingness.”6

4Henry of Huntingdon, Historia Anglorum, 118-120.
5Orderic Vitalis, VI:73-5:. . . et Rodbertus quidam miserabilishomuncio datis
duci centum xl marcis argenti eius in loco intrusus est. Hie autem professione
monachus sancti martyris Dyonisii, non pastor sed dispersor fa ctu s est gregis
dominici. et multi noxius utpote sectator Simonis Magi. Coenobitae siquidem a facie
lupi devoratorisfugerunt, et in aliis monasateriis animas suas salvare cupientes
dispersi sunt. Ipse vero supra Divam in coenobio castellum construxit, familiamque
militum aggregavit, et sic Dei templum speluncam latronum ejfecit. Aecclesiastica
quoque omamenta quae fideles sollicite procuraverunt vendidit, et simonialis munio
adsubsidium satellitum suorum distraxit.
6Gervase o f Canterbury, Historical Works, II: 73.
323

permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This never-ending hunger was all the more horrifying to the twelfth-century
observer because o f the powerful scriptural model o f the Church as flock, Christ as
shepherd, and Satan as the prowling wolf. In the understanding of the twelfth century,
“The devil bears the likeness of a wolf . . who is always looking over the human race
with his evil eye, and darkly prowling round the sheepfolds o f the faithful so that he may
afflict and ruin their souls.”7 Wolves were known to whelp only once a year, and the
devil had certainly produced similar litters: during Robert Curthose’s misrule, as Orderic
saw it, o f Normandy, “unlicensed castles were built in many places, and there sons of
iniquity-or rather wolf-cubs-were reared to tear the flock to pieces.” And again from
Orderic: “The enemies of the Creator are those who despise his laws, aggressively
interfere with the order of the Church, and scatter the Lord’s flock like ravening
wolves.”8 It was this paradigm that William o f Newburgh evoked when he praised
Henry II’s restoration of public order by several measures, not least of which was the
expulsion o f all the foreign soldiers drawn to England during Stephen’s reign by the
opportunity for plunder and military glory. Henry not only drove out the Flemings,
whom William especially identified as wolves, but transmogrified many who remained
into sheep. If some “wolves” escaped this change, they at least learned to stay quiet
within the flock. Newburgh’s rhetoric is double-edged. On one hand he holds Henry II
up as ushering in Isaiah’s paradise where wolf and lamb shall dwell and eat together in
peace. On the other hand, however, he also describes a situation that essentially has

7White, 59.
8OV, iv: 27, 147; also VI: 11 for a list o f various animals equated with the devil.
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wolves in sheep’s clothing. Henry may have imposed law upon these foreign soldiers,
but Newburgh had not forgotten Christ’s warning in the first gospel9
Occasionally, the pastoral image became a bit muddled, although in the
following case, the pope saw who was truly the wolf among the sheep. Philip, bishop of
Beauvais, tried to use the lupine comparison to discredit king Richard after being
captured by Richard’s mercenaries in 1197 and imprisoned by the English king. He
wrote the pope and charged Richard with leading regiments of “apostate Brabancons”
into France to denude the country of its people and resources. Not surprisingly, Philip
described Richard as not fearing to rage like a wolf against Christ himself, thereby
justifying his own martial proclivities. In these circumstances, he wrote, he remembered
those maxims that allowed force in order to repel force and to defend one’s own
country. Unfortunately for Philip, Celestine knew the bishop’s past record too well. He
ignored the fact that Richard was violating the Lateran decrees against the hiring of
mercenary bands and emphasized rather that Philip was enjoying the rewards o f his own
violent actions.10

William o f Newburgh, 101-2: Denique edicto praecepit, ut illi, qui ex gentibus
exieris in Anglican sub rege Stephano praedarum gratia tanquam ad militandum
confluxerant, et maxime Flcmdrenses, quorum magna tunc Angliae incubabat
multitudo, propriis regionibus redderentur, fatalem eis diem constituens, quern in
Anglia sustinere certi fo re t discrim inis. Quo edicto pavefacti, ita in brevi dilapsi sunt,
ut quasi phantasmata in momento disparuisse viderentur, stupentibus plurimus
quomodo repente evanuissent....Fugiebant lupi rapaces, vel mutabantur in oves; out si
non vere mutabantur, metu tamen legum innoxii cum ovibus morabantur.
I0Roger o f Howden, Chronica, IV: 22:. . . afferens igitursecum ignem et
gladium, subnixus etiam apostaticis Braibancenorum cohortibus, patriam nostram
irruebat circumquaque depopulando... Taliter ergo rex Angliae in christum Domini
more lupino saevire non formidavit, nee vestris auribus incognitum existimamus.
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The mercenary’s perceived appetite for plunder and fatal mayhem was not just
terrible in and of itself; it was an approach to war different from that being held up by
either the Church or the emergent chivalric culture. When compared to the ransombased, glory-focused efforts of knights, the battlefield methods o f Braban^ons and the
like were anthropologically wolflike. Humanity has essentially two hunting paradigms:
the original primate one of the herbivore and the more recently adopted one of the packoriented carnivore. The first is a solitary effort, tolerating little of help or interference in
the gathering of food. The push for dominance pervades the individuals of the group.
Within the recent evolutionary past, however, humans made the transition to the more
demanding, but more rewarding technique of the wolf-pack. Such an approach required
improvements in communication, cooperation, and not least, division of the prey.
Competition is still present in the group, of course, but is tempered by the cooperative
imperative o f the hunt."
The analogy of these two dynamics to the techniques o f knights and hired
soldiery is hard to avoid. It is a commonplace of military analysis that a disciplined band
of infantry, if it stays together, can and will successfully withstand cavalry assaults.
Although the appearance of such tactics is still in some quarters being placed in the late
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the performance o f Renaud de Dammartin’s
Brabangons at Bouvines in 1214 clearly shows otherwise as do Henry II’s Brabangons
at Dol in 1173. These latter troops demonstrated another aspect of these “wolves” in

"Richard Gabriel, The Culture o f War (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 6;
Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 21-24, 30.
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relationship to the Church’s attempts to channel the violence of Europe’s warriors into
certain courses. Besides contravening the practices o f the chivalric ethos, the soldiers
hired by Stephen, the Plantagenet kings, and Philip Augustus also had the common trait
of ignoring the Peace o f God’s injunctions against attacking the unarmed: the peasantry
and the clergy. In the science of war, however, this was the cooperative violence of the
pack operating at a higher level of organization. Often enough, this destructive impulse
happened as the soldiers chanced upon opportunities; but it has been shown clearly by
scholars that Henry II, Richard, and Philip Augustus knew well the advantage of
economically forcing their foe to the bargaining table rather than risking outright
battle.12 Such a policy o f “fire and sword” played a part in the bishop of Beauvais’s
denunciation of Richard.
One final issue deserves notice. War is a group activity; on this point
anthropologists, historians and philosophers are in agreement.13 O f crucial importance
then is that group with which individuals and smaller groups identify. Some association
beyond a salary changes whether some warriors ought to be labeled mercenaries.14 In

12John Gillingham, “Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages,” in
ANW, 194-207. Also, Strickland, War and Chivalry, 261: “In war itself, in addition to
the plundering o f valuables as booty, the seizure o f grain and livestock from an
opponent’s territory served concurrently both to provision an invading army and to
inflict severe economic damage on the enemy.”
l3GabrieI, Culture o f War, 19-21; Michael Gelven, War and Existence, 22; Harry
Holbert Tumey-High, Primitive War), 23, 52; Richard Cohen, “Warfare and State
Formation” in Warfare, Culture, and Environment, R. Brian Ferguson, ed. (New York:
Academic Press, 1984), 330.
,4On this basis I disagree with Morillo’s functional definition of a mercenary, 11
Yet Morillo, 92, is correct to point out that, “In an age when personal ties were so
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the welter o f political, familial, ethnic, and ecclesiastical ties that made up Western
Europe in the twelfth century, such identification is hardest just when it most critical.
The lupine metaphor, especially in the hands of clerical writers, can give at least some
indication o f which link among many really held a warrior to any particular side. This
clue derives from the comparative positions in our historical consciousness of those
distant cousins, the wolf and the dog. In the words o f one ethologist, “No animal is so
unselfishly loved as the domesticated wolf the dog, and none is so mercilessly hunted
down as the real wolf.” 15 To the ecclesiastical mind, those warriors who fought within
strictures such as those laid down by St. Bernard or John of Salisbury were creatures
the Church could welcome.16 They were not the interlopers, the untamed predators. In
some instances, such as the more legitimate imperial forces at Bouvines, they had some
excuse in madness; thus the Marchiennes account described them as “rabid dogs.” 17 But
when no respectable tie bound a warrior to a cause or group, when the impetus to
violence was lure o f plunder or pleasure in lethal mayhem, then that warrior was a wolf,
eventually the whore o f war, a stranger not only to the land he plundered, but also to

important, we must attribute a large part of the Anglo-Norman kings’ success to their
ability to inspire friendship, affection and personal devotion in their followers. To this
they added several important inducements which formed part of the system of
employing military leaders.”
l5Erik Zimen, The Wolf: a Species in Danger, Eric Mosbacher, trans. (New
York: Delacorte Press, 1981), 307.
I6Bemard o f Clairvaux, “Liber ad Milites Templi de Laude Novae Militiae,” 20539. John o f Salisbury, Policraticus, 8-22.
11Relatio M archiensis, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores XXVI,
390-1.
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God’s mandated order. Thus the chroniclers described the wolves who rose up in
Normandy at the least opportunity, who rushed to England when Christ and the saints
slept, and who ravaged the lands and churches of France in the latter-twelfth century.
In the end, the lupine metaphor was one o f exclusion.18
One last question remains: what brought these wolves down upon the fold?
There are several answers to the question that began this study. In the first third o f the
twelfth century, many who have been incorrectly labeled mercenaries pledged
themselves to military service as the only viable means o f social and political promotion.
The nature of war among the nascent knighthood was already such as to eschew
outright casualties; it was a dangerous game certainly, but the odds were actually
against the death of the participants. The temporarily disadvantaged noble was not
likely to hire himself out as part of a castle’s garrison, but those who did accept such
employment were also gambling that they could earn a daily wage without actually
experiencing hostilities. For the latter part o f the period, the dynamics changed. Sieges
became less prone to protracted efforts at starvation, and assaults preceded by
bombardment became more common. In the rare battle, the risks of dying increased
also as the more diverse components of the armies did not have the luxury o f battling
only their peers. For all groups, one paradigm remained in force: if he survived,
exemplary conduct on the battlefield was the warrior’s surest avenue to patronage by

l8See for a clear example Gerald of Wales’ description of the community which
every seven years exiled a man and woman, both o f whom became wolves for the
duration o f their exclusion. The History and Topography o f Ireland, (New York:
Penguin, 1982), 69-72.
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those who mattered. Encased in their increasingly complex suits o f armor, knights had
the original wherewithal to reduce death’s sting. For the Brabangons and such,
however, it was a choice between Scyila and Charybdis. Conditions like those which
William of Malmesbury described for Brittany at the century’s start, or the devastation
wrought by locally intense conflicts such as the Grimburg War, or the never-distant
threat of famine: they all played a part in every routier's decision that the risks on the
road and in the occasional pitched battle were less adverse than what he faced on the
homestead or in overcrowded, job-hungry towns. Moreover, once part of a band, he
gained a new community. Arguably, the roving groups constituted their own society
and, to twist Gelven’s we-they principle one final time, became the cause for which the
mercenary warred.
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